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Introduction 
Within the Governmental Agreement on Cooperation in Scientific 
Research and Technological Development signed between the 
Republic of Indonesia and the Federal Republic of Germany on 
March 20th, 1979, a Special Agreement on Cooperation in the field 
of Nuclear Energy was concluded on October 29th, 1982, between 
the National Atomic Energy Agency (BATAN) and the Kernforschungs-
anlage Jülich GmbH (KFA JÜlich). 
During the first German-Indonesien" Workshop on Nuclear Power 
Technology" in January 1984 and in subsequent discussions between 
the Research Ministries of the Federal Republic of Germany and 
the Republic of Indonesia it was agreed to hold a second Seminar 
on "R &6 D Activities Using the MPR-30" which took place in 
August 1985, and a third Seminar on" Public Acceptance, Was te 
Management, and Nuclear Safety" which was held in October 1986. 
The aim of the third seminar was to convey the experience and 
knowledge gained on both sides in their attempts to explain 
technical matters, especially those related to engineered safety 
to the broad public. This Seminar, although being planned as much 
as four years back, reached special significance and impact after 
the accident in Tschernobyl. 
The seminar took place October 7 - 9, 1Q86 in BATAN's head-
quarters in Jakarta before a broad audience. In presentations 
from both the Indonesian and the German side an overview was 
given in the areas of 
Public Acceptance 
Waste Management 
Nuclear Safety. 
The lectures presented by both sides are compiled in these 
proceedings with the aim of further disseminating their contents 
thus helping BATAN to assess the possibility of introducing thOSE 
R & D activities pertinent to the country's development. 
The present publication is edited by the International Bureau of 
KFA Jülich compiling the manuscripts submitted by the authors. 
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D. Nentwich 
International Bureau 
KFA Jülich 
This is already the third occasion, on which experts from the Fe-
deral Republic of Germany and the Republic of Indonesia gather in 
a seminar to present the state of art of research and technology 
within their respective country and domain and which serve to 
exchange views of newest developments and to possibly find ways 
and me ans of establishing joint collaborative efforts. The first 
seminar was held in August 1984, giving a general overwiew of 
nuclear activities in both our countries. You may jUdge by your-
self the political importance attached to that seminar by our 
respective governments when I recall to your memory that it was 
opened by our Federal Minister for Research and Technology, Dr. 
Heinz Riesenhuber, whereby the scheduled participation of Minister 
Prof. Habibie had to be postponed at shorthand notice due to other 
non-forseeable obligations. As one outcome of this seminar, both 
sides agreed to hold further ventures of this kind, recognizing 
these occasions as a valuable instrument to establish close bila-
teral contacts. 
The second seminar took place almost exactly one year later in Au-
gust 1985. Reflecting the explicit wishes of BATAN it concentrated 
on reviewing R+D activities using neutrons as a research tool and 
served also to provide a forum of discussion between the experts 
of both sides to evaluate the possibili ties of jointly implemen-
v 
ting projects of mutual interest utilizing the MPR 30 as a neutron 
source. As I see it, this seminar has shown outstanding results by 
reaching agreement in the following areas: 
1. 
2. 
Following expert 
has theintention of 
input from the German 
concentrating future R+D 
side, BATAN 
activities 
on materials sciences using neutron scattering techniques, an 
area of high interest to the German side,too. Based on 
first recommendations of Prof.Springer from Jülich and of 
Prof. Schmatz from Karlsruhe, Dr. Werner from Jülich has in 
the meantime undertaken the noteworthy task of specifying in 
considerable detail the technical outlines of the experimen-
tal hardware. In order to also create the necessary hu-
man resources on the Indonesian side to gradually independe-
zise this research, Prof. Schmatz and Dr. Werner gave a se-
ries of lectures over a fortnight in Bandung in July of this 
year on the basic of physical principals of neutron scatte-
ring. Participants to this venture were young scientists from 
BATAN and graduates from Indonesian universities who will ho-
pefully have the chance to use later on the acquired know-
ledge within BATANs research programmes. Needless to say that 
we have also initiated training programmes for BATAN person-
nel in German research institutions : Three BATAN employees 
are presently undergoing training within the IAEA fellowship 
programme. 
Furthermore, the German and Indonesian side agreed to 
initiate a fuel development programme including irradiation 
tests. In a first step, BATAN will fabricate fuel pellets 
from natural Uranium with the existing facilities at Bandung 
VI 
in order to have first inserts ready when the MPR 30 becomes 
serviceable. Later on, inserts with enriched Uranium and PWR 
dimensions will be produced. Together with this it is planned 
to extend the hardware ordered already wi th the MPR 30 con-
structor so 
safe handling 
as to include an out-of-pile loop where 
and insertion of the irradi tion capsules 
the 
can 
be practised prior to the 
loop. Following the seminar, 
ring committee comprising 
insertion in the 
a joint programme 
high-ranking officials 
in-pile 
stee-
from 
both sides was established, which in turn was followed by the 
visit of BATAN representatives to Germany in October 1985 
when a detailed programme schedule was discussed and pin-
pointed. Programme activities started in April 1986 with the 
training of 4 BATAN employees in all relevant areas 
of irradiation test lay-out and performance. A further BATAN 
employee took up his training in quality control activities 
concerning pellet manufacture in September 1986. 
3. The 1985 seminar was also the starting point for jointactivi-
ties concerning the safe and reliable operation and main-
tenance of the MPR 30 as a neutron source for the joint R + 0 
projects. Based on an industrial training programme for 
reactor operators an agreement was reached to delegate an ex-
perienced shift leader from KFA to BATAN to advise and guide 
BATAN personnel in pre-operational training schemes and in 
giving a hand after the MPR 30 comes on line. This expert is 
just now taking up his activities. Still open for discussion 
with the BATAN management is the training of the service per-
sonnel that is to safely manage the experimental hardware un-
der request from the scientific user community. Taking into 
VII 
eonsideration the presently valid time sehedule for the eom-
missioning MPR 30, we have the firm opinion that aetivities 
in this area are lagging and should be implemented as soon as 
possible. 
Now let me eome to the third joint seminar whieh has just started. 
Topieal issues to be delt with are publie relation aetivities and 
the lessons we have learned eoneerning the eontrovertial situation 
in our eountry wi th regard to nuelear energy; nuelear safety is-
sues whieh naturally play a eentral role in this eontroversy and 
whieh after Chernobyl have reaehed a new dimension; and last but 
not least the wide area of waste management, where at least in our 
eountry a lot of things are left to be done, not beeause our engi-
neers did not offer adequate and safe teehnieal solutions, but be-
eause poli ti es eould not be able formulate the objeetives to be 
reaehed. We feel sure that the experienee displayed here in the 
next 3 days will give BATAN an ample pieture of the issues on hand 
and whieh might serve to eope with the one or other similar situa-
tion in this eountry. Needless to say that we offer our eoopera-
tion after and beyond this seminar in all those teehnieal areas 
where a eommon interest might be found, the same as we have done 
in the preeeeding ones. 
Please don' t let me elose these opening remarks wi thout saying 
that at least as far as the large number of seminars that I have 
organised with our partner countries around the world in the past 
12 years we have introdueed a novalty and I am partieularly grate-
ful to Dr. Körting for having made the first suggestion. With Mr. 
Koppelstätter we have a young journalist amongst our leeturers 
who, in the striet sense, does not belong to any given seientifie 
VIII 
community and who in our country has acquired the reputation of 
being able and willing to report in the press on nuclear issues in 
an objective and matter-of-fact manner. I am particularlay looking 
forward to his point-of-view from across the fence. 
In closing I would like to extend my best wishes for a successful 
and informative seminar to all lecturers and participants. 
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"PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN THE NUCLEAR ENERGY PROGRAM IN INDONESIA" 
Experience and Future Program 
Introduction 
The activities in nuclear field in Indonesia started in 1954 when the 
Government appointed astate Committee for the Investigation of 
Radioactivity. The task of this Committee was to investigate the effects 
of radioactivity to the people of Indonesia caused by nulear tests carried 
out in the Pacific, to make a study on atomic energy as a ne~1 energy source 
for the development of the nation and to inform the public concerning the 
consequences of peaceful and non peaceful uses of atomic energy. With the 
Government Regulation No. 65 year 1958 the Institute for Atomic Energy was 
founded in 1958 and later on became the National Atomic Energy Agency 
(BATAN) as the Law on Atomic Energy was enacted in 1964. 
The main objective of the Indonesian Nuclear Programme is to promote the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy in various fields such as agriculture, 
medicine, industry and electric power generation. 
The first research reactor Triga Mark 11 was built in Bandung and in 
operation in 1965 and another reactor was built at Jogyakarta in 1979. 
Henceforth the research activities and application of radioisotopes 
supplied by the Triga Reactor developed rapidly. 
Since 1968 Indonesia has been considering nuclear energy as an option for 
the supply of energy for electric power, as aseries of Seminars and 
Workshops had been carried out on several aspects of interest including the 
public appraisal of nuclear energy. 
A nuclear power planning study was carried out on Indonesia with IAEA in 
1975 and then followed by feasibility studies in 1978 and 1979. 
A "new pali cy" was i ssued afterwards , it vlas expected tha t the deci si on to 
build a nuclear power plant will be considered after the completion of the 
30 MW. Multipurpose Research Reactor in Serpong, about 25 km from Jakarta. 
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BATAN experience in Public Information 
Soon after the Institute for Atomic Energy was established in 1958, the 
first step being taken by this Institute was to diseminate the information 
on how important the new energy source, what we call atomic energy, can 
help to solve many problems in the field of agriculture, medicine, industry 
and the ever increasing demand for electric power. 
There was no significant obstacle in giving the information to the public, 
and so far 
opposition, 
negative. 
it was observed there hardly exist complain, protest, 
contra action or other attitude which might be construed as 
The people who live around the atomic energy centres feel no harm or fear 
and they believe that the Government who initiated the construction of 
atomic energy centres have already considered various aspects of nuclear 
safety to protect the workers as well as the general public. 
The success was due the programme launched by the Institute, covering 
a. Technical information services. 
b. Public information services. 
c. Education programmes. 
d. Laws and regulatory activities. 
e. Research, development and demonstration. 
Those programmes were carried out by arranging publication of bulletins, 
magazines, leaflets, booklets, scientific journal, articles in newspapers 
and popular magazines, press conferences, open house, study tours for 
students and professionals to BATAN's laboratories, training and upgrading 
courses for professionals, newspapermen and licensees, film production and 
performance, and also conducting routine travelling exhibitions in 
cooperation with the Ministry for Information. 
In the early years these activities were carried out with no particular 
budget allocation, but since the fisca~ yelr 1977/1978 a particular budget 
was allocated for public information, and programmes were planned more 
deliberately. Participation in national expositions became routine 
activities annually and at the end of 1981 SATAN established a Permanent 
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Exhibition Building consisting of two floors covering on area of 800 M2. 
This Permanenet Exhibition shows research and development activities being 
done at BATAN's laboratories. 
The role of other government bodies and organizations in forming public 
opinion are very important and gives a great support to BATAN in gaining 
these success. 
Up till now the activities as mentioned above are aimed for the promotion 
of peaceful application of nuclear technology in various fields except 
nuclear power. 
After the Three Miles Island II and Chernobyl IV accidents, the waves of 
"public opinion" through news papers, seminars, parlementarian hearing, and 
so on, was focused on the question whether it is wise and safe to build 
nuclear power plants in Jawa. 
To overcome this issue we increased the activities in giving information to 
all levels and groups existing in the general public. 
These problems which have to be faced in the very near future are the 
issues of : 
1. The risk of nuclear energy, namely how safe is safe. 
2. Nuclear waste disposal. 
3. Catastropic accidents. 
4. Environment and social impact. 
5. Low level radiation. 
6. Access versus security. 
Work Programme 
The objective of BATAN Public Acceptance Programme is to convince and 
persuade the public concerning BATAN programmes, in particular those which 
relate to nuclear power generation. 
divided into several strata a.o. : 
1. General public. 
2. Executive society 
Considering this, the public can be 
3. Young people like students, member of youth movements etc. 
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4. Professionals. 
5. Politician. 
6. Press. 
The information activities will be based on the objective and the strategy 
taking into consideration the public strata as such that the public will 
gain an objective understanding concerning nuclear power programme. 
Working Programmes prior to the Decision of "Go Nuclear" 
As we expect that the Government will make the decision at the endof the 
Fourth Five Year Development Plan, BATAN has launched and will continue to 
keep the general public informed concerning all aspects of our nuclear 
power programme and will aim to establish a perception of nuclear 
acceptance on the part of the executives, young people, professionals, 
politicians and the press. 
These efforts will be done through lectures, writing papers and publication 
in the mass media, so that at the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan the 
consciousness and confidence of the public concerning nuclear power 
programme will increase. 
Working Progamme During Construction 
With the assumption that the Government has made adecision, the working 
programme during construction will consist of more intensive activities as 
performed during the first stage to establish public opinion in favour of 
nuclear energy. 
Lectures will be given within a wider range of young people such as youth 
and students of government and private Universities, Societies of 
executives and professionals. Further we will also intensify to write 
articles for mass media and publication for students from elementary and 
highschools. 
We expect that a good perception of our nurlear power programme within the 
public will have been established, so thJt the public will have a basic 
knowledge of our programme, especially the ';afety and reliability of a 
Nuclear Power Plant as a source of energy. a,d the executives can accept 
- 6 -
the development of nuclear energy, especially the aspects of security, 
safety, reliability, economics, and the cleanness of Nuclear Power Plants. 
Working Programme after Commisioning 
The activities will be continued to achieve public understanding and we 
hope there will be no obstacle to accept the operation of NPP as an 
alternative energy supply which is safe, reliable and economic. The first 
NPP will be in operation and will be followed by other NPP's. 
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Decision Making in Energy Policies with Conflicting Interests 
6. to 10. October 1986 
Ortwin Renn 
Programmgruppe Technik und Gesellschaft 
Kernforschungsanlage Jülich 
Postfach 1913 
D-5170 Jülich 
BATAN Seminar on Nuclear Energy 
Jakarta (Indonesia) 
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ABSTRACT 
Decision analysis has frequently been criticized as an inappropriate 
tool for complex policy issues since it presupposes a rational and 
homogeneous decision maker and a consistent set of va lues from which 
preferences can be derrived and ordered according to importance. A 
typical policy situation is characterized, however, by a heterogeneous 
group of decision makers mainly interested in the justification of a 
preformulated policy vis-a-vis competing interest groups and by 
conflicting values and objectives. Therefore, a modification of the 
original decision analytic approach will be presented focussing on 
plural value inputs and participatory weighting procedures. 
The approach was tested in a large policy study on future energy strate-
gies. The study contains three major components: in a first step values 
and criteria were elicited by interviewing the leading representatives 
of nine stakeholder groups in the Federal Republic of Germany and 
structured in the form of a joint value tree. Second, the revealed 
criteria were translated into indicators. Four different energy 
scenarios were evaluated with respect to each indicator making use of 
physical measurement, literature review and expert surveys. Third, the 
weights for each indicator were elicited by interviewing randomly chosen 
citizens. Those citizens Ivere informed about the scenari'os and their 
impacts prior to the weighting process in a four day seminar. The 
results of the study were reported to the policy making bodies and 
served as a discussion outline to form a viable compromise for fpture 
energy politics.The chances, prospects and limitations of the applied 
model are discussed during the presentation and some guidelines are 
developed for an effective and implementable policy consultation. 
Abstract 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the accident in Tschernobyl policy making and implementation of 
energy decisions have become more difficult than ever. On one hand side 
the public reacts with fear and opposition to a possible extention of 
nuclear power, on the other hand the economic prosperity of a country 
depends on an inexpensive and non-exaustive energy source like nuclear 
energy. Energy planning is necessarely associated with conflicting 
values. This situation is true for industrialized and developing 
countries alike. Ivhat can policy analysts do in order to resove the 
conflict and initiate a rational and a publically acceptable energy 
pro gram? 
The following paper desribes a concept of energy planning developed by a 
study group of the Nuclear Research Centre in Julich (FRG). The concept 
is based on the idea that in a pluralistic society different social 
groups should participate in the policy formulation process and that the 
values of the public should be incorporated in the weighting process to 
make choices between given options. As reference theory we use the basic 
framework of decision analysis. 
The essential guideline of decision analysis is to layout the decision 
options, assess the often probabilistic consequences of each option and 
select the one option that offers the highest expected value.This may 
not be of strategie interest to public decision makers. In many 
instances transparency of the motives for a specific decision and 
publicising the trade offs used in the analysis might create a political 
dis aster , in particular if heal th effects are traded off against 
economic benefits. In addition, the policy making bodies form a 
heterogeneous group of individuals with different personal values, 
aspirations and perceptions of the institutional tasks that they are 
obliged to perform. The specific goals of a proposed policy might be 
obscure or controversial and there might also be no clear distinction 
between means and ends. 
Hence, many policy analysts have come to the conclusion that the 
specific tools of decision analysis only apply to situations in which 
individuals have to choose between personal options almost unrelated to 
potential consequences for third parties. As soon as preferences of 
decision makers with conflicting values have to be taken into account 
and as soon as collective goods with external effects playamajor part 
in the analysis, the one-dimensional process prescribed by decision 
theory must fail according to many investigators. 
Although 
decision 
tential 
this criticism is true with regard to a naive adoption of 
analysis into the policy sector, there is a wide range of po-
modifications of the original decision analytic framework 
- 10 -
providing for multiple decision makers and conflicting values. 
Furthermore, the decision analytic perspective has proven to be a 
rewarding heuristic concept for analyzing factual policies and an - easy 
to cummunicate prescriptive method to ass ist policy makers to 
determine potential options for resolving social problems. 
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THE BASIC STEPS OF DECISION MAKING 
According to the basic axioms in decision theory any planning proeess 
consists of seven different steps: 
• 
Commitment and specification of needs or goals with respect to 
overall va lues in society. 
Choice of appropriate criteria or dimensions which ean be used as a 
heuristie elassification to assess eonsequenees for eaeh option and 
to define violations or fullfillments of the speeified goals or 
values. 
• Transformation of criteria in measureable indicators to assess the 
consequenees of various options in a most objeetive manner. 
• 
• 
• 
Definition of options that are technieally feasible and 
eorrespondive to the overall aim speeified in the first and seeond 
step. 
Assessment of consequences for each option aeeording to the 
preformulated indicator list (extent and probabilities). 
Assignment of relative weights to each indieator 
appropriate- subcriterion). 
(or -if 
Selection of an aggregate model to eombine assessed probabilities 
and weights. Usually for eaeh indieator the assessments are 
multiplied with the pereeived probability and with the relative 
weight and afterwards summed up. 
As long as the total range of consequential effects (from best to worse) 
is taken into aecount, as long as individual utility functions for 
variations in probabiliti~s are considered and as long as independence 
and non-redundaney of al~ dimensions have been assured, the seven-step 
model has proved an exeellent normative guideline for rational decision 
making. But this good reeord can only be applied for deeision making by 
individuals or by homogeneous groups. As soon as different groups with 
different eriteria and values are involved in the deeision-making 
process, the simple model fails, because rationally derived means to 
summarize va lues or to aggregate weights between groups are not 
available. All attempts to eonstruct soeial utility funetions are either 
too abstract so that they are impossible to use in a concrete case or 
they are rather adoptive to strategie maneouvers. 
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A PLURALIST APPROACH TO DECISION MAKING UNDER CONFLICT 
Any approach to build a model for decision making in energy planning has 
to face the difficulty that not only values and criteria are disputed, 
but also the facts, e.g. the assessments with respect to each option. 
Thus dis agreement is expected to appear also in step 5 describing the 
assessment of consequences and their transformation into indicators. 
When designing the research program the study group had to consider the 
characteristics of the political arena in which energy policies have to 
be formulated and implemented. 
In contrast to some other political arenas the energy scene in Germany, 
as in many other western countries, is characterized by the following 
four major features: 
A lack of unanimity among the scientific experts (or those regarded 
as experts' ) about facts 
The public's lack of confidence in scientists and policy makers 
The assignment of symbolic values to nuclear energy including moral 
and ethical considerations regarding industrial society as a whole 
The unwi11ingness of the stake-holder groups to move towards a 
compromise 
The lack of general agreement about future energy policies among 
experts, politicians and interest groups has led to frustrations amongst 
the general public and has promoted a feeling of dis trust and scepticism 
towards official decision makers. Public media and opinion leaders have 
transferred the controversy to the public, forcing people into the role 
of arbitrators between scientific camps. Needless to say, most people 
feel overtaxed by this task and recommend a more cautious strategy 
incorporating a11 the critical remarks of professional scientists. 
Since scientists for various reasons disagree on the question of 
acceptability of nuclear power, a loss of credibility has occured \vhich 
makes it difficult to convey trust in the regulating bodies. 
This specific situation leads to the necessity to alter the steven steps 
of decision making in order to cope with the conflictual situation and 
to gain approval by the different stake-holder groups which take part in 
the decision-making process. 
The basic framework for our analysis was conceptualized as a modified 
version of the traditional decision analytic approach. The study was 
carried out in the years 1982 to 1985 initiated by the Federa1 Hinistry 
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for Research and Technology. We were asked to investigate the 
possibilities of designing an energy policy programme which would not 
only satisfy the needs and requirements of an energy-seeking society, 
but also provide a way of resolving the related conflicts within German 
society. In particular the prospective out look and the further 
development of nuclear energy were to be investigated, taking into 
ac count social and psychological aspects and constraints. 
Since we basically followed the idea of the seven step model of decision 
making, we can best describe our approach by referring to this concept. 
'The specifications of policy goals 
The controversial question in step 1 deals with the problem if the 
government in a pluralist society is justified to specify universal 
goals and needs or if all groups in society should have an equal right 
to come up with their own definitions what kind of basic aims a society 
should pursue. We decided that any political system - even the most 
democratic society - should base their decisions on a few mandatory 
criteria, namely that the physical needs of the public should be served, 
that the civil rights should not be violated and that social change is 
not prevented or hindered. In the case of energy we specified these 
criteria in the following way: energy systems should provide all the 
services that people demand today and they will probably demand in the 
future; energy systems should not lead to a considerable restriction of 
personal freedom in order to insure protection against sabotage or 
terrorism nor to control and enforce state laws on energy conservation; 
energy systems should be flexible enough to adjust to changes in the 
societal structure of needs and demands. These criteria were considered 
as meta-criteria for the energy planning process regardless if groups in 
the society shared this view or not. 
As expected there were no objections from any of the querried groups 
with respect to these thJiee yardsticks . They were later used to specify 
the options that were regarded feasible. Any option which did not meet 
one of the main criteria was excluded from the analysis. 
The selection of criteria. 
The choice of appropriate criteria beyond the rather abstract level of 
meta-criteria involves several procedures which go beyond the normal 
method of decision theory by asking the decision maker what matters to 
hirn. First, we had to take into account that in democratic societies 
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many decision makers are part of the decision process and secondly, that 
relevant groups in society demand that their va lues and interests should 
be considered when making collectively binding judgements." Thus, the 
problem had to be solved in which way we could select appropriate 
criteria that in principle could be approved by a group of heterogenious 
decision makers and be accepted by major interest groups in society. 
We could use intuition, analysis of current documents in the political 
debate, brainstorming with experts, or surveys among the public. But 
these methods don't meet the two relevant conditions: approval by the 
decision makers and acceptance by societal groups. 
Thus, we selected a rather new technique referred to as value tree 
analysis, which was developed at the Social Science Research Centre of 
the University of Southern California. 
The value tree analysis is an interactive, iterative and integrative 
method. Individuals or representatives or important societal groups are 
interviewed in order to determine their relevant va lues and concerns 
about the domain of investigation. The values formulated as statements 
about desired states, positive intentions or preferred directions with 
respect to possible decision options, are organized in a value tree 
representing the hierarchy of va lues of the particular group. Each group 
had to approve of its value tree. 
In order to cover the wide spectrum of views on energy systems in the 
contemporary German society, ten stake-holder groups were invited for 
the value tree analysis. The politically most controversial 
organizations were probably the Power Plant ~lanufacturer and the Nature 
Cons ervat ion League. W i th nine of the ten groups interviews were 
conducted and individual value trees were constructed. The list of 
participating organizations is shown in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The value tree represents an hierarchical structure with the general 
values and concerns on top, and the specific criteria and value dimen-
sions at the bottom. Host of the groups expressed a common understanding 
of the basic objectives for energy systems, but differed in their 
comprehension of the meaning of each value. 
Accordingly, the individual trees have a similar superstructure with 
different focus on the degree of refinement of particular branches. 
Without giving preference to any individual value tree, the tree 
structures for the German Catholic Church and for the Federation of the 
German Industries are illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. 
Insert Tables 2 and 3 here 
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The nine individual trees were used as the basic elements to construct a 
combined value tree for all groups respectively. Such a joint tree can 
be understood as the representation of major concerns in a pluralist 
society without focusing on the differences in weighting and importance 
for each value item. 
But the combined tree represents more than just a list of concerns 
mentioned during group interviews. It is an attempt to structure 
various, even conflicting values and criteria in a logically consistent, 
generally acceptable manner which is aprerequisite for the formation of 
a societal consensus on how to resolve the conflict ab out the criteria 
used for evaluating different energy options. 
The combined value tree was generated in the following way: The main 
values of the overall tree were formed by clustering and contrasting the 
general values of the seperate trees. All other items and terms were 
listed according to the hierarchical level of appearance. Then, the 
whole set was sorted and clustered around the respective lexical content 
of the main values. Finally, the clusters were aggregated and rearranged 
hierarchic~lly in the overall tree with the eight main criteria: 
• 
Energy systems aspects, 
Impacts for the national economy 
Impacts on the natural environment, 
Health and safety, 
Political impacts, 
Social impacts, 
International impacts. 
The criteria "energy systems aspects" and "national economic impacts" 
cover costs, efficiency, security of supply, and market consequences of 
different energy systems. The criteria "impacts on the natural 
environment" and "health and safety" are self-explanatory. The criteria 
"political impacts" and "social impacts" include consequences for the 
social structure, quality of life, political decision processes, 
democracy and its institutions, options for future generations, etc. The 
criterion "international impacts" includes issues of peace, 
distributional justice in international affairs, and options of inter-
national policy. 
The combined tree contains the concerns and evaluative criteria of all 
participating groups. All groups were asked to approve of the overall 
value tree. There was a mutual agreement among all groups that they 
would respect the va lues of the other participating groups provided that 
their own ones were equally accepted and considered. The acknowledgement 
and acceptance of each other's values structure was facilitated by the 
procedural mechanism that each item on the tree could be weighted by 
zero and thus elliminated from the list. For this reason an agreement 
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among the interviewed groups was achieved, since every group found 
itself represented. 
It should be noted that in this step no compromise between groups was 
needed, as all concerns were adopted regardless if they were perceived 
as important or not. Therefore, the joint tree is assumed to account for 
all viewpoints in the German society on energy system options. Since the 
joint value tree consists of more than 100 different items, omly a 
selection of the tree may be presented in this paper. The social and 
political criteria of the combined value tree are reproduced in Tables 4 
and 5. 
Insert Tables 4 and 5 here 
By using the joint value tree as criteria list we were able to meet the 
second condition - approval by societal groups - by definition. The 
political decision makers were also satisfied with the catalogue of 
criteria, since the main interest of politicians is to maximize public 
support. A criteria list which combines all the concerns of the relevant 
groups is the best mean to assure this objective. 
The transformation of criteria into indicators. 
The next step refers to the transformation of the value tree structure 
into an operational system of dimensions and indicators. Ideally this 
task should also be performed by the various groups forcing them to be 
more precise in what they mean by using various terms. Rowever, because 
of lack of time of the representatives of each group and the difficulity 
of combining different operationa1 definitions of the same term, we used 
our own expertise and transformed all lower level criteria into 
indicators which in principle should provide us with the possibility of 
physical measurement or at least of scaling expert ratings. 
Our group catagorized the eight main criteria of the combined tree into 
a catalogue of nine criteria with up to ten sub-criteria each. 
Although requiring simplification of clusters and aggregation of bran-
ches this process had to maintain the content and the meaning of the 
overall tree. It resulted in the following categories: 
• 
• 
• 
Operationality of the energy system, 
Environmental impacts, 
Real th and safety, 
Security of supply, 
Economic effects, 
International effects, 
• Political impacts, 
Social impacts, 
Personal impacts. 
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The list of criteria, indicators and subindicators is illustrated in 
Tab. 6. 
Insert Table 6 here 
In the next step we selected measurement scales to assign physical or 
judgemental data to each indicator. In response to the complexity of the 
technical information and the degree of uncertainty we used different 
scaling levels: 
• 
• 
Quantitative scaling, 
Ordinal rating, 
Rank ordering, 
controversial statements (categorial measurement level) 
In order to improve the readability and apprehension of the assessment 
all ratings were then standardized on a four scale rating scheme (from 
very weak to very strong) . 
The final set of criteria and indicators represent a comprehensive, 
complete, independent, meaningful and adequate list for the evaluation 
of energy policies. The criteria have deliberately not been weighted, 
and the indicators have not been aggregated according to an index 
construction rule. Rather the catalogue of indicators and measures 
should be regarded as an approximately objective list of social concerns 
which render the measurement of each scenario' s performances with 
respect to these concerns. 
The generation of options. 
On first glance it seems odd to look for possible options in such a late 
stage of the decision-making process. There are two reasons for the 
placement of this step after the specification of the evaluative 
criteria. 
First, options generate positive or negative associations which 
unconsiously shape the analysts' selection of criteria and indicators. 
In most cases the criteria are defined in such way that the intuitively 
best option will inevitably turn out to be the "winner of the decision 
game". Second, the set of indicators and criteria are an excellent tool 
to search for new options which have not been included in the discussion 
so far. If one knows in advance, which criteria potential options must 
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meet, one's imagination for totally new options might be encouraged and 
new solution might be envisaged. 
In our study we did not construct our own scenarios, but used four 
existing ones. In 1979, the German parliament adopted unanimously the 
resolution to establish the Enquete-Commission on "Future Nuclear 
Energy Policy". The commission consisted of seven members of parliament 
and eight experts representing the fields of engineering, natural and 
social sciences. Because of the nuclear energy controversy in Germany 
and the development of the fast breeder reactor the commission assembled 
proponents of the nuclear energy as weIl as opponents. 
The commission designed four scenarios of future energy situations or 
paths into the energy future which were supposed to comprise the full 
range of opinions on energy systems. This fan of prospective solutions 
did not only express the possible future mixes of the available energy 
sources, but also the value orientations of the commission members. 
The scenarios were constructed in such a way that different political 
options were operationalized in terms of consistent energy supply and 
demand models for the years 2000 and 2030. The four scenarios are 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
In particular the role of nuclear energy differs among the four 
scenarios: Path 1 and 2 utilize this technology to a large extent, op-
tions 3 and 4 do not use nuclear energy after the year 2000. With respect 
to energy conservation and solar systems paths 1 and 2 provide for a mo-
derate amount of conservational and solar technologies, options 3 and 4 
concentrate on these two means of energy conversion. 
The advantage of using the four energy scenarios of the German Enquete-
Commission is the approval by most societal groups including pro and 
antinuclear activists. Both sides could find themselfes represented in 
the four scenarios. 
Assessment of consequences according to the indicator list. 
Since the effect of the consequences of various energy systems are 
disputed among scientists, it was not possible to employ physical 
measurements for all indicators. At least we were confronted with a 
broad range of estimations depending on the point of view that the 
analyst had taken in the energy debate. For many indicators, in 
particular those referring to social and political aspects, the status 
of scientific methodology does not imply a clear theoretical or 
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empirical relationship between the implementation of any energy system 
and its possible outcomes . In this situation two methods of impact 
analysis were used: 
• 
• 
Professionals were asked to give estimations for each indicator that 
they felt to have expertise in. In addition they were asked to 
determine the range of other possible answers to the problem given a 
confidential interval of 95%. Those ranges were collected and later 
sent back to each participant again, contrasting the position of 
each consultant with the ranges of all the other experts. After the 
revision we \vere able to construct a probability function for each 
indicator summarizing the ranges given by each expert. 
We invited energy experts and trained professional in the field of 
impact analysis to adelphi seminar in order to assess the rather 
controversial economic, social, and political consequences of each 
energy option based on their best estimate of their factual 
knowledge. 
A group of 17 experts employed at German universities or institutes 
attended the two day Delphi seminar. They were selected because they 
had previously published articles or books on social or economic 
impacts of energy systems. Deliberately we looked for scientists 
with different educational background. Engineers, na~ural 
scientists, economists and social scientists were invited to 
participate. We also tried to include persons with diverging 
attitudes towards the four scenarios. 
The Delphi method is an iterative and integrative procedure used to 
arrive at a consensus on the forecast or estimate of specified 
future events or situations. The experts were querried in iterative 
rounds with feedback supplied in between concerning the group I s 
comments and responses. 
Because the assessment had to be made for future energy situations, the 
participants made their intuitive subjective judgements based on a 
rather high degree of uneertainty. But on overage the ratings turned out 
to be generally sufficient for evaluating the different scenarios at 
least on an ordinal measurement level. The results are reproduced here 
in detail for the political impacts (Tab. 7). 
Insert Tab. 7 here 
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Assignment of relative weights. 
Similar to the selection of criteria and indicators it seems impossible 
to presume that there is a unanimous consent within society about the 
importance of each criterion for evaluating different energy options. 
There is no legitimate rationale to combine different assignments of 
weights elicited from stake-holder groups or the general public into a 
single societal weight. There are in principle four different approaches 
to come up with a generalized weight: 
Direct negotiations among the decision makers (unanimious vote) 
• Selection of a few respresentatives out of the decision making body 
and using their mean weights (benevolent dictator) 
• 
Utilization of different voting models (ordinal pair comparison, 
assignment of points, majority vote of options) 
Elicitation of weights among relevant groups in society and transfer 
of the results to client oriented politicians 
Elicitation of weights among a representative sample of the general 
public and adoption of their mean value. 
\~e tried to elicit the relative weights by organlzlng a survey of the 
general public (one man - one vote), but we used the results of our 
surveys only as an informational input for the legitimate decision 
maker. We thought it necessary that the decision maker should have a 
most realistic impression as how the public at present assignes trade 
offs between different va lues . Some of the dis advantages of public 
surveys were overcome in our study by a special survey method, called 
planning cell procedure. 
A planning cell consists of a group of citizens who are selected by a 
random process and are given paid leave from their workday obligations 
for a limited per iod of time in order to work out solutions for given, 
soluble planning problems with the assistence of advisors on procedure. 
A group of citizens actually means a small group of ab out 25 people who 
work on a predefined task in a group process. Since the citizens 
involved have been selected by a random procedure they are not 
individually concerned in the planning problems to be solved. In order 
to encourage them to participate they are assigned the socially highly 
esteemed role of a "consultant" in the public planning process. The 
seriousness of the planning task to be solved is also made clear by the 
honorarium which the citizen receives for his function as a 
"consultant". The limited participation period prevents the citizen 
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from being alientated from his real social role; he only changes his 
perspectives for abrief period. 
In our study 24 planning cells all over Germany were organized and 
confronted with our impact analysis of the four energy scenarios. The 
task of the citizen was to rate each scenario according to the main 
criteria, assign relative weights to each criterion and formulate a 
recommendation about the desired future energy policiy. 
Again it should be emphasized that all the results of the planning cells 
are regarded as an input for the decision-making process, and not as a 
substitute for the decision. This input should be regarded as adecision 
aid to form and shape political judgements according to the latent and 
overt value structure of the concerned public. If this assumption is 
accepted, the planning cell might be a good instrument to collect the 
relevant feedback from society and to reveal the intuitive preferences 
and values that should be the guidline of democratic policy making. 
Aggregation of weighted assessments. 
We considered the aggregation as a fundamental political process which 
should not be confined to a mathematical formula. If the help of a 
decision analysist ist still demanded (and this is usually not the 
case), he or she should concentrate on revealing the salient dimensions 
that define the borderlines between the preferences for one option or 
the other. 
Hay be specific political procedures can be implemented to overcome some 
negative impacts associated with the most promissing option. Hay be a 
recombination of options can be initiated, may be a compromise can be 
found by compensation or by accepting compromises in other political 
issues. Negoti'ations are so complex that it is almost impossible to 
press them into a procedure of rational reasoning. 
The dialogue of the decision maker with the policy maker is usually 
referred to as sensitivity analysis. By changing the different parame-
ters or the different evaluations or assessments the decision maker gets 
a feeling which aspects exercise the strongest influence on the overall 
evaluation. Also he gets more aware of the uncertainties involved in any 
decision model. We think that it is most appropriate to combine the ag-
gregation of the weighted assessments with the sensitivity analysis to 
provide a framework in which a most rational decision-making process can 
be initiated. 
If the decision makers have a good impression of what to expect when 
aiming for any of the possible options, if they are sure that they have 
- 22 -
considered all relevant aspects and if they found a compromise in 
assigning weights to each dimension incorporating the wants and trade 
offs of the general public - if a11 this is accounted for, then the 
decision makers have all the necessary input to make a rational and 
for the time being - non-improvab1e decision. There is no further need 
to confine the u1timate decision to a specific aggregationa1 procedure. 
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RESUL TS OF THE PLANNING CELL PROCEDURE. 
So far we desribed the procedure and the methodology of the study. 
Although our emphasis for this paper is on the methodological aspect, we 
would like to report on some of the main resul ts of the study. The 
evaluation of a new methodology in policy analysis certainly depends on 
the soundness, validity and reliability of the results that can be 
expected from its implementation. Therefore, we will present some of the 
outstanding results from the planning cell procedure. 
The first task of the participants was to assign Iveights to each 
subcriterion and criterion, and later on to evaluate the four options 
according to each criterion. \ve assumed that the rank order of criteria 
is derived from personal va lues and should therefore not be altered by 
the information process; our information was meant to focus only on 
facts and their (controversial) interpretation. In order to test the 
influence of the information process, we asked the participants to make 
rank order of the main criteria on the first and the last day of the se-
minar. 
Figure 2 illustrates the medians of the rank order for all eight 
criteria, comparing first and second measurement. Evidently all 
observed changes are only of minor magnitude and the sequential order 
remains the same. 
Insert Fig. 2 here. 
Looking at the priorities revealed by the weighting procedure it does 
not seem surprising (knowing the general beliefs) that healthjsafety and 
environment al quality form the top of the hierarchy. The general 
economic concerns - in particular, security of supply - are rated higher 
than the more specific concerns of financial and material requirements. 
It is interesting to note, though, that this criterion gained more 
importance over the four days information period, whereas the relevance 
of the environment al eft'ects is rated slightly lower on the last day 
compared with the rating of the first day. Political, social and inter-
national aspects were regarded as less important for the evaluation of 
energy systems. 
Figure 3 shows the results of the intuitive preference measurement with 
respect to the four energy scenarios. Intuitively the moderate 
pronuclear option 2 has gained the highest approval, followed by the 
most moderate non-nuclear option 3 (43 percent and 39 percent 
respectively). 
Insert Figure 3 here. 
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Most of the respondents who gave first priority to option 2 or 3 
assigned also the second priority to the other moderate option (either 
scenario 2 or 3, respectively). Thus, there is a clear indication for 
the preference of more moderate scenarios. 
The two pronuclear options together were chosen less frequently than the 
two non-nuclear options. Approximately 16% of participants preferred 
the extreme solar and conservational scenario 4 as opposed to only 3% 
preferring the extreme pronuclear scenario 1. Evident1y, there is a 
considerable group of high1y motivated and convinced citizens with a 
strong antinuclear commitment, whereas an equally sized pronuclear 
fraction is missing. Also, more than 70% of the persons who preferred 
option 2 (moderate pronuclear) moved to the moderate non-nuclear 
scenario 3 when asked for the second priority. The proponents of 
scenario 3, however, were equally divided: 50% assigned their second 
priority to scenario 2, the other 50% to scenario 4. 
When we take a closer look to the the perceived performance of each 
energy scenario according to the main evaluative criteria, scenario 3 
receives the highest scores on average. Scenario 1 is almost inferior to 
all three alternatives, whereas scenario 4 is associated with positive 
scores with respect to environment and health and negative scores with 
regard to economy and security of supply. Scenario 2 is regarded as 
superior in all economic aspects compared to scenarios 1 and 4 and not 
significantly different from scenario 3. But with respect to environment 
and health the scores are considerably lower than the ones of scenario 
3. Fig.4 illustrates the mean values of performance for each energy 
scenario. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
If we use the mean values of performance, the incorporation of any 
weighting assignment performed by any of the participants would have 
resulted in a calculated preference for scenario No 3 if the weighted 
means for each scenario were summed up in a simple linear model. But as 
mentioned before this was not the case. More than 40 percent of all 
respondents voted in favour of option 2. How can this overt 
contradiction between perceived performance and preference be 
explained? 
Dur study revealed four different reasons for this discrepancy: 
• The weighting process was highly influenced by a common understan-
ding of "social desirability". Most people did not dare to express a 
high preference for economic prosperity since this value could be 
interpreted as "egoistic" and "self-centered". 
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• Hany respondents feIt 'that options which receive rather negative 
scores on all three economic criteria should' gain extra negative 
weights which should not be compensated for environmental benefits. 
• Hany participants did not share the presumption of 'the Enquete 
Commission that all four scenarios represent feasible energy bp-
tions. They were convinced that scenario 3 might indeed be 
associated with the best possible out comes , but thatit would not 
meet the precondition of securingthe energy demand for the next '50 
years. 
• Some respondents claimed that the politicians and oplnlon leaders 
to whom they had trust and confidence had expressed their preference 
for scenario No 2. Therefore they feIt obliged to vote alike. This 
effect may be labelled "loyality vote" . 
So in spite of the highest score for the moderate pronuclear option 2, 
there is a tendency to perceive the share of nuclear energy as a burden' 
which almost half of the respondents are ready to accept for mainly 
economic reasons,' whereas the other haI f would prefer this burden to be 
replaced by conservation br solar systems. 
This ambiguity in the perception of nuclear energy is even more visible 
if we look into the results of the questionnaire dealing with the future 
of nuclear energy. The vast majority of participants perceived nuclear 
power as necessary, economical, and promising, but on the other hand 
they expressed a strong degree of discomfort with this type of 
electricity generation. Host people supported the recommendation to 
confine the use of nuclear energy to that amount that all other energy 
sources together could not meet. However, almost everyone of this 
majority group voted against a complete shutdown of nuclear power 
plants. They were convinced that nuclear energy might play a major role 
in the future, provided the safety problems, the reprocessing and waste 
disposal problems, and the negative social impact (like police state 
methods) could be managed in a satisfactory way. 
Also most people believed that in the long run nuclear energy had the 
potential to be the most important energy source for the Federal 
Republic of Germany, but the appropriate technology for this purpose was 
still to be developed. Hore than 70% of all repondents were convinced 
that the problem of waste disposal was not solved in a satisfactory way, 
but 60% agreed with the statement that nuclear power is safe and clean. 
Whereas sex had no impact on the formation of nuclear attitudes, we 
detected quite intensive relationships between age, party preference, 
and the evaluation of nuclear power. The more conservative people voted 
in national elections, and the older they were (in particular over 40 
years old), the more they preferred the pronuclear options 1 and 2. 
Older people and conservative voters tend to express more trust in 
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established institutions and assign a higher degree of credibility to 
politicians and scientists. Younger people with less conservative 
background were more inclined to adopt the arguments of the'antinuclear 
experts. They also assigned higher weights to environment al values and 
scored nuclear energy as more environmentally harmful compared to older 
or more conservative persons. 
These results support the observation that nuclear energy has gained a 
symbolic position to represent industrial va lues in general. Persons who 
favour the industrial society are more inclined to evaluate nuclear 
energy in a rather positive manner; persons holding a sceptical view of 
the industrial society reject nuclear energy more frequently. 
Those results were revealed before the Tschernobyl accident. Therefore, 
fears for accidental release of radioactive material were not very 
strong. As recent opinion polls demonstrate the German public has 
dramatically increased its concern for nuclear accidents. But with time 
passing by the preoccupation with nuclear accidents migh fade away, in 
particular if similar events do not occur in Germany itself or in the 
surrounding countries . In the past changes of attitudes because of 
nuclear incidents (like Three Hiles Island) did not prevail over a 
longer period, but adjusted to the former level of attitude structure. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The techniques and methods presented in this paper can be considered as 
an aid to improve the political decision-making process. In a society 
with plural ist values and commitments technical and economic criteria 
are not sufficient for policy formulation and implementation. Potential 
conflicts have to be indentified in advance, and the pros and cons with 
respect to relevant societal groups have to be gathered and 
systematically classified. 
The study on "decision analytic tools for resolving conflicts about 
energy policies" has been carried out to analyse, systematize and 
evaluate the interrelationship of energy systems characteristics and 
their societal perception. The comparison of the assessment profiles 
with holistic judgements of the possible future energy options can 
probably facilitate the process of finding desirable and acceptable 
solutions for the future technical development and its societal 
implementation. For this purpose we have enlargened the traditional 
decision theoretical approach to incorporate conflict resolution and 
pluralist value commitments. 
We are not sure if our model will also work in different cultural 
contexts. But in cases that the decision making bodies do not form a 
homogenious entity and different social groups demand to be part of the 
decision process, there might be a good chance to implement similar 
procedures. 
With respect to Indonesia we would recommend to use our model of value 
tree analysis for getting a feeling of society's needs and desires and 
integrating important social groups in the policy formulation process. 
By interviewing the leading representatives of important stake-holder 
groups the planning task force will receive information on what people 
are concerned about and what they would like the government to do. 
Unpleasant surprises and -sometimes avoidable- public opposition might 
thus be mitigated. 
The transfer of the planning cell method does not seem advisable for 
Indonesia if the random selection process to recruit the participants is 
adopted. But we could think of a modified version of a planning cell in 
which representatives of social groups, highly educated citizens and 
government officials meet together to discuss the various options and 
evaluate them according to the concerns expressed by the stake-holder 
groups. 
It would be worth while trying to apply the model of decision making 
under conflict in different nations and for different purposes . The 
model certainly needs further refinement and improvement. But it can be 
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regarded as a first step towards an efficient policy tool which combines 
the often conflicting goals of rationality and public involvement. 
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Abstract 
This contribution is a study of the development of public 
opinion on nuclear technology in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The development of nuclear technology over a 
period of nearly fifty years is analyzed in close connection 
with its reputation in the German public. The picture 
sketched in these five chapters is a complex one. 
While nuclear power played no major role in the energy 
economy weIl into the sixties, and the attitude of the 
public consequently oscillated between positive interest 
and an absolute lack of interest, it was increasingly 
found in the sixties and seventies that the detailed 
aspects of nuclear power as weIl as the entire problem of 
its use incorporated a considerable potential for public 
controversy. 
It was, above all, the historie burden of the proximity 
to the atom bomb, which probably will never be forgotten 
entirely, that filled the citizen's mind with fear. The 
radiation emitted by radioactive substances, which cannot 
be perceived by the human senses, had a similar effect on 
this fear as had the memories of the horrors caused by 
the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945) 
and the threat, which has continuously grown since, 
arising from nuclear armament and its excesses as practised 
by the superpowers. 
These latent fears were activated in the sixties by 
social upheavals and historie events of various types 
(Vietnam war, the assassination of US President Kennedy) 
and by an increasing sensitivity towards the environment. 
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The mobilization of old, subconscious fears continued 
throughout the seventies, and persists in the eighties, 
as a result of a number of events. The energy crises and 
their consequences, the Harrisburg accident, but also the 
emergence of political groups (the Green movement, 
ecologists, organized nuclear opponents, Greenpeace, 
Friends of the Earth, etc.l are among the factors which, 
in the Federal Republic of Germany as weIl as in other 
countries, initiated a movement of skepticism and rejection 
of nuclear energy. 
These counterproductive events, as far as nuclear energy 
is concerned, were paralleled by an expansion of nuclear 
power plants and other nuclear installations, not quite 
on the scale originally planned, but weIl up to a level 
which results in some 36% of the electricity produced in 
the public utility system in the Federal Republic of 
Germany being generated in nuclear power plants safely, 
economically, and without polluting the environment. 
The attitude of the public reflects a high percentage of 
advocates, who fee 1 that nuclear energy has an indispensable 
role to play in the energy supply also of the future. 
Specific groups, such as politicians, journalists and 
energy experts, express themselves much more unequivocally 
in favor of the important role of nuclear power. 
In summary, it is safe to predict for the further develop-
ment of nuclear energy in the Federal Republic a steady, 
but certainly not undisturbed, consolidation. A long 
per iod of probation will have to create broader acceptance 
in the public. Problems and risks, which have been with 
us for a long time in connection with conventional 
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technologies, with which we may not be familiar, but 
which hardly affect the acceptance of those systems, 
still need to be learned in the coexistence with nuclear 
technology be fore the much disputed acceptance of today 
can consolidate and will be supported by broad majorities 
of public trust. 
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Chapter 1 
The Federal Republic of Germany is among those countries 
whose economy is mainly based on services and industries. 
As far as its volumes of exports and imports are concerned, 
the Federal Republic of Germany occupies second place 
among the trading nations of the world, after the Uni ted 
States of America. Its most important export commodities 
are motor cars, chemical products, products of electrical 
engineering, iron and steel products, and all kinds of 
machines up to complete industrial installations and 
power plants. This makes the Federal Republic of Germany 
very much dependent on exports. Roughly 25 to 33% of the 
jobs in the country depend on exports. 
There is a similarly strong dependence on imports. Thus, 
iron ore, non-ferrous metals, such as copper, silver and 
aluminium, as weIl as all metals used to process steel 
(such as nickel, molybdenum, tungsten, vanadium, chromium, 
manganese) must be imported from abroad practically 100%. 
This high degree of dependence on imports also applies to 
phosphates (fertilizersl), petroleum, and uranium. The 
only domestic resources available in the country are hard 
coal, lignite and, to a lesser extent, natural gas, lead, 
and zinc. 
Fig. 1: 
Figure 1 shows the interdependence of the most important 
data in this respect. 
The close interdependence of the German national economy 
and the world market as described above makes this country 
highly sensitive to economic and political developments 
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worldwide, motivating us to engage in a prospective, 
moderate policy of partnership with countries of different 
social and economic systems. 
Already at an early point in time, the use of uranium as 
a quasi-domestic energy resource was recognized as a 
valuable, even indispensable, supplement to the utilization 
of fossil sources of energy (coal, oil, gas). Because of 
their high energy densities, uranium and other nuclear 
fuels offer extremely favorable conditions for stock-
piling and transport. Over aperiod of thirty years the 
Federal Republic was able to develop nuclear technology 
into a powerful branch of industry. Government support 
through research programs and international cooperation 
as weIl as private initiative of industry jointly achieved 
a high standard of quality and safety of nuclear facilities 
and made considerable progress in managing all steps in 
the nuclear fuel cycle. 
At present, twenty nuclear generating units are in operation 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, whose capacity of 
approximately 17,000 MWe covers some 36% of the public 
electricity supply, requiring only 11% of primary energy 
consumption. 
Figures 2 and 3 present an overview of the percentage 
fractions held by various energy resources in the supplies 
of primary energy and electricity. 
Six other nuclear generating units are under construction; 
applications have been filed for the first partial 
construction permits of another eight units. Fuel element 
factories, a uranium enrichment plant, and intermediate 
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storage faeilities for spent fuel assemblies have been 
eompleted, while a eommereial reproeessing plant will be 
built in the near future and preparations are under way 
for a repository for all kinds of radioaetive waste. All 
steps taken to eomplete the nuelear fuel eyele are 
supported by intensive international eooperation under 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
All told, it almost seems as if the development of nuelear 
teehnology in the Federal Republie had proeeeded without 
any disturbanee or major opposition over the past thirty 
years. Yet there has been,and still is, massive resistanee 
in parts of the publie, not direeted at partieular plants 
or sites, but of a more fundamental type. The pOlitieal 
party of the "Greens," whieh is represented in the Federal 
Parliament and in some State Parliaments, for instanee, 
advoeates an uneompromising opposition against nuelear 
energy. As the Greens present themselves as an environ-
mentalist party, the unbiased observer is surprised to 
see this negative engagement direeted, of all things, 
against an energy produeing teehnology whieh experts 
regard as a highly non-polluting, modern teehnology 
designed to replaee fossil plants (whieh have a mueh less 
positive reeord in this respeet). 
In the next few ehapters it will be attempted to examine 
this apparent dilemma between highly advaneed nuelear 
teehnology and a highly advaneed opposition to nuelear 
power. It is probably useful to traee the development of 
publie opinion about nuelear power in the Federal Republie 
of Germany in a quasi-historie study, eonsidering also 
international developments over the past few deeades. 
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Chapter 2: The Per iod Preceding the Utilization of Nuclear 
Power - the Thirties, Forties and Fifties 
The exploitation of nuclear energy and its public acceptance 
has a history which, undoubtedly, also helps to explain 
some of the difficulties associated with that acceptance. 
Scientific findings and discoveries in the fields of 
atomic physics, nuclear physics and radiochemistry made 
by German research workers over the past 100 years have 
made important contributions towards the exploitation of 
nuclear power in today's technology. One of the most 
important discoveries is considered to be the first 
detection of nuclear fission by Otto Hahn and Fritz 
Strassmann in December 1938 at the laboratories of the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society (now the Max Planck Society) in 
Berlin-Dahlem. That discovery was explained theoretically 
by Lise Meitner and her nephew, Otto Robert Frisch. 
This discovery of nuclear fission was to have unforeseen 
consequences in the following years and decades. Soon 
after the discovery, " ...... at this historie moment, ... . 
the work of Strassmann und Hahn ..... had triggered a 
chain reaction of ideas and experiments ..... ," as a 
monograph on the history of nuclear fission very aptly 
finds (Jost Herbig: "Kettenreaktion - das Drama der 
Atomphysiker" ) . 
The "chain reaction of ideas and experiments" was propagated 
especially in the USA and in France. The letter written 
by Albert Einstein to the then President of the USA, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, in October 1939, in which the 
famous scientist suggested to investigate the military 
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uses of nuclear fission, marked the beginning of 
the military application, i.e., the design of the "atom 
bomb," long before the peaceful uses of nuclear fission. 
The discovery of nuclear fission and, especially, its 
theoretical and practical consequences remained unknown 
to the public worldwide, even to most scientists. In the 
USA, a highly secret project was soon started under the 
name of "Manhattan Engineering District," whose purpose 
was the design and fabrication of nuclear weapons. As 
late as in August 1945, three months after the unconditional 
surrender of the German Reich (Hitler), atom bombs were 
dropped on Japanese cities: a uranium-235 bomb of 13 kt 
(relative to the explosive force of the conventional 
explosive, trinitro-toluene, TNT), was dropped on Hiroshima, 
and a plutonium-239 bomb of 21 kt (of TNT) was dropped on 
Nagasaki. These two nuclear explosives killed several 
hundreds of thousands of people immediately and several 
hundreds of thousands more as a result of the late effects 
of mechanical, thermal and radiological injuries. The two 
bombs were the strongest weapons ever developed by man. 
They ended the war between the USA and Japan, but simul-
taneously initiated an era of human fear of anything 
"nuclear," "radioactive," and "radiating," which ever 
since has accompanied the his tory of mankind like a 
shadow. This shadow cast on human history by that "zero 
hour" again and again detracts from the glamour of a 
modern energy producing technology with which so many 
hopes are associated. 
The technical advancement of nuclear weapons, combined 
with far-ranging carrier systems (intercontinental missiles), 
to incomparably higher explosive forces, longer ranges 
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and greater precision did not help in forgetting the 
terrors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nuclear weapons based 
on nuclear fission and nuclear fusion ("the hydrogen 
bomb," thermonuclear weapons), their tests in the atmosphere 
and the resultant contamination of the ea~th's atmosphere 
with fission products and activation products - all this 
has remained a subject of worldwide apprehension to this 
day. Even if the nuclear superpowers USA and USSR in 1963 
stopped their bomb tests in the atmosphere in favor of 
underground tests, nuclear armament and the nuclear arms 
race have remained a topical problem of mankind, a sword 
of Damocles hanging over all our heads. According to the 
annual publications by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI), some 14 GT (of TNT), which is 
14 billion tons of TNT equivalent, are at present kept in 
the arsenals of the nuclear powers in the form of nuclear 
weapons of various types, explosive forces and ranges. 
For today's mankind of about 5 billion people this means 
some 2.8 tons of TNT per person. There are very few 
figures which could better demonstrate the irrationality 
of weapons development. It is understandable that a 
worldwide protest against this development, above all by 
the young generation, arose rather early, in the fifties, 
which later was to motivate and support also the rejection 
of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
It shöuld be recalled at this point that nuclear armament 
up to an overkill capacity not only resulted in a permanent 
sense of fe ar in the minds of the peoples of the world, 
but also established a "balance of terror" between the 
nuclear powers in the West and in the East. That there 
have been numerous, dreadful wars since Hiroshima, but 
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not another world war, especially no war waged with 
nuclear weapons, is also very much a consequence of this 
balance of terror. 
After Germany had lost the war it had started under the 
Hitler regime, and in which it had committed the most 
terrible crimes against mankind, the destroyed country 
had been divided in many ways. There are still two German 
states and a city of Berlin separated in two parts, the 
eastern parts of which are integrated into the Warsaw 
Pact and into the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA), while the western part is integrated into the 
European Community and NATO. In the forties, the Germans 
in west and east had to struggle against hunger, diseases 
and sUffering, had to integrate millions of refugees from 
their lost regions in the east, had to pay reparations to 
the victorious powers and had to try to reconstruct what 
had been destroyed. Among all those existential problems, 
nuclear armament and its progress was just one out of 
many negative perspectives of world policy, by no means a 
national point of concern. Even after the monetary reform 
(1948), after the gradual economic recovery beginning in 
the Federal Republic with the generous support by the USA 
in a number of aid programs (Marshall Plan) and gradually 
speeding up (German economic miracle), nuclear power was 
not a subject of public interest, all the more so as all 
scientific and technical activities in the nuclear field 
had been inaccessible, "verboten," to the Germans since 
their unconditional surrender (May 8, 1945). 
The situation changed fundamentally in 1955, when the 
Federal Republic regained its national sovereignty in the 
Paris Agreements and thus also was enabled to start 
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research and development work in the nuclear field in a 
situation in which countries such as the USA, the Uni ted 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France seemed to have 
acquired an irrecoverable lead in nuclear technology 
merely because of their military engagement. 
1955 also was the year of the first Geneva Conference 
converting into political reality the slogan of US 
President Eisenhower in 1953: "Atoms for Peace." The 
Federal Republic of Germany found itself among the nations 
able to participate in the broad dissemination of know-how 
from the USA. 
Science, industry and politics in the Federal Republic 
welcomed this opportunity for transfer of knowledge and 
technology and devoted much attention to it. Only two 
months after the Geneva Conference, the German Federal 
Ministry for Atomic Matters was established in Bonn. 
Already in the Paris Treaties the Federal Republic of 
Germany had expressly renounced the fabrication of nuclear 
weapons and any military research and development work in 
the nuclear field. Important tendencies underlying this 
deliberate embarkation on a new technology were the 
strict political will to use nuclear power only for 
peaceful purposes, the intention to recover the lead 
other nations had gained in the field, if at all possible, 
and finally also the technical and industrial associations 
of the young nuclear program. 
When observed from today's perspective, more than thirty 
years after the beginning of nuclear research and nuclear 
technology in this country, the start appears to be 
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surprisingly broad in its approach, characterized by 
farsighted judiciousness in tackling the manifold problems 
and also by a spirit of optimism hardly understandable 
in the present frame of mind of our society, now that 
nearly 36% of the public electricity supply comes from 
nuclear power plants. Undoubtedly, the pioneering spirit 
at that time was moved by the need to reconstruct the 
country, which had been divided and destroyed after the 
devastating world war, to consolidate the young democracy 
and, with the help of the victorious powers, of which the 
Western powers had now become al lies and partners, use 
for reconstruction every modern technology available. 
Certainly the nuclear flash of the bombs overHiroshima 
and Nagasaki had also shocked the people in Germany, and 
undoubtedly also the Germans were biased against, and 
fearful of, anything associated with such concepts as 
atom, radiation or radioactive against this background of 
a shock experienced by mankind in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
And yet, the onset of nuclear research and technology at 
that time meant a step forward into the future to most 
people in Germany. It was a step on the way into the 
community of peoples and their scientific and technical 
cooperation and, last but not least, a clear confirmation 
of being recognized and accepted again among the civilized 
countries. 
In the early days there. were differences of opinion about 
the site to be selected for the first state operated 
nuclear research center to be founded. In any case, the 
state had to, and wanted to, exercise its duties and 
powers of supervision and control in the field of nuclear 
research and development. In addition, the site of a 
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nuclear research center was to be found in favorable 
geographie location with respect to traffic connections, 
the proximity to universities, and the close association 
with large industries in the Federal Republic , for the 
national research centers to be founded were to act as 
links between the government, industry and universities. 
Atomic programs (as, later on, energy and environmental 
programs), research, teaching and industrial projects in 
this way were to constitute a closely knit unit. 
In the choice among a number of sites, the best solution 
was found in establishing more than one research center. 
In 1956 alone, the Jülich Nuclear Research Center (near 
Aachen), the Gesellschaft für Kernenergieverwertung in 
Schiffbau und Schiffahrt, GKSS (near Hamburg), and the 
Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center (near Karlsruhe) were 
founded. More centers devoted to nuclear research and 
other areas of big science research were created later; 
today Germany has 13 such national research institutions. 
Already in the fifties, the first power reactor projects 
were drafted within the framework of the first Atomic 
Power Program (500 Megawatt Program), and the first 
research reactors were designed and built as entirely 
German efforts. Thus, the Research Reactor II ("FR 2") 
was the first project of this kind designed and completed 
in the country, giving rise to the expansion and also to 
the scientific goals of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research 
Center. This reactor constituted the geographie center of 
the site and acted as a nucleus of crystallization in the 
activities pursued in the following years and decades. 
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Plans and objectives were established on a broad basis at 
the beginning of nuclear research and nuclear technology 
in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the whole effort 
was supported and accompanied by international partner-
ship; for instance, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) was founded in Vienna, and EURATOM, the 
European Atomic Energy community, was founded in Brussels 
in the fifties. Important structures of the nuclear fuel 
cycle, including the back-end steps, such as reprocessing, 
the investigation of plutonium and of the breeding process, 
already took shape in projects at that time. 
In those days, there was no "nuclear controversy" in the 
general public, no profound obstruction of the acceptance 
of nuclear installations of the kind which, in the past 
fifteen years, has created unrest and concern also in the 
minds of the politicians in the. Federal Republic. The 
reason probably was that nuclear facilities were just in 
the process of being built; most people had never seen 
them, let alone knew anything about them. Still, in the 
vicinity of the emerging Karlsruhe Nuclear Research 
Center there were farmers cultivating tobacco, corn and 
asparagus who expressed their fear that radioactive 
substances could harm their corps or at least make them 
unmarketable; this concern was soon dissipated in the 
following years. However, the shock mankind had suffered 
as a consequence of Hiroshima and Nagasaki continued to 
act subconsciously; anything atomic, radioactive or 
radiating was stigmatized and, in the long run and by 
devious ways, was to teach people to know fear. 
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Chapter 3: Nuclear Research and Nuclear Technology in 
the Startup Phase - the Sixties, the Founding 
Years 
In the sixties, plans and preparations were continued. 
The second German Atomic Program consolidated and continued 
earlier decisions. Gradually it became apparent that the 
light water reactor line would be the most important 
commercial reactor line for the decades to come. Fast 
breeders and high temperature reactors were defined as 
the two promising advanced reactor lines and included in 
the project design phase. The development of ship propulsion 
reactors, plans for a reprocessing plant of 34 t/a (WAK 
Karlsruhe) and the conversion of a former salt mine into 
a repository for low level and intermediate level wastes 
raised nuclear technology to a higher level of development. 
Already in the late sixties, the first two LWR nuclear 
power plants of 600 MWe were built in the Federal Republic 
of Germany: Würgassen and Stade; construction of the then 
largest nuclear generating unit of the world was begun: 
Biblis A with some 1200 MWe. A German reactor building 
company was established: Kraftwerk Union, then a sub-
sidiary of Siemens and AEG, now a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Siemens. The third Atomic Program (1967), which was 
adopted roughly one decade after the start, already 
indicated that the lead other countries had had in the 
nuclear field had almost been recovered, perhaps less so 
quantitatively than qualitatively. Other advances, such 
as the construction of uranium enrichment plants, the 
erection of one prototype facility each of a thorium high 
temperature reactor and a fast breeder (or its forerunner), 
and the first signs of success in export negotiations 
with the Netherlands, Switzerland and Argentina added to 
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the success achieved by German research and development 
in the nuclear field. The increase in personnel of the 
Nuclear Research Center from 120 (1956) to some 3000 
(1966) is an indicator also of the whole national devel-
opment. 
This development, which almost went on like a crash 
procedure in some areas and was additionallly accelerated 
by the pioneering spirit of its founding fathers, also 
had a few negative sides to it: 
- The transfer of knowledge and know-how took place in 
very close cooperation with the Western leading countries 
in the nuclear field, especially the United Kingdom and 
the Uni ted States, which means that it was organized 
mostly in English. Numerous technical terms were, and 
remained, English technical terms. This jargon was 
largely unintelligible to many members of the public 
who wanted to learn about this new technology in which 
they were interested. Only very much later, after more 
than ten years of intensive efforts spent especially by 
the technical committees of the German Standards 
Committee (DNA), the most important technical terms 
were harmonized, standardized and translated into 
German. Nevertheless, terms such as cladding, contain-
ment, pellet and others continued to exist untranslated 
for a long time. 
- The optimism of the early years, further boosted by 
research and development results which compared weIl 
internationally and soon made the German "apprentices" 
equal partners in the nuclear business, also spilt over 
into the evaluation of the results to be expected. For 
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the following decades the electricity generating costs of 
the fast breeder were already calculated down to minor 
differences in the second digit after the comma, i.e., 
the costs of a system whose technical breakthrough was at 
least one decade ahead and whose fuel cycle problems were 
still objects of research and development. 
- This optimism made scientists and engineers overlook the 
need to explain to an interested public (was it in fact 
interested?l what the potential risks and disadvantages 
of this young technology might be. There was anational 
goal to be pursued, and a goal worthwhile concentrating 
on. This work, in turn,was part of an immense effort of 
rebuilding a country which had been destroyed in a war, 
divided, and whose historie conception of itself had 
suffered. The optimism of German nuclear scientists was 
also apart of a worldwide optimism which believed that 
nuclear power would work wonders for the world of tommorrow, 
such as irrigating deserts, finding food for the hungry, 
and developing fundamental solutions to all problems of 
energy supply. 
This wave of optimism, which carried science and technology, 
was soon intermingled with a dangerous streak of pessimistic 
moods not yet feIt by most contemporaries, but clearly 
discernible from today's historie vantage point. In the 
late fifties and early sixties, a worldwide front of protest 
was raised against nuclear armament, a movement carried 
mainly by young people, but also by scientists of all 
disciplines. A manifest had been publicized in the Federal 
Republic of Germany by Göttingen scientists, and it had 
been signed also by the founding fathers of the Karlsruhe 
Nuclear Research Center. After two terrible world wars 
waged and lost by their grandfathers and fathers, the sons 
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did not want to suffer another war for themselves and 
their descendants, let alone a war employing nuclear 
weapons, a war which might weIl be the last and ultimate 
war of mankind and whose risks nobody could fathom, not 
even nuclear scientists. Each year, the Easter holidays 
saw protest rallies, demonstrations, lists with signatures 
and appeals against the "nuclear danger," the much dreaded 
nuclear armament of the superpowers soon to become reality. 
The protests were heard and shared by many people, but 
they missed their actual target, namely the superpowers 
and their armament plans. Despite, or just because of, 
their futile nature, protests of this quality and intensity 
kept up their own momentum; they soon concentrated on a 
different nuclear target chosen as a sort of stand-in, 
namely the peaceful uses of nuclear energy then under 
development. 
This logical inconsistency, namely "to hit the bag and 
me an the donkey," as the German saying goes, may look 
surprising, but it is not as strange as it may appear at 
first sight. There were sound reasons for this apparently 
illogical conversion of a protest against atom bombs into 
a protest against "atomic technology." Historically 
speaking, the peaceful uses of atomic energy remained a 
spinoff of the development of atom bombs; the "good 
atomic reactor" was overshadowed by the "bad atom bomb." 
Most adolescents and most adults had not been told any-
thing about reactor lines, reactor designs and reactor 
operation either at school or in their professional 
education. Not even the university courses to be attended 
by a student of science included nuclear physics or 
nuclear technology as compulsory subjects. How then was 
the average man on the street to assess whether a nuclear 
reactor was nothing but a bomblike machinery tamed with 
great difficulties, but still incalculable? 
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The Uni ted States had a lead of about two decades in 
nuclear technology. This lead in development also included 
the period of bomb deelopment and the pioneering years of 
reactor technology, plutonium technology and reprocessing 
technology. There were accidents and incidents, but only 
surprisingly few of them had serious consequences, such 
as casualties or persons severely injured by radiation. 
This is true in particular if one compares the suscepti-
bility and sensitivity to failure of the budding nuclear 
technology with technologies used for many decades, which 
we think are sufficiently safe, but which are not really. 
In a country of "unlimited possibilities" (also in the 
field of journalism), such as the Uni ted States, there 
were also scientists and journalists, action groups and 
pressure groups, who turned their attention to such 
accidents, processed and published them in a very effective 
way in the media. Parallels were drawn between the effects 
of nuclear power plants and those of atom bombs, and 
discussions went on about the effects of small and minute 
radiation dos es on human organism. The period of sombre 
diagnoses and doomsday forecasts began. The swelling tide 
of publications of this type was accompanied by films, 
which are still shown quite frequently in our movie 
theaters and also on TV, demonstrating the much dreaded 
late effects of ionizing radiation on plants, animals and 
persons in horror pictures of killer spiders several 
meters high, semihuman or superhuman monsters of the 
Dr. Frankenstein type, or terrible homunculi. 
At the same time, a scientific controversy arose over 
some publications by Dr. Sternglass, a US radiologist who 
said he had detected radiation damage in the form of 
increased infant mortality and higher rates of death from 
cancer in the environment of nuclear installations. 
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Scientists like Gofman, Tamplin and Alfven (the latter in 
Sweden) took up some of the aspects included in Sternglass' 
hypotheses and found and discussed new ones. In short: 
scientists, of all people, soon got into a heated argument 
about the environmental impacts of nuclear facilities, 
which was bound to extend to the non-scientific layman 
and make him feel uneasy. Moreover, where was the layman 
who could say he was able to decide which of the scientists 
were right in this argument? 
Arguments among scientists: Sternglass, Gofman, Tamplin 
and the other "nuclear critics" did not remain uncontested. 
Independent scientists, also state authorities and research 
centers intervened, disproving Sternglass and the other 
"critics" in careful "countercritical" analyses (Fig. 4). 
In the same way in which fashion trends, toys and sports 
activities had been transmitted from the US to the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the other countries of Western 
Europe with some delay, the Sternglass controversy also 
struck Europe in the early seventies; some countries were 
affected very little or not at all, others, such as the 
Federal Republic of Germany, feIt the impact clearly and 
for a long time. 
The "threatened environment" was a subject assuming more 
and more weight in the public debate in the sixties, for 
instance in the book by Rachel Carson, "Silent Spring," 
which dealt with the damage arising from the use of DDT 
and other herbicides and insecticides. From the present 
point of view it is almost tragic to consider that, after 
the ban on DDT as a consequence of these warnings, the 
death rate due to malaria in many tropical countries of 
the earth (which had been reduced to very low levels 
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thanks to the use of DDT) soon returned to appallingly 
high levels within a few years. One of those countries is 
Sri Lanka (Ceylon). 
The two topics, "nuclear power and its hazards" and 
"threats to the environment," were combined in one "super-
subject" engulfing large groups of the public, the 
intellectuals included, bringing forth a wealth of primary 
and secondary literature, leading to the formation of 
pressure groups (Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth in the 
USA, and parallel and successor institut ions in all 
countries of Europe), and influencing public discussion 
up to political decisions, and wrong decisions, for more 
than a decade. 
Another development, the origins of which have not been 
clearly analyzed to this day, determined public attitude 
to nuclear energy and other areas of life, both in the 
USA and in many European countries. This development can 
only be sketched very roughly in this paper. 
The assassination of US President Kennedy in 1963 acted 
like a shock on many people to whom this President had 
been a symbol of hope, a charismatic figure. The United 
States, the leading Western power in the conventional and 
the nuclear sectors, guarantor of democratic liberties 
not only within the boundaries of the USA, but for all 
countries in Western Europe, had set a clear limit to 
Communist expansion in the deliberate action Kennedy had 
taken against Cuba and the Soviet Union. This young 
President had been shot before his political career had 
reached its peak. His successor, Lyndon Johnson, seemed 
to belong to an entirely different generation, to be a 
- 54 -
different personality; he was a President without any 
charisma. Was it the destruction of the hopes that had 
been put in John F. Kennedy, or was it the lack of 
political farsightedness of his successor, Johnson, which 
got the Uni ted States deeper and deeper, finally irre-
trievably, into a war to end only after many years and 
with great sacrifices by the USA in Vietnam? The reputation 
of the US in the free countries of the world had suffered 
tremendous damage, most of all in the States proper and, of 
course, also in those countries which had recognized the 
US as the bulwark of democracy, good will and freedom. 
It is not certain whether the student revolts beginning 
in the sixties in the USA, in France, in the Federal 
Republic and in other countries were indeed caused by 
this "Kennedy/Vietnam effect" of shattered hopes and 
expectations. At any rate, these historical events greatly 
contributed to developments in society in the years to 
follow. For the Federal Republic of Germany it can also 
be said that twenty or more years had passed since the 
end of World War 11, reconstruction had been completed 
more or less, postwar destruction and poverty had given 
way to material wealth, and a new generation was growing 
up whose members had not been directly affected by the 
horrors of war. This new generation grew up in a society 
it found "saturated" and "materialistic," a society in 
need of new impulses, of shedding old educational structures 
and of finding new concepts of authority and of the 
freedoms guaranteed in the constitution. 
These revolutionary movements, which sprang up everywhere, 
were directed against traditional authorities and 
institutions, also against the ethical principles 
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represented by the traditional leading power, USA, whose 
unfortunate role in Vietnam was critized severely; they 
also reinforced leftwing and ultra-Ieftwing political 
currents which, in those years, feIt that their time had 
come and, for this reason, did not reamin passive. 
Without the public realizing it, the period of maturation 
of nuclear technology and re ac tor technology was paralleled 
by the growth of a protest potential able to unfold its 
activities in the next decade, the seventies. The anti-
authoritarian wave, the permissivity in thought and 
action spreading in the sixties in families, schools and 
partnership relations - all this was supported and 
encouraged in many statements by leading politicians 
calling for "more democracy," for the cooperation of the 
public in political decisions, and for creative self-
realization. 
Chapter 4: The Breakthrough of Nuclear Technology -
the Seventies: Euphoria, Crises, and Resistance 
There are no precise time limits in the developments 
described in the chapters above. A classification by 
decades is arbitrary and only arranges the subject matter 
for historical purposes. This means that many of the 
events described here as being part of the seventies can 
be found to have been present already in the sixties. For 
instance, a pamphlet published by a major German publishing 
house in 1968 ("Eight Arguments against Nuclear Power," 
Verlag Handelsblatt) already contains the topics of 
discussion which influenced the broad public and political 
debates in the Federal Republic of Germany in the seventies 
and eighties, including the question about the disposal 
of radioactive wastes, economics, lifetime, and sufficient 
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safety of nuclear power plants. As viewed from the vantage 
point of today (1986), the public debate about some 
aspects of the nuclear power problem looks like a sequence 
of focal subjects. Today it can be said that some of 
those subjects have their "comebacks" and become topical 
again. (See also Fig. 5). 
The seventies saw the economic breakthrough of the light 
water reactor (LWR) in its two variants, the boiling 
water reactor (BWR) and the pressurized water reactor 
(PWR); this phenomenon was experienced worldwide and, 
especially so, in the Federal Republic of Germany. In 
this country, three so-called demonstration reactors, two 
BWR and one PWR, symbolized this breakthrough, as explained 
in the previous chapter. They were followed by nuclear 
power plants in the 600 MWe, 800 MWe, and the 1200 - 1300 Mwe 
categories. The latter, largest, unit size soon established 
a sort of standard which, although it could in principle 
be surpassed, led to a consistent unit size of LWR power 
plants because of the optimization achieved as a result 
of cost degression. 
Biblis A with 1147 net MWe, commissioned in 1974, and 
Biblis B with 1238 net MWe, commissioned in 1976, became 
the protagonists of a type of modern pressurized water 
reactors worldwide regarded as safe and economic. This 
international recognition led to many contracts from 
Germany and abroad, to the nuclear agreement with Brazil 
in 1975, and to the contracts concluded by Persia (Iran) 
a little later. The two contracts today appear to be 
symbols both of the euphoria and of the setbacks soon to 
occur. 
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Already in the early seventies, construction was begun of 
the THTR 300 near Uentrop-Schmehausen, the first proto-
type high temperature reactor, and of the SNR 300 near 
Kalkar, the first prototype fast breeder reactor, both 
plants designed for an electric power of 300 megawatts. 
In 1972 the prototype reprocessing plant, WAK, went on 
stream in Karlsruhe. In 1974, close cooperation between 
Germany and France beg an in the research and development 
of advanced reactor concepts, especially the fast breeder. 
In the first Energy Program adopted by a German Federal 
Government (1973) nuclear energy had been assigned an 
important, even indispensable, role in the energy supply 
plan; in line with the increase in energy consumption 
predicted at that time, the program assumed that an 
aggregate nuclear capacity of 45,000 to 55,000 MWe would 
be required for 1985. The nuclear power plants in operation 
and under construction in 1972 had an aggregate power of 
just 7200 MWe. 
Again, a coincidence in time can be found for optimistic, 
even euphoric, aspects of nuclear development and very 
pessimistic and counterproductive developments. The 
expansion of nuclear power almost on schedule seemed to 
be enhanced even further by the oil crisis of 1973. Oil 
became scarce and expensive, which meant that a policy of 
oil substitution had to be pursued also on a long term 
basis. A monopolist preference for oil, which had been so 
extremely cheap until then, could no longer be tolerated. 
Nationwide, oil absorbed more than 55% of the primary 
energy consumption; the national oil production was, and 
still ist, less than 5%. Nuclear power appeared to be 
predestined for this substitution, especially in electricity 
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generation. However, also the priority given to the use 
of coal was emphasized: hard coal and lignite are the 
only sources of energy available in large quantities in 
the Federal Republic. 
Almost simultaneously with the oil (price) crisis, the 
Federal Republic was hit by an environmental crisis, 
another late effect imported from the USA: environmental 
problems assumed an increasingly larger proportion of the 
public debate. Rachel Carson's book was widely read, the 
publication by Meadows and Meadows, "Limits to Growth," 
and the follow-on publication commissioned by the Club of 
Rome reached many people and were in line with the "spirit 
of the time." Although many of those ideas and computerized 
forecasts later were found to be unsatisfactory and 
biased, many people regarded them for what they were: 
warnings expressed to the decision makers of this world. 
Even if the reconstruction of a country devastated by 
war had become almost a thing of the past, regarded as 
nothing more than a topic for his tory lessons by the 
younger part of the population, the fifteen to twenty 
postwar years of environmental unconcern were over once 
and for all. The symbol of the "smoking chimneys," an 
expression denoting economic recovery in the fifties, now 
became a phrase expressing environmental concern and 
profound doubt in economic growth, wealth and the use of 
energy, which was considered to be wasteful in general. 
Nuclear power automatically became one of the targets of 
this intellectual and ecological doubt. To many people, 
nuclear power even seemed to be the very protagonist of 
this wasteful use of energy, for it promised low electricity 
generating costs and, with its large nuclear generating 
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units and huge cooling towers, had become highly visible 
to many people on many sites and begun to replace other 
techniques of energy generation. It was no longer the 
small research reactor or power reactor, then regarded as 
a symbol of technical progress and anational achievement, 
but the 1300 MW unit with its high cooling towers (160 m) 
visible from afar which was regarded as a symbol of an 
unknown future feIt by many to be threatening when people 
started talking about nuclear reactors. Old fe ars associated 
with Hiroshima were revived. Concern about the future, 
the unpolluted environment, personal wealth, the employment 
situation, the end of the worldwide economic crisis - all 
this added increasingly more somber touches to the 
picture. 
In the late sixties and early seventies, "public action 
committees" were founded in many pI aces in the Federal 
Republic, smaller or larger groups of concerned citizens 
working for common goals, such as streets on which children 
could play, children's playgrounds, more green areas in 
the cities, against the construction of highways, for 
noise control measures, against the spreading of cities 
into the open country ...... and also against building 
nuclear power plants. Especially the opposition to the 
construction of nuclear power plants and other nuclear 
facilities acted as a nucleus of crystallization. The 
Energy Program of the Federal Government quoted above had 
forecast an expansion of nuclear power plants which would 
have meant 36 new nuclear generating units within only 
twelve years, that is, three new units per year. The 
public understandably viewed these plans with misgivings, 
even fear, especially in a situation when concern about a 
threatened environment and about increasingly scarcer and 
more expensive energy resources reinforced such fears. 
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The planned construction of one specific nuclear power 
plant (Kernkraftwerk Süd in the southwestern part of 
Baden) concentrated, institutionalized and multiplied as 
weIl as popularized the actions of such public action 
groups against nuclear power in a way not experienced 
before. 
The public utility company responsible for that region 
had defined a site in the city of Breisach, southwest of 
a region of great scenic beauty, with a unique flora and 
fauna (the Kaiserstuhl hilI) and, in addition, one of the 
most famous wine growing regions in Germany. The protests 
by the public action groups were directed against the 
anticipated radiological and meteorological impacts of 
the planned nuclear power plant. Especially the adverse 
effects expected to arise to the conditions for growing 
wine greatly excited the minds, and many people had 
mental pictures of the sunny slopes of the Kaiserstuhl 
hilI threatened by misty, humid vapors rolling up from 
the River Rhine. This was intolerable and produced loud 
protests ·in broad groups of the public. 
In the public inquiry prescribed by law for hearing the 
objections against such plans, the licensing authorities 
committed a number of blunders and psychological errors 
vis-a-vis the highly emotionalized opponents. Very soon 
opposition turned into open hatred. The Breisach case had 
a number of consequences with effects extending far into 
the next few years and also to other sites: 
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(1) Different groups motivated by very different reasons 
solidarized. The protests by wine growers, fishermen, 
critically minded scientists of adjacent universities, 
concerned citizens and public action committees 
produced an explosive mixture. 
(2) The opposition against nuclear power assumed inter-
national proportions: nuclear opponents from the 
adjacent regions of Basle, Switzerland and Alsace, 
France joined in the protests against the planned 
site. 
(3) The nuclear controversy grew from a local affair into 
a dispute between government and opposition parties 
in the state and throughout the Federal Republic. 
(4) The controversy between nuclear plant operators and 
the public developed into a legal battle which, in 
the years to come, went through all stages of litigation 
before the administrative courts about nuclear power 
plants existing and planned on many sites, often 
assuming sharp, unconciliatory forms and involving 
tremendous expenditures of time and documents for 
each project, thus causing unforeseen delays and 
often bringing plans close to the limits of what was 
financially calculable by the operators (see Figures 6, 
7 and 8). 
(5) The massive protests in many cases led to revolts 
which, by their very nature, also attracted groupings 
which were not really interested in the causes of the 
movement but liked to use the opportunity for revolution 
and for "overthrowing the system." Besides the 
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anarchists and similar characters, which can be found 
in any society, these were especially Communist-Marxist 
parties and groupings, which saw the dawn of their 
desired world revolution come up. It should be added 
that the influence of these groupings has not decreased 
a bit over the past ten or fifteen years, but has 
been increased and reinforced by violent terrorists 
and has influenced developments at many demonstrations, 
not only those against nuclear facilities. 
Breisach as a site was rejected because, under an order 
by the Federal Ministry of the Interior, thermal power 
plants at that time had to be equipped with cooling 
towers unless they were located close to the estuaries of 
large rivers ~nd could easily be cooled directly with 
sufficient amounts of water the whole year through. 
For the planned nuclear power station of Breisach this 
new condition would have meant that one or two cooling 
towers of 160 m height would have emitted their clouds in 
the main wind direction (from southwest to northeast) 
straight to the vineyards on the slopes of the Kaiserstuhl 
hilI. This was not acceptable even to the licensing 
authority and its expert consultants. As a substitute 
site, an area in the valley of the Rhine River was 
selected some 10 km northeast of the Kaiserstuhl hilI 
near the village of Wyhl. The distance to the nearest 
vineyards, perhaps 4 or 5 km, was feIt to be sufficiently 
large, the main wind direction did not give rise to any 
meteorological disadvantages for most of the year. The 
situation appearedto be under control. And yet Wyhl 
became the spark that made the charge explode. Why? 
Probably because the controversy about Breisach had 
generalkzed resistance by a number of effects of aggregation 
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and multiplication. Resistance had become a permanent 
institution, and a mobile one at that, which operated 
nationwide and could easily be transported to other 
sites, as was to be seen in the next few years. In the 
words of the die-hard nuclear opponents, Wyhl also meant: 
"No nuclear power plant here and none elsewhere." Wyhl 
led to Brokdorf, Grohnde, Kalkar, Gorleben, up to Wackers-
dorf, the site of the planned reprocessing plant of 
350 t/a, which is currently a subject of violent discus-
sion and fighting. All these places experienced demon-
strations on the largest scale, some of them assembling 
50,000 participants, and also a number of violent battles. 
The other events important for the seventies will be 
briefly summarized under the following headings: dialog 
with the public on nuclear power; the Greens; risk studies; 
Harrisburg, TMI II; Gorleben/waste management problems. 
The State Governments and the Federal Governments, which 
had basically agreed in their positive assessment of 
nuclear power at that time and until the early eighties, 
concluded from Wyhl that the controversy should not be 
allowed to develop into a civil war. A "dialog with the 
public on nuclear energy" was established in which all 
socially important groupings were to participate, such as 
the public action committees, scientists from state 
operated research centers and utilities, but also priests, 
politicians, and educational institutions. This dialog 
existed for a number of years; perhaps it did put some of 
the problems associated with nuclear power on a more 
rational basis, but it was unable to shift the controversy 
proper to a more rational track. The debate about nuclear 
energy had already become too emotional for that, and 
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"third parties" (those who wanted to change the system, 
leftist radicals, criminals) had become too much part of 
the disputes. Also too many scientists and engaged laymen 
had acquired a personal reputation in the dialog, although 
most of them had no technical competency whatsoever in 
the matter. Yet they soon made for themselves a reputation 
as speakers, partners in discussions, authors and initiators; 
in some cases they even made money on top of that reputation 
and, in this devious way, enjoyed (pseudo-) scientific 
farne. This dialog with the public practically stopped 
with the change in government in 1982. 
The Greens. There were numerous action groups and public 
action committees with hundreds of thousands of members. 
As a consequence of the revolts in the sixties there was 
an extraparliamentary opposition, also against nuclear 
power, about which all parties in the Federal and State 
Parliaments, the parliamentary opposition included, were 
pretty much of the same opinion. In the seventies, there-
fore, a new political party emerged, the Greens, which 
after lengthy preparations and much interna I strife moved 
into many State Parliaments and into the Federal Parlia-
ment wherever they were able to win more than 5% of the 
votes (the so-called 5% clause). True, the Greens did not 
become a party because they were against nuclear power, 
but their attitude to nuclear power has been, and still 
is, negative. Their uncompromising "no" to nuclear power 
is documented, for instance, in their demand to close 
down all German nuclear power plants (whose safety and 
quality standard is regarded as the best worldwide) after 
the major accident in the Soviet reactor of Chernobyl had 
become known (April 28-29, 1986). 
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From the late seventies onward, the resistance to nuclear 
power concentrated in the parliamentary opposition by the 
Greens, which was quite efficient in many ways. This is 
true despite the fact that the seventies, with the major 
oil crises of 1973 and 1979, to all intents and purposes 
represented a veritable appeal for substituting oil, for 
implementing non-polluting, safe and economic nuclear 
power schemes. The opposition had formed and established 
itself, it had acquired a dynamics of its own no longer 
to be slowed down by technical arguments based on reason. 
In a party representing only a few percent of the votes 
this actually should not playa role, but it was seen 
later that the party in government until 1982 (SPD) since 
that time has given up its consensus with the other major 
parties, which had been maintained until that time, in 
the obvious hope to recover votes lost to the Greens; the 
success of this dual approach is bound to be doubtful in 
the long run. In this connection it is also interesting 
to look at the outcome of the last federal elections 
(Fig. 9), which indicate percentages of votes in favor of 
the Greens below the national average in practically all 
regions where nuclear facilities are operated. Proximity 
to a nuclear power plant, as is also apparent from a 
separate study (the Biblis Study), is tantamount to more 
knowledge about nuclear power and, hence, less sensitivity 
to the fear which, unfortunately, is systematically 
provoked by the Greens. 
In 1975, the famous Rasmussen Study (WASH 1400) was 
published; in 1979, the German Nuclear Power Plant Risk 
Study appeared, which was based on the first phase of 
Rasmussen's publication. Both voluminous studies in a 
very detailed way dealt with the risks inherent in 
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(light water) nuclear power plants of US and German 
designs, respectively. Although it is impossible to sum 
up the contents of those studies in a few sentences, it 
is probably safe to say this: 
- Major accidents resulting in radiation damage or death 
to third parties, that is to say,. people in the environ-
ment of the nuclear power plant, can arise only as a 
consequence of a grave loss-of-coolant accident leading 
to what is called a core meltdown. 
- Accidents of this severity have extremely low proba-
bilities. Their frequency can be compared to the 
frequency of rare natural disasters, such as the crash 
of a large meteorite on a big city, which is an accident 
that could happen any time, but is not seriously 
considered by anybody. 
It should be assumed that this result did much to pacify 
the public debate. However, this is not really the case, 
and perhaps it is understandable why. The authors of the 
German Risk Study were aware of this potential negative 
effect when they wrote in the summary of their main 
volume: 
- "Events excluded on the basis of human assessment could 
easily assurne areal character in a detailed analysis. 
Potential hazards, which most probably will never lead 
to concrete damage and which do not play a role in the 
minds of most people, are thus brought to everybody's 
awareness. In this way, the paradoxical situation can 
arise that certain risks are demonstrated to be minimal, 
but are feared even more because of this very demon-
stration ..... " 
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From this more psychological than scientifically exact 
assessment it can also be seen how opinion makers can 
affect the public mood by generating and propagating 
fear, forinstance, in order to exploit a widespread 
feeling of public "angst" for their own political purposes 
in elections. 1979 was the year not only of the German 
Risk Study (DRS), but also of the Harrisburg TMI-II 
accident and of the public inquiry about the planned 
construction of the 1400 t/a reprocessing plant at Gor-
leben, Lower Saxony, Northern Germany. The Harrisburg 
accident, which we have known for about one year to have 
been a major accident causing some 20 and more tons of 
fuel assemblies to melt (a finding photographed by special 
cameras only some six years after the event), had a very 
negative impact on the public. The image of what was 
considered to be practically an absolutely safe techno 1-
ogy seemed to be destroyed and fear of the accident 
spreading further increased tremendously as a function of 
the number of reports published in the media (at one 
point in time, roughly 1000 journalists were on the 
spot) . 
In summing up the findings after the Harrisburg accident 
on the basis of what is known today one can say that the 
opponents to nuclear power were confirmed in their views 
just as much as the proponents were in theirs. The 
assertions of many opponents that the accident had 
increased the cancer rate and infant mortality has not 
been confirmed either theoretically, in the light of 
existing medical and radiological knowledge, or practically 
from the evaluation of statistics. As the notorious 
Dr. Sternglass also used this opportunity for his doomsday 
diagnoses, it was to be presumed for that very reason 
that nuclear power once more was to be discredited by 
statistical manipulations. 
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Nuclear power experts, especially after having learnt 
about the extent of the Harrisburg accident,were able to 
point out that the reactor had behaved in a very good 
natured, that is to say safe, way despite many technical 
failures and an accumulation of human errors. 
In a nutshell then, see Fig. 10, the confidence in safety 
among the proponents of nuclear power suffered only 
slightly, while the front of the opponents clearly became 
stronger. This situation applies to the USA, while in the 
Federal Republic, despite similar criticism, the insight 
gained ground over the years that the German reactor 
safety concept was much more efficient and, consequently, 
there would be no German Harrisburg (let alone a German 
Chernoby 1) . 
The Harrisburg accident coincided with the date of the 
German Gorleben hearing, a hearing comparable to the 
British Windscale Inquiry, dealing with the pros and cons 
of a planned reprocessing plant. However, what was 
involved in this case was more than just a reprocessing 
plant, but anational waste management center, designed 
to combine reprocessing and conditioning of radioactive 
waste, fuel (re-)fabrication, and intermediate and final 
storage of radioactive waste on one site. In the opinion 
of the government and of all experts, these plans constituted 
an optimal solution for closing the nuclear fuel cycle. 
That this solution was not adopted in the end was certainly 
due less to the intervention of the Harrisburg accident 
than to two decisive facts: 
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- At that time, six years after the publication of the 
Energy Program of the Federal Government, it could be 
foreseen that the original forecast of 45,000 or even 
55,000 MWe could not be met to any degree in 1985, and 
that the energy crises of 1973 and 1979 and their 
consequences in general had clearly retarded economic 
and industrial developments. The concept of anational 
waste management center had been based on the original 
forecasts, being designed for 1400 tons of spent fuel 
assemblies per annum, which. meant that it was now 
outdated. 
- The opposition against nuclear power in the Federal 
Republic had assumed proportions in a number of large 
scale demonstrations in several places, and in the 
strategie resistance to a reprocessing plant in partic-
ular, which did not fail to influence even political 
decision makers. Although the moderator of the Gorleben 
hearing, earl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (brother of the 
present German Federal President), a renowned philosopher 
and physicist, at that time stated that there had not 
been one argument by the "critics" (= opponents) of the 
planned facility which had not been convincingly dis-
proved by the "countercritics" (= experts in favor of 
the facility), the Lower Saxony State Minister President 
decided that "the plant could not be built at the 
present time for pOlitical reasons." It was cold comfort 
to the proponents who, according to Weizsäcker, had 
been justified in their assessment, when the Minister 
President commented that a plant of this type was 
"basically feasible on scientific and technical grounds." 
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The dice had been cast against the integrated was te 
management center, against the optimum solution. However, 
closing the nuclear fuel cycle continued to be anational 
goal of high priority. The two fact finding committees 
instituted by the German Federal Parliament after 1980 to 
deal with the subject of a "future nuclear energy policy" 
discussed the waste management problem as weIl as the 
need for advanced reactor systems, especially the fast 
breeder; these disputes confronted "critics" and "counter-
critics." In the well-known spirit of German thoroughness 
an attempt was made to find a workable compromise in 
matters of nuclear energy, and energy in general, in a 
group of parliamentarians and scientists. The scenarios 
submitted by the fa~t finding committees included four 
very different energy supply paths, the extremes of which 
(1 and 4) were associated with a highly advanced utilization 
of nuclear energy and the total abstention from nuclear 
energy, respectively. The recommendations resulting from 
the sessions the fact finding committees held over many 
years neither improved nor generally changed public 
opinion about nuclear energy; the large number of minority 
and majority votes by the members of the committee in many 
decisive questions did not really help responsible 
politicians in their decisions. Nevertheless, they still 
constitute a rich source from which each Federal Govern-
ment in power can quote to substantiate its decisions. 
One of those decisions is the construction of a medium 
sized reprocessing plant as decided in a majority vote by 
the fact finding committee; another decision is the 
completion and commissioning of the SNR 300 prototype 
fast breeder reactor near Kalkar. 
In developing the fast breeder, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France were practically on an equal footing 
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in their close scientific and technical cooperation 
fifteen years ago. Today France has a lead of approximately 
twelve years in breeder development. Consultations, 
litigation before administrative courts and even the 
Federal Constitutional Court, objections and requirements 
for backfitting safety measures have caused the Federal 
Republic to lag behind in breeder development. Also in 
the expansion of its nuclear generating capacity France 
has acquired a clear lead, thanks to a decisive energy 
policy, industrial policy, and interior policy. On this, 
see Figures 11 and 12. Also the attitude in the public 
vis-a-vis nuclear power obviously is positive. Even the 
Communist Party of France has adopted a "national" attitude 
relative to nuclear power, which means that it fully 
supports the country's nuclear policy, while the leftwing 
parties in the Federal Republic of Germany are almost 
fanatic in their opposition against nuclear power. Although 
it would be interesting to analyze the attitude to nuclear 
power found in the other European countries, this chapter 
shall be concluded with the above comparison between the 
Federal Republic and France. 
Chapter 5: Nuclear Power on Its Way to Normality? 
The Eighties: Steps towards Consolidation 
We are already beyond the first half of the eighties. 
Nuclear power in the Federal Republic of Germany has 
proved not only its environment al compatibility and 
reliability in supply, but also its economics. On this, 
see Fig. 13, which demonstrates the economic edge of 
nuclear power plants over hard coal fired power plants up 
to the lower medium load range in electricity generation. 
This comparison is particularly important because normally 
hard coal, being an abundant national resource, is favored 
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in the energy programs for reasons of employment policy 
and preferred almost uncritically in daily political 
proclamations by practically all parties. 
For environmental reasons, burning hard coal and lignite 
will carry tremendous financial burdens in the eighties: 
facilities for dust removal, desulfurization and denitrifi-
cation, which will have to be fitted to fossil fired 
power plants, will add to the present cost edge of nuclear 
power. The relatively low cost percentage of uranium fuel 
in the electricity generating cost stabilizes an electricity 
economy which, for this reason, bases its operation on 
the indispensable role of nuclear power in the base load 
range of electricity generation, thus raising uranium 
(and the plutonium produced from non-fissile uranium) to 
the rank of "quasi-domestic" energy resources. 
Over the past few years, German nuclear power plants have 
demonstrated their high availability in terms of capacity 
and time also by international comparison. Three or four 
German nuclear generating units have long been at the top 
of the list of the almost 400 nuclear power plants operated 
worldwide, and the Grohnde Nuclear Power Station com-
missioned in 1984 was the world's first nuclear power 
plant to generate 11.48 billion kilowatthours of electricity 
in one year (1985). 
The development of the so-called "convoy" concept, a 
series of identical nuclear generating units at present 
comprising three plants, which could reduce the time 
required for completing the difficult licensing procedure, 
i.e., ultimately the time to commissioning, from at 
present ten or twelve years to some six years, is another 
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step towards more economy. Other advantages were achieved 
by reducing the annual downtimes required for maintenance, 
inspection and repair by applying more modern technical 
procedures. If such progressive techniques were exported 
it would be possible, according to German experts, to 
make nuclear power the more economic energy technology 
even in those regions in the USA where coal mined at low 
cost and used for electricity generation would have a 
positive impact on electricity generating costs. 
The Federal Republic is firm in its obligation to tolerate 
no abuses of fissile material or of nuclear research for 
military purposes. This contractual condition is inspected 
and checked regularly and strictly by a number of inter-
national institutions, such as IAEA and EURATOM. 
The installation of repositories for radioactive was te of 
all categories, and of intermediate storage facilities 
for spent fuel and radioactive waste, is either partly 
completed or in the process of preparation. Also con-
struction of a reprocessing plant with a capacity of 
350 t/a (Wackersdorf, Bavaria) was be gun in the past few 
months. However, in this case it is seen that the plans 
of the operator (DWK) and the firm pOlitical will of the 
State Government concerned and of the Federal Government, 
which is of the same pOlitical colour, is now meeting a 
major obstacle in the change of mind the leading opposition 
government underwent for tactical reasons in the light of 
coming elections. The debate about Wackersdorf as the 
"missing link" in the closed nuclear fuel cycle has 
assumed proportions combining elements of a religious war 
with those of a more folkloristic nature. This dissent, 
which is at present being fought out in a lot of heated 
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exchanges, can only be overcome by the "normative power 
of facts," meaning a facility built and commissioned, 
whose functioning capability and safety is indisputable 
according to the present of the art, but which can be 
proved to the opponents and the public only in practical 
operation, that is to say, roughly ten years from now. 
However, this is aperiod of time for which a lot of 
stamina and steadfastness of the responsible politicians 
is demanded, and in which perhaps also changes in the 
overall political situation will have to be taken into 
account. 
Along with the plans for the reprocessing plant, planning 
studies were drafted on the direct repository storage of 
spent fuel assemblies in accordance with the decisions by 
the fact finding committees. The construction and com-
missioning of a plant for this purpose is now taking 
shape and will be devoted to the safe containment of such 
reactor fuel assemblies for which reprocessing is not, or 
not yet, feasible. 
Now the question emerges whether these undisputed steps 
forward in the nuclear power field have also assured the 
public acceptance of this technology. 
Any reply will depend on the way in which the question is 
worded. If one looks at the results of an opinion poIl 
last organized on a larger-scale irr 1984 one sees that 
the consolidation of nUclear power is reflected by the 
majority opinion that nuclear power should be continued 
at the present level, but that there is a clear decrease 
of the number of answers in favor of nuclear power being 
expanded further. The number of strict nuclear opponents 
may have increased slightly in the past few years, but it 
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is a clear minority, albeit a minority which cannot be 
disregarded because of the unmistakable, vociferous way 
in which it makes its opinion heard. On this, see Fig. 14. 
A closer look reveals a complicated pattern of attitudes 
to nuclear power and its position. Although more than two 
thirds of the public regard nuclear power as necessary to 
protect the continuity of electricity supply, a surpris-
ingly high percentage of the public clearly underestimate 
the present development status of nuclear power. 30% think 
that the number of nuclear power plants in the Federal 
Republic is eight (at the time of the inquiry it was 
eighteen). While 68% of the public asked regarded nuclear 
power as a form of energy which could be expected to 
secure the continuity of energy supply in the future, 75% 
of the politicians, 83% of the journalists and almost all 
epxerts in energy matters asked in this poIl advocated 
this important role of nuclear energy. The opinion 
frequently heard in Germany that nuclear power is a 
subject of debate among experts is thus disproved in a 
very clear way. 
Contrary to the persistent stream of fear of things 
atomic, radioactive, radiating, contrary also to the 
small number of accidents and disasters, such as Harrisburg 
and Chernobyl (were those in fact disasters, or were they 
not technical accidents and incidents occurring more 
frequently and with much graver consequences inother 
sectors of technology7), nuclear power will remain an 
important pillar of energy supply in the Federal Republic 
of Germany and in more than thirty other countries of the 
globe. It is a technology for energy supply whose environ-
mental compatibility, safety, economy and quality of 
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supply becomes more and more clearly apparent. Public 
acceptance will probably be won only in the course of a 
human generation. Like success in many other fields, it 
will not be available for nothing. 
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Problems on Acceptance of Nuclear Eneq,ry - Roots, Development, and Varities in Different Coun-
tries 
E. Münch 
Nudear Research Centre, Jülich, Germany 
Introduction 
For a number of years the introduction of nudear energy and its expansion have been accompanied 
by acceptance pro blems in a number of industrialized countries of the world. This behaviour seems 
to be to a certain extent a historical phenomenon. Since the beginning of technology and industri-
alization in the European countries nearly all innovations have caused fear to the population on the 
one hand and faith in progress on the other. In recent times this ambivalence has evoked a dis-
cussion about risk and benefit. But risk and benefit canot be measured in the same units. Normally 
it would be necessary to compare benefit and damage on the one side and on thc other the risk 
which sterns from a technology with the risk removed by that technology. Therefore the question 
must arise to what extent teclmology and industry has diminishcd the risks of everyday life. In 
former times man was forccd to protect himself against the risks of nature. Today it is more nec-
essary to protect nature from the technology developed by man. Neverthcless it can bc said that 
technology has changed our life positively. Life expectancy has been increascd by technology. The 
number of diseases has been reduced and epedernics have bccome very seldom. Technological de-
vclopments played their role in shortcning our working hours and in preventing the exploitation 
of animal and human labor. Industrialized states presently use an amount of energy comparable 
to a labour force of 12 workers per inhabitant. Technology and industrialization have played their 
role to improve the standard of living, improve health and to protect mankind from natural dangers 
and illnesses. At the same time technology and industry have introduced a number of new - hitherto 
unknown - risks for mankind. It is especially this potential which can lead to problems with the 
acceptance of these technological risks. If it could be shown absolutely clearly that the decrease in 
risk brought about by industrialization is by far bigger than the increase created by technology than 
it would be easy to come to the acceptance of new technologies. But this seems to be a very difficult 
task because objective measures of risks associated with technology are very difficult to come by 
and therefore it is not easy to convince the public. 
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This paper will show using the example of nuclear energy the different elements and viewpoints of 
a controversy created by a new technology. Risk estimation and perception is described as the basis 
of a study, comparing alternative points of view of public perception of nuclear energy of people 
from industrial states with those from developmg countries. Thc analysis and the asscssment of 
differences of attitude can be used to advantage for the situation in Indonesia. 
Different Elements of the Nuclear Controversy 
It is a striking feature of the nuclear controversy that its objectives, means, and methods changed 
frequently during its more than 10 years duration. In spite of the extreme heterogeneity of the 
groups supporting this controversy and despite the different interests goveming it, it is possible to 
identify and to characterize a number of different topics between 1965 and today. The direction of 
impact on the public at large in the nuclear controvery has frcquently changed in the course of years 
or has been handlcd by those involved with varying intensity (Figure 1). While in the fIrst few years 
major importance was attachcd to nuclear safety, radioactive releases, the plutonium problem and 
questions of economy, the emphasis for the scientilic fIeld and in the public mind changed in later 
years. As far as nuclear safety was concerned public interest decreased in the 70s followed by a 
sharp increase in the year 1979 following the Three Mile Island accident. Mter that public interest 
in nuclear safety decreased again until it reached its highest level after the Chernobyl catastrophy. 
Nearly the same behaviour can be identilied for the discussion about radioactive releases and 
emissions from nuclear installations. This question, too, slowed down in the 70s and gained new 
and high importance after Chernobyl. The plutonium issue has attaincd nearly stable importance 
during the last 20 years, whereas interest in economic aspects of nuclear energy, still comparitively 
low in the 60s, had a maximum value in the late 70s and again lost importance until now. In the 
mid 70s new emphasis was attributed to the problems ofwaste handling. The question of prolifer-
ation and the discussion about soft and hard technology is characteristic of the difference between 
nuclear energy and alternative energy sources. In the 80s the waste problem was incrcasingly im-
portant because of the more and more active discussion about the construction of a German re-
processing plant and the preparation of a site for a fmal waste respository. 
Facets of the Nuclear Controversy 
Looking at the nuclear debate in the Federal Republic of Germany between 1974 and today it is 
possible to identify and to describe various facets of this controversy and to analyse the results, 
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achievements, and consequences. Whereas in the beginning of the nuclear age this new energy 
source enjoyed a favorable public which regarded modem technology with fascination and related 
it with national prestige, research reactars and the ftrst commercial nuclear energy installations were 
constmcted alrnost without any public discussion and could be put into operation. The ftrst emer-
gence of opposition to nuclear energy could be recognized in the United States in the late 60s. It 
spread to the European countries around the year 1973 as a consequence of the rising oi! price and 
the resultant acceleration in the extension of nuclear energy. 
Individual groups of opponents quickly joined up to form citizen interest groups which insisted on 
a participation in decisions concerning relevant questions in general and nuclear energy in particular 
(Figure 2). The population's "participation" in licensing proccdures which was granted by means 
of hearings by the Atarnic Law was exercised to an ever increasing extent and led to an exponential 
rise in the number of objections raised in connection with these procedures. These citizen interest 
groups obtained strong support in the press, radio and television. There the questions under dis-
cussion were represented as a topical problem by means of politically effective reporting. In the 
course of time these groups succeeded in influencing political parties and in forming their own 
political parties like the Green Party in Germany. 
Another facet of the nuclear controversy can be identilied in,the effects on public opinion which 
could be initiated by opponent groups. At remarkably regular intervals information was published 
and discussed at length in the media. These news reports were produced on the one hand by erro-
neous interpretations of publications on various topics relating to nuclear energy, on the other hand 
with a lack of factual knowledge. Sometimes these rcports referred to unobjective and 
incompentent sources. 
In the nuclear debate it is frequently maintained that even experts were divided over many 
questions, implying the existance of a scientilic controversy in these respects. It is tme that a large 
number of scientists expressed their opinion on nuclear question, but they did not do so as com-
petent experts on questions relating to nuclear energy but primarily as engaged citizens who, in 
their capacity as scientists in various branches outside nuclear energy enjoy high public esteem. 
Their opinion has a large influence ön public opinion. The population in principle can not decide 
whether or not a scientist really is an expert in the nuclear fteld. Panel discussions in particular have 
gained in popularity because it is more interesting to see experts ftghting on a panel than tö hear 
reports on special topics of nuclear energy. A10ng with this development however, a generalloss 
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of confidence in scientists in general has taken place among the population. This could, however, 
not be capitalized on by the critics of nuclear energy. In 1975 half of those interviewed believed that 
the critics posessed an equally good knowledge as those active in the field of nuclear technology. 
In an interview in the year 1983 both proponents and opponents of nuclear energy attributed the 
greatest expertise and credibility to members of universities and nuclear research centres. Scientists 
engaged in citizen interest groups are given only third place, even by opponents, whereas propo-
nents of nuclear energy rank them in 8th place. 
In the early phase of resistance against nuclear energy sporadic demonstrations against siting deci-
sions for nuclear power plants were observed. Since then the number of demonstrators went up to 
nearly 100,000 in a demonstration in the Capital of Bonn at the peak of the anti-nuclear movement 
in the year 1979. The first demonstrations took place without any use ofviolence but this changed 
in the course of time with violence directed against property being one of the early goals of the 
demonstrations. Violence against the police was gradually increased during these actions. 
The activation of the political sphere for the problems of nuclear energy constitutes a further facet 
of the nuclear controversy. This facet is interesting in more than one respecL It illustrates anti-
nuclear initiatives, it involves massive influence on parties and government, it manifests itsclf in 
elections influenced by the nuclear energy issue and in the foundation of new political parties by 
citizen interest groups, fighting for seats in parliament from whence to continue their struggle 
against nuclear energy. As a consequence there have been parliament debates on the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy, but as far as the German Parliament is concemed the result has always been a 
basic approval of nuclear energy. Nevertheless the problem of nuclear energy has been dealt with 
by all political parties on the occasion of their party congresses. Presently there is a great difference 
in the points of views in the different parties as far as nuclear energy in Germany is concemed. 
Courts of justice were also appealed to most frequently in the course of the nuclear controversy. 
Court decisions interrupted the construction of nuclear power plants for months, prevented the 
commissioning of completed plants by more than 1 year or ordered building stops one of which 
has lasted till the present day. All levels of the judiciary up to the Federal Constitutional Court 
have b~en appealed to in the course of time. Although the opponents of nuclear energy were seldom 
ultimately successful in their appeals these appeals nevertheless have let to construction times for 
nuclear power stations almost doubling in the past few years, numerous building projects being 
interrupted for long time periods or not being put into operation after completion and the blocking 
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other plants. This fact is one of the contributions to considerable cost increases for nuclear instal-
lations in Germany. 
Risk Estimation and Perception 
In a previous paper [IJ presented 2 years ago, it was mentioned, that the general public assesses risks 
in a different manner from the risk evaluation of experts, who work on the basis of scientific risk 
defInition. To fmd out the reasons for this descrepancy it is necessary to point out the important 
factors which people apply in their specific evaluation of risks. In a number of investigations the 
analyses determined 5 topics as important factors in risk perception. 
.. Qualitative risk features, 
.. Catastrophe potentials, 
.. Beliefs about the type of eonsequenees, 
.. Social values, 
.. Personal eharaeteristies. 
Voluntariness seems to be the most irnportant qualitative risk feature. Freedom of ehoiee in the 
aeeeptanee of risk is one of the reasons that a risk souree whieh is voluntarily aeeepted may show 
a 1,000 times higher loss rate than risks which are imposed by soeiety. This ean explain that ciga-
rette smoking and automobile traffie are much more easily acecepted than nuclear energy in spite 
of the fact that the number of deaths by lung cancer or heart deseases due to smoking or the number 
of deaths by traffie aceidents is much higher than the number of people killed by nuclear energy 
even in a catastrophic aecident. 
Great difficulties in aceeptanee of nuclear energy result from the believe that nuclear energy has 
an extrcmely high catastrophe potential. It is true that similar eatastrophe potentials are associated 
with a big number of teehnologies used by highly industrialized n,ations, for instance chemie al in-
dustry, energy production, automobile and air traffic, or bioteehnology. But this potential is only 
taken seriously as far as nuclear energy is coneemed because it is described in an highly exaggerated 
manner by the opponents of this technology. 
Beliefs about consequences auain more negative values for nuclear energy than they do for the use 
of coal, solar energy or wind. The fact that nuclear energy does not contribute to the problem of 
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acid rain and its effeets on the forests, and the role of nuclear power for solving future energy 
problems is not enough to prevent a negative effeet on the publie. In spite of aeeidents in coal 
mines, the pollution of air by emission of SO&hd.2&hu. and NO&hd.x&hu.and the future problem 
of CO&hd.2&hu. eoal and other fossile energies have a generally positive publie image. 
Personal eharacteristics can be measured for instance in the difference between what energy option 
or teehnology is wanted and how far this desire can be realized in the technical future. Furthermore 
it is always necessary to establish a relationship between the ideas people have about risks and the 
object causing them. Thus the atomic armement or the Chemobyl accident with the radioactive 
contarnination of countries Iying more than 1,000 miles away from the nuclear reactor site paints 
a more negative picture of everything associated with nuclear energy than a positive one. 
From Normality to the Chernobyl Syndrom 
In spite of all these problems nuclear energy was accepted in the Federal Republic of Germany in 
the ftrst half of the 80s. After the last election nuclear energy was not considered to be a topic for 
political discussion. It was possible to describe nuclear energy just as a 'normal' method of energy 
production. At the end of 1984 a total number of 20 nuclear stations (3 prototypes and 17 com-
mercial plants with a capacity of about 17,000 MWe) produced nearly 1/3 of the total electricity in 
Germany and contributed more than 10 per cent to the primary energy production in our country. 
Normality does not mean that nuclear energy was not discussed any longer. It was recognised that 
all forms of energy production had their advantages and disadvantages. The fossil fuels caused acid 
rain and were therefore a great danger for the forests. The alternative sources had the disadvantage 
of low potential and high price, and nuclear energy the disadvantage of radioactivity, the so-called 
plutonium eeonomy and the aspeet of proliferation. 
This all ehanged irnmediately after April 26, 1986, when the aeeident oeeurred in one of the four 
nuclear power plants in Chemobyl, USSR. Sinee then, the fear of nuclear energy in the publie has 
grown and the overwhelming majority suddenly wants to abandon nuclear energy. Beeause of the 
fact that the radioaetive eontarnination eaused restrietions in fmit and vegetable eonsumption, the 
European population feit the eonsequenees of a nuclear aecident very close to horne, although the 
aeeident was very far away. In the forefront of diseussion was the question whether an aecident like 
that in Chemobyl eould also oeeur in a nuclear power plant of the Federal Republie of Germany. 
Anti-nuclear organizations, together with political parties, thought about the possibility offorgoing 
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the utilisation of nuclear energy. In the course of this consideration the great differences in nuclear 
safety between Gennan and Russian power plants had been apparantly forgotten. On the other 
hand it was very difficult to make these technical differences clear to the public. The physical in-
stability of the Russian reactor in which a temperature increase leads to apower excursion, the poor 
design of the emergency core cooling system (which would never fulIf111 the demands of Gennan 
safety guidelines) and the absolute absence of a tight containment to retain radioactive fission pro-
ducts could not be conveyed to the public. According to the report of the USSR state committee 
on the utilisation of atornic energy about the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant [2], 
which has been presented to the IAEA in August 1986 the operating personnel of the reactor 
blocked the safety system of the reactor in order to perfonn an experiment with a turbine. One can 
therefore argue that this type of accident is impossible in a reactor which is built according to 
Gennan safety rules and guidelines. Whereas some political parties and interested groups in our 
country want to abandon nuclear energy without regard for cost, unemployment, industrial situ-
ation and the country's position in international commerce, the majority ofthe Gennan population 
is not in favour of this, as the latest polis perfonned in the Federal Republic of Gennany show. 
According to these polis 57 per cent are not in favour of foregoing nuclear power, whereas 32 per 
cent do so [3]. In the public discussion, the question of safety differences in nuclear power plants 
between Gennany and the neighbouring countries is receiving more and more attention. Our 
country, with its 20 nuc1ear installations, is surrounded by nearly 200 nuclear installations in other 
European countries. Therefore, once again safety is one of the key issues of nuclear energy. The 
trend is going toward a so-called forgiving technology in the nuclear field which does not endanger 
the environment even in the event of human error. 
The Attitudes towards Nuclear Energy - Comparison between Industrial and Developing COllntries 
In a paper two years ago it was illustrated that there exist distinct differences in public attitudes 
towards the nuclear energy option arnong people from industrial societies and those living in de-
veloping countries (1]. In that paper some important influences goveming the attitudes of people 
in developing and industrialized countries where obtained by comparing the answers of students 
of technical subjects in Gennany, Japan and the Philippines to questions concerning nuclear energy 
[4]. Today, additional results for Latin American students perrnit a more comprehensive look to the 
situation [5]. The student sarnples were taken from technical faculties of universities. In Gennany 
150 students were interviewed, the Japanese students comprised a group of 120, the Philippine 
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students were 174 in number and the students from Latin America were, with 684, the largest group 
sampled. As a general remark it can be coneluded that the Japanese students are predominantly in 
favour of the use of nuelear energy, the 3 other student-samples from Germany, the Philippines and 
from Latin America inelude both interest groups, proponents (PRO) and opponents (CON). In 
Latin America the distribution between PRO and CON was nearly equaI. 
To measure the attitude of the students towards nuelear energy direct1y the technique of the se-
mantic differential was used. This technique makes use of the evaluation of bipolar descriptors and 
provides interesting information about the respondents' perception of nuelear energy. The students 
were asked to rate themselves conceming the relevant descriptors on a 7-point-scale ranging from 
-3 (i.e. to accept the negative descriptor) to + 3 (for the positive one). Figure 3 shows the list of 
these bipolar descriptors and the mean ratings given for each country. The sequence of the de-
scriptors on the figure is determined by the mean value for the Latin American respondents in de-
scending order. The favourable Japanese respondents (open circles) see the use of nuelear energy 
as very important and useful, quite good, modem and worthwhile, although they realise that it is 
quite controversal and slightly dangerous. In contrast to this relatively elear perception, Philippine 
students (elosed cireles) view nuelear energy as quite wrong, oppressing and useless, whereby they 
seem to acknowledge that the nuelear energy source has so me irnportance. The German students 
(c1osed triangles) have the least strong feeling about the use of nuelear energy, perceiving it as quite 
modem, useful, fairly important, worthwhile, but slightly dangerous, too. The Latin American 
students (open triangles) are of the opinion that nuelear energy is modem, quite useful, important 
and worthwhile. But they see it as an unpredictible harmful energy source which might be contro-
versial and dangerous. 
For the Latin American students the semantic differential method was applied for five energy 
sources: nuelear, solar, hydro, coal and oil. The results are depicted in figure 4. The order of de-
seriptors is the same as in the previous figure and is determined by the mean values for nuelear 
energy in descending order. It is elearly seen that the Latin Ameriean students have given the highest 
positive ratings to solar energy, elosely followed by hydro. The fossile fuels such as oil and eoal are 
generally rated as less positive than these. As far as nuelear energy is concemed ratings tend to be 
low. Most of the values are located in the range between -I to + I whieh indieates that the opinion 
is, to a certain extent, undecided. Solar, hydro and coal are perceived as right, benefieial, irnportant, 
useful and aeeeptable. Nuelear energy is appreciated as useful and modem, but the reservations are 
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expressed in that nuclear energy is seen as dangerous, hannful, unpredictable and controversial. It 
seems that the interviewed students re!ate negatively to nuclear energy whereas they do not perceive 
other energy options with the same degree of eriticism. Solar and hydro are to a great extent energy 
sources which people desire today and especially in the future.They are used to eoal and oil and they 
fee! that they ean use these fossile energy sources together with a lot of other countries. Nuclear 
energy is ambivalent. There are positive and negative eharacteristics, as far as risk and benefit is 
concemed, in nearly every country of the world. So in every nation where nuclear energy is used 
01' will be used in the future it seems necessary to inform people, especially the young intelligent 
generation, about the real advantages and the real disadvantages of nuclear energy. Only in this way 
will objective assessment be forthcoming. 
But there is another interesting fact which was revealed by the investigation. The Latin American 
students were nearly equally divided into opponents and proponents of nuclear energy. So a se-
mantic differential could be obtained for the CON and the PRO-group. This is shown in figure 5. 
It is easy to see that the main values of the PRO-group are predominantely in the positive range 
whereas the CON-group averages are mainly negative. However, some concems about nuclear 
energy have also been expressed by the PRO-group. Both groups agree that nuclear energy is very 
modem way of energy production. But for nearly all descriptors the differences between the CON 
and the PRO-groups ratings are 2 points 01' more on the possible 7 point scale. The difference is 
very small only as far as solar, hydro, eoal and oi! is eoneemed. Here the ratings ofthe positive and 
negative groups are very close together with the greatest differenee for oi!, amounting to nearly I 
point on the 7 point seale. This shows onee again that only nuclear energy seems to be eontroversial 
in publie opinion in general and in students opinion in partieular. The slight differenees in the at-
titude and the aeeeptanee of other energy sources make nuclear encrgy so problematie in the 
thinking of people. 
Another possibility to obtain information about the attitude of people towards cncrgy production 
methods is the definition of beliefs and their irnportanee in deeiding to be in favour or against one 
of these methods. A belief, in the way it is used in this analysis, represents the information a person 
has about a given object and to what degree this information is assoeiated with the objeet in ques-
tion. Figure 6 shows which beliefs are chosen to be of highest irnportanee by the different sampies 
of interviewed students Le. in the first 6 ranks. This gives information about the attributes to whieh 
the highest rate of awareness of the respondents about the current issues in the nuclear debate is 
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associated. There were in all 30 attributes on the basis of which the students could make their 
rating. The analysis indicates the degree to which the respondents are informed on the subject of 
nuc1ear energy production. 
Taking the flrst 4 top ranking issues for each sampie, it can be seen that Philippine and Japanese 
respondents see both risks and beneflts of nuclear energy as of relevance whereas German re-
spondents mainly are interested in the beneflts. With regard to the priorities expressed by 
Philippine students, they are concerned with potential health impacts and large accidents on the risk 
side, and on stimulation of scicntilic, technological research and technical progress on the beneflt 
side. Japanese students paid attention to the management of dangerous wastes and to large accidents 
but also recognized the importance of the stimulation of scientific and technological research and 
a cheap energy source. In Germany students appear to be concentrating their attention on the 
bencflcial aspects of generating nuclear energy and on conservation of natural resources, long-term 
solution of energy needs, increased employment and stimulation of research. Trus might be inter-
preted as an indication that their interest in the beneflts of nuclear power takes precedence over their 
beliefs regarding risks. Regarding the lowest priority assigned by the 3 sampies, wruch is not shown 
in the flgure, they all agree that concerns about a consumption oriented society are not relevant to 
thc debate about nuclear power. 
For the Latin American sampie the situation is slightly different. For the total sampie the most 
important concems were about the harmfulness to future generations, followed by the management 
of dangerous wastes, the impact on peoples health and the hazards wruch people can not influence 
by their own actions. The possiblity that nuclear energy might be stimulating scientific and tech-
nological research occupies only flfth place in the importance ratings. The issues regarding the 
consumption oriented society and the diffusion of knowledge for construction of weapons are given 
the least importance in the nuclear debate and are therefore not shown on the flgure. 
The Latin American sampie was divided into the PRO and CON-group on the basis of their dis-
tinct attitudes. Inspection of the ranks assigned to the attributes by the CON-group shows a much 
higher similarity with the total sampie than the PRO-group does. In particular the top 4 ranks in-
clude the same attributes. Only the flfth rank is totally different. The highest ranking is given by the 
CON-group to concerns about potential risks. On the other hand the PRO-group gives flrst priority 
to technical progress, stimulation of scientilic and technological research, the promotion of the in-
- 102 -
dustrial development and the economic independence of the country. These attributes can be de-
scribed in general as technical, economic and national benefits. 
This situation shows that there exists to a certain degree a concem among the proponents of the 
nuc1ear energy as to potential risks and diff'iculties in the management of nuclear energy. These 
concems are articulated by the proponents along with the benefits. The opponents, on the other 
hand, focuss their attention purelyon the negative aspects of nuc1ear power production and give 
little or no credit to its benefits. In this sense, the CO N -group appears to represent the general 
feelings of the sampie as a whole more than does the PRO-group. 
Conclusions 
With regard to the experience of more than IO years of nuclear controversy in an industrialized 
country it seems to be very difficult to give advice for actions to improve acceptance. Moreover this 
might be even more difficult to give this advice for the situation irr a developing country. For every 
nation the prerequisits, irrcentives, conditions and plans for the future are different. The social sit-
uation, the economic conditions, the resources and the political facts have to be analyzed specific1y 
and taken irrto consideration by irnproving acceptance for new technologies and especially accept-
ance for nuclear energy. So it was more the intention of this report to show some deciding factors 
for direct activities, the elements which have to be recognized, the methods which can be used, and 
to show how other people, especially students, behave in industrialized and in developirrg countries. 
Without a better knowledge it can not be decided precisely which ofthe presented countries, Japan, 
the Philippirres or the Latirr American countries are representative for the situation irr Indonesia. 
But the reader will certainly be able to take this decision and to take advantage of the results and 
fmdings of the different studies reported about in this paper. Therefore this presentation might be 
the analytical background for future actions specifically focussed on the Indonesian people which 
enables it to make a profit of nuclear power as a vigorous energy source for furt her development 
and for the industrialization of the country. 
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1. The Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center 
The Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center (KfK) was founded in 1956. This 
national research establishment and others were created roughly at the 
same time in order to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in the 
Federal Republic of Germany by research and development work in the 
nuclear field. 
The Nuclear Research Center is organized as a private company (Gesell-
schaft mit beschränkter Haftung, GmbH, under German law) in which the 
Federal Government holds a 90%, the Baden-Württemberg State Government a 
10% interest. The KfK site at present covers an area of approx. 
2.5 km2 (Fig. 1). The Center's 52 administrative units are arranged 
under five executive headings with specialized scientific and technical 
functions (Fig. 2). Most of the twelve main activities of KfK (Fig. 3) 
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deal with nuclear subjects, but are increasingly supplemented by non-
nuclear topics. The Center at present has a staff of approx. 4100 persons 
and an annual budget of approx. DM 700 million. 
2. Basic Principles of Public Relations Work 
Public relations work is a dialog between institutions and society 
carried on in an attempt to generate understanding and appreciation of 
the activities of those institutions. In concrete terms, this means that 
the external image of an institution is preserved and improved, respec-
tively, and the internal corporate identity is strengthened. In anational 
nuclear research center, this dialog is influenced especially by the 
following environment (Fig. 4): 
Communication in public relations is about highly specialized research 
findings. 
Research in the nuclear field is bound to be accompanied by nuclear 
incidents and accidents. 
- Government institutions have the duty to inject information into the 
ongoing debate about the acceptance of nuclear technology. 
- Research - its public relations activities included - costs public 
money. 
From these contributing factors a number of major points and administrative 
requirements can be derived which must be met in public relations work: 
- Understandability and clarity is essential in a dialog with the general 
public, in the presentation of recent research and development findings 
as weIl as in reports about accidents or incidents or descriptions of 
the current state of the art in nuclear technology. As a rule, this 
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requirement is met only by public relations experts; research scientists 
are seldom prepared to translate into general, understandable language 
the scientific and technical jargon used in the field. 
- Openness and frankness, i.e., communication without reservation, is 
indispensable to establishing an atmosphere of trust with the public 
and representatives of the media. As far as research findings are 
concerned, this frankness can be taken for granted, for it is required 
under the statutes of KfK. However, especially when accidents or 
incidents are involved, absolutely open and complete reporting of the 
facts by the Public Relations Department is the only way in which to 
counteract one of the frequently practiced tenets of the media: "Only 
bad news is good news." Moreover, experience teils that a less-than-open 
information policy in such cases is bound to produce a negative basic 
attitude vis-a-vis that institution. 
Uniformity, i.e. speaking and writing in one voice is a confidence 
building measure whose effectiveness should not be underrated, especially 
in controversial discussions about nuclear technology. This absence of 
contradictions in written or verbal statements is supplemented by a 
uniform outward appearance, which is one of the preconditions for 
achieving high scores in public awareness. 
- Controllability of the impact of public relations measures must be 
ensured if funds ar to be spent effectively. Despite great efforts, the 
impact of such measures can be gaged objectively only in some narrow 
fields. 
Initiative or taking the lead in informing the public is particularly 
important, not only in positive, but also in negative cases. Taking the 
initiative especially in those latter cases will create confidence, 
even if it will not entirely avoid critical articles in the press. The 
impression created by negative news can be compensated only by a high 
rate of positive news. It is known from experience that a high rate of 
news production requires the proper initiative on the part of public 
relations departments. 
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- Freedom of action is needed for quick reactions to the media. It is a 
weIl known fact that reacting quickly is very important in establishing 
good working relations with the media. Freedom of action also means 
that public relations is not only a mediator, but also a source in the 
communication process. 
3. Administrative Structure of the Public Relations Department 
Public relations departments are given the necessary freedom of act by 
being placed in the company hierarchy so that they report to top manage-
ment. At the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center, the Public Relations 
Department (Fig. 5) directly reports to the Chief Executive Officer. The 
Head of the Public Relations Department acts as spokesman of the Center 
in the public. This is an independent function, which requires hirn to be 
fully informed of the work of all units and of the policy goals of the 
Executive Board. At KfK this is ensured by the Head of Public Relations 
attending the meetings of the Executive Board and of its consultant 
bodies. Other conditions for achieving adequate freedom of action are 
good personal contacts with the scientists in the different units and 
also scientific and technical knowledge of their activities. 
Administratively, the Public Relations Department is arranged in specialized 
areas managed by expert staff (Fig. 5). The Department has a staff of 
twelve persons, among them two scientists, one editor, two graphie 
artists, and two photographers. Annual expenses amount to approximately 
DM 2.2 million (state as of 1985). The activities of the Public Relations 
Department are planned ahead in detail for aperiod of approximately 
18 months. Effectiveness is monitored on the basis of an annual activity 
report. 
4. Public Relations Instruments 
The key tools used by the Public Relations Department are listed in 
Fig 6. These are the "KfK-Hausmitteilungen" as a house journal, the 
reports distributed about accidents and incidents, the "KfK-Nachrichten" 
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as a scientific journal, press releases, exhibitions, guided tours for 
visitors, the Nuclear Energy Information Staff, the production of displays 
and publications, and a Conference Office. These tools are arranged in a 
sequence representing the transition from more internal to more external 
effects. Figure 6 also contains a statement on effectiveness monitoring, 
indicating to what extent effectiveness can actually be measured in 
objective terms or is restricted to a more subjective evaluation. This 
will be described in greater detail below. Figure 6 does not contain some 
other essential tools not routinely applied, such as improving community 
relations by organizing meetings with the mayors of the neighborhood 
communities or producing a film informing about the Center every 5 to 
6 years or updating the permanent exhibtion for the benefit of visitors. 
4.1 "KfK-Hausmitteilungen," a House Journal 
The house journal, "KfK-Hausmitteilungen", (Fig. 7) informs tahe staff 
about what goe~ 6n at the Center and is important or worth knowing. 
Although most of its impact is internal, some 20% of the approx. 
6000 copies printed of each issue are mailed to former staff members and 
to friends of the Center. The journal is published in six issues annually, 
each of them comprising an average of 35 pages. The editors enjoy freedom 
of the press and receive no instructions from the Executive Board. 
An attempt was made to conduct impact research on an objective basis. 
Unlike commercial publications, the acceptance of our house journal 
cannot be judged on the basis of its circulation. Consequently, the 
topics the personnel want to be covered in a company journal were listed 
in the format of an interest profile. The editors try to adhere to this 
profile of readers' interests on a long-term basis by selecting the 
appropriate topics and giving them the desired space. The outcome of this 
procedure is represented in Fig. 8. Five areas of interest were defined 
for the contents of articles to be published in the company journal: "The 
Working Environment at KfK" encompasses the activities of the staff 
except for those treated under "Research and Development." Other headings 
are "Social and Personnel Matters," "Corpora te Policy," and "Hobbies and 
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Sports Activities." Averaging various profiles of interests assumed to be 
plausible for various groups of staff members results in a target profile 
of the interests of the staff of the whole Center, which should be 
catered to in the information mix published in "Hausmitteilungen." It 
appears that articles about hobbies of staff members and sports activities 
rank at the bottom of the sale of interests, while the working environ-
ment of the Nuclear Research Center, which affects by far the largest 
number of staff members, seems to be the topic arousing the greatest 
interest. The articles published in the company journal can be classified 
under these areas of interest and can then be weighted with editorial 
factors as far as reading appeal and frequency of publication are concerned. 
The average of the information contained in all issues of "Hausmitteilungen" 
in the per iod 1978 - 1985 more or less corresponds to the demand profile. 
Individual issues of the journal may greatly deviate from that profile, 
as the low statistical population can cause considerable variation. 
4.2 Accident Information 
The information disseminated to staff members in cases of accidents, of 
which Fig. 9 shows a specimen copy, is an attempt to provide information 
to the staff as quickly and as factually as possible by notices put on 
the bulletin boards. At the same time, this information is transmitted by 
telephone to representatives of the local press. Consequently, this type 
of information has both internal and external impacts. 
Classical accidents at work, especially if personnel injuries are involved, 
must be reported to the supervisory authorities and the insurance 
companies. The press take little interest in such events uhless spectacular 
property damage or major injuries of personnel are involved. In the 
nuclear field, however, accident or incident is a term encompassing all 
events which deviate from the routine scheme of operation and which must 
be reported to the supervisory authorities with different degrees of 
urgency, depending on their relevancy to the safety of the facilities 
involved. Unlike conditions in the classical industrial sector, the press 
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take a keen interest even in very minor incidents in the nuclear field. 
KfK works by the rule that all events which must be reported to the 
authorities will be published as accident information, if persons were 
endangered by exposures to radioactive substances or direct radiation or 
if there had been a risk of such exposures, or if such troublesome terms 
as, e.g., plutonium were mentioned in this connection. 
Effectiveness monitoring in this field can be conducted on an objective 
basis. Fig. 10 shows that the frequency of articles reporting on such 
events with a negative bias has decreased greatly. 
However, it must be pointed out that it took several years for this open 
information policy to be fully accepted internally and appreciated 
properly by the representatives of the media in matter-of-fact reporting. 
Incidentally, 1985 shows a considerable renewed increase in negative 
reporting. After a long per iod in which nuclear technology had been taken 
almost for granted we now recognize a growing sensitivity of the press, 
triggered probably by the renewed discussion this year about construction 
of a German reprocessing plant. Also, we anticipate another rise in 
negative reporting in 1986 as a consequence of the Chernobyl event. 
4.3 "KfK-Nachrichten," a Scientific Journal 
The scientific journal published by the Nuclear Research Center, "KfK-
Nachrichten" (Fig. 11), is among the science periodicals in the Federal 
Republic of Germany with the highest circulation. It provides information 
about research activities at the Nuclear Research Center on a scientific 
level, but written so as to be understood also by other disciplines. Two 
thirds of the roughly 4500 copies printed are distributed externally, 
some 5% of these internationally. Effectiveness monitoring in this field 
is mainly subjective. He conclude form the external demand for "KfK-
Nachrichten" and from the journal's use a s forum for scientific publi-
cation that it has been accepted as one of the major factors contributing 
to the positive image of the Nuclear Research Center. 
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4.4 Press Releases 
Press releases are the most important tool in external public relations 
work. Fig. 12 shows a specimen copy. The Public Relations Department 
issues approximately 40 press releases per annum, most of which contain 
reports about scientific and technical work conducted at the Center. The 
Executive Board does not exercise any influence over the wording. The 
press releases are meant to achieve the broadest possible coverage in the 
daily press. 
The attention the national press is devoting to the Center is measured 
with the assistance of a press clipping service and is documented in 
semi-annual press coverage reports. These reports contain reprints of all 
press clippings mentioning the Nuclear Research Center, arranged both by 
source and by tendency with respect to public impact. Fig. 13 shows the 
cumulated press resonance of the Center since 1978. Press activities have 
been greatly intensified since 1977. On an annual average, some 2700 
clippings are registered in which the Nuclear Research Center is mentioned. 
Sampies have indicated that these clippings represent an annual newspaper 
circulation of approximately 115 million copies. Special attention should 
be drawn to the relatively small average fraction of 3% of reports with a 
negative bias, most of which originate with newspapers whose political 
attitude is antinuclear, and a relatively high percentage of positive 
reports amounting to an average 30%. 
Fig. 14 shows the press statistics for 1985. The press clippings collected 
are arranged in accordance with the topics covered: press clippings based 
on press releases by KfK or on accident reports, and those articles in 
which KfK is only mentioned in connection with the general subject of a 
report. Interestingly, more than half of the clippings are based on 
reports initiated by the respective press releases, with an impressive 
percentage of positive reports in this category. This is experimental 
proof of the benefit of aggressive press work. 
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Press activities in the seventies were supplemented by information 
courses for journalists on topics und er particularly violent discussion 
at the time. These courses were discontinued in 1979 for lack of attendance 
of the target group. 
4.5 Exhibitions and Fairs 
Representing the Nuclear Research Center at exhibitions is also one of 
the responsibilities of the Public Relations Department. The center 
participates in 3 - 5 exhibitions a year, whose impact is exclusively 
external in nature, apart, perhaps, from motivating the staff members 
involved. Fig. 15 shows one example: environmental measurement systems 
displayed by the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center at the 1986 ENVITEC 
international fair at Düsseldorf. 
The success of exhibitions at fairs can be assessed on a largely objective 
basis, i.e., the reports by participants, which reflect both the general 
interest of visitors and the success achieved in technology transfer. 
4.6 Guided Tours 
Guided tours represent another major factor in external image building. 
The Center is visited by some 10,000 persons annually, who are guided by 
some 40 staff members from various institutes and departments on the 
basis of a highly standardized program. The standardization of the 
program, and the installation of permanent points to be visited within 
the units of KfK, was found to be necessary because of time consuming 
measures of physical security and radiation protection. Fig. 16 shows 
details of the program. First a film is run and an exhibition of the main 
activities of KfK is demonstratedj this is followed by a discussion, a 
round trip, and a tour usually of one technical object. The guides are 
recruited from among particularly interested scientific staff members, 
who undergo special didactic training. 80% of the visitors are primary 
and secondary school students (Fig. 17), most of them highly interested 
in the program. This makes guided tours an investment for the future. 
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Assessment of the impression visiting groups receive on their guided 
tours is largely objectified on the basis of questionnaires. An average 
of 40% of the visiting groups return the questionnaires, expressing 
unreservedly positive comments in some 70% of the cases. Frequent complaints 
are made, however, about the limitations, due to radiation protection and 
physical security, of possibilities to visit objects within radiation 
protection areasj even the permanent points visited on each guided tour 
at various institutes and departments are not considered to be adequate 
substitutes. This points to a clear conflict between security and safety 
requirements and the needs of public relations work. Points to be visited 
on guided tours therefore should be incorporated in the plant designs, if 
possible, as areas excluded from radiation protection control to which 
access is easy. 
4.7 Nuclear Energy Information Staff 
The Nuclear Energy Information Staff is an important instrument in 
improving the public acceptance of nuclear technology. It was set up in 
1974, when the nuclear controversy was at its peak, and comprises some 
30 staff members of the Center (Fig. 18). The members of the Nuclear In-
formation Staff participate in public debates about nuclear energy, 
lecture to various groups of multipliers or at seminars organized by 
secondary schools, and write information brochures published by KfK on 
special topics under discussion. Fig. 19 is a list of the titles of those 
brochures and their circulations, with the added footnote that these 
publications are distributed mainly as single copies sent out on request. 
Fig. 20 gives you an impression of the presentation of these brochures. 
As far as lecturing activities are concerned, effectiveness monitoring is 
based mainly on subjective assessment by the members of the Nuclear 
Energy Information Staff, apart from occasional reports about lecturing 
events. As far as publications are concerned, the demand for these 
brochures may be taken as a yards tick in objectifying impact research. 
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4.8 Corporate Displays and Publications 
All displays and publications by the Nuclear Research Center, such as 
scientific reports\ posters, slides, brochures, programs, memos, pamphlets, 
and even the car fleet, should bear uniform design features to achieve a 
recognizable corporate identity. This uniformity in presentation facilitates 
external identification and enhances awareness. Awareness is important, 
for there can be no appreciation without awareness. Also the interna 1 
identification of staff members with their institution is reinforced in 
this way, especially if that institution, like the Nuclear Research 
Center, is made up of a large number of scientific facilities with very 
many individual feelings of "institute identity." There is growing demand 
for these services by the Public Relations Department, but full acceptance 
of this standardization has not yet been achieved at the moment. 
4.9 Conference Office 
An important instrument in public relations work i8 the service offered 
to scientific meetings. The facilities of the Nuclear Research Center can 
be used as avenue for meetings of up to 500 participants. The Conference 
Office of the Public Relations Department organizes some 20 major events 
annually, each of which is attended by more than 100 persons. In addition, 
some 30 minor events with a total of approximately 1000 participants are 
organized. This service is provided in order to create a positive external 
impression through efficient conference organization and by taking good 
care of the participants in such meetings. The popularity of KfK as a 
venue for meetings is indicative of the success of these efforts. 
5. Influencing Public Opinion 
The influence exerted on public opinion by the public relations activities 
of an institution can be measured by representative polIs. Fig. 21 shows 
an example. In a representative poIl organized on a nation wide and a 
regional basis, we inquired about public awareness of the name of "Kern-
forschungszentrum Karlsruhe" and of the "KfK" acronym and also about the 
trend of public opinion. Even on a national basis, a surprising high 
score of 64% of public awareness was found. Regarding the trend of 
opinion, it is not the positive vote of 47% which is surprising, but 
rather the relatively low negative score of only 6% - compared, for 
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example, with the 40 to 50% currently found for other industries in the 
focus of public interest. From a detailed evaluation of the results of 
the poIl it can be concluded that these 6% are people more or less 
generally opposed to modern technology. Furthermore, it can be shown that 
the printed media represent the greatest source of public awareness. 
Chernobyl had consequences not only on the public attitude towards 
nuclear power in Germany, but also on the organization of the Pub1ic 
Relations Department of the KfK, as far as emergencies are concerned. We 
have to admit that the event found us largely unprepared. As a consequence, 
we had to improvise our informing the news media, the pub1ic and the 
authorities. To avoid simi1ar uncoordinated actions in the case of future 
events, we have set up an emergency committee in the meantime, which 
consists of members of the Executive Board, heads of relevant scientific, 
technical and administrative departments, and of the Pub1ic Relations 
Department. In case of an emergency, that committee will en1arge the 
Pub1ic Relations Department by delegating to it expert personne1 from the 
institutes and by insta1ling appropriate, prepared, technical means of 
communication. The production and the f10w of information is directed to 
four c1early different groups: the media, the public, the staff and 
public authorities. We hope that.it will not be necessary to put this 
plan into action. 
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Interne Information Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe Vorstand 
4.10.1985 
Info Nr. 3/85 
Am 3.10.1985 gegen 12.00 Uhr wurde ein im Technikum zur Komponen-
tenerprobung (TEKO) beschäftigter Mitarbeiter beim Umgang mit 
einem Chemikalienbehälter im Lager für wiederverwertbare Chemie-
abfälle des KfK äußerlich mit Spuren von Plutonium und Americium 
kontaminiert. Die Kontamination wurde anschließend vollständig 
entfernt. Die am gleichen Tag durchgeführten Direktmessungen 
ergaben keinen Verdacht auf Inkorporation radioaktiver Stoffe. 
Ergänzende ausscheidungsanalytische Messungen werden durchge-
führt. 
Gegenwärtig wird untersucht, wie der kontaminierte Chemiekalien-
behälter in das für nicht radioaktive Stoffe vorgesehene Chemie-
lager gelangt ist. Die zuständigen Behörden wurden von dem 
Zwischenfall unterrichtet. 
Kernforschungszentrum Kortsruhe GmbH· 0-7500 Karlsruhe1 • Postfach 3640 . Tel. (07247) 822861 • Fernschreiber 7828484 
====================~~====~ 
Accident memo 
Fig. 9 
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Accident 
Press clippings 
Year memos Rate Total Negative 
1978 10 5 51 25 
- ~ -- --- ----~ I 
1979 14 I 49 690 33 I 
-
--
1900 17 36 620 2 
. -'.---- - - ----- ._-
-----
1981 10 28 277 3 
.---_.- - .... -.- -- "--- -- _ .. ,--. _ .. - -- --"" 
1902 5 19 94 0 
-_. 
1983 4 6 25 0 
- .- . --- .. --
.- -- ! 
I 
1904 4 I 46 183 0 I 
-~ I 
1985 4 I 106 I 425 39 I ! I I -~ 
[ Average 9 37 296 
======================~~======= 
Development of press coverage of accidents at KfK 
Fig. 10 
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Scientific Journal 
Fig. 11 
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Presseinformation Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe 
36/85 
Seifenblase aus Baustahl 
Vom Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe (KfK) wurde jetzt eine 
stählerne Kugelschale von rd. 1,3 Meter Durchmesser und 
einer Wandstärke von nur 1 Millimeter als Modellkörper für 
Schwingungsuntersuchungen entwickelt. Besonders bemerkens-
wert: Durch spanabhebende Herstellung konnten Formabwei-
chungen von der Kugelgestalt der "stählernen Seifenblase" 
von weniger als 0,05\ erreicht werden. 
Der charakteristische, kugelförmige Reaktorsicherheitsbehäl-
ter ist bei Kernkraftwerken eine wichtige Barriere gegen die 
Freisetzung von Radionukliden. Für die Stabilitä~ des Reak-
torsicherheitsbehälters bei stoßartigen Belastungen, etwa 
durch Erdbeben, sind die in der Behälterwand auftretenden 
Schwingungen maßgebend. Die üblichen Rechenprogramme gehen 
dabei von einer idealen Kugelgestalt des Behälters aus. Im 
Institut für Reaktorentwicklung des Kernforschungszentrums 
soll dagegen jetzt quantitativ geklärt werden, welchen 
Einfluß die in der Praxis vorhandenen Abweichungen von der 
Kugelgestalt, etwa durch die Personen- und Materialschleusen 
oder die zahllosen Rohrleitungsdurchführungen in der Wand 
des Behälters auf sein Schwingungsverhalten haben. Beson-
ders wichtig ist dabei die experimentelle Bestätigung der 
entwickelten Rechenmodelle. In-situ-Messungen der Schwin-
gungsformen des Reaktorsicherheitsbehälters eines Kernkraft-
werks mit seinen 56 Meter Durchmessern sind nur begrenzt 
möglich und für das theoretische Verständnis auch nur von 
begrenzter Aussagekraft. 
Für die experimentellen Untersuchungen wurde daher ein maß-
stäblich verkleinertes Abbild des Sicherheitsbehälters von 
1,3 Meter Durchmesser und einer Wandstärke von 1 Millimeter 
konzipiert: eine Seifenblase aus Stahl. Am Anfang der span-
.1. 
Nachdruck kostenlol Baleg erbeten 
Kernfonchungszontrum Karlsruhe GmbH, 7500 Karlsruhe 1, Postfach 3640, TeleIon (07247) 822861, FernschreIber 7026484 
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Press release 
Fig. 12 
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Press clippings 
Year j 
Total Positiv Neutral : Negative 
1978 1881 766 1052 . 03 
41% 56% 3% 
-~--_. 
1979 3755 705 2940 110 
19% 78% 3% 
-~~ -" ._~---
-------
1980 2913 874 2004 35 
30% 69% 1% 
-~-~- --_ .. _-- .. _----. 
---------_ .. 
1981 3058 702 2331 25 i 
i 23% 76% 1% 
- -
I 
1902 2126 862 1165 00 
40% 54% 6% 
. _. 
1903 2527 838 1620 69 
"d,'. __ I 33% 64% 3% _ d" __ 
. - ,-
! 
1904 2709 I 841 1840 23 
i 31% 68% 1% 
.. 
I 1985 2902 1135 1612 155 ! I 39% 56% ! 5% 
~; 840 I 1820 i AVerag_e_~_2_7_33_~ ___ . I I 30% 67% : 3% ~I ___ --~----~ 73 
======================~~====== 
Press clippings 1978 - 1985 
Fig. 13 
Source Total 
Press releases 46% 1331 
Accident memos 15% 425 
Other sources 39% 1146 
Total 100% 2902 
Tendency 
positive neutral 
867 449 
- 386 
268 777 
1135 1612 
neaative 
.... 
15 
39 
101 
155 
LN 
c..n 
========================~~======== 
Press clippings Govering KfK in 1985 Fiq. 14 
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Organization of Guided Tours 
• Welcome by the guide of the tour 
• Film and exhibition showing research priorities and main activities 
• Discussion of questions raised by visitors 
• Round trip and tour of one scientific institute 
Guides 
• 40 scientific and technical staft members from 20 institutes and departments 
• Assignment and coordination by a member of the public relations staff 
• University training and didactic skiHs 
• Regular in-career training for public relations work 
• Pay per guided tour 
vo 
" 
==================================~~========== 
Aspects of organization of outside visits at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center 
Firr. Hi 
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Students 3t KfK 
Fig. 17 
Duties 
• Attendance at public events dealing with nuclear energy 
• Courses for various groups of opinion leaders 
• Seminars tor high schools 
• Brochures and pamphlets intorming on important questions ot 
nuclear energy 
Strueture 
• 30 scientific and technical staft members from 20 institutes and 
departments 
• Headed by a member of the public relations staft 
• University background and didactic skiHs 
• In-career training tor public relations work 
• Pay by assignment 
CJ.I 
<D 
=====================================~=========== 
Duties and strueture of the nuelear energy information staff 
Fig. 18 
Tille 
How Safe is the Fast Breeder? 
Safety and Radiological Proteetion 
How Safe are the Back-End Fuel Cycle Services? 
Radioactivity - Risk - Safety 
Nuclear Fusion Technology 
Total 
~ 
---- -----
---_ .. - ------ --
-
Publishing 
year 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1985 
Distributed 
circuiation 
31.12.1985 
131.800 
98.000 
107.000 
76.300 
7.000 
420.100 
I 
.j:>. 
o 
==========================~~======= 
Brochures on special technical issues Fig. 19 
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======================~~====== 
Brochures on current technical issues 
Fig. 20 
- 142 -
National Regional 
Public awareness 
Kernforsch u n gszentru m 64% 94% Karlsruhe 
KfK 7% 23% 
Tendency of opinion 
positive 47% 58% 
neutral 28% 25% 
negative 6% 11 % 
No response 19% 6% 
Source: Wickert~lnstitute Tübingen, January/February 1986 
=======================~====== 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe: Public 
awareness and tendency of the public opinion 
F ig. 21 
D Publics 
o Public Relations 
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Executive Board 
Sc. and Techn. 
Departments 
PR-Management 
Infrastructure 
D Emergency Committee 
=======================~====== 
Emergency Planning for Public Relations 
Fig. 22 
Horst Koppelstätter 
- 144 -
Badische Neueste Nachrichten 
D-7500 Karlsruhe 
Experiences of a Newspaper Journalist with the Official 
Information Policy of Nuclear Facilities 
1. The portrayal of the work and procedures of nuclear 
facilities by the press. 
1.1 The newspaper and its readership 
1.2 Editorial policy and decision mechanisms within a 
newspaper editorial department 
2. The relationship between the press and technology in 
general 
3. The experiences of a newspaper journalist in dealing 
with the press offices of nuc1ear facilities 
3.1 A concrete example - cooperation between the Badische 
Neueste Nachrichten and the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research 
Centre 
4. The demands of a newspaper journalist on the press 
spokesmen and operators of nuc1ear facilities 
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1. The portrayal of the work and procedures of nuclear 
facilities by the press 
Even in the age of television, radio and the new media, 
daily newspapers still play a central role in the transmis-
sion of information in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
There are currently 1300 newspapers in the Federal Republic 
although, due to a progressive process of concentration, 
only 125 of these can still be termed independent. "Indepen-
dent" means that a newspaper produces all sections of the 
paper itself, including the political pages, whilst the 
majority of papers confine themselves to local and regional 
news and take their political news from one of the big 
newspaper concerns. 
The role of the regional press in the Federal Republic of 
Germany requires special emphasis, since it is of very great 
importance when it comes to conveying information. This is 
because West Germany has no "metropolis" like Paris, London 
or Rome. Bann, admittedly, has been the seat of the Federal 
Government for almost four decades but Bann has never 
assumed the function of a "central capital". This is why 
there is no "metropolitan press" in West Germany as is found 
in many other parts of the world. 
1.1 The newspaper and its readership 
The Badische Neueste Nachrichten in Karlsruhe is one of the 
big regional newspapers of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
With a daily circulation of some 180 000 copies, it covers a 
whole region some 130 kilometres long and 60 kilometres 
wide. The area which it takes in includes Federal Germany's 
largest nuclear research centre in Karlsruhe and the third 
largest nuclear power station in Philippsburg. The Badische 
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Neueste Nachrichten holds more or less a monopoly position 
in its circulation area, having no direct competitiQn. For 
this reason alone, the daily newspaper on which I have 
worked for the last eight years constitutes one of the most 
important sources of information both for the population at 
large and for those in positions of responsibility in 
politics, industry, culture and the economy. 
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1.2 Editorial policy and decision mechanisms within a 
newspaper editorial department 
What coverage then does the peaceful use of nuclear power 
receive in the daily newspaper? Before the rotary printing 
presses are switched on night after night and a couple of 
hundred thousand copies of the paper printed, it has been a 
long day for the editorial staff, in which countless items 
of news from all over the world have been competing with 
each other. What the news selection process actually 
involves is best illustrated with a figure: at times only 
five to ten percent of the news which reaches the editorial 
staff is passed on to the reader the next day. The remainder 
ends up in the wastepaper bin, since the space in a daily 
newspaper is limited. 
It is thus obvious that a large number of decision mecha-
nisms are involved when it comes to the nature, length and 
position of an article in the paper. This is far from being 
simply a question of which event is to be printed - the 
prime concern is the size of the articles and the items that 
are to feature on the front page the next day. 
The central focus of these decisions is the editorial 
conference. Every afternoon all the heads of the editorial 
staff meet for this conference, chaired by the Editor-in-
chief. Everyone reportson their most significant events of 
the day, and the provisional positioning and layout are then 
discussed and laid down - always providing that there are no 
new happenings on that particular day, in which case plan-
ning will have to start from scratch again. 
The individual heads of the editorial staff more or less 
"fight" for space. Everyone naturally maintains that "his" 
or "her" happening is the most important of the day. The 
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head of the foreign politics editorial staff, for instance, 
wants to see the latest news from Washington on the next 
day's front page, whilst the head of the sports staff 
regards the football match as the prime event of the day, 
and the economic staff want to be allocated space right at 
the front for Daimler-Benz's balance sheet figures. It is 
then difficult for me, as "regional news" editor to come by 
space for topics such as new research results from the 
nuclear research centre or the reliable operation of the 
Philippsburg nuclear power station. Experience has, admit-
tedly, shown that the more specialist knowledge a journalist 
has about a specific topic, the more likely he is to be able 
to convince colleagues on the editorial staff of the im-
portance of the subject. 
2. The relationship between the press and technology in 
general 
A number of remarks on the rel~tionship between technology 
and the press in Federal Germany are called for at this 
point. First of all, it is important not to be under any 
illusions. Only very few journalists on daily papers and 
illustrated weeklies were great experts at school when it 
came to mathematics, physics and chemistry. Concepts such as 
kilowatts and kilowatt hours, or activity and dosage, then 
very readily become mixed up. And kilowatts or horsepower 
are, all the same, still concepts which occur in everyday 
life. Everything else which goes beyond domestic and automo-
bile technology is by and large incomprehensible to the 
majority of the population. This explains why technology and 
its fringe areas frequently receive insufficient coverage in 
the newspaper. 
This anomalous state of affairs has doubtless also developed 
on account of the need felt by newspapers to be highly 
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topical, often believing that they can only print "new" 
reports. They forget, however, that things which have 
perhaps been common knowledge to technical experts for years 
are experienced by the reader as being something new and 
worth knowing. 
This is why, when a journalist gives an account of technical 
processes, he repeatedly has to provide a vivid explanation 
for the layman of details which have been familiar to the 
experts for a long time. What use is even the most brilliant 
of reports if the reader cannot understand it? 
Here is an example taken from a newspaper of how to explain 
to the reader in vivid terms what an atom really is: "an 
atom sitting at the end of an eyelash would be like a 
greenfly in Munich with a 130 kilometre motorway stretching 
out in front of it, so inconceivably small is it. Scien-
tists thus save themselves the trouble of working out all 
the noughts after the decimal point (0.0000 .... ) and say 
that "in terms of the theory of gas kinetics, the diameter 
of an atom is ten to the minus seven millimetres. This means 
that it takes ten million atoms lined up side by side to 
produce a row one millimetre in length. 
All materials are made up of atoms - ships, shoes and paint. 
Most atoms are content with their fate and behave calmly. 
Scientists call these stable atoms. Others are restless and 
will not give any peace until they have changed into a 
different atom. One atom of this type is radium, which 
changes into lead." 
So much for this extract from a vividly comprehensible 
newspaper article. An expert may weIl laugh at it, but it 
must not be forgotten that reading a newspaper is no substi-
tute for five years at Technical University. The reader has 
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at least obtained a small degree of insight into the world 
in which he lives. 
As a rule, an editor will not be able to assume too ~uch 
fundamental knowledge on the part of his readers, since the 
increasing specialisation in the world of work (and at 
school) has largely led to the demise of the polyhistor and 
the man of great learning. Let us come back to the ominous 
kilowatt again. There would be little point in providing an 
explanation of the kilowatt. What use is it to the reader to 
learn that a kilowatt is the equivalent of 1.36 horsepower. 
He has a sufficiently good conception of a kilowatt from the 
fact that an oven uses one kilowatt and a light bulb 60 
Watts. 
In contrast to the Federal Republic of Germany, science and 
technology in the United States have long been integrated 
into popular usage in what is frequently a very informal 
approach. A belief in progress and the question of the 
economic benefit for the individual have secured popular 
science a broad readership in the United States. In Germany, 
however, the links between the press and technology are 
still very loose in a large number of cases. There are 
relatively few technical journalists. These then sprinkle 
the whole of Federal Germany with news services so that the 
articles also suffer from a monotonous uniformity throughout 
the country. People from the technical world frequently make 
the suggestion that the daily press should call upon the 
staff of the technical journals more frequently. The engi-
neers naturally overlook the fact that only very few techni-
cal journalists have become familiar with the day-to-day 
journalism of a newspaper in the course of their career - as 
a rule they come from their technical discipline and not 
from a newspaper. 
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In many cases, these technical journalists will give one 
hundred percent accuracy precedence over readability. 
Technical experts just aren't prepared to sacrifice a nuance 
for the sake of the general comprehensibility of an article. 
In my opinion, a ninety-five percent correct article with 
one hundred thousand readers is at times better than a one 
hundred percent article with only two thousand readers. Of 
course, the journalist must not misrepresent the technical 
problem in order to make his writing more attractive. Re is 
not allowed to serve up any hollow sensations but may to 
simplify the process, just as he would simplify, condense 
and clarify the speakers' arguments at a meeting of the 
local allotment gardeners. 
On the other hand, however, there is confusion in a large 
number of newspaper publishers' as to the section in which 
technical problems should be covered - in the economic 
section, the feature section, on one of the political pages 
or in a special scientific column. Rere again, direct 
contact between the press office of nuclear power stations 
and the editors proves very helpful. This makes it possible 
to prevent good articles from getting caught up a the fatal 
process of being passed from editor to editor and finally 
ending up in the waste paper bin. 
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3. The experiences of a newspaper journalist in dealing with 
the press offices of nuclear facilities 
One of the biggest problems for a newspaper journalist is to 
communicate highly specialist statements about technical 
matters to the reader in comprehensible form. This calls for 
a great deal of initiative on the part of the journalist and 
also for total confidence in the informant at the nuclear 
facility, i.e. the press spokesman. 
In the rush with which the notification of an incident, for 
example, has to be assessed and processed, there is no time 
to call upon independent experts. It is the assessment of 
the consequences of an incident, however, which largely 
determines whether the announcement is taken up in the 
paper. If it is to be taken up, the question is then whether 
there should be a big report of the incident on the front 
page or a small article in the regional, or even local, 
section. 
The editor must, therefore, be able to rely to a large 
extent on the press spokesman's assessment. If, however, it 
subsequently emerges - even just on one single occasion -
that the press spokesman has deliberately given incorrect 
information or even withheld information, then the basis of 
cooperation that has been built up over many years is 
shattered overnight. 
The extent to which general topics relating to atomic 
energy, such as nuclear safety, the background to research 
projects, developments and trends in a nuclear research 
centre, are able to establish themselves within a newspaper 
editorial department depends on how well the competent 
editor is informed and on his basic attitude to the peaceful 
use of atomic power. 
- 153 -
There are much more rewarding subjects for a newspaper 
editor,which are much easier to writeabout, are more fun 
and cause a greater stir amongst the public and within the 
editorial department than reports on the routine in nuclear 
research or in a nuclear power station. The way in which 
news from a nuclear power station or research centre is 
prepared thus plays a big role. 
One very important point for an editor on a daily newspaper 
is that he should have means of further educating himself in 
specialist fields such as nuclear energy. In my opinion, 
nuclear power stations and nuclear research centres in the 
Federal Republic of Germany do not do enough here. The 
Deutsche Atomforum (German Atomic Forum) is alone in holding 
seminars for journalists once a year, in which technical 
matters are clearly explained, often in-si tu, in a way which 
is comprehensible to non-scientists as well. 
It is my opinion that the less knowledgeable journalists and 
readers are about a particular specialist area, like nuclear 
energy, the more readily they will let themselves be in-
fluenced by the political agitation of the opponents. Now, 
radiation cannot be seen, smelt or touched. Rumours about 
dangers and problems thus spread quickly and putting these 
straight with factual information is a very difficult 
process. Allow me to draw a comparison: if someone stands 
up in a fully occupied cinema and shouts "fire, fire" , 
people will quickly start to panic. It will then be diffi-
cult to make the people who are pushing to get out under-
stand that it was simply a false alarm. 
One big danger when giving an account of the use of nuclear 
power is that of getting things out of proportion. If it is 
not possible to report continuously on the normal state of 
research in a medium such as the daily newspaper or the 
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television then ultimately it will be only the negative 
news, i.e. the incidents, which will feature in the news of 
the day. 
It is then no longer possible to give an objective account 
of the facts. This has made it clear just how decisive the 
good work of a press spokesman at a nuclear research centre 
or nuclear power station iso 
3.1 A concrete example - cooperation between the Badische 
Neueste Nachrichten and the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research 
Centre 
To take an example from real life: the Karlsruhe Nuclear 
Research Centre issues a large number of press releases over 
the year, all of which pass over my desk. Although I have 
been concerned with the peaceful use of atomic energy for 
many years, the percentage of information that I directly 
understand and am thus able to reword in articles averages 
2Wo or less per press release. It can be assumed that if 
these statements were to be printed as they stand, as is the 
case in a number of small newspapers, the readers would be 
in a similar situation. They see the name "Nuclear Research 
Centre" but can do precious little with the information that 
folIows. Viewed in this way, the high print figures that 
official institutions such as the nuclear research centre 
like to publish are frequently misleading when it ~omes to 
the actual information value. 
The reason for what are frequently difficult to understand 
press releases lies in the fact that this information is 
also supplied to technical journals and technical editors on 
other journals where the information content is, of course, 
allowed to be of a considerably more technical nature. 
- 155 -
As a rule, it is only possible to use press releases from 
the nuclear research centre after consultation with the 
press spokesman in order to bring the contents into line 
with a newspaper. This functions very weIl in Karlsruhe -
indeed, in an exemplary manner. The staff of the public 
relations division provide every conceivable assistance for 
journalists seeking information. This has, for instance, 
developed to the point where I can ring the press spokesman 
at horne at any time and receive detailed information from 
hirn. In the further course of his work too, he will put me 
in ,contact with anyone I wish to speak to, right up to the 
chairman of the board of directors. A firm relationship of 
trust has been built up over the years, with each side being 
able to rely totallyon the other. A situation of this kind 
is naturally very much a question of the personalities 
involved. 
Just how good the relationship between the press and nuclear 
power stations really is cannot be read off from the number 
of press releases printed but only emerges at a time of 
crisis. Such a case occurred - admittedly only as a side 
issue in the Federal Republic of Germany - following the 
accident at the Chernobyl reactor. 
I shall outline a number of impressions of my experiences as 
a newspaper editor attempting to obtain information follow-
ing the accident. The experts at the nuclear research centre 
were initially unwilling to make any statements as to the 
extent and background of Chernobyl since they had too little 
concrete information. Yet the need for information within 
the newspaper's editorial department, and amongst the public 
as weIl, was enormous. It was high time to reduce the 
anxiety prevailing amongst the population with concentrated, 
objective explanations. 
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The basically well-equipped press department of the nuclear 
research centre was obviously completely overwhelmed by the 
flood of inquiries from the media and also from the public. 
This meant that it was impossible for me, as an editor who 
had been in close contact with the nuclear research centre 
for many years, even to obtain short definitions of the 
chief concepts such as iodine 137, strontium, half-life and 
similar. This would have been essential for the reader as an 
explanation right at the outset of the discussion. The press 
office's telephone lines were so frequently engaged that it 
was virtually impossible to reach an expert capable of 
explaining complex technical matters. The information 
shortfall on the part of the journalist then became an 
information shortfall on the part of the reader. The case of 
Chernobyl showed clearly that the press offices of nuclear 
power stations and nuclear research centres are not prepared 
for crises. In such a case it would not really be enough 
simply to react, i.e. to answer inquiries. Instead, there 
should be a team of experts available to come forward of its 
own ac cord and make a contribution towards elucidating 
matters in concrete terms. Breakdowns of this nature at a 
time when all discussions are suddenly centred around a 
single topic destroy the positive policy of information that 
has been built up over many years and nurture (in many cases 
incorrectly so) the doubts of critics and sceptics of the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
4. The demands of a newspaper journalist on the press 
spokesmen and operators of nuclear facilities 
On the basis of my experience in daily dealings with infor-
mation from nuclear facilities I would place the following 
demands on the operators of nuclear facilities in my capa-
city as a newspaper editor: 
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4.1 Information from a research centre or a nuc1ear power 
station must be readily comprehensible to the editor. 
4.2 A relationship o~ mutual trust must be built up 
between editorial staff and the press office. 
4.3 Information must be passed on quickly, i.e. whilst it 
is still highly topical. 
4.4 The information policy of nuclear facilities must be 
one of complete openness vis-a-vis the public. Only an 
offensive strategy will lead to acceptance by the 
public over the long term. 
4.5 It is frequently necessary to find a compromise 
between technical precision and intelligibility to the 
average newspaper reader. 
4.6 There must be a continuous flow of information from a 
nuclear research centre and from nuclear power sta-
tions, and not simply information when problems arise. 
4.7 The representatives of the interests of nuclear 
facility operators must take pains to ensure that 
journalists are provided with further education in 
this specialist area in seminars, lectures and printed 
material. 
4.8 Press offices must also be prepared for crises, i.e. 
sufficient personnel must be available to cope with a 
large flood of journalists seeking information. 
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BATAN ACTIVITIES IN WASTE MANAGEMENT *) 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The basic objective of radioactive waste management at 
BATAN's Nuclear Installation is to treat the waste in such 
a way that the release of an unacceptable amount of radio-
activity into the environment cduld be prevented. So any 
discharge of effluent radioactive to the environment is low 
as reasonably achievable, taking into account economic, so-
c.ial, and psychological factors. 
Due to such reason all radioactive waste should be pr~ 
cessed. In order to establish a viable waste management sy~ 
tem, and to meet the goals and needs for the future nuclear 
science and technology development in Indonesia, a range of 
policy and technological options should be considered. 
The options presented here are directed for short and 
long term needs, and are based on existing technology, de-
monstrated as the safest, most effective and efficient ma-
nagament method. 
Short term options include identification and development 
of improved treatment methods which am reduce volume, cha-
racterization of the treated waste for safety store in inter 
mediate storage facilities, pending final disposal. 
These options could be implemented within five years. The 
long term options are ultimate dis pos al options and direc -
ted for the final goal of workable and effective waste ma-
nagement system. Implementation of these options 
quire regulatory action and legislative approval 
initiation and operation. 
1 
may re-
for its 
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2. THE ROUTINE OPERATION 
The first reactor, TRIGA MARK II 250 Kw, was commisio 
ned in 1965. In 1971 the power was upgraded to 1000 Kw 
for routine production of radioisotopes. The radioactive -
waste produced from the processing facility which mostly 
contain short lived radionuclide is collected in the hold-
up tank for further decay down to insignificant activity , 
then further diluted and dispersed in the river. 
At the Nuclear Industrial Complexes, Puspiptek, Ser-
pong, the radioactive liquid wastes that will be treated 
in RWMS ( Rad. Was te t4anagement Station ) should have cri-
terias as follows 
- Activity which could be treated 10-6"" A ~ 2.10-2 Ci/m 3 
- Non corrosive and without organic materials 
- pH between 7 - 9 
2. 1. Sources of Radioactive Waste. 
In a reactor building the liquid wastes are di'-
vided into two categories, low active and high active 
liquid waste 
- Low active liquid waste, having the activity of 10-6 
to 10-2 Ci/m3 . 
- High active liquid waste, having the activity of 10-2 
to 102 Ci/m3 . 
The system or components from which the radioactive li-
quid waste originated, are from : pool drainage, shower 
and wash water, and ventilation system i and the high 
I 
active liquid waste are from : resin flushing, power-
ramp test, and decontamination of isotope box. 
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The spent resin coming from the water purification sy~ 
tem will be handled as semi liquid waste. Radioactive 
solid waste consists of used reactor component, 
sules, filters,etc. 
cap-
From radioisotope installation 
wastes are classified as follows : 
the radiöactive 
- The socalled "large quantity", with a dose rate gre~ 
ter than 1000 mR/h at the surface. At the time they 
are packaged, they contain mixed fission products. 
- The socaled "small quantity", with a dose rate of 
less than 1000 mR/h at the surface they contain so-
lid materials and solidified liquid wastes from the 
processing hot cell. 
The radioactive liquid wastes that comes from fuel 
element production installation are mostly contamina -
ted with chemical wastes in which the uranium content 
is very low and so is the activity of the liquid. 
The solid wastes consisting contaminated linnen, paper, 
filters, overshoes, gloves, etc. are collected in a 
plastic bag, put into 100 liter drums and sent to R~~S. 
2. 2. Treatment of Liquid Waste. 
All radioactive wastes originateo. from laboratory 
installation in Nuclear Industrial Research and Deve -
lopment Complexes are treated centrally in RWMS, except 
the very high active waste are treated "in situ" in 
the hot cell by solidification either with cement or 
epoxy. 
There are two main objectives in applying the ge-
neral principle of concentrating and conditioning ra-
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dioactive wastes, i.e. 
a) to enable large volume of liquid to be decontamina-
ted by evaporation and the distilate which is then 
discharged in accordance with relevant regulation 
or re-used. 
b) to convert and/or to concentrate the 
waste into a minimum solid volume. 
radioactive-
Many factors have been considered in selecting 
the most suitable and economic treatment plant applic~ 
ble to liquid wastes in Serpong Nuclear Installation , 
for example 
- quantity of liquid expected by each laboratory 
- possibility of recycling of treated liquid 
- presence of particulate material and organic compound 
- chemical composition of the solution, especially salt 
content and corrosive materials 
- pH 
- gross activity and radionuclide composition 
- permissable discharge limit 
- criteria such as reliability and maintainability of 
plant, exposure of personnei. 
The wastes are collected from each installation and 
transported to RWMS by waste transporter, that is tanker 
trailer for the liquid waste or truck with bin for the 
solid wastes. 
The liquid wastes containing non organic subtances 
and non corrosive chemical are collected and mixed to-
gether in the head tanks which have a capacity of 4 x 
3 50 m . 
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Since the volume of these liquid wastes are expeated to 
be large, processing option is based on volume reduction 
by evaporation. Evaporation process has been selected -
by assessment of safety, high decontamination factor and 
cost effectiveness of the operation. The evaporator is 
athermosiphon type, automatically operated, equiped 
with indicators and recorders necessary for system sur-
veilance, push bottoms actuators and remote controlled 
valves, warning indicator for indicating any exaeeded 
threshold or incidents that could be occured during op~ 
ration. 
2.3. Conditioning Process. 
The concentrated liquid from the evaporation pro -
cess is, then, pumped into immobilization unit for fur-
ther conditioning with cement in steel lined container 
ealled "shell". This unit are installed in the hot eello 
The operation is automatie and remotely observed through 
a shielded glass window. Cementation is not only selee-
ted as the simlest and the most adequate method for eo~ 
ditioning of low and medium level semiliquid wastes, 
but also the ehemieal and physical properties of eement 
are well known. Besides, eement is also readly available 
and eomparatively inexpensive. 
However, knowledge of the effeet of mixing cement 
with radioaetive wastes is still limited. To support 
routine work R & D has been programmed to optimize ee 
ment waste formulation. The embeded product contained 
in the shell is covered by lid and sealed. Then, it is 
transfered into the interim storage after drying. These 
shells ensure biological shielding enabling a conuact 
dose rate les~ than 200 mRem/h. 
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2. 4. Treatment of Solid Wastes. 
The radioactive solid wastes are sorted as compac-
tible and non compactible wastes. To minimize the risk 
of dispersion of contamination, and in order to mitiga-
te exessive radiation exposure by air borne radioacti -
vity from the contaminated dust, sorting gloves should 
be provided during handling. The compactible solid wa~ 
tes are put into 100 liter steel drums and compacted 
one by one into 200 liter drums by means of 600 RN hy-
draulic press. The 200 liter drums can accomodate 5 co~ 
pacted 100 liter drum. To avoid dispersal of contaminants 
during the operation the press is put in a ventilated -
hood, connected to the off-gas system. The compacted 
wastes are then conditioned with cement slurry. The o~ 
compactible solid wastes will be directed in 200 liter 
drums on a vibrating table. 
3. INTERIM.STORAGE. 
The mode of ultimate disposalof embedded wastes is 
not decided yet due to unsufficient data concerning the 
characteristics of embedded wastes and also the interaction 
of the wastes with the environment. These datas are requi-
red for designing the repository of the ultimate disposal. 
The engineered storage was planned to built at Serpong to 
store the processed wastes for an interim period. 
The period of interim storage was planned for 5 - 10 
years. In this period of time it is expected to gain suf-
ficient data from R & D programmes, as mentioned before, 
leading into adecision in building the shallow ground re-
pository used for ultimate disposal for the low and medium 
level embedded w~stes. The interim storage at the Nuclear 
Industrial Research and Development Complexes, Puspiptek , 
Serpong had been constructed with a module type design. 
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One module having a capacity of 500 shel1s and 1500 drums, 
is designed for maximum dose rate of 2,5 mRem/h in the 
un10ading and handling room, of 10 mRem/h and 0,7 mRem / h 
in storage room and inside the building respectively. 
4. CONTROL OF THE ENVIRONMENT 
Based on the recommendation of the International Com-
mission on Radiological Protection ( ICRP ), our national 
regulation states that radioactive materials should be pr~ 
vented being re1eased into the environment. If it fo11ows 
the basic principles of radiation protection, public expo-
sure to radiation cou1d be kept as low as reasonably achie 
vab1e. 
Based on the through know1edge of how radioactivity 
behaves, the system of monitoring environment either on or 
off site includes 
- Operating a network of control points to measure the ra-
dioactivity throughout the transfer chain : air, ground 
water, and food. 
- Routine monitoring and checking the level of seepage wa-
ter and ground water table. 
Measuring the natural radioactivity either on or off site 
had been performed, and the data obtained will be used as 
reference when the faci1ities will be in operation in 1987. 
The on-site monitoring will be backed up by appropriate 
environmental monitoring in accordance with IAEA Safety S~ 
ries No. 41, "0bjective and Design of Environmental Moni -
toring Programmes for Radioactive Contaminants". The mo-
nitoring process has been designed to give information a-
bout the sourcesland characteristics of radionuc1ide and 
to provide adequate information to demonstrate in complia~ 
ce with authorization. 
- 166 -
For gaseous eff1uent, two types of measurement will be pr~ 
vided, i.e. 
- continuous measurement at fixed location where radiation 
levels are mentioned continuous1y and recorded remot1y 
using Reuter Stokes Centri 1012 Radiation Monitoring Sy~ 
tem with 10 station. 
- Periodic measurement as mentioned above by samp1ing of 
transfer chain. 
5. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME. 
To support the options, BATAN is current1y engange~ 
in a comprehensive programme of Research and Deve10pment 
directed from Radioactive Waste Management Techno1ogy Cen-
tre of Nuc1ear Industria1 Research and Deve10pment Comple-
xes, Puspiptek, Serpong. The objectives of the programme 
are 
a) To assess the environmental and safety aspects of the 
radioactive waste disposal concept. 
b) To develop techno1ogy for volume reduction, immobi1iza-
tion, storage, and disposa1 at sha110w ground reposito-
ry. 
c) To deve10p the analysis and characterization of embedded 
wastes. 
d) To study the interaction of embedded wastes with the 
environment, and characteristics of different clay (ar-
gi1laceous materials) as the natural barrier. 
e) To estab1ish the requirement, equipment, and procedures 
for site characterization and se1ection. 
f) To deve10p pub1ic acceptance to support the concept. 
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The concept of R & D programme are focussed on disposal 
of immobilized low and medium level radioactive wastes on 
shallow ground repositories provided \'lith engineered 
barriers. The wastes which to be disposed off are solid 
or solidified, which are immobilized in steel lined con -
crete containers the socalled "shells". The containers, 
then, will be put into a concrete cell acting as enginee-
red barrier which is built in the subsurface of the ground 
surrounded by argillaceous materials as the natural bar -
rier. The only feasible way that radioactive species could 
return to the biosphere is by ground water breaching the 
containment, dissolves the waste form and transports the 
dissolved radionuclide through the geosphere back to the 
surface. To minimize ground water flow to and from the 
waste form and to prevent the movement of the ra'dionucli-
de species that dissolved in the ground water the dispo -
sal system therefore will be a comprehend system of engi-
neered barrier. 
The major components of the R & D are: 
- Characterization of the embedded waste. 
- Characterization of the argillaceous materials used as 
natural barrier. 
- Geotechnical engineering and geosciences 
- Environmental and safety assessment. 
5. 1. Characterization of the Embedded Waste. 
The objectives of this component are : 
- To develop know-how and skill of analyzing and cha -
racterization of the embedded ,,,astes in order to meet 
the requirement for final disposal in shallow ground 
repository.\ 
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- To ensure satisfactory of safe containment by perfor-
mance, providing additional barrier to radionuclide 
migration. 
- To select and demonstrate the suitability of materials 
and techniques for embedding. 
To meet its objective, experimental facilities will 
be designed and construct.ed in Serpong : 
- Research and Development work on process formulation 
of immobilization with cement, using different types 
of hydraulic binder in different composition. 
Installation to support routine work facilities using 
well equiped embedding system for evaporator, spent -
resin and compacted solid waste is under constructiOn. 
- Characterization of the embedded waste by studying the 
physical and chemical properties and distribution of 
radionuclides. The leaching rate behaviour will be stu 
died by statical and dinamical methods either in labe 
ra tory scale or in full scale. 
5. 2. Characterization of Natural Barrier. 
The objectives of the component are . 
- To define physical and chemical characteristics of 
argillaceous materials - quarts, bentonite, vermicu -
late, apatite, etc. - in connection with transfer ph~ 
nomena like exchange capacity, selectivity, sorption 
capacity and valency modifiers, to ensure containment 
of radioactivity for a long period of time. 
- To develop mathematical models to study the interac -
tion of radionuclides released from the waste, the 
natural barrier, and the ground water, for example : 
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thermal diffusion, corrosion, radiolysis, 
transport, etc. 
,nuclide-
The data gained from this experiment will be used to de 
velop and evaluate the designs, materials, method of 
construction of shallow ground repositories, and perfoE 
mance of the engineered barrier through physical models 
and simulation. 
5. 3. Geotechnieal Engineering and Geoserviees. 
In general, geologieal formations that posess a 
eertain degree of plasticity and are free of e~reula­
ting ground water would be most favourable for the site 
of shallow ground repositories. 
To support the long term options, experimental dr~ 
lling should be planned and be performed at several po-
tential areas in Indonesia. The geoteehnieal investiga-
tion will be eondueted in eooperation with other gover~ 
mental institut ions and other universities to study de-
tailed surfaee geology, lithology, hydrology, and water 
table. 
Laboratory study on behaviour of undisturbed log 
samples will be also done in eonneetion with Simulation 
Test for Environmental Radionuelide Migration. The goal 
of this programme is to per form radionuelide migration 
tests under natural soil layer eonditions. 
Migration of radionuelides is one of the most 
important faetors to be eonsidered when carrying out s~ 
fety analysis of a repository for radioaetive waste in 
a wet geologie formation. This is partieularly impontant 
in Indonesia where preeipitation rate is high. 
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The knowledge gained will be used in developing me-
thods to characterize potential disposal sites. 
The objectives of the experiments are to study the corr~ 
lation between surface and subsurface features, hydrolo-
gical and geochemical system of the soil used as the na-
tural barrier. 
6. CONCLUSION. 
A comprehensive programme of research and development 
on radioactive waste management has already weIl defined to 
meet the requirement for the future nuclear science and 
technology development in Indonesia as technical support of 
routine work for quality improvement td ensure that the pr~ 
cessed low and medium wastes could be stored ultimately in 
shallow ground repositories safety and economically. 
The interim spent fuel facility ( ISFSF ) will be cons 
tructed at Serpong to provide space for interim storage of 
irradiated fuel elements and high activated used components 
which is accumulated during 30 years of MPR-30 operation. 
However, aperiod of many years will elapse before in-
dustrial full scale disposal operations are carried out to 
achieve nuclear power plant programme. 
The need for continuation of R & D should be attributed 
to the need of improving the understanding of some specifics 
of radioactive waste management, and undoubtly, the viabi -
lity of the disposal concept. 
BATAN fully participates in international information 
exchange and waste management research projects. This ensu-
res that Indonesia has access to technological advances on 
alternative disposal methods. 
*) To be presented on Indonesia - German Seminar on Pub1ic -
Acceptance, Waste Management, and Nuc1ear Safety 
Jakarta, October 7 - 9, 1986. 
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In establishing a radwaste management system a number of factors 
have to be considered. Their influence on the general concept and on the 
layout of particular plants will be discussed below. 
Correlation between the Overall Nuclear Program 
and the Wa:3 te Management Concept 
Radioactive waste management has to ensure that radioactive wastes 
arising from nuclear activities are safely and economically treated and 
disposed of. However, prior to constructing facilities for the management 
of waste, anational waste management policy and abasie technical con-
ce pt have to be elaborated. They must be based on the long term general 
nuclear program and a political strategy. 
The scope of the nuclear program is of primary importance to the 
layout of the waste management facilities and the waste management po-
licy. Only small amounts of radioactivc wastes with low activity levels 
arise from the application of radionuclides. As most of the radionuclides 
applied have short half-lives, collection of the waste and interim stora-
ge until the radionuclides have sufficiently decayed for being dis char-
ged or disposed of as inactive waste may be the most appropriate method 
of waste management. The necessary installations are very simple and also 
the waste management policy can be very simple. The fabrication of 
nuclear fuels also leads to only small amounts of low level waste with, 
however, long-lived radionuclides. 
Nuclear power plants produce rather large amounts of low and small 
amounts of medium level wastes and call for a more extensive system. They 
also necessitate a concept for the management of spent fuels (retrievable 
storage - disposaJ. - reprocessing) including ideas about the time hori-
zons. Besides low and medium level wastes also high level wastes arise 
from reprocessing of spent fuels and mixed oxide fuel fabrication. Most 
of these wastes contain at least small amounts of long-lived trans uran-
ium elements. Reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel fabrication there fore 
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require an important and eomprehensive waste management system and waste 
management poliey. 
An adequate waste management poliey has to define elear political 
boundary conditions. It is generally aeeepted that the radiation exposure 
resulting from waste management should be kept as low as reasonably 
achievable and that radiation exposure of future generations should not 
be higher than that of the generation that had the advantages from nue-
lear teehnology. There is still a number of other general rules. They 
are, however, not suffieient for praetieal purposes. Anational waste 
management poliey must go further into details. A good example is the re-
lease of radionuelides into the environment together with the effluents. 
Modern technologies make it possible to keep them much lower than neees-
sary from the point of view of radiologieal protection. This laises the 
question if only those measures should be taken which are necessary for 
radioproteetion or if should be done what is teehnieally feasible. Gener-
ally speaking, the often eneountered question "how safe is safe enough" 
ealls for political guidelines. This implies that the waste management 
policy canWJt be based only on technical and safety but also on 
socio-ethical and political eonsiderations. 
General Objectives of Waste Treatment 
The primary objeetive of waste treatment is to 
separate the radionuelides from the bulk waste or 
eoncentrate the radioaetive waste into smaller volumes; 
convert the residues into a was te form suitable for transport, 
interim storage and disposal; 
separate the radionuelides from thc liquid and gaseous effluents 
to such an extent that they ean be released into the environment 
safely and in conformity with the regulations. 
Besides routine operations, waste treatment plants could also ful--
fill the task of serving as testing facilities. In this ease, more flexi-
bility would be necessary than for routine operation alone. Also training 
programs could be thought of. This would call at least for bigger locker 
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rooms for the staff. If the plant is to be used for demonstrations to vi-
sitors, a special entrance and locker room and perhaps a visitor's gal-
lery should be provided. 
Adecision must be taken whether the plant should be used only for 
the treatment of wastes arising at the site or if it should act also as 
a regional or central facility. Furthermore, it must be decided if it 
has to fulfil only the near-term needs or also future ones. 
Practically all facilities necessary for the treatment and dis pos al 
of radioactive wastes are today available on the market. When deciding on 
their implementation it has also to be decided wether they should be pur-
chased key-turn from competent companies or not. In the latter case, con-
sultants and more time will be necessary. 
Information on characteristics of the individual waste treatment 
processes, their advantages and their shortcomings are given in the paper 
'Principles of and Experiences in the Treatment of Low Level, Medium Le-
vel and TRU-Element Bearing Radioactive Wastcs.' The aspects outlined in 
that paper have to be considered together with those proposed in this 
paper for thc selection of a waste management system. 
Waste Amounts Arising in Nuclear Facilities 
Prior to the design of waste treatment plants careful and compreh-
ensive estimates have to be made of the volumes of future wastes aris-
ings, their chemical and physical nature, activity level and type of ra-
dionuclides involved. This is not easy but a lot of experience is already 
available in this field from operating facilities. 
The amounts and characteristics of radioactive waste arisings in a 
nuclear facility depend largely on the type of operations carried out. 
They depend also on the measures taken to keep the arisings small and on 
the experience and discipline of the staff. The average values of liquid 
effluents produced in laboratories are 0.1 to 5 m3 per person and year. 
In nuclear reactors several thousand to a few ten thousand cubicmeters of 
liquid effluents my arise per year, depending on the type and size of the 
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reactor and the waste collection and treatment system chosen. The produc-
tion of liquid effluents in the fabrication of nuclear fuels amounts to a 
few m3 per ton of fuel fabricated. 
The production of solid waste amounts to 0.1 - 5 m3 per year and 
person in laboratory work, a few hundred m3/a in nuclear reactors and a 
few m3 per ton of nuclear fuel fabricated. 
Factors Influencing the Capaeity of Waste Treatment Plants 
The steadiness in arisings is an important faetor in estimating the 
eapaeity of a liquid waste treatment plant. If waste does not arise at a 
steady rate, either a storage eapaeity for untreated wastes must be pro-
vided to buffer peak arisings or the eapaeity of the treatment faeilities 
must be conceived for peak arisings. The most reasonable solution usually 
a compromise between these two extremes. A combination of spare tanks and 
spare treatment capacity will be the technically most reasonab le and the 
most eeonomie solution. Also it has to be borne in mind that treatment 
plants need regular maintenance. Ouring the maintenance per iod they are 
not available for operation. Furthermore, equipment may fail. The time 
needed for repair or replaeement must also be taken into account in esti-
mating the plants storage and treatment capaeity. 
For solid wastes no large spare treatment capacity is required as 
spare storage eapaeity will be cheaper and fulfils the task very weIl. 
Provisions have also to be made for the retirement of old faeilities. 
The capaeity of interim storage faeilities for eonditioned waste 
will depend on the availability of a repository. As it is not very expen-
sive, an ample eapaeity should be eoneeived. A storage capacity for se-
veral years seems a minimum in any ease. 
Environmental Conditions Influeneing the Layout 
Prior to the selection of treatment processes for radioactive efflu-
ents, the capaeity of the environment for taking up the residual radio-
nuclides has to be established. If, e.g., a plant can discharge its li-
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quid effluents to a large river or to the sea, greater amounts of radio-
nuelides will be tolerable then if the effluents are diseharged into 
small water bodies, The utilization of the water, e,g, for irrigation or 
as drinking water, are other important faetors, as are the national or 
loeal discharge poliey, All these faetors have an influence on the se 
leetion of a treatment proeess beeause they aehieve different degrees of 
radionuelide separation, 
Impact of Waste Disposal Options 
Quite often simple and eheap waste treatment proeesses aehieve only 
a modest volume reduetion, whereas processes leading to a high volume 
reduetion are usually more expensive, The selection of waste treatment 
processes with a view to redueing the volume to a eertain axtent will 
therefore largely depend on the spaee available for waste disposal and on 
its costs, 
The seleetion of waste forms will be influeneed by the eharaeteris-
ti es of the repository, If a repository is eompletely isolated from eir-
cUlating ground water or if the time the water needs to reach the bio-
sphere is long compared to the half-life of the radionuelides, the leach 
resistan ce of thc waste forms will be of minor importance only and vice 
versa, Also some other waste form requirements, e,g, mechanical stabili-
ty, gas release etc, may depend on the characteristics of the repository, 
General Technical Aspects in Planning Waste Treatment Facilities 
Waste treatment facilities must be subjectcd to thc general rules 
applicable to the eonstruction of nuclear installations, As usually non-
scaled radioactive materials have to be handled, provisions have to be-
made against the spread of contamination, Walls and floors must be desig-
ned so as to be easily deeontaminable, An adequate ventilation system has 
to be installed, In ease of shielding requirements, which are not neces-
sary for low level wastes, the floors of the buildings must be capable of 
earrying the eorresponding heavy loads, Experience is available in all 
these fields, 
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Provisions have also to be made for the retirement of old faeilit-
ies. ies. The possibility of easy extension should be foreseen for all 
plants. 
In the waste treatment facilities rooms have to be provided for the 
health physies activities and for analytics and process control. In all 
plants space has to be provided for monitors. Also an adequate store for 
spare equipment may be necessary. 
Time Aspects in the Establishment of a Waste Management System 
In order to have available the waste treatment faeilities in time, 
it must be borne in mi nd that the planning phase may require 1-2 years or 
even more. This ineludes the elaboration of a plant philosophy and eßti-
mations of the plant eapaeity. At a new site the diseharge limits have to 
be fixed and all other rules have to be elaborated. Also the waste form 
requirements must be fixed, cost estimates made, etc. After the estab-
lishment of at least preliminary plans and cost estimates the budget ean 
be set up and the money proeured. The construetion of the plants may 
require 2-3 years, depending on the complexity of the plant and thc orga-
nization of its realization. Also some time will be needed for the trai-
ning of the staff and for startup. 
Setting up a repository will need mueh more time. As a first step, 
eareful geographie, geologie, hydrologie and meteorologie studies have to 
be earried out. After site seleetion, the land has to be purehased. Often 
some infrastrueture, (e.g. roads, railway eonnection, harbor) will have 
to be installed. Furthermore, a safety assessment has to be elaborated. 
It mUßt be approved by the eompetent authorities. Also publie ae ceptanee 
has to be obtained. It might be wise to start the operation of the 
repository'with an experimental phase limited to several years in order 
to demonstrate to the publie that the repository can be operated safely. 
Unlimited disposal could start after that. 
There is plenty of time for the establishment of a repository, pro-
vided that suffieient interim storage capaeity is available and the long 
range time schedule has been announced and explained to the publie from 
the beginning. The public will usually aecept more easily a careful long 
range than a greatly speeded up concept. 
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Organization 
Prior to starting operation of waste management faeilities the re-
sponsibilities for plant operation, health physics, authorizations for 
discharges, maintenanee, ete. have to be fixed. It is also neeessary to 
work out a eomplete documenta ti on of the entire facility, to elaborate 
fixed plans for maintenanee, and to doeument and evaluate all results of 
operation. 
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1. The Treatment of Low and Medium Level Liquid Wastes 
Low level liquid effluents arise in all nuclear facilities and con--
stitute the largest portion of all radioactive wastes. Although a uniform 
worldwide waste classification system does not exist, liquid wastes with 
an activity content of < 3.7x107Bq « 10-3Ci) beta-gamma per m3 are often 
called low level. According to the same system, liquid wastes containing 
3.7x107-3.7x10 14Bq (10- 3-104Ci) beta-gamma per m3 are classified medium 
level. Their volume is much smaller than that of the low level effluents. 
esides a few organic liquids, most liquid wastes are waste wat er or 
aqueous solutions. 
The objective of the treatment of low and medium level aqueous wast-
es is to separate the radionuclides from the water to such an extent that 
it can be safely discharged into the environment or reused. The small 
fraction containing the separated radionuclides together with in active 
matter is transformed into asolid waste form suitable for in terim stor-
age, transport and disposal. Organic liquids are either cleaned and reus-
ed, incinerated or transformed into a disposable waste form. 
The most frequently applied methods for the treatment of aqueous 
effluents are precipitation, ion exchange and evaporation. 
1.1 Chemical precipitation or flocculation are relatively simple and in-
expensive processes. They are suitable mainly for the treatment of efflu-
ents with low activity and high salt and mud contents. Their effectivity 
depends largely on the chemical and radiochemical composition of the 
waste water. If it is known which radionuclides are present, specific 
reagents can be applied, e.g. phosphates for the precipitation of stront-
ium, heavy metal (Cu, Ni ... ) ferrocyanides for cesium, etc. The effecti-
vity of radionuclide separation can be increased by addition of the same 
or allied inactive ions (e.g. Ca for Sr). In such cases, decontamination 
factors (DF = activity before treatment) up to 103 can be achieved. 
activity after treatment 
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If the radiochemical composition is not known, only non-specific floccu-
lation processes can be applied, e.g. addition of Fe- or Al-salts and 
precipitation by rise of pH or precipitation by carbonates after addition 
of e.g. Ca. In such cases the DFs amount to only 2-100. The effectivity 
of chemical precipitation and flocculation is largely reduced by the pre-
sence of complexing compounds in the effluents. The precipitation/ floc-
culation can be carried out batchwise or continuously. 
The precipitates are separated from the liquid by filtration or cen-
trifugation. This is the only delicate step in the whole process. 
1.2 Ion exchange processes are based on inorganic or organic ion ex-
change materials. Inorganic ion exchangers are usually ion selective and 
can therefore be used for the separation of specific radionuclides after 
chemical flocculation. The DFs amount up to 103. Inorganic ion exchangers 
are sometimes produced by coating a cheap basic material, e.g. silicagel, 
with the exchanger material. In this way, the amount of expensive exchan-
ger material can be reduced and/or the hydraulic properties of the ex-
changers improved. 
Organic ion exchange res ins are high-molecular compounds, often on 
the basis of polystyrene. They contain active groups, e.g. -S03H groups 
for binding cations or -OH for binding anions. Accordingly, they are cal-
led cation or anion exchangers. They are applied in the form of beads in 
columns with aperforated plate or in the form of powders as precoating 
material in centrifuges or filters. Organic ion exchangers are particul-
arly suitable for the decontamination of low salt containing clean solut-
ions. They are applied everywhere for cleaning the water from the primary 
circuits of reactors and of fuel storage ponds. They also can beused ad-
vantageously for the post-purification of evaporator distillates if this 
is necessary. 
Ion exchangers separate only radionuclides present in the water as 
ions. Complexing agents jeopardize their efficiency. Effluents with a 
high salt content lead to frequent exhaustion of organic ion exchangers 
and therefore cannot be treated advantageously by this method. Mud and 
other solid matter must be separated previously from the effluent as 
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their deposition on the surface of the ion exchangers would reduce their 
efficiency. 
Organic ion exchange res ins can be regenerated after exhaustion (sa--
tu ration of the active groups). Mineral acids are used for lhe regener-
ation of cation exchangers, alkaline solutions for anion exchangers. 
1.3 Evaporation is the most effective and most universal but also the 
most expensive method. With the exeption of tritium and the very small 
amounts of radionuclides bound in steam-volatile organic compounds, and 
the few radionuclides which can become volatile under certain circumstan-
ces (e.g. I, Ru, Te), all other radioneulides are almost quantitat vely 
separated from the liquid effluents. To prevent the carryover of water 
droplets and, consequently, of radionuclides, the vapor is cleaned by 
baffle plates, packed colums, venturi scrubbers, fiber filters, etc. DFs 
of 104-106 can be achieved by appropiately designed evaporators. This is 
far more than required for most effluents. Whenever further decontamina-
tion should be required, this can be done by second evaporation or by ion 
exchange. 
Chloride free solutions can be evaporated under acidic conditions 
whereas chloride containing effluents are usually alkalized in order to 
prevent corrosion. In alkaline solutions the tendency of foaming is in-
creased. Foaming can be controlled by proper design of the evaporator and 
by addition of antifoaming agents. 
Several types of evaporators have been used. Natural or forced cir-
culation evaporators are very often installed. Especially the first are 
simple in design and need only little maintenance. The disadvantage of 
both types is their large consumption of energy which is a result of 
annihilation of the whole latent evaporation heat in the condenser by 
cooling water. If waste heat is available, the high energy consumption is 
not important. Wiped film evaporators are equal in energy consumption but 
can achieve a high salt concentration (up to 40 wt.% as compared to 15-25 
wt.% in most other types). 
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More eeonomieally with respeet to energy eonsumption are the vapor 
compression evaporators. In these units the vapor generated in the boil-
ing solution is passed through a compressor and by compression is heated 
up to about 140C. This vapor can then be Ilsed for heating up its own eva-
porator. In this way the whole latent evaporation heat is recover ed and 
life steam is needed only for startup. The condensate is used to preheat 
the raw water. Therefore, neither eooling water is needed. As such vapor 
compression evaporators are somewhat eomplicated in their design and need 
frequent maintenanee, their use is restrieted to low level wastes. For 
these, they have been applied very successfully. 
2. Conditioning of the Residues Arising from the Treatment 
of Low and Medium Level Liguid Wastes 
From the liquid effluents treatment various kinds of residues arise. 
They contain all radionuclides and inactive substances separated from the 
effluents and are either concentrated aqueous solutions, sludges or ion 
exchangers with a large pereentage of water. To make them suitable for 
disposal, they must be converted into asolid product. This should not be 
easily dispersible, i.e. it should form a quasi-monolytie block. They al-
so should fix firmly the radionuclides thus preventing leaching by water 
and salt brines. Finally, waste eonditioning should, if possib lei also 
achieve a volume reduction. Today the most frequently applied methods for 
low and medium level waste concentrate conditioning are eementation and 
biturninization. At a smaller degree incorporation into plastics or evapo-
ration to dryness, followed by packaging into special containers, are 
applied . 
2.1 Fixation in cement is simple and cheap in terms of equipment and 
operation, especially in case of in-drum mixing. Continuous mixers are 
slightly more complicated. Mobile cementing units are also available and 
ean service several nuclear facilities. Cementation is done by mixing the 
waste concentrate with cement at the 1:1 volume ratio. 
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In contrast to the mechanical process of cementation, the chemical 
processes taking place during setting of the cement grout are very com-
plex and can be disturbed by several waste components, e.g. boric acid, 
some organic acids or detergents. By pretreatment or the addition of 
special additi ves these problems can usually be mastered . Organic ion ex·· 
changers do not give very good waste forms. The leach resistance of cem-
ent products is not very high, especially if the leachant contains mag-
nesium salts or sulfates. However, the quality of cemented residues is 
sufficient for most kinds of wastes and disposal options. 
The main disadvantage of cementation is that it doubles the waste 
volume. The usual waste content of the final waste form is 10 wt.'. The 
waste volume is important if only limited space is available for disposal 
Due to the large volumes of wastes produced, the actually cheap cementa-
tion may lose this advantage, if storage, transport or disposal costs are 
high. 
2.2 Bituminization 
By mixing evaporator concentrates, precipitates or exhausted ion ex-
changers with hot bitumen the water evaporates and the residues are fine-
ly dispersed in the waste form. This becomes a solid block when cooled 
down. Mixer-extruders or wiped film evaporators are mostly applied in 
this process. Bitumen products usually contain 40 wt.' waste material. To 
avoid disturbances during the process the waste concentrates should not 
contain large amounts of thermally unstable substances. Nitrates do not 
disturb. 
In comparison to cementation, the volume of the final waste form is 
2 to 4 times smaller. Also the leach resistance of bituminized wastes is 
usually better. A fundamental disadvantage of bituminization is the in-
flammability of bitumen. However, wastes from nuclear power plants are 
rather flame resistant and a possible fire would not be self-sustaining. 
Practice has shown that also wastes with a high nitrate content can be-
safely bituminized. If packed in shielding containers, the products do 
not burn at all in standard fires as defined in the IAEA transport regul-
ations. 
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Bituminization involves high investment costs but they pay off if 
storage, transport and dis pos al costs are high considering the sma1l 
volume of the final waste form. 
2.3 Organic polymers are used on1y to a small extent for conditioning 
residues from liquid waste treatment. Embedding of ion exchange bead re-
sins is the method most frequently applied. By simply pouring styrene, 
divinylbenzene and a catalyst over the dewatered res ins in a drum at room 
temperature a mono1ytic block is produced. Embedding in polyesters or 
epoxides is a similar process. Fixation of powdered ion exchange resins 
is more complicated. Embedding evaporator concentrates and sludges calls 
for drying before mixing, unless vinyl esters are applied. 
Instead of thermosetting plastics also thermoplastics such as poly-
ethylene can be used. They are heated beyond their melting point and then 
mixed with the waste as in bituminization. 
The incorporation of ion exchange res ins into thermosetting plastics 
is promising because it is a simple process. For this reason, the relat-
ively high material costs are acceptab1e. Also mobile units are availab 
le for this process. The immobilization of sludges and evaporator concen-
trates in thermosetting res ins and in polyethylene seems to be hardly 
competitive with alternative methods. 
2.4 The transformation of water containing concentrates into asolid 
waste form without any binder has been investigated in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany in recent years. Evaporator-dryers and in-drum-dryers are 
in operation in some NPPs. A relatively big volume reduction is achieved 
in this way. The potential dispersibility and low leach resistance of the 
solid residue -as not fixed in a binder- is compensated by high quality 
cast iron containers. 
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3. Treatment of Solid Wastes 
The main objectives of solid waste treatment are reduction in volume 
and transformation of the residue into a waste form which meets transport 
and disposal criteria. 
3.1 Compaction 
Baling presses are relatively simple, inexpensive and robust appara-
tuses. However, they do not produce a high volume reduction. They are 
used mainly for low level wastes. The high investment costs and the com--
plicated operation of schielded presses are usually not justified for 
medium level wastes which constitute only a small part of the solid wa-
stes. If an incinerator is available, only non-burnable wastes are baled 
but in many places baling presses are the only devices for volume reduct-
ion of solid wastes. They can be found in almost all nuclear facilities. 
In former times many baling presses generated apressure of about 20 
tons. With these presses a volume reduetion of about 2 had usually been 
achieved. In order to reduce the volume even more, baling presses of up 
to 1500 tons capaeity are installed today in same places. These so-ealled 
"supercompactors" attain an average volume reduction by a faetor of 5. 
Praetice has shown that it is advantageous to package the wastes into 
simple and cheap barrels and to bale them together with these barrels. 
The resulting pellets ean then be packaged into standard drums. The free 
space is usually filled with concrete grout. 
3.2 Incineration 
The most appropriate method of treating burnable wastes is inciner--
ation. It allows a volume reduction of 1:20-1:80 to be aehieved. The ash 
is usually fixed in cement. Several types of incinerators have been in 
operation for many years. Some of them have already reaehed a high degree 
of technical maturity. 
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At KfK a ceramic-lined shaft-type incinerator has been in operation 
for about 15 years. More than 15.000 m3 of burnable waste have been 
treated so far. The flue gases pass an afterburner and are then cleaned 
by ceramic candle filters. If necessary, they pass then a wet scrubber. 
Final cleaning is always done through HE PA filters. The purified flue 
gases can be safely discharged to the atmosphere. 
The extent of application of incineration varies widely from one 
country to another. The main reason are the relatively high investment 
costs against often low throughputs. The disposal situation is therefore 
the most important factor in decision making. Central incineration faci-
lities may improve the economic situation. 
4. Exhaust Air Treatment 
The main contribution to the al ready very low dose commitment in the 
environment of nuclear facilities is made by the airborne radionuclides. 
They also constitute the main potential hazard for radionuclide release 
in case of accidents. Exhaust air and off-gas treatment is there fore an 
important part of the waste management system. 
Airborne fine solid or liquid particles are separated very effect-
ively from exhaust air in all nuclear installations by high ~fficiency 
~articulate ~ir (HEPA) filters provided that they are properly installed 
and not damaged during transport or installation. The correct function of 
the filter units can be checked by in situ-tests. 
In all nuclear power plants the noble gases are released after an 
appropriate delay, very often by adsorption processes. Radioiodine is se-
parated with high efficiency, e.g. by impregnated carbons. Special com-
ponents are available to control high temperatures, shock waves, and high 
differential pressures. To avoid damage to the filters by excessive hum-
idity or droplets, the air cleaning systems of modern plants are equipped 
with demisters followed by air heaters. 
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In the off-gases from chemical plants (reprocessing, waste treat-
ment, etc.) also semi-volatile radionuclides like ruthenium or cesium may 
have to be separated. Furthermore, these off-gases may contain large 
amounts of water vapor and corrosive components, e.g. nitrous oxides. 
Therefore, the corresponding off-gas treatment facilities are often 
equipped with condensers, NOx-adsorbers, wet scrubbers of different typ-
es, and demisters. Silver impregnaLed inorganic sorbents achieve very 
high iodine removal efficiencies. 
5. The Treatment of TRU Wastes 
Transuranium element (TRU) bearing wastes arise in significant am-
ounts only from reprocessing spent nuclear fuels and from mixed oxide 
(U02/PU02) fuel fabrication. Even in these areas the waste volumes aris-
ing are relatively small as compared to those produced in nuclear engin-
eering as a whole. 
The TRU wastes are characterized by the long half-lives and high 
radiotoxicity of most TRU elements. Working with high levels of TRU ele-
ments calls for special precautious to avoid the spread of contamination 
(alpha-boxes, etc.). Besides, TRU wastes resemble low and medium level 
wastes, as far as their appearence and their content of beta/ gammaemit-
ters is concerned, and high level wastes in terms of their long-term 
radiotoxicity. At present a comprehensive TRU waste policy is still miss-
ing in most countries. There is, however, a general agreement that TRU-
wastes shall not be disposed of by shallow land burial. 
In some countries TRU wastes are stored retrievably until regulat-
ions will be set up and/or a repository in a deep geologie formation will 
be available. In some countries TRU wastes are treated together with low 
and medium level wastes or according to the methods established for these 
wastes. With respect to TRU waste disposal it is important to bear in 
mind that TRU-elements -exept for neptunium- migrate in soils at a very 
slow rate only. 
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As long as only small amounts of TRU wastes arise, a treatment to 
gether with low and medium level wastes seems to be a reasonable approach 
provided that they are diposed of in a deep geologic formation. The main 
disadvantage lies in the fact that very small contents of TRU elements 
(in the ppm range) determine the long-term radiotoxicity of relatively 
large amounts of waste. Advanced TRU waste management concepts aim at re-
covering plutonium and concentrating the other TRU elements as mueh as 
reasonably achievable. The small volume residue is then converted into a 
very stable waste form. It seems possible to eoncentrate about 99% of the 
TRU element los ses outside the high level wastes in about 1% of all final 
waste forms. 
For this aim some special processes have been developed and are app-
lied in some cases. The proeess applied for the recovery of plutonium 
from solid wastes depends on the chemical form of the Pu. Solid organic 
box wastes contaminated with pu02 are washed with water and detergents 
(recovery rate 60-95%). To free metals and other solid materials from 
Pu02, a treatment with freon in an ultrasonic bath has proven successful. 
Equipment eontaminated with PU(N0 3)2 is cleaned with diluted nitric acid. 
Equipment, contaminated with other TRU elements, ean be cleaned by vari-
ous decontamination techniques like vibratory finishing, electropol ish-
ing, etc. Plutonium ean be largely reeovered from burnable wastes by acid 
digestion. In this process, the organic matter is decomposed by a hot 
mixture of nitrie and sulfuric aeid and the plutonium eompounds are 
transformed into Pu (504)2 which can be recovered easily. Plutonium can 
also be reeovered from the ashes of dry ineinerators, but this is more 
difficult and the yield is lower. TRU elements can be removed from liquid 
effluents by chemieal precipitation or inorganic ion exchangers. 
After concentration into a small volume the TRU elements should preferab-
ly be immobilized in a high radiation, heat and leaeh resistant waste 
form. Lanthanide phosphates, the SYNROC components zirconolite and per-
ovskite, and a mullite-corrundum ceramie have been proposed for this pur-
pose. It has also been proposed to separate the TRU elements from high 
level waste by extraction and to fission them in a fast flux reactor. 
This, however, does not seem to be a realistic approach. 
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6. Transport and Interim storage 
The transport of low level soli~ wastes does not pose any particular 
problems and can be done by e.g. trucks or fork-lifts. The wastes must, 
of course, be properly packed and no outside contamination is permissib-
le. Wastes with a dose rate 200 mrad/h at the surface and 10 mrad/h at 1 
m distance have to be shielded. Concrete and steel containers are normal-
ly used for this purpose. Liquid wastes are transported in bottles if the 
volume is small or in tank trucks. Between individual buildings of a site 
liquid effluents can also be transferred in doublewalled pipelines. 
For the interim storage of low level solid wastes simple store haus-
es with a decontaminable floor are suitable. The storage of medium level 
wastes calls for a structure with shielded walls and remote handling de-
vices. Alternatively, the wastes can be packaged into shielding contain-
ers and then stored in simple storehouses. In case of small amounts of 
medium level wastes, the latter approach will be cheaper. Liquid wastes 
should not be stored for an extended period of time. For interim storage 
corrosion resistant tanks, made of stainless steel, coated normal steel 
or plastic, and mounted in a water-tight trough are used. They are 
equipped with level detectors, a sampling system, and a circulating pump. 
- 193 -
References 
/1/ Conditioning of Low-· and Intermediate Level Radioacti ve Wastes, 
Technical Reports Series NO 222, IAEA, Vienna, (1983) 
/2/ Management of Low- and Intermediate-Level RadioaGtive Wastes (ProG. 
Symp. Aix-en-Provence, 1970), IAEA, Vienna (1970) 
/3/ Kibbey,A.H., Godbee, .W., State-of-the-Art Report on Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Treatment, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, 
Rep. ORNL/TM/7427 (1980). 
/4/ On-site Management of Power Reactor Wastes (Proc.Symp.Zurich, 1979), 
OECD, Paris (1979). 
/5/ Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Power Plants (Proe. Sem. 
Karisruhe, 1981), IAEA, Vienna, IAEA-TECDOC-276 (1983). 
/6/ Carley-MacauIy, K. W. et a1., Radioacti ve Waste: Advanced Management 
Methods for Medium Active Liquid Waste, Harwood, Chur, 1981 
/7/ The Bituminization of Low and Medium Level Radioactive Wastes 
(Proc. Sem. Antwerp., 1976), OECD, Paris (1976) 
/8/ Treatment of Low- and Intermediate Level Solid Radioactive Wastes 
Technical Reports Series NO 223, IAEA, Vienna, (1983) 
/9/ Bähr,W., Diefenbacher,W., HiId,W., Krause,H., Überblick über die 
Betriebsanlagen und Entwicklungsarbeiten zur Behandlung radioakti 
ver Abfälle im KernforsGhungszentrum Karlsruhe, KfK 1455 (1971) 
/10/ Bähr,W., Höhlein,G., Kroebel,R., Lins,W., Experience and Projects 
for Treatment and Conditioning of all RadioaGtive Wastes from Re 
processing Plants in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Prac. Internat. Canf., Seattle, Wash., May 16-20, 1983, IAEA, 
Vienna, (1984), STI/PUB/649, Vol.2, p. 239-248 
- 194 -
/11/ Design of Off-Gas and Ventilation Air Cleaning Systems at Nuclear 
Facilities, Technical Reports Series, Draft, IAEA, Vienna 
/12/ Proceedings of the 15th DOE Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference, 
Boston, Mass., 1978, CONF-780819 (1979). 
/13/ Management of Gaseous Wastes from Nuclear Facilities (Proc. Symp. 
Vienna, 1980), IAEA, Vienna (1980). 
/14/ Krause,H., The Treatment and Conditioning of Transuraniumelement 
Bearing Wastes in the Federal Republic of Germany, Radioactive 
Waste Management and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Vol. 7 (2), 1986, 
p. 139-150, Harwood Acad. Publ. 
/15/ Schneider,V., Ledebrink,F., Treatment of TRU Wastes: Recent Results 
of Developments underway in Germany, 
Proc. of the ANS Topical Meeting on the Treatment and Handling of 
Radioactive Wastes, Richland, Wash., April 19-22, 1982, Batteile 
Press, Columbus. Richland (1982), p. 362-366. 
Burnable waste 
Propane 
Air 
Steam 
Fumace Afterbumer Candle filters HEPA filters 
<1000°C 1200°C <900°C <500°C <250°C 
Propane Air Air Water Air 
M ! .r)~Stack 
<D 
U1 
==============================~======== 
KfK Incinerator for Soli Radioactive Waste 
- 196 -
mARACI'ERIZATION OF I.fJil AND INTERMEDIATE LEVEL WASTE F'OR-1S -
QUALIFICATION FOR INTERIM STORAGE, TRANSPORT, AND DISPOSAL 
R. Köster 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH. (KfK) 
D-75oo Karlsruhe, FRG 
ABSTRACl' 
The objective of the waste conditioning process is to transfer the raw 
wastes into a waste form which fullfills the reguirements for a safe 
handling, transportation, intermediate storage and disposal. The deter-
mination of the relevant waste form properties is performed by the 
waste form characterization. 
For the low and intermediate level waste concentrates and solid wastes 
arising fran the planned 350 MTHM/year reprocessing plant cementation 
is foreseen as the method for solid ificat ion . 
The main objective of the characterization work performed at the Kern-
forschungs zentrum Karlsruhe was to establish source term formulations 
for the cemented waste forms as input for safety analysis. 
For the operation phase of a repository radionuclide JOObilization fram 
the waste packages via the gas phase, caused by mechanical or thermal 
impact has to be considered. For this reason, besides laboratory tests, 
experiments with inactive full scale sampies were performed (200 1 and 
400 1 drums) to determine quantitatively the activity release fram the 
waste packages under defined thermal and mechanical stresses. 
In order to evaluate source terms for the IDJbilization of relevant ra-
dionuclides via the liquid phase (post operation phase of the reposi-
tory) as a function of time due to leaching and corrosion, detailed ex-
perimental work with simulated inactive and dopted (Cs-137, Sr-90, Pu, 
Am) laboratory sampies and with inactive full scale sampies was perfor-
med. The experimental work was accanpanied by theor:etical investiga-
tions to establish an improved basis for lang term predictions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the waste management concept is 
based on disposal of all radioactive wastes in repositories in deep 
geological formations. In the repository the wastes are isolated fran 
the biosphere by a system of multiple engineered and natural barriers. 
Liquid and solid wastes have to be treated and packaged to waste forms 
with known physical and chemical properties, which correspond to legal 
demands, especially the German Strahlenschutzverordnung. 
The investigation of essential waste form properties has been performed 
within the waste form characterization for every waste type. On basis 
of these data and safety analysis the Physikalisch-Technische Bundesan-
stalt (PTB) proposes specification for waste products. The waste form 
characterization therefore provides an important contribution to judge 
the disposal capability. 
To obtain comparable and acceptable resul ts for essential waste form 
characteristics, e.g. thermic and mechanic properties, leaching- and 
corrosion resistance, radiolytic stabilty, capable investigation me-
thods have to be fixed and standardized. In the FR:; this work has been 
done since 1979 by the working group LLW/ILW waste forms. 
Waste Types 
To establish the investigation methods for the waste form characteriza-
tion and for quality assurance the knowledge of physical and chemical 
properties of the raw waste and the matrix material is essential. Table I 
contents the raw wastes and the matrix material. 
Table I 
Matrix Materials used in the FRG for the fixation 
of LLW and IUW fram reprocessing- and fram power plants 
raw waste 
aqueous LL and IL concentrates fram reprocessing 
solid LL and IL Wastes from reprocessing 
IL-ION exchanger fran reprocessing 
organic waste concentrate from reprocessing 
(n-TBP/dodecan mixture with 10 Vol.% dodecan) 
LL-waste concentrates fran power plants 
IL ion exchanger fram power plants 
solid LL and IL wastes fram power plants 
matrix material 
cement (bitumen) 
cement, concrete 
cement 
polyvinylchloride (PVC) 
cement, (bitumen, polyethylen) 
cement, JXll ystyrene-JXll y-
divinylstyrene (bitumen) 
cement, concrete 
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WASTE FDRM PROPERrIES 
Important waste form properties, which have been investigated in oonnec-
tion with the waste disposal are besides radionuclide inventories acti-
vity releases under thermal and mechanical stresses (operational phase) 
and activity releases fram waste packages via the water patt (post ope-
rational thase). Results of this investigations are presented in this 
paper. 
Source term for the operation phase of the repository 
Mechanical Impact 
Mechanical impacts on waste packages during the operational thase 
of the underground repository in principle may cause release of small, 
oontaminated particles (fines) which may be dispersed by the ventilation 
and thus create an airborne hazard. 
For this reason, full scale experiments were performed to determine guan-
titatively the amount and the particle size distribution of the dust re-
leased from packaged inactive simulated cemented waste forms by mechani-
cal impact. A point of special importance was the determination of the 
release of fines with a particle size 10 pm because the particles oould 
be inhaled and thus create internal radiation exposure. In addition, la-
bora tory experiments were performed far oomparison of the fracture beha-
viour of different waste forms. The camposition of the waste forms for 
the laboratory experiments is given in TABLE 11. 
TABLE Ir 
Camposition of Different Cemented Waste Forms 
Waste Types Binder Waste Loading 
evaporator concentrate ßFS-cement 10 wght % 
(NaN°3) OPC 
* decontaminations ßFS-cement 2 wght % 
effluents 
Scrub water (NaCl) * 4 ßFS-cement wght % 
Filter aid sludge BFS-cement 7 wght % 
bead res ins ßFS-cement 10 wght % 
incinerator ash BFS-cement 40-61 wght % 
pyrolysis ashed OPC 39 wght % 
pyrolysis ashes ßFS-Cement 39 wght % 
compacted trash *** OPC-mortar 50-82 wght % 
* 
** 
*** 
used for cementation of incinerator ash 
free water 
pellets ~ 500 mm, overpoured with mortar 
w/c-ratio 
0.35 - 0.45 
0.50 
0.40 
0.50 ** 0.28 - 0.33 
0.40 - 0.50 
1.80 
1.80 
0.30 - ().40 
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Laboratory experiments 
The results of laboratory experiments are useful to characterize 
waste forms and to conpare different was te types, but they overestimate 
airborne release because they neglect the influence of packaging. Sone 
similar laboratory tests have been performed within our investigations 
too, the results are reported here. 
The impact resistance of small laboratory sampIes was investigated 
similar to Wallace and Kelly 11/. In the test prismatic samples 2x2x4 cm 
were impacted and crushed by a falling 1 kg-weight from 1 m height (10 
impacts). The impact energy was 2,6 J/g. Particle size distributions we-
re analyzed by sieve analysis according to DIN 4188 and Laserdiffraction 
techniques for particle sizes smaller than 50 pm. 
Weight fractions of fine particles < 200 pm for different waste ty-
pes, surface area increase rates and ratIOs of surface area increase/im-
pact energy are summarized in TABLE 111. Cement products with compressi-
ve strengths > 20 Nimm' yield weight fractions up to 5.8 weight % for 
particles < 200 pm and up to 0.91 weight % for particles < 50 pm. The 
average surface area increase yields a factor of 40 compared to the non 
crushed product, the average ratio of surface area increase/impact ener-
gy 20 cm'/J. 
Full sc ale experiments (drop tests) 
Description of the experimental setup 
For the drop tests inactive simulated cemented waste forms (OPC 35, 
w/c = 0.35, 10 weight % NaN03) packed in 200 1 steel drums were used. 
The mechanical impact was applied by dropping the waste package 
from a defined height on to a reinforced concrete target (2x2x3 m, 20 
tons) covered by a 80 nm thick steel plate. Different mechanical im-
pacts could be realized using a crane with a maximum lift height of 65 
m. Based on the package weight of about 500 kg and the applied drop 
height of 60 m the mechanical impact yields 3.105 Nm. This impact corres-
ponds to the maximum mechanical impact considered for the safety 
assessments for the repository /2/. 
Ta establish a closed system for the collection of the released 
dust, (under undisturbed conditions) the concrete basement was surroun-
ded by a mechanically stable cage with mobile ceiling. For collecting a 
part of the airborne fines, a total of 30 filter units with microfilters 
(nucleopore 0.2 pm) were placed on the inner sides of the cage. The ex-
perimmtal equiprent is shewn in Fig. 1. Fron the amount of dust on the 
filters and taking into account the suck-off parameters, the dust crn-
centration in the cage air volume and in consequence the source term 
can be calculated. 
For the determination of the dust amount rn the filter SEM-photo-
graphs of selected filter sections were performed and evaluated using an 
automatic picture evaluation system. In addition, the time dependence of 
the average dust concentration in the cage was measured by using a tyn-
dallometer equipment. Ta obtain further information rn package behaviour 
and dust spreading the impact on the waste package was observed by an in-
stalled video camera. In two experiments, the fraction with an aerodyna-
mic diameter between 1 pm and 20 pm was determined using a cascade impac-
tor. 
TABLE III 
Partic1e size distribution of fines after mechanical impact 
on cernented 1aboratory samples (impact energy 2.6 Joule/g) 
Weight Fractions Surface Area Surface Area 
Waste Types .5 11 pm < 50 pm < 80 pm < 200 pm Increase (-) Impact Energy (crn2 IJ) 
evap::lr. conc. 2.3 E-3 9.0 E-3 
decontarnination 1.5 E-3 6.6 E-3 1.9 E-2 
effluents * 
filter aid sludge 1.2 E-3 7.1 E-3 1.2 E-2 
bead res ins 2.1 E-3 9.1 E-3 2.4 E-2 
incinerator ash 1.4 E-3 3.4 E-3 1.2 E-2 
pyro1;(sis ashes 
OPC * 4.8 E-3 3.6 E-2 
BFS-cernent *** 2.8 E-3 1.9 E-2 
* with 61 weight % incinerator ash 
** 
*** 
compressive strength 4 N/mm 2 
cornpressive strength 20 N/mm 2 
Surface area of broken waste product: 
A = Surface area of the product (m2 ) 
M total rnass of the partic1es (kg) 
S density of the waste product (kg/m 3 ) 
fi = weight fraction of class i 
xi = average diameter of particles in class i (m) 
3.4 E-2 
4.6 E-2 
2.7 E-2 
5.8 E-2 
3.0 E-2 
1.4 E-1 
5.7 E-2 
6 M 
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Fig. L Scheme of the experimental set up for the collection of airbarne fines from the vlaste package 
after mechanical impact. 
The result from 4 simular experiments show that the release of fines 
with a particle size < 1 ovrn arnounts to :::. 1 g. This value =rresponds 
to 10-4 % of the totäl inventory. 
The released fraction with an aerodynamic diameter between ljJm and 2ÜjJm 
(impactor rneasurements) amounts to 1.5 g. 
This values and the dust concentration measured with the tyndallometer 
equipment show a good agreement within the range of the same order of 
magnitude. Fron these results it is concluded that for h9J11Ogeneous ce-
ment waste forms the activity release amounts also to 10-4 % of the ra-
dionuclide inventory. 
To ob ta in also information about the waste form destruction at the 
end of the experiment all the crushed waste form material released from 
the package was collectedfor further analyses. The total material weight 
was determined and a sieve analysis was performed. By the aEPlied separa-
tion technique (sieve analysis) only the total fraction with a particle 
size > 0.063 rrm =uld be determined. For a more detailed analysis of the 
partlcle size distribution in this range other separation techniques 
have to be used. The total fraction with a particle size <0.125 rrm arnounts 
to 518-608 g, the fraction 0.063 rnm amounts to 86-202 g.-
Thermal impact. tests 
The effects of thermal impacts are especially important for organic 
waste forms, e.g. bitumen waste forms, because the matrix material is 
inflammable. Detailed investigations with bitumen/NaN03 was te forms 
were performed in the past /3/. 
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To complete the knowledge about the behaviour of cemented waste forms 
in case of thermal impact, the here described experiments were perfor-
med. 
Cement as an inorganic binding material is not inflammable, but ce-
mentitious waste forms contain a certain aIrount of water, which can be 
removed by heating, and in addition organic materials, e.g. ion exchange 
materials or burnable trash, which can be decanposed by pyrolysis. The 
release of water or pyrolysis products fran cemented waste forms can 
cause activity release, e.g. by formation of radioactive aerosols. 
Hydrated cement contains in principle two different forms of wa-
ter. The free or unbound water is easily removed from the cement by hea-
ting to a temperature of 10SoC. 
The other form is bound in the various hydra ted phases and as interlayer 
water. Release of this water depends on the decanposition points of the 
hydra ted phases and therefore strongly on the temperature. For this rea-
son water release from a cemented waste form in case of an accidental 
fire situation clearly depends on the energy input. 
Experimental 
To determine the activity release from cemented waste forms contai-
ning NaN03' laboratory experiments with inactive sunulated as well as ex-
periments with inactive simulated full scale samples were performed. 
Thermographimetric-Analysis and DifferentialThermo-Analysis Inve-
stigations were performed with inactive simulated laboratory samples. 
Most of the obtained results are already described in the literature /S, 
6/ but for a canplete set of data it seems advantageous to perform these 
experiments. 
Samples of different compositions were investigated, that is ce-
ment without NaN03 and cement containing 10 weight % NaN03' Fig. 2 shows 
the calculated weight los ses from the Thermographic-Curve for the two 
different sample compositions. The results indicate very clearly that 
most of the weight loss occurs in the temperature range up to lSO°C -
200°C. Free pore water is liberated up to a temperature of 10SoC and 
aIrounts to one third of the total weight loss for this sample composi-
tion. An interesting point is the observed weight loss for the NaNOr 
containing sample in the temperature range between Soo°C and 700°C. This 
increase of weight loss is probably due to decomposition of nitrates and 
this· is also indicated by the total weight loss of 31% because the water 
content of these samples is only 2S.7 %. 
Field Tests with 200 1 and 400 1 Packages 
In the Held tests 200 1- and 400 l-steel drums containinj simu-
lated cemented was te forms (evaporator concentrate, filter aid sludges, 
incinerator ashscrubwater, organic bead resins, high force canpacted 
trash) were exposed to an oil fire or isopropanol fire of 30-110 min du-
ration (Harne temperature SOü-looOoc )..During these experiments the tempe-
rature distributions inside the drums, weight losses and element losses 
(Cs, Sr, Eu, I) were measured. 
30 
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t 
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Fig. 2. Weight loss of cerT€nted waste fonns 
(laboratory scale) as function of 
temperature. 
Same results of detailed temperature profile measurements in a ho-
rnogeneous waste form (evaFOrator o::mcentrate) are shown in Fig. 3. The 
maximum temperature at the package surface is 5OO-660°C. In the waste 
form a strong temperature gradient exists: 
- max. 10 rnm from the outer surface temperatures 
350°C. 
- max. 50 rnrn from the outer surface temperatures 
100°C. 
- max. temperature inside the waste form 80°C 10 
hours after the end of the fire. 
This result indicates very clearly that water and pyrolysis resi~ 
dues are released only fran the outer parts of the waste form. In case 
of heterogeneous waste forms, e.g. compacted bumable trash in pellets, 
overfOured with mortar (10 rnm mortar thickness) higher temperatures in-
side the pellets up to 400°C can occur, due to the different heat capa-
city of the heterogeneous structure and pyrolysis reactio:n inside the 
waste. 
Weight losses of 200 1 drums are 10 - 16 kg after 30 min. fire and 
16 -23 kg after the 60 min. fire test. This corresFOnds to 2.3 - 4.0 
weight % and 4.0- 7.3 weight % respectively. The highest weight losses 
had been obtained wi th canpacted burnable trash (23 kgj7. 3 weight %). 
Fire tests with 400 l-samples (evaFOrator concentrates) yielded weight 
los ses of 14-15 kg (1.8-2.0 weight %) after a 30 min. fire test. 
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Fig. 3 Positions of the thermocouples in the cemented waste form (a) and time 
dependence of the temperature distribution (b) in the waste form (upper 
level of thermocouples) during the first test 
(field test, 40 min. oil fire). 
The element losses were investigated by two different off-gas sam-
pling methods: 
total condensation 
total exhaustion and aerosol filtration (Fig. 4). 
es, Sr, Eu and I-releases fran different cementitious waste forms 
after a 60 min. fire test (200 1 drums) are summarized in TABLE III. Ho-
mogeneous cement products yield following results: 
Total released fractions 
es < 3 E-4 
Sr "< 9 E-5 
I "< 2 E-4 
Eu ~ 9 E-6. 
High force compacted burnable trash shows higher release rates, due to 
higher product temperatures inside the waste: 
Total released fractions 
es < 2 E-3 
Sr "< 1 E-4 
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Fig. 4 Flow sheet of experimental set up for the fire field test. 
TABLE IV 
Elernent-speeifie release fraetions fram different waste forrns 
after 60 rnin. fire test, 200 l-drums * 
Cernented Waste Form Release Fraetions (-) 
Cs Sr Eu I 
Evaporator rone. 8 E-5 2 E-5 4 E-6 
Bead resins 8 E-5 5 E-6 2 E-4 
Incinerator ash/ 3 E-4 9 E-5 9 E-6 
serub water 
Cornpacted Trash 2 E-3 1 E-4 
* without lid 
The data apply to cernent prüducts solidified without supernatant 
water in open steel drums without additional shielding. 
Volurne changes and water losses during heating cause sorne crack 
formation at the surface of hornogeneous cernent prüducts. An outer layer 
of 5 nm prüduct shows colour changes, indicating high ternperatures and 
pyrolysis effects. During heating of overpoured rornpacted burnable trash 
a volurne increase of pellets occured ( 2-3 Vol.%) which eaused partial 
destruction of the rnortar layer surrounding the waste. Inside the pel-
lets an outer layer of 5-10 nm was thermally decamposed. 
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In sunmary the results of the experiments give a clear indication 
that any activity release from cemented waste forms under thermal impact 
is very low. For example, the activity release from NaN03-containing ce-
mented waste forms is 3 orders of magnitude lower than the activity re-
lease from NaN03-containing bituminized waste forms /3/. 
SOURCE 'lERM FDR 'IRE WATER PA'lll WAY 
The source term for the water path in this paper is described for IL/LL-
evaporator concentrate cement waste forms. Similar results for other 
waste types are available. 
A representative composition of IIW concentrates from a reprocessing 
plant with Purex flowsheet for LWR fuel is given in TABLE V. 
TABLE V: ILW-concentrate from a Purex reprocessing 
plant 
(LWR fuel, burn-up 30 GWd/mt H.M., 
U 235 3.5%, cooling time 5 a). 
specific Beta-Activity < 1013 Bg/m3 
specific Alpha-Activity 3 1010 Bg/m 3 
main activity carriers: 
Cs l37/Ba 137m; Ru 106/Rh 106; Ce l44/Pr 144; 
Sr 90/y 90; Sb l25/Te 125; Cs 134 
solid content: 25-35 wt% (~90% NaN03)' /6/ 
Typical cemented evaporator concentrate waste form properties are listed 
in TABLE VI. 
TABLE VI: Typical waste form properties 
(cemented evaporator concentrate waste form) 
Matrix: ordinary portland cementstone (OPC) 
Main components of concentrate: NaN03 
solid load in the waste form : 5 - 15 wt.% 
Water content: 20 - 30 wt.% 
Density 2 g/cm 3 
Porosity 25 Vol.% 
Air porosity 2 - 4 Vol.% 
Compressive strenght 
Considerable water release: 
Heat conductivity 
Radiation resistance 
Radiolysis gas formation: H2 
02 
15 N mm-2 
T > 105°C 
oSW'm-l 
(p = 1 bar) 
K-l 
< 1010 rad 
0.3-0.8 ml/kg'10 6 rad 
0.1-0.2 ml/kg'106 rad /7/ 
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For the aqueous pathway radionuclide releases frau cernented waste 
forms have been investigated in detail in water and sal t brines. The 
leachability of, e.g., Cs 137-tracer arnounts in saturated NaCl brine 
from a' simulated ILW concentrate cement waste form in laboratory scale 
using the lAEA leach test is shown in Fig. 5. 
The volurre of the leachant is IV 10 times the sampIe volume • Frau such 
curves a diffusion constant and the leach rates can be calculated. Typi-
cal values for the integral leach rates are (1 year, 25°C): 
10-3 -
10-6 -
10-6 -
0:<: 
er. 
,0 
er 
10-4cm/d 
10-7cm/d 
10-7cm/d 
for Cs, Sr 
for Co, Sb, I 
for TRU-elements 
tirre (years) 
Fig. 5 es release from laboratory scale ILW-oPC 
waste forms in sat. NaCl-solution 
(OPC, W/C = 0.4, 10 weight% NaN03 ) 
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In a brine rich in MgC12 (Q-brine) - which has to be considered for safe-
ty analysis as possibly attacking the waste form - the release of Cs can-
not be described by a simple diffusion process, as can be seen in Fig. 6 • 
o 
o 
o 
w 
o 
o 
o 
o 
N 
t:ine (years) 
Fig. 6 es release from laboratory scale ILW-OPC 
waste forms in Q-brine 
(OPC, W/C == 0.48, 10 weight% NaN03) 
The kinetics in this case are determined by three corrosion processes: 
- leaching of soluble compounds 
- exchange reactions (Ca(OH)2 + MgC12 -+ CaC12 + 
Mg(OH)~) 
- formatlon of new phases causing swelling. 
Leach experiments, x-ray analysis of phase cauposition and deter-
mination of element concentration profiles by electron microprobe ana-
lysis in the cement stone sarnple as a function of time and distance fram 
phase roundary were carried out. These data have been integrated into a 
theoretical model using finite difference techniques to establish an im-
proved basis for longterm predictions /91. A oamparison between measured 
and calculated element concentration profiles is shown }n Fig. 7. 
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Fig. 7 Comparison between experimental and eomputed 
calcium and magnesium coneentration profiles of a 
slag eement specimen eorroded in quinary brine for 
24 weeks at 40°C. 
To investigate ti1e influence of ti1e conditioning process itself (homoge-
nity, crack fonnation) on the leach behaviour aoo to verify the rela-
tion between laboratory and full scale samples, leach experiments with 
inactive 200-1 and 400-1- samples were carried out at NUKEM and KfK. 
For both investigations ti1e products contained about 10 wt.% salts and 
CsN03 as an inactive tracer was added. Samples of each waste form were 
prepared, using an in-drum planetary mixer or a continuous mixing sy-
stem. 
Fig. 8 shows ti1e time dependence for ti1e full scale and laboratory sam-
ples, produced at KfK. 
Each sample had a volume of 160 1 (wie ratio 0.44, salt content 9.2 wt.%, 
inactive CsN03 content 0.9 weight%) and ti1e amount of leachant used was 
230 1. The experiments were perfonned at 40·C without changing the 
leachant. After certain periods ti1e leachant was stirred and samples 
(0.5 1) were taken for analysis. 
The results show no significant difference between ti1e Cs leaching from 
the full and laboratory sc ale samples for the 1 year period. 
5.0 
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Fig. 8 
FUTURE AcrIVITIES 
Time dependence of es-release from full scale and 
lanoratory cemented waste forms in quinary brine at 40° e 
For long term considerations especially the release of actinides has to be 
investigated. The release is determined by two essential values, the kinetic 
of the activity release and the distribution of the activity between the 
solid and the liquid phase which has to be considered in a closed system. 
The establishment of the equillibrium depends e.g. on the volume ratio of 
the sample and the leachant, on the initial activity in the waste form and 
on the solubility of the nuclide campounds (oxides, silicate phases). 
To determine the equillibrium distribution for Pu and Am experiments using 
samples with a high specific surface (to simulate a matrix corrosion) in 
excess leachant were perforrred. The investigations were started using Pu 
and Am doped samples as weIl as real samples from the KfK waste treatment 
facility. 
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DISPOSAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RADIOACTIVE HASTE 
EXPERIENCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
H. Stöber 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH (KfK) 
Project Reprocessing and Waste Management 
1. Abstract 
In the paper, a survey is given on the situation of nuclear 
technology in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) with 
regard to management and disposal of radioactive waste. 
Factors to be considered and implementation of disposal 
programs are briefly described. 
2. Current Practice 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, research on development 
activities on the field of the peaceful use of nuclear power 
began in 1956 with the foundation of the first nuclear 
research centres at Jülich and Karlsruhe, followed by other 
research centres not much later. Electricity generation by 
nuclear power began in 1961. 
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In 1986 nuclear power plants with an electric capacity of 
about some 18.500 MW are operational contributing some 35 
per cent to the total public electricity generation. Addi-
tionally nuclear power plants with an electric capacity of 
about 5400 MW are in construction. According to the utili-
ties planning, nuclear power plants with a total electric 
capacity of approximately 28.000 MW may be installed by the 
year 2000. As the spent fuel arising per 1200 MWel and year 
amounts to some 30 tons heavy metal, this would lead to a 
spent fuel arising of some 600 tons heavy metal 
year. 
(HM) per 
In addition, the use of nuclear power and nuclear activities 
in general originates radioactive wastes which in the FRG 
amounted to some 25.000 m3 of conditioned waste and 7000 m3 
of unconditioned waste by the end of 1984, mostly composed 
of low and medium level waste (with negligible he at genera-
tion), but also of some 180 m3 of heat generating condi-
tioned waste and some 50 m3 of high level liquid waste from 
reprocessing of spent fuel, being all these wastes stored in 
so-called engineering storage buildings. Till the year 2000, 
a tqtal amount of about 240.000 m3 of conditioned waste with 
negligible heat generation may be expected, and some 1000 m3 
of heat generating conditioned waste, including about 600 m3 
of vitrified high level waste from reprocessing. 
Virtually from the beginning of nuclear science and power 
development, radioactive waste and spent fuel management was 
a point of concern in the FRG. This led to extensive re-
search and development (R&D) activities in the various 
nuclear research centres, to the participation in the repro-
cessing project EUROCHEMIC in Belgium and to the operation 
of both a pilot disposal facility in a salt mine (ASSE) 
since 1968 and a pilot reprocessing facility at Karlsruhe 
(WAK) since 1971. 
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For the management of spent fuel in the FRG there exists a 
licensed capacity of some 4.700 tons in nuclear power plants 
and of 1500 tons in the away-from-reactor (AFR) storage 
facility at Gorleben - blocked by legal proceedings for the 
moment - where the spent fuel elements will be stored in 
casks ("dry storage"). At the experimental reprocessing 
plant at the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Centre, there have 
been processed about 160 tons of spent oxide fuel since 
1971. The experience gained with this facility forms an 
important basis for the planningof a larger facility, like 
the experience gained in the internatinal EUROCHEMIC repro-
cessing plant in the sixties and seventies. 
The operators of nuclear power plants in the FRG have con-
cluded contracts for the storage and reprocessing of spent 
fuel elements with foreign partners, namely in France and in 
Great Britain, to date about a total of some 4000 tons HM, 
from which about 550 tons HM were reprocessed by the end of 
1985. Provisions for the spent fuel management of the ex-
perimental and prototype re ac tors High Temperature Reactor 
(HTR) and Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) types (AVR, THTR-300, 
KNK, SNR-300, respectively) have been taken: HTR-fuel 
(graphit coated spherical fuel elements) is stored in casks 
for later direct disposal in the geological repository; FBR 
fuel is stored at the reactors and is planned to be repro-
cessed in France. 
The intermediate storage of radioactive waste takes place at 
present on the sites of the nuclear power plants in the 
nuclear research centres, in industrial firms, and in the 
Federal States collection facilities. 
The experimental reprocessing plant in Karlsruhe has a 
storage capacity of approximately 130 m3 for high level 
radioactive liquid wastes. Around 50 m3 are currently being 
stored there. 
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Low and medium level radioactive wastes are conditioned in 
nuclear power plants, in nuclear research centres and on the 
premises of some other waste producers. 
3. Future Plans 
Actual planning of the utilities calls for an electric 
nuclear capacity of about 28.000 MWel in the year 2000. This 
indicates that about 10.000 tons HM of spent fuel would have 
arisen by the end of this century. 
To manage these quantities and the radioactive waste 
arisings related to nuclear power and nuclear activities in 
general, the following activities are planned: 
Industry 
--------
- Reprocessing of spent fuel in foreign countries, based on 
the existing contracts. 
- Construction of a AFR storage facility with a capacity of 
1500 tons HM at the city of Ahaus, Western part of the 
FRG. 
- Construction of a demonstration reprocessing plant with a 
capacity of 350 tons HM per year (2 tons HM per day) to be 
sited at Wackersdorf (Bavaria). The plant includes a re-
ceiving facility for spent fuel (with a capacity of 1500 
tons HM) and a storage facility for HLW glass blocks. 
- Construction of a pilot conditioning plant for spent fuel 
at the site of the Gorleben interim storage facility. 
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Extension of thermal recycling of uranium and plutonium in 
LWR, including recycling of fissionable material recovered 
from reprocessing of German fuel abroad and all Pu not 
needed for FBR fuelling. 
- Extension of storage capacities for low - and medium 
level waste (LLW and MLW), both at-reactor and away-from-
reactor, taking into consideration the wastes from repro-
cessing abroad. 
Government 
While governmental responsibility is limited to disposal and 
safekeeping of waste, some R&D activities are sponsored that 
refer to safety questions of dry interim storage of spent 
fuel, reprocessing, waste conditioning and transportation. 
Further activities sponsored by government refer to 
questions of direct disposal of spent fuel. 
The .. most important task of Federal Government concerning the 
management of radioactive residues resulting from nuclear 
activities is the safekeeping and disposal of those radio-
active residues: 
- R&D activities on the field of disposal of radioactive 
was te are concentrated in the former salt mine ASSE, where 
more than 40.000 m3 of low and medium level waste have 
been disposed of from 1968 to 1978, and on the former iron 
ore mine Konrad, both in Northern Germany. These R&D works 
are supported by activities in research centres and 
federal institutes. 
- The suitability of the Konrad mine for disposal of wastes 
with negligible heat generation and wastes from the 
decommissioning 
determined in 
procedure, a 
eighties. 
of 
the 
license 
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nuclear ,installations is being 
course of the current licensing 
being expected toward end of the 
- An extensive exploration program has been performed since 
1979 in the Gorleben salt dome to find out its suitability 
above all for disposal of heat generating waste like HLW 
glass blocks or spent fuel canisters. Excavation of two 
shafts for an exploration mine has begun and a judgement 
about the suitability of the salt dome is expected for the 
mid nineties. 
- In addition to the R&D activities on disposal mentioned 
above, investigation continues on the possibilities of 
disposal in solid rock, partly in a Swiss-German coopera-
tion, and on the possibilities of disposal of special 
radioactive wastes containing tritium, carbon 14, krypton 
85 and iodine 129. 
4. Institutional Framework - Reponsibilities and Financial 
Provisions 
Spent fuel management and the management of all kinds of 
radioactive waste in the Federal Republic of Germany has 
been summarized under the designation "Entsorgung" (which 
might be translated wi th "relieving") and which means the 
contrary of "providing" or "supplying with", and is defined 
as the appropriate and safe conveyance, treatment - e.g. 
reprocessing - storage and disposal of radioactive residues 
coming out from the use of nuclear power and radioactive 
isotopes. 
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Bases of the policy of spent fuel and radioactive waste 
management in the FRG are the Atomic Energy Act and the so-
called "Entsorgungs-concept" or "back-end - of - the - fuel 
- cycle-concept", the latter confirmed by the "Resolution of 
the Heads of Government of Federation and Federal States 
relating to the Entsorgung of Nuclear Power Plants" dated 
28th September 1979. Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act, 
anyone who produces radioactive residues shall make provi-
sion to assure that these: 
- are recycled without harmful effects, or 
- are disposed of as radioactive wastes in an orderly manner 
insofar as utilization is not technically possible, is not 
economically justified or is incompatible with the protec-
tive purpose of the Atomic Energy Act. 
In accordance with this, in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
reprocessing of spent fuel elements with recycling of usable 
nuclear fuel materials and ultimate storage of reprocessing 
wastes has to be considered, the common way of "Entsorgung" 
of nuclear power plants. 
The Entsorgungs-concept comprises the following steps: 
1) Interim storage and treatment (i.e. reprocessing) of the 
spent fuel elements. 
2) Development of direct disposal techniques without repro-
cessing. 
3) Conditioning, interim storage and disposal of radioactive 
wastes. 
The Atomic Energy Act allocates certain tasks to the 
tors of nuclear facilities, the Federal States 
Federation with reference to "Entsorgung". 
opera-
and the 
- 219 -
Applying the "polluter pays" principle, it is the duty of 
the operators to provide for: 
- the intermediate storage of spent fuel elements; 
- the reprocessing of spent fuel elements including recyc-
ling of the fissile material; 
- the conditioning of the radioactive wastes; and 
- the intermediate storage of the radioactive wastes insofar 
as these are not delivered to Federal States' collection 
facili ties. 
The operator has the duty to demonstrate the provision for 
the "Entsorgung" and thereby, among other things, to prove 
that the safe storage of the spent fuel elements is always 
assured in advance for an operating per iod of 6 years as 
from the commissioning of the nuclear power plant. 
The Federal States are obliged to erect Federal States' 
collection facilities for the intermediate storage of the 
radioactive waste occuring in their area, if such wastes 
result from the application of radioisotopes in industry, 
research and medicine. 
The Federation, that is the Federal Government, is obliged 
to install facilities for the safekeeping and disposal of 
radioactive wastes. In accordance with the Atomic Energy 
Act, this task is performed by the Federal Agency "Physika-
ltsch-Technische Bundesanstalt (PTB)" at Braunschweig. This 
institution forms part of the portfolio of the Federal 
Minister of Economics but, in this sector, is subject to the 
expert supervision of the Federal Minister for Environment, 
Nature Protection and Reactor Safety, (formerly to the 
supervision of the Federal Minister of the Interior). The 
PTB avails itsself of the cooperation of the German Company 
for the Contruction and Operation of Final Disposal Facili-
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ties for Waste (DBE), being the majority of the shareholders 
federal controlled companies. 
With reference to the facilities for "Entsorgung" of the 
Federation and the Federal States, fees can be collected 
from those liable to deliver conditioned radioactive wastes 
in accordance with the "polluter pays" principle pursuant to 
the Atomic Energy Act. Prepayments for later contributions 
are collected for the facilities of the Federation on the 
basis of a decree issued in 1982. The costs incurred by the 
Federal Government in this connection are reimbursed annu-
ally since 1982 from waste producers corresponding to their 
estimated disposal requirements. Actually, 97 per cent of 
the cost is borne by the German Reprocessing Company and by 
the public utilities engaged in nuclear power. This means, 
that these costs are finally paid by the electricity con-
sumer. The rest of 3 per cent is borne by the other waste 
producers including users of nuclides in medicine, research 
and industry. Therefore, the installation of future disposal 
facilities is payed by the users of nuclear technology 
already now. 
5. Disposal Activities in the FRG 
As already mentioned, from the beginning of nuclear tech-
niques development_in the FRG, there was also begun research 
and development on the field of spent fuel management and 
management of radioactive waste, including activities con-
cerning ultimate disposal of radioactive wastes. 
WhileR&D activities for ~aste conditioning were concen-
trated mainly in the Nuclear Research Centres of Karlsruhe 
and Jtilich, completed by activities of the nuclear industry, 
and by projects directly induced by the Federal Government 
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and in the frame of R&D programmes of the European Communi-
ty, the R&D for disposal of radioactive waste was concen-
trated in the Institute for Geologie Disposal (IfT) which 
belongs to the Radiological and Environmental Research 
Centre (GSF) at Munieh, completed by activities of other 
institutions like the Federal Agency for Geologie Sciences 
and Raw Materials (BGR),the already mentioned Federal Agency 
PTB, and KfK. 
Facility ASSE 
From 1967 till 1978 the former salt mine ASSE near Braun-
schweig was opera ted as disposal facility for the demonstra-
tion of disposal techniques for low level and medium level 
radioactive wastes. During this period some 125.000 barrels 
of low level waste (42.000 m3 ) and 1.300 barrels of medium 
level waste (260 m3 ) were disposed of. Further on, research 
and development work for the disposal of radioactive wastes 
in salt formations is primarily performed in this mine. 
Disposal experiments with high active, heat generating glass 
blocks will be performed still in the eighties. These blocks 
will be removed at the end of experiments. In addition, 
checks are carried out to see whether ASSE can be used for 
the Entsorgung of radioactive wastes in the future. 
Facility Konrad 
The former iron mine Konrad near Salzgitter (in the Braun-
schweig areal is planned for the final disposal of low level 
radioactive wastes and wastes from the decommissioning of 
nuclear installations. Its suitability was determined in the 
course of a detailed examination performed by the Radio-
logical and Environmental Research Centre GSF (Qesellschaft 
für Strahlen- und Umwelt!orschung). 
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On the basis of this suitability report, the Federal Agency 
PTB submitted an application for the issue of a li'cense to 
the Government of the State of Lower Saxony in 1982. The 
license is expected to be issued still in the eighties. It 
is assumed that disposal in the mine Konrad can commence 
about 1990. 
Facility Gorleben 
According to current plans, the planned disposal facility in 
the salt dome Gorleben, in the North-Eastern region of the 
Federal Republic is the only repository in which high level 
radioactive heat-producing wastes are to be stored in addi-
tion to low and medium radioactive wastes. 
The site exploration programme, comprising a hydrogeological 
drilling programme, salt level drillings and deep drillings 
began in 1979 and has been completed. The sinking of two 
exploration shafts began in summer 1984. Summarizing and 
examining all the results ~btained to the date in the site 
examination, the PTB and the Reactor Safety Commission (RSK) 
came to the conclusion that to date there were not provided 
any results which would question the suitability of the salt 
dome of Gorleben for the disposal of radioactive wastes of 
diverse origin, including high level radioactive waste. 
In order to demonstrate the suitability of the disposal 
facility Gorleben in the licensing procedure, it is essen-
tial to carry out an underground exploration. The German 
Company for the Construction and Operation of Disposal Faci-
lities for Waste DBE is commissioned with the fast perfor-
mance of thewörk. The underground exploration is expected 
to supply important findings by the end of the eighties and 
that it will be possible to give a final verdict on the 
suitability of the salt dome as a disposal facility for 
radioactive waste at the beginning of the nineties. 
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Disposal capacity 
If the planned final disposal projects are realized, all 
conditioned waste occurring up to the year 2000 could be 
disposed of. No bottlenecks are to be expected after this 
date either. 
Direct disposal of spent fuel 
Direct disposal of spent fuel is foreseen for special fuel 
elements not suitable for reprocessing, e.g. HTR fuel or 
fuel elements from research or prototype reactors. Whether 
this technology will be acceptable for LWR fuel, too, will 
depend on the results of technological development and 
finallyon the adaptation of the Atomic Energy Act which 
actually prescribes recycling, i.e. reprocessing. 
Disposal in solid rock 
In addition to disposal in salt formations, the Federal 
Government is checking the suitablility of solid rock. 
Granite is primarily of interest in this case. Development 
work is being performed on examination methods, which are 
suitable for solid rock, e.g. granite, 
taking the ore formations there as an 
in the mine Konrad 
example. Important 
research work on granite is being executed in the frame of a 
bilateral German/Swiss cooperation. Furthermore, knowledge 
gained in the frame of research work performed by the Euro-
pean Communities is also at the disposal of the Federal 
Government. 
- 224 -
Radioactive special wastes 
Radioactive wastes mainly consisting of separated tritium, 
carbOn 14, krypton 85, iodine 129 or radium are termed 
special wastes because these radionuclides are volatile, 
form volatile compounds or decay to produce volatile, radio-
active daughters. In the course of research work performed, 
conditioning processes, which can ensure safe disposal, are 
also developed for these wastes. 
Dumping of radioactive wastes at sea 
Pursuant to the German ratifjcation law on the "Convention 
for the Prevention of Marine Pollution as the Result of the 
Dumping of Wastes by Ships and Aircrafts" dated February 11, 
1977, permission to dump any kind of waste at sea may only 
be gran ted if disposal on land is impossible without im-
pairing the public health or can only be implemented with an 
unreasonably high expenditure and if no disadvantageous 
change in the quality of the sea water is to be feared as a 
result of the dumping. 
As presented above, ~ccording to the present state of know-
ledge it is possible to dispose of radioactive wastes (and 
special wastes) on land without impairing the public good 
and without an unreasonab+y high expenditure. For this 
reason, the Federal Government does not see any need to 
discuss the question of the dumping of radioactive wastes 
into the sea at present. The futher prerequisite for per-
mission, namely that the dumping at sea must not make one 
fe ar a disadvantageous change in the quality of the sea 
water, is therefore of less importance for the decision. 
For reasons of research policy, the Federal Government is, 
nevertheless, involved in pertinent international investi-
gations. Furthermore, it takes part in the international 
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surveillance procedure which is set down in the OECDcouncil 
resolution for the creation of a multilateral consultation 
and surveillance system for the sea dumping of radioactive 
wastes, da ted July 22, 1977. 
Shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear facilities 
The obligation to dispose of radioactive wastes also covers 
radioactive parts from shutdown nuclear facilities. Shutdown 
and decommissioning of the plant are the duty of the opera-
tor or owner of the plant. 
The research reactors FR 2 and MZFR (Karlsruhe) and FRN 
(Neuherberg near Munich), the prototype nuclear power plant 
Niederaichbach/Bavaria (KKN) and the nuclear power plants 
Lingen/Northrhine-Westfalia (KWL) and Gundremmingen/Bavaria 
(KRB-1) have finally stopped operation and are avaiting 
decommissioning. 
After removal of the reactor and decontamination and dis-
mantling of the other nuclear systems, the nuclear ship 
"otto Hahn", which now has the status of a conventional 
ship, has been released from supervision according to the 
Atomic Energy Act. 
The complete decommissioning of a nuclear power plant is to 
be demonstrated for the first time in the Federal Republic 
of Germany using the plant Niederaichbach (KKN). The demo-
lition plans are essentially completed. 
It is planned that decommissioning wastes will be disposed 
of in the former Konrad iron mine. 
- 226 -
6. Factors influencing spent fuel/radioactive was te manage-
ment and disposal policy 
• Current spent fuel/radioactive waste management policy is 
based on pOlitical decisions and ordinances issued bet-
ween 1976 and 1979 and mentioned in chapter 4. Since 
then, the operation licenses of nuclear power plants are 
legally linked to the proof of the safe management of 
spent fuel always 6 years in advance, and to progress of 
the realisation of the back end of the fuel cycle concept 
("Entsorgung"). As the by far largest producers of radio-
active waste are the nuclear power plants Bnd the fuel 
cycle facilities linked hereto, the safe management of 
radioactive wastes including future possibilities of 
waste disposal has become a crucial condition for the 
further use of nuclear energy in the FRG. 
This, on the one side, led to one of the possibly most 
advanced disposal programs in the world, on the other 
side, to growing political problems relating to the 
realization of the "Entsorgung", as the opponents to 
nuclear activities have detected just this link of the 
nuclear fuel cycle as possibility to stop the future 
development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
• Political discussion about the development of nuclear 
energy in the FRG and actions at the courts concerning 
many nuclear projects led to delays up to years in some 
cases, which caused a severe raising of the costs of 
nuclear installations. Additionally, safety standards 
required in the licensing procedures became enlarged, 
partly caused by the political irritation on the field of 
nuclear technologies, which gave rise to higher costs, 
too. 
• The delay of projects by political reasons also concerns 
the use and development of disposal sites. Here the 
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special situation resulted, that the amendment of the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1976 demands public participation in 
the licensing procedure of disposal sites, too, like it 
had been the ca se already in the licensing of nuclear 
power plants and other nuclear facilities. 
Therefore, the license for disposal of radioactive waste 
in the ASSE salt mine which expired in 1978 was not 
renewed automatically and political discussion since then 
impeded the disposal of low and medium level waste, so 
sucessfully demonstrated during 10 years. 
There has also been some delay by growing concern in 
public and political opinion with regard to selection of 
a disposal site for future waste arisings, including heat 
generating high active waste, in the seventies. But after 
beginning of the exploration program at the salt dome 
near Gorleben, this project is weIl within the schedule 
of 1979. This also can be stated with regard to the 
former iron mine Konrad. 
o Of course the remarkable reduction of nuclear capacity 
forecasts since the seventies has to be considered. While 
in the seventies a nuclear electricity production capaci-
ty of 40.000 to 50.000 MW by the year 2000 was foreseen, 
this figure was reduced step by step in the last years, 
to a forecast of some 25.000 to a maximum of may be 
30.000 MWel by the year 2000. There is not an immediate 
influence on spent fuel and radioactive waste management 
policy, but with this reduction the spent fuel storage 
capacities in operation or under construction probably 
will be sufficient - in addition to the existing re pro-
cessing contracts with foreign countries and the planned 
reprocessing in the FRG - to manage all spent fuel 
arisings till the year 2000. This could mean a relief in 
the restraint to have to manage and dispose of the re-
sulting radioactive wastes. 
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• There must also be taken into consideration in disposal 
strategies the fact that the reprocessing contracts with 
foreign countries include returning of the corresponding 
radioactive waste arisings to the FRG. This could be 
realized in the nineties at the earliest, after mutual 
agreement. 
• A relatively new factor to be taken into account in 
disposal strategy is the development of conditioning 
techniques for all kind of spent fuel, not only from HTR 
pebble bed reactors, with the aim of direct disposal. 
Studies on consequences of this spent fuel management 
form to disposal techniques have been performed; the 
disposal technique itsself is to be developed in the 
coming years. 
• Other factors of possible influence on disposal strate-
gies are given by cooperation in international 
international agreements and joint R&D with 
nations on this field. 
bodies, 
foreign 
The FRG takes part in disposal related research activi-
ties in the frame of the so-called "indirect action on 
radioactive wastes" of the Commission of the European 
Communities. 
There exists a R&D cooperation on the field of radio-
active waste management and disposal of the USA and the 
FRG, in the frame of a corresponding agreement. The 
cooperation on the field of hard rock disposal with 
Switzerland has been mentioned already. 
Finally, the FRG cooperates with international bodies on 
this field, in the frame of the European Community, the 
Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the 
Internatinal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 
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As resume it can be stated that international contacts 
and cooperation on this field are generally considered a 
valuable factor in development of disposal strategies. 
@ A fact that has to be taken into consideration is that 
all disposal activities in the FRG will take place in 
continental geologie repositories. This is of importance 
for example for the development of waste conditioning 
techniques or the waste treatment strategies in nuclear 
facilities, i.e. reprocessing plants. Of course an im-
portant aspect in this regard is the possibility of waste 
volume reduction by new conditioning methods. 
• The question of safety of course is a crucial factor 
concerning the acceptability of disposal strategies, for 
political and licensing bodies as well as for the public. 
Safety analysis like those elaborated in the frame of the 
"Project Safety Studies Entsorgung" (PSE), can be of 
great help in this regard . 
• Last but not least, a very important factor is the finan-
cial aspect. Although in the FRG, the Governmental Bodies 
are responsible for the installation of safekeeping and 
disposal facilities for radioactive wastes, the "polluter 
pays" principle is applied here, too. In accordance with 
the Atomic Energy Act, the erection of disposal facili-
ties and disposal are financed by the was te producers, 
that is, finally by the user of nuclear energy or nuclear 
services. 
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BATAN's long 
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BATAN'S ACTIVITIES IN NDCLEAR SAFETY 
activities in the Reactor Technology and Nuclear 
cover also Nuclear Safety are outlined in the 
Term R & D Programme in nuclear field with its 
o Safe, economic and reliable energy supplied by Nuclear Power 
Plant. 
o Wide spread benefication of Nuclear Technique and Nuclear 
Technology. 
o Safe and protected environment 
pOllution and nuclear hazard. 
against conventional 
And the basic programme related to the nucle,ar safety is : 
o To investigate the material and componentbehaviour, and 
to contribute and partisipate in international Research and 
Development Programme. 
o To contribute to the demontration and assurance of plant 
safety and reliability through experiment and research. 
Therefore Nuclear Facilities (reactor and supporting 
laboratories) are built in Serpong included Engineering and 
Safety Laboratory. A facility to study reactor safety had also 
been installed in Bandung (Research Center for Nuclear 
Technique). Then the programme on Nuclear Safety should be 
established. 
As goal of BATAN's long term programme on utilizing nuclear energy 
for electricity in Indonesia is to introduce nuclear power 
plant, where the safety aspects is the main consideration besides 
economical and political aspects. Presently BATAN has started to 
initiated some activities for studying Nuclear Power Plant in 
some aspects included safety aspect for facing and handling plant 
which have high reliability and high safety in its operation. 
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That goal acheivement should be support by improving and 
developing of technology, personnel capab~lity and regulation 
through research activities. 
Safety research will cover : 
1. Research required for development of criteria for safety 
standard and safety inspection. 
2. Research to improve safety of nuclear facilities and its 
components which must be introduced in to the design, 
fabrication, construction and operation. 
The research programme is carried out on the international level 
and the possibility of implementation through international 
cooperation. 
BACKGROUND OF NUCLZAR SAFETY ACTIV7TliS 
Several activities on nuclear safety assesment are explained here 
which intended as background of Nuclear Safety activity 
programme. 
1. The first research reactor was commissioned in 1965, which 
located in Bandung. The reactor was TRIGA MARK TYPE made by 
General Atomic with 250 KWT capasity as nominal power. The 
advent of reactor initiated the study of reactor safety. The 
safety assesment was carried out in connection with research 
programm proposal as the utilization of reactor. Then the 
safety assesment was emphesized on reactor operation in 
longer time and on the up grading of reactor power up to 
1000 KWT. 
2. Reactor Kartini was the second research reactor and built in 
Yogyakarta. It used spent fuel of TRIGA MARK II REACTOR in 
Bandung, thereforethe safety assesment on spent fuel trans-
portation due to the criticality was carried out. This 
reactor was constructed by BATAN personnels and of course it 
gave as a good experience to the engineers and scientists 
and also gave the experience on the evaluating of safety 
aspects. 
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3. Regulations, safety inspections, monitoring including its 
procedures were developed by BATAN's Regulatory Body. 
4. With the operating of TRIGA MARK 11 Reactor and Kartini 
Reactor, a project was initiated which was concentrated to 
study research reactor safety mainly for reactor operation 
procedure, co re thermohyßdraulics core physics, and 
environmental monitoring, with the aim was to improve 
reactor operation safety. The project was started in the 
third period at five years development plan. 
5. With the increasing of electricity demand in Indonesia, the 
possibility to introduce nuclear power plant was discussed 
in a seminar in 1968, then followed by aseries seminar 
thereafter. The seminar concluded that nuclear power plant 
was the one of promising alternatives to supply electric 
energy demand. As a follow up of the conclussion, BATAN made 
a preliminary site selection in Java where several places 
were investigated and then decided one place for making 
detail examination. Then feasibility study has been carried 
out. The conclusion also motivated researchers to study 
technology of Nuclear Power Plant in various institutions 
within and outside BATAN. One of the study was held in 
Research Center for Nuclear Technique in Bandung to study 
safety of Nuclear Power Plant on thermohydraulic aspects. To 
suppot that purpose, a laboratory for thermohydraulic study 
was installed and some activities were performed. 
6. With the decision to build a Multipurpose Reactor in 
Serpong, a very rare apportunity was existed due to ~e new 
design of the reactor. A few engineers and scientists were 
sent to joint with the designer group of supplier to 
partisipate and take part in design phase in connection with 
transfer of technology, where also included the safety 
group. Thereby experience in design, evaluation, 
construction and commissioning are gained during the 
execution of this project. 
7. Along with the Multipurpose Reactor, several nuclear 
facilities are also built to support reactor, to provide 
facilities for doing activities related to the reactor 
utilization and to support the research on Nuclear Power 
Plant technology such as Fuel Technology and Nuclear Safety, 
etc. 
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8. In preparation to the introducing of Nuclear Power Plant in 
Indonesia where now is under assesment, BAT AN has 
established a center to study technology of Reactor Safety. 
The fields which would be investigated are Reactor 
Protection System, Analysis and Reliability of Reactor 
System, Ergonomie of instrumentation and human equipment 
interaction, Accident Analysis, Testing of equipment, 
reactor component and material for reactor structure. These 
activities are supported by Engineering and Safety 
Laboratory which will be established in Serpong. 
FACILITIES FOR NOCLEAR SAFETY ACTIVITIES 
A. The existing facility : 
NILO-l Thermohydraulic Loop in Bandung. 
B. The future facilities 
- Ramp test facility 
- In-pile devices for irradiation 
Out of pile loops (general loop, primary loop and test rig) 
- NDT equipment 
- Mechanical testing machines 
ACTIVITY PROGRAMME 
1. Period 1986 - 1989 
1.1 To continue experiments using the existing facility NILO-l 
thermohydraulic loop to study heat transfer, thermohydraulic 
on steady state and transient condition, and to study two 
phase flow, etc. 
The experiments are performed by simulation of fuel rod with 
a single heated rod test section at the Nuclear Power Plant 
specification of Light Water Reactor as weIl as Heavy Water 
Reactor. 
1.2 To continue the previous work in safety assesment of TRIGA 
MARK REACTOR especially on the operation safety. 
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1.3 Performing safety assesment to the MPR-30, ana by this 
experience the capability of personnel can be improvea. 
1.4 To construct 
Laboratory. 
ana to instal1 Engineering ana Safety 
2. Perioa 1989 - 1994 
After the completion of several facilities for doing safety 
stuay, some activities which will be carriea out are 
aotlinea. 
2.1 Activities on fuel element ana material for 
structure using irradiation facilities. 
reactor 
2.1. 1 
2.1. 2 
2.1. 3 
2.1. 4 
2.1. 5 
Using Ramp Test Facility, the stuay will be carriea 
out for aetermination of the threshola values ana 
mechanism for fuel failure aue to Pellet Claaaing 
Interaction to confirm the integrity of fuel auring low 
ana miale burn up of new fuel element ana irraaiatea 
fuel element. 
Subassembly fuel bunale test qualification for LWR type 
fuel element ana HWR type fuel element using PWR/PHWR 
in-pile loop. 
Testing of MTR type fuel element in the form of mini 
plate, to investigate burn up, heat generation, 
dimension changes. 
Testing of single fuel pin to stuay heat aesipation, 
changesof aimension, burn up, fission gas release. 
Creep test unaer irradiation for material of reactor 
structure/reactor component to stuay creep behaviour. 
2.2 Stuay on thermohydraulic of the power channel for LWR as 
well as PHWR with the simulation of heatea roa assembly in 
steaay state ana transient conaition using general loop. The 
stuay on small LOCA can also be carried out. 
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2.3 Study on water chemistry using primary loop, including 
corrosion study, and crud deposition. 
2.4 Study on freeting corrosion/stress corrosion using test rig 
for stainless steel and zircalloy. 
2.5 Dynamic fracture test of stainless steel and zircalloy. The 
objective is to study the foundamental problems of 
metallographie fracture mechanism related to fracture 
behaviour. 
2.6 Study on inspection technique. The study will be stressed on 
the utilization of NDT equipment likes acoustic emission, 
eddy current unit, ultrasonic unit, x-ray to investigate 
defect, crack, crack propagation etc. 
2.7 Testing of small components such as rotary seal, safety 
valve as reliability test. 
2.8 Study on probabilistic risk assesment and the reliability on 
nuclear facilities. The objective is to determine risk by 
probabilistic risk assesment method within the permissible 
level. Risk Assesment must be developed where the result 
must be directly applied for improvement of design, 
operation, and it will contribute to the improvement of 
plant safety. 
3. Per iod 1994-1999 
If there is no major change in reactor technology, a similar 
programme will be conducted as continuation of previous years. 
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1. Introduction 
In this presentation an overview is given on the current programme 
of reactor safety research in the Federa1 Republic of Germany. For 
a number of selected topics the development of the research work 
and the contribution of the results to licensing and plant per-
formance is shown and an outlook of future demands on reactor 
safety research is given. 
The presentation concentrates on the research into reactor safety 
sponsored by the BMFT (Ministry for Research and Technology). 
Except for the joint ventures between BMFT and industry, the 
research conducted directly by industry in its continuous effort 
to further develop reactor safety will not be covered here. 
The systematic approach to reactor safety research in Germany dates 
back as far as 1970 when a programme was set up by the predecessor 
of todays BMFT-Ministry of Research and Technology. The research 
programme was a natural conseguence of the growing experience in 
the field of reactor technology in Germany, which had started with 
plants built under American licenses (AEG-GE and Siemens-Westing-
house) and safety evaluations based on American research and develop-
ment results. 
As German industry began with their own technical developments, 
modifications of the American systems first, leading to complete 
new designs ,later, and authorities and experts gained more and 
more experience in the safety area, the neccessity for national 
research into reactor safety became obvious. The new designs 
and the safety reguirements, some of which went beyond US-practice, 
posed guestions which could not all be answered on the basis of 
foreign research alone. 
Today, in the Federal Republic of Germany there are 10 pressurized 
water reactors (PWR) and 7 boiling water reactors in operation. 
3 more PWR are under construction, 1 PWR and one prototyp gas cooled 
high-temperature (THTR 300) are in the commissioning phase. A small 
gas cooled high temperature reactor (AVR) has been in operation 
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since 1967. The construction of the prototype fast breeder reactor 
(SNR 300) is almost completed; a small fast breeder (KNK 11) 
being in operating since 1973. 
2. The objectives of the BMFT reactor safety research programme 
The utilization of nuclear energy in a country as densely populated 
as the Federal Republic of Germany requires high safety standards. 
Conseguently the protection of man and environment against release 
of radioactive materials is written down in the German Atomic Energy 
Act. From this principle aim of reactor safety, the objectives of the 
BMFT programme on reactor safety research are derived, so that safety 
research contributes 
to keeping the residual risk low in comparison to other risks 
of civilisation, even under growing use of nuclear energy, and 
to the further development of safety technology. 
The research work within the BMFT-programme is aimed at 
a continuous extension of the knowledge of potential causes 
and seguences of accidents; 
a continuous further development of the methods used for a 
realistic assessment of safety; 
the analysis and evaluation of safety margins; and 
the further development and optimization of safety technology. 
3. The role of research within German reactor safety 
Before dealing in somewhat more detail with the technical guestions 
being pursued within the main research areas, it might be worthwhile 
to identify the role of this research work within German reactor 
safety as a whole. Its task is to further develop the status of 
science and technology and to provide the sound basis of knowledge 
and expertise to be used by all institutions contributing to reactor 
safety. 
While decisions regarding licensing and supervision of plants in 
operation are based on the consensus state of science and technology 
at a given time - Mr Philip will talk about that later - the 
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further development of that status in the safety area is a 
matter of the BMFT research. The research is pursued according 
to a continuously monitored and updated research programme 
addressing light water, fast breeder and high temperature 
reactor plants. 
Conseguently the RSR-programme is not a licensing programme, the 
results of which are preconditions for decisions to be drawn in 
licensing procedures and RSR is not conducted because of insuffi-
cient safety of the nuclear technology applied. 
A considerable part of the reactor safety research, is being 
executed by the nuclear research centre at Karlsruhe and to 
a lesser extent by the centres at Jülich and Geesthacht. 
The other research work is performed by universities and other 
research institutions, GRS, TÜV, independent engineers and by 
industry. Beside it's task as a research organisation, GRS is 
assisting the BMFT in the coordination and fund administration of 
reactor safety research. The funding is done mainly by direct 
research contracts or by sponsoring research work undertaken by 
universities or industry. 
The results obtained by that work are distributed inside of 
Germany to all institutions concerned with reactor safety so 
that a broad based consensus can be achieved on any topic. 
These are ~ederal and individual state authorities, safety 
experts, industry and the public, which, as discussed in the 
first part of this seminar, is often strongly engaged in 
discussions concerning the safety of large technical systems. 
Especially for the support of international cooperation also 
brief annual reports are published in English. 
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4. The main research areas 
In accordance with the situation of nuclear energy in Germany, 
reactor safety research has been concentrated mainly on LWR. 
The research programme reflects the German safety concept, aiming 
for safe operation, control of incidents and provisions in the 
field of residual risk, with highest priority attached to the 
prevention of accidents. 
Presently the research programme concists of 4 main areas: 
Component safety and guality assurance 
transient analysis and accident seguences 
man-machine interaction 
risk and reliability. 
In the following, the 4 main research areas will be discussed 
in sequence. Reference will be made to their development in 
time, also showing how previous achievements caused changes in 
the priorities given to various topics. 
4.1 Component safety and quality assurance 
Part of this research area are the investigations into the integrity 
of the primary circuit and its components, i.e. reactor pressure 
vessel, pressurizer, steam generator and interconnecting pressure 
pipes. The behaviour of real components was investigated under 
loadings, like pressure and temperature, water chemistry and 
radiation, to be expected during normal operation and accidents. 
Real components means, that components or their materials were 
investigated including possible guality reductions by deviations 
from specified compositions, by micro-cracks, non-metallic inclu-
sions and material modifications caused by welding or irradiation. 
The first slide shows one example of many experiments investigating 
the influence of flaws on the burst pressure of avesseI. 
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The results of this research provided a very good understanding of 
quality reducing effects from component production concerning 
the choice of material, the forging, welding and annealing processes. 
E.g. the steel 20 MnMoNi 55 is the preferred material because it 
gives high strength, ductile behaviour and reasonably constant 
material properties even for higher wall thickness. For welding 
e.g. welding rods containing copper are to be avoided because of 
possible radiation embrittlement. 
Similarly the behaviour under operating loads has been investigated 
and solutions worked out, e.g. a larger gap of water to limit the 
neutron flux to the reactor pressure vessel. Thermoshock has been 
discussed internationally to great extent. Our experiments show 
that very many (3000) temperature cycles are possible without crack 
initiation. Nevertheless new constructive details were chosen to 
further reduce the loading of important components. 
Closely connected to this line of research is the further develop-
ment of non destructive examination (NDE) techniques, with the aim 
of a total volumetrie testing ability of primary circuit components 
with respect to all relevant faults, including their location and 
description. 
The techniques applied today for quality assurance during construc-
tion and operation are mainly ultrasonic (US) inspection and eddy 
current testing. More recently new develonments have been included, 
using the pO,tentials of modern small computers for more sophisticated 
analysis of ultrasonic signals in order to improve fault description. 
Examples are ALOK (Amplituden Laufzeit Ortskurven), where the time 
of flight of the US-signal is evaluated, and the American Synthetic 
aperture focusing technique (SAFT), where high resolution is obtained 
by signal manipulation of comparatively low resolution US beams. 
For application under adverse conditions like high radiation levels, 
remote control techniques are being improved to allow non destructive 
testing by automatie manipulator systems. 
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The central pole manipulator,for excample, allows automatic 
evaluation of the findings in the reactor pressure vessel and 
a reproducability of sensor positioning of ± 3 mm, which is 
important for comparison of signal mappings to detect any 
changes between inspections. 
Today we can state that a sufficient detectability of safety 
relevant faults has been achieved, a good status in their des-
cription and very useful remote control techniques. 
This research is actually a very convincing example on the contri-
bution from safety research to the licensing process. 
One of the most important application of the results was the 
formulation of the "Basis Safety concept". In this, detailed 
procedures are laid out for production and quality assurance of 
components with safety relevance. If adhered to, the Leak Before 
Break research results show that guillotine breaks of primary 
circuit components can be excluded for design considerations of 
the primary circuit. The most obvious consequence of this was, 
that expensive technical measures against pipe whip are no longer 
required. 
Even though considerable progress has been made over the years, 
experimental and theoretical investigations are being continued 
into the description and evaluation of al~erations of material 
properties as a function of operating parameters, e.g. the in-
fluence of fatigue, irradiation, corrosion, thermal shock on 
material properties with the aim of early prediction of possible 
component failures, also for lang time operation. 
Furtherinvestigations are also required concerning the transfer 
of results from laboratory investigations to real components, 
concerning the failure modes of real components, fault propagation 
in steam generators and a further assurance of the·Leak Before 
Break criterion for a broader range of parameters. 
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In the field of nondestructive testing, further improvements are 
aimed at in the detection sensitivity and reliability, in particular 
under difficult conditions like complicated geometries, crack fields 
under pressure tensions and in cladding surfaces. Testing techniques 
for coarse structure materials like austenits are also under 
development. 
4.2 Transient analysis and accident seguences 
The structure of this chapter is given in figure 1. 
At the beginning of this section, lId briefly like to mention the 
research into the effects of external hazards. In this field many 
results have been obtained in re cent years, so that now efforts 
at a much reduced sca1e suffice for the few remaining guestions 
concerned with earthguake loading. 
The external hazards under consideration were air plane crash, gas 
cloud explosion and earthguakes. They have been considered in such 
detail because they can initiate commom mode failures, so that the 
design advantages of redundancy and diversity may be considerably 
reduced in case of their occurance. Therefore, German nuclear plants 
are designed against these events. 
The main investigations concerning aircraft crash were large sca~e 
experiments at a military testing site at Meppen, where 6 m long 
deformable projectiles crashed with 230 mfs onto 6 m x 6 m slabs of 
reinforced concrete. Figure 2 shows the test site, where in all 
22 of these tests have been performed. 
Accompanying analytical efforts, led to a very good description 
of the nonlinear response of reinforced concrete under impulsive 
loading, the results confirmed the design method and were 
incorporated into the draft of a design-rule. 
The earthguake research field spans from investigation of the seismo-
logical parameters like duration of earthguakes, freguency contents 
of excitation, maximum acceleration, to the response of buildings and 
finally to the response of components and their pipes in the plant. 
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Of course, the freguency of occurance of earthguakes in Germany and 
their magnitude are very low in comparison. Nevertheless some 
research has been devoted to guantify the safety margins which are 
obvious from experience. Today building and machinery responses are 
weIl understood for low and medium excitations as could be shown by 
comparison between calculations and large scale experiments, 
particulary at the HDR plant. 
The HDR-investigations are presently extended to extreme loadings, 
forcing non-linear material behaviour of the structures. 
Let me.briefly introduce this very special experimental research 
facility, the HDR. The HDR is a decommissioned superheated 
BWR, which had 100 MWth thermal power, started operation in 1970 
and was shut down by the end of 1971 because of fuel element 
problems. The containment building hight is 52 m, its inner 
diameter 20 m. Since 1975 it is being used for reactor safety 
research and it enables, because of its size, tests in a scale 
considerably larger than other facilities allow and with real 
objects (pressure vessel, piping, pumps etc.). 
This is an important facility for the investigations of result 
transfer to large dimensions as can be seen from the comparison 
of test facilities to real containments shown in the figure 3. 
The investigations, which have attracted considerable interest 
and also international cooperation, are grouped under the following 
headlines: 
Nondestructive and destructive testing 
Loadings and failure modes 
Fluid- and thermodynamics 
Structural dynamics 
Special investigations, like fire research 
Coming back to the topic of transient analysis and accident 
seguences, I'd like to continue with the detailed investigations 
concerning the plant behaviour under emergency core cooling and 
transient conditions. 
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Research on emergency core cooling has been conducted for a long 
time. At first separate effects were investigated, like heat 
transfer from the co re to the cooling fluid and the fuel element 
behaviour under abnormal conditions (the large break 2F rupture 
being of particular interest because of the licensing require-
ments), flow distributions in various phases of the accidents. 
In sequel the interrelation of the separate effects received 
much attention, including the whole loop to describe the core 
cooling situation. This is reflected in the experimental facili-
ties like LOBI (Loop Blowdown Investigation at the Joint Research 
Centre at Ispra, Italy) and PKL (Primärkreislauf, Primary 
circuit) of KWU, capable of investigating the pressure ranges 
150 bar to 10 bar (blow down) and 40 bar to 0 bar (refill, 
reflood), respectively. 
As an example the PKL facility is shown in figure 4, which 
simulates a 4 loop pressurized water reactor by using three 
loops, one of them having double capacity. The facility offers the 
genuine elevation scale, the volume however is reduced by a factor 
of 130. Its main application is for systems effects tests to look 
for the interplay between components and for application of the 
results for code verification. 
The detailed investigations concerning the emergency co re cooling 
(ECC) and fuel behaviour under these circumstances, including the 
fluid/structure interaction at the beginning of blow down, have 
confirmed t~e existing design. Experiments at the LOBI integral 
test facility (Volume scaled 1:700) for the blow down phase showed 
the effectiveness of the German cooling concept, using injection 
into both hot and cold legs of the primary circuit. The investiga-
tions concerning large breaks have been complemented by the 
analysis of experiments at the nuclear LOFT reactor, scaled 1:50 
as weIl as refill experiments at the PKL facility. All investiga-
tions led as a result of loss of coolant to maximum fuel rod 
temperatures below the design limit of 12000 C. 
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with the investigation of large scale effects and their impact 
on emergency core cooling in a current large scale experiment, the 
major part of the research relating to the loss of coolant through 
a large break will essentially be completed. This is part of the 
international 2D/3D Emergency Co re Cooling Project carried out in 
a joint effort by the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the 
united states. Japan is investigating processes inside the reactor 
core. In Germany the experiments concerning the processes in the 
upper plenum of the reactor pressure vessel are carried out at 
the UPTF shown in the figure 5. The Uni ted states have supplied 
the data collection system for the German experimental facility 
aswell as the advanced instrumentation needed and made available 
the sophisticated computer code TRAC. TRAC and the German code 
FLUT, separately developed within this projec·t are being verified 
using the experimental data. Recently, the first three experiments 
on the German test stand were completed successfully. 
For small leaks, the main problem was the adequate removal of energy 
from the primary circuit. The research results have shown that 
for all conditions of the primary circuit - even for interrupted 
natural circulation and in the presence of non-condensible gases 
sufficient heat removal is ensured. The effectiveness of heat removal 
from the primary loop by means of cooling down on the secondary side 
at a rate of lOOK/h could be demonstrated both at the LOBI and 
PKL facilities. 
More recently the emphasis has been shifted to smaller deviations 
from normal plant operations, the transients. Work regarding 
transients includes the components which help to avoid negative 
consequences, e.g. armatures of the primary circuit, steam generators, 
pressurizer and secondary side components. The analyses of the 
interplay of various components and systems are carried out, 
both experimentally, as weIl as analytically. 
The PKL experimental loop is being modified (PKL 111) to investigate 
possible events which could affect the primary circuit or its com-
ponents if, in addition to the transient, the failure of a safety 
relevant component would occur. It will be used to optimize recovery 
procedures designed so far. 
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The experimental results will be used to further improve the 
analytical description of transients. 
This analytical description of the whole plant behaviour under a 
wide range of conditions is at the centre of attention in the Analyse-
Simulator project. The aim is a comprehensive package of computer 
codes, describing the physical behaviour of the plant like DRUFAN, 
ALMOD or the American Code TRAC as weIl as the behaviour of various 
plant systems and their interactions. 
The simulation of plant systems is to include the most relevant 
failure modes of these systems as weIl as provisions to simulate 
operator interventions. 
It is hoped, that the Analysesimulator, by providing interactive 
facilities to the user of the code package, will greatly enhance 
the capabilities for analyses of abnormal events, where automatically 
acting protective systems and possible operator interventions are 
taken into account as weIl as todays best thermal-hydraulic codes 
for a description of the physical phenomena. 
In parallel to these investigations into small deviations from 
normal operating conditions and into accident control by emergency 
core cooling, very early research has been conducted beyond the 
design basis looking into accident courses where total failure of ECC 
system is postulated. Such investigations\form the scientific basis 
for risk anqlytical work, which has to include also very low probabi-
lity events. 
The phenomena after total ECCS failure are core heat up and melt, 
dropping to the bottom of the pressure vessel, its subseguent melt 
through and melt concrete interaction in the containment. The 
accompanying effects of Hydrogen-formation, steam explosion, fission 
product release and their transport inside and eventually outside 
the containment have been investigated. 
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Today the core melt down process is reasonably weIl understood, 
being described by the codes like KESS. Steam explosions powerful 
enough to destroy the reactor pressure vessel or the containment 
are considered practically impossible. 
Large scale experiments at the BETA facility on melt-concrete 
interaction have shown, that this inter action does not lead to any 
essential further release of active fission product aerosols from 
the melt and that the initially rapid penetration of the melt into 
the concrete involves a considerable temperature decrease leading 
to a lower penetration velocity (approx 1 cm/h at ca. 1300 - 1500 °C). 
Figure 6 shows the results of BETA in comparison to earlier 
assumptions. The penetration behaviour and the release of H2 , CO 
and CO2 can now be described with good accuracy, in the codes 
WECHSL and KAVERN, the data being of importance in the risk 
assessment and accident management. 
This is also true for the results of the DEMONA-project, which 
showed by large scale experiments that the concentration of fission 
product aerosoles in the containment atmosphere is reduced. by a 
factor of about 10 000 within a short period of time (7-30 h). 
In particular for the radiologically important iodine, detailed 
chemical and physical investigations as weIl as the TMI experience 
have shown, that most of it is in the soluble form of CsJ and only 
about 1 % of the core inventory in the form of easily volutile 
iodine. 
The DEMONA results are being applied to verify codes like NAUA 
and FIPLOC. 
The pressure rise within the containment because of sump water 
evaporation and melt/concrete interaction can be described quite 
weIl by analytical means. This is shown in the transparency, where 
the pressure in the containment is shown as a function of time 
for the low pressure (large break LOCA) sequence, a particular 
small leak and the high pressure sequence, all of them resulting 
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in containment overpressurization after 4 to 5 days. Conseguently 
means for depressurization of the containment are being dis-
cussed in Germany. 
H2 and CO can be generated in the vessel by the exotherm zirkonium-
steam reaction and during the core melt interaction, when water 
is evaporated from the concrete and travels through the melt. 
Regarding the behaviour of these inflammable gases further 
investigations are in progress, looking at the distribution within 
the containment and possible burning modes. 
From the point of view of controling even such seguences, the 
guestions of degraded core cooling are also of interest: The 
behaviour of an inadeguately cooled core, e.g. if ECC is only partly 
available, or the possibilities of bringing a degraded core back 
to thermal stability. 
This area is part of the accident management which deals with 
the guestion, how available operational systems may be used to 
keep the conseguence of degraded co re cooling as low as possible, 
that will receive even more attention in the future. 
4.3 Man-Machine Interaction 
The running of nuclear power plants by the operators and their 
responses to perturbations are a factor o{ outmost importance 
to safety. This judgement is strongly supported by probabilistic 
analysis as weIl as international operating experience. 
The human factor is to a large extent already taken into account 
in the design of our plants, I only briefly remind you of the 30 
minute time span given to the operator in German plants by the 
built in safety features. This means that in more serious disturbances 
the operator can diagnose and analyse the situation, devise his 
counter actions, while the safety systems take care of the plant 
automatically. 
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Much of the research today is concentrating on the man/machine 
interaction be fore a serious disturbance, trying to detect and 
counteract it as early as possible. The aims of the research are 
generally to avoid operational failur~s by man and to put hirn in a 
position to act efficiently and successfully against any disturbances. 
The main activities in this field concentrated on the further 
development of information provided to the operators. 
Recognizing that still more information on plant systems would help 
to keep the operator mentally in tune with the plant at any time, 
that on the other hand he already bears a heavy information burden 
now, the only way out is provide more intelligent information 
to hirn, where only few important conclusions drawn from very many 
pieces of information are conveyed to hirn. 
One development which began fairly early is the STAR-system (Störungs-
Analyse-Rechner). From the idea of a perturbance analysis system a 
general software package has been developed in the meantime, capable 
of dealing with several functions like post trip analysis, alarm 
reduction, status surveillance, and disturbance analysis. 
A system of this kind is being implemented at the Biblis B plant, 
parallel to the existing control room - of course - where the 
functioning of the system will be tested as weIl as its usefullness 
in supporting the operators. 
Systems of this kind rely heavily on the correct preanalysis of 
events and/or plant behaviour. This analysis, including the dynamic 
behaviour starting from various initial conditions like full power 
or load follow modes of operation, can in itself be very demanding. 
In fact, the STAR-software package is designed to transfer the 
result of such analysis into an online programme, which supports 
one or several of the possible functions. The experience of an 
earlier implementation at the Grafenrheinfeld plant was that the 
cause-consequence diagrammatic method had to be extended to 
incorporate software models of the time dependent physical behaviour 
of some components to provide information intelligent enough to be 
of interest to the operators. 
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In the meantime a new line of development is being explored, where 
the latest developments in the field of informatics - artificial 
intelligence methods - are to be applied to the problem of in-
formation enhancement to the operator, including help not only 
for diagnosis of the situation but also for decision on suitable 
countermeasures. 
Other lines of research try to extend the information available on 
the plant status e.g. by early fault detection or core power 
distribution surveillance. 
Early fault detection systems installed in German plants are vibra-
tion monitoring systems of the primary circuit. They utilise the 
stochastic signal of displacement-, acceleration- and neutron-
detectors to detect any changes in the dynamic response of the 
primary circuit. 
The core surveillance systems apply fast computer models of the core 
neutron dynamics and thermohydraulics which, starting from existing 
instrumentation signals, provide more detailed information e.g. on 
the power distribution, its likely development and on the distance 
of parameters like fuel temperature from their safety limits, the 
DNB - distance to nucleate boiling being an example. 
Common to these developments is the use of new display techniques 
as weIl as modern programmable microelect~onics. A precondition for 
the introdu~tion of these systems into the control rooms, is the 
proof that the systems are reliable enough to fulfil the stringent 
requirements of nuclear grade components. Therefore, another line 
of research deals with the reliability of programmable electronics, 
including the software and its analysis. Current projects are 
developing software tools to help the analysis of computer codes 
at the level on machine language, i.e. that form of the software 
which is actually run on the micro-computers. This project is run 
in close cooperation with the international OECD-Halden project. 
Current research in Germany also deals with the validation of 
primary signals from the process by sophisticated methods like 
nonlinear KaIman filters to ensure valid inputs to the information 
processing systems. 
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In addition to this more technically minded research concerning the 
man/machine interaction, some research is directed towards the 
human element. 
Observation made in actual control rooms showed the teamwork in 
running the plant, the work load distribution for different members 
of the plant under various conditions, the effective way of team 
communications which are, because they are very short, ve~y rarely 
interrupted or disturbed even under high work load. 
since in the control rooms very rarely disturbances can be witnessed 
the research is extended towards simulator studies, where teams 
of operators at a full scope simulator can be closely observed 
while they are dealing with preprogrammed disturbances unknown to 
them. The main problems of this kind of research are the huge amount 
of data collected even for short simulator sessions and thus 
the neccessity to develop efficient analysis methods and the question 
of sensitivity. If we not only look for normal human behaviour, 
but for failures and human errors, because of their low probability 
of occurance, very many data are required. 
This research into man/machine interaction will be pursued further, 
continuing the very good international cooperation established 
so far, in particular with the OECD HALDEN-project. 
Further work will concentrate on the quic~ and precise identification 
of the plan~ status at any moment, the improvement of knowledge 
on human behaviour and reliability under all operating conditions 
and the further development of software and electronics evaluation 
in safety relevant plant systems. statistics inform that human 
errors during maintenance and repair work contribute to a high 
percentage to disturbances of plant operation. Therefore, also 
investigations are being initiated to analyze maintenance and 
repair work in order to identify the best possible conditions for 
its error free performance. 
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4.4 Risk and reliability 
The main contribution to this field was the conduction of the 
German Risk Study (DRS). Its phase A, was initiated shortly after 
the release of WASH 1400, when it became obvious that the results 
of WASH 1400 could not easily be transferred to the German situa-
tion. So, using an approach very close to WASH 1400 but taking the 
German safety concept and plant technology as weIl as the siting 
and weather conditions into account, Phase A was performed. 
The results obtained were roughly the same as in WASH 1400 for 
risk values as weIl as error band widths: The overall core melt 
freqency was calculated to 9.10-5 per reactor year, with an une er-
tainty of about an order of magnitude. 
A more detailed account of the risk analysis will be discussed 
separately in this workshop. Here some examples shall be mentioned 
where the risk analysis contributed to improving plant design. 
One of the tasks of risk analyses is to find the relative weak 
points of a design, so that the overall risk can be further improved. 
In phase A of the risk study, while mainly confirming the validity 
and effectiveness of the safety design, leading contributions to 
the risk could be identified to be: small LOCA, because delicate 
operator actions were required to cool down the plant and transients, 
e.g. the loss of preferred power. Some system modifications have 
been performed e.g. 
automatie control for the cooling down procedure in the case 
of a small LOCA 
instrumentation of the main feedwater systems adequate to LOCA 
conditions 
electric power supply, modifications for return to normal 
power in case the emergency diesel generators fail. 
With the modifications the contributions of both sequences are 
now weIl below 1.10-5 per reactor years. 
The experience gained performing risk analyses was subsequently 
applied to perform a risk oriented study for the SNR 300, the 
German prototype of a Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor. It could 
be shown that the risk of the SNR 300 plant is of the same order 
as the risk for PWRs. 
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In the meantime, phase B of the German risk study is nearing 
completion. Its aim is to reduce the uncertainties of the phase A 
results which were about one order of magnitude by using better 
data, e.g. component reliability by including' operating experience, 
by using better analytical models or more detailed analysis methods 
and recent results of research work. 
lId like to mention one example that is not included in the separate 
talk on the risk analyses, that is question of fire hazards. 
This was of particular interest, since American fire hazard studies 
had produced very high contributions to the probability figures 
of core melt events. A new time dependent method has been developed 
whereby the effects of possible fire progression on the plant 
systems is treated in considerable detail. Because of the high 
passive fire protection due to spatial separation of redundancies 
in German plants, the resulting figures for co re melt probability 
were quite low. The programme is now being continued with experimen-
tal work at HOR, where fire experiments are conducted inside the 
containment to provide the neccessary da ta for further validation 
of models and codes used so far. 
Together with a number of international partners, we are also 
trying to improve the treatment of common mode failures and 
of operator intervention by taking part in benchmark exercises 
organised by the joint research establishment ISPRA. 
5. International cooperation 
The close international cooperation has been touched upon in 
several fields mentioned before. The common interest in reactor 
safety and the high costs of the research required, which can 
be reduced in cost sharing projects or exchange of research results, 
have always provided strong motivation for international cooperation 
in this field. The recent accident at Tschernobyl has underlined 
the international character of the reactor safety area. So we 
can expect that the previous exchange of views on safety issues 
will even be intensified, the execution of common projects 
and the joint evaluation of R&D results will continue. 
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In fact, BMFT has been engaged in a number of weIl balanced inter-
national exchange programmes based on bilateral agreements. 
Some of our partners are 
CEA (France) 
EPRI and NRC (USA) 
STA and MITI (Japan). 
In addition, there are the bilateral contacts with the countries 
of Indonesia, Egypt, Brasil, Peoples Republic of China, Finland, 
South Korea, Portugal. 
A number of larger projects with international membership have been 
mentioned before, like 
HALDEN (OECD) 
HDR (FRG) 
LOBI (CEC) 
LOFT (USA) 
MARVIKEN (Sweden) 
PHEBUS (France) 
UPTF/SCTF (FRG, USA, Japan), the 2D/3D project mentioned before. 
In addition, the international cooperation is conducted within the 
large international organisations like 
CEC, where the BMFT participated in the design of reactor safety 
research, e.g. at the research centre ISPRA, 
as weIl as IAEA and OECD/NEA. 
6. Summary and Outlook 
In summary we can state that 15 years of reactor safety research 
have provided a considerable pool of knowledge in various 
disciplines. Actually, up to late 1985 the BMFT spent a total of 
1,850 Mio DM for more than 700 projects. 
This knowledge is being applied by all institutions concerned with 
reactor safety: it is incorporated in guidelines, rules and 
regulations, it forms the basis for safety and risk assessments 
and it also supported the development of the reliable safety 
technology of German LWR Designs. 
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Despite the high level achieved so far, the requirement of the best 
possible protection of the population and the environment against 
the hazards of nuclear energy calls for the continuation of safety 
research as one of the precautions the authorities have to take. 
So, the further development of the state of the art in all fields 
of reactor safety, giving highest priority to prevention of accidents, 
will continue. 
Future work will take note of industries continuous further development 
of plants, e.g. by adjusting currently available tools (computer 
codes) for safety assessment in parallel to the development of e.g. 
district heating or advanced pressurized water reactors. 
similarly the rapid development of programmable electronics 
requires the development of qualification methods which, as far 
as safety functions are concerned, can prove that the high 
standards of nuclear technology regarding absence of design 
faults and reliable operation are adhered to. 
Also the developments in other technical fields and their possible 
application to reactor safety tasks will be followed up as before. 
As an example the potentials of artifical intelligence for helping 
men in diagnosis and decision making springs to mind. 
A number of tasks is waiting to be addres~ed. For example, in the 
field of ri~k, data bank systems allowing fast information retrieval 
must be developed for plant, operating and reliability data. After 
completion of Phase B of the German risk study for PWR, an analogous 
analysis for BWR is due. 
Although according to the knowledge presently available, the 
accident at Chernobyl has not shown any new phenomena or surprising 
new events, details of future research work may be influenced by the 
detailed evaluation of the Chernobyl accident, as more information 
becomes available. E.g. the accident may intensify research concer-
ning the further improvement of the prevention of accidents and the 
mitigation of consequences. 
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According to the information so far at hand, the investigation of the 
dispersion behaviour of fission products should be addressed. 
Questions with respect to fission product retention in the containment 
and to the source term are the next subjects of importance. Moreover, 
the research into fire protection and the intended further inves-
tigations of the hydrogen problem may be influenced by a detailed 
analysis. 
In addition, planning efforts concerning accident management have 
been proven in their importance. This term is used to designate 
active measures involving the use of operational andjor simple 
additional systems rapidly to install in order to exercise 
an early influence on the sequence of serious accidents even if 
they have not been taken into account during the design analyses. 
An example illustrating such a measure would be the selected 
depressurization of a containment at a favorable moment in 
order to prevent an uncontrolled failure and arelease of fission 
products that could no longer be coped with, which had been 
pointed out by the DRS B analysis. 
The preconditions for the preparation of such methods include 
detailed information on the sequence of all kinds of severe 
accidents, the possibility of describing them as aprerequisite 
for an accident sequence prediction, and an accident-proof 
instrumentation to provide information on\the state of the plant 
at any give~ time. 
Accident management provides a consider~ble potential for the 
further reduction of the residual risk and for the limitation 
of the consequences of serious accidents. 
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2. TRANSIENT ANALYSIS AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCES 
EXTERNAL HAZARDS 
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING 
LARGE BREAK LOCA 
SMALL BREAK LOCA 
TRANSIENTS 
CORE MELT SEQUENCES 
FIGURE 1 
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Ergonomics in Nuclear and Human Factors Engineering 
Introduction 
E. Münch 
Kernforschungsanlage Jülich GmbH 
Programmgruppe Technik und Gesellschaft 
Postfach 1913 
0-5170 Jülich, Fed. Rep. of Germany 
G.F. Schultheiss 
GKSS-Forschungszentrum Geesthacht GmbH 
Institut für Anlagentechnik 
Max-Planck-Straße 
0-2054 Geesthacht, Fed. Rep. of Germany 
Because techn i ca 1 systems are created by and for human be ings, i t i s 
important for the dimensioning to take human concerns into account. 
Oetermin ing the mode of oper at i on of a techn i ca 1 system also enta il s 
mak i ng dec i s ions on the future tasks of i ts users and operators. F or 
complex technical systems, like power plants or chemical industrial in-
stallations it is essential to include the consideration of human 
characteristics and capabil ities at an early point in the development 
process. This is related to safety of operation as well as to relia-
bility and availability and thereby governing economics. 
At this interface between man and machine ergonomics and human factors 
engineering are required. 
Adefinition of ergonomics is given in Fig. 1. Ergonomics refer essen-
tially to the data and principles concerning human characteristics and 
abilities as obtained in the fields of anthropometry. physiology and 
psychology as well as the application of this knowledge to the dimen-
sioning of workplaces, machines, equipment, work cycles, and environ-
ments: Some important ergonomic parameters are listed in Fig. 2. Within 
- 267 -
this overview only a compact summary can be given. More details are 
shown in /1, 2, 3, 4/. 
Bes i de th i s data set there exi sts another very important aspect of 
man-machine-interaction as shown in Fig. 3. Time constants of 
- processes running in technical plants, 
information transport and processing either for man or automatic 
control systems and 
initiation of actions 
have to be carefully evaluated and adjusted to get finally a stable 
process control and not an oscillating diverging control loop running 
out of all limits. Fig. 3 shows already the principle of a combined 
system control using human capacity as well as automatic control paths, 
the latter for response time shorter or too large for human beings. 
Technical equipment should be designed so that after learning the indi-
vidual functions the operator can run it reliably. This calls for action 
based on rules. Failure to observe instructions and operating procedures 
can have negat i ve effect on the operat ion of the equipment, sharp ly 
reducing its availability and safety. 
Existing systems, planning methods already in use, and a growing number 
of advanced training options for ergonomic concerns lead to cooperation 
of engineers and ergonomists in the preparation of ergonomic standards. 
One example in Fig. 4 shows the DIN-standards to be included in the 
design of a ~ideo ~isplay ~nit (VDU) workstation. One may easily recog-
nize several areas out of the data set of Fig. 2. 
As this paper shall concentrate on nuclear power plant aspects the work 
situation there including man-machine-relationship is described in the 
next chapter. 
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2. On Power Plant Working 
Looking for work situations in power plants one has to include different 
areas, e.g. 
the main control room 
local control boards inside the plant or at auxiliary systems 
- electronic and computer rooms 
(a part of the action zone in Fig. 2) 
- power switch rooms 
- offices 
- workshops 
- at subsystems and 
- on transport facilities like cranes or vehicles. 
By the differences of those locations it is obvious that we need careful 
considerations on the anthropometrie design of the respective work 
places. Additionally these work places may be used continously or only 
for a short but determined time. 
The tasks to be performed need also special consideration. Important 
examples for power plants are 
- surveillance of totally or partialy automated processes 
(a more visual work) 
- control of non automated processes 
(as a more mannual example) 
maintenance and repair in workshops or in the plant itself and last 
not least 
- documentation and preparation of records in offices or on site. 
For these different tasks the adequate tools are to be designed and or-
ganized in a user oriented way e.g. on control desks or in workshops. 
User oriented - here we are! Man comes into the business! Tools, work-
pieces, machines, plants are designed by man for special use and 
according to standards, regulations, design criteria - 'but what about 
man? If we look for man to step into responsibility in 
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man-machine-interaction work, we always ask for e.g. 
- ability, skillness, qualification 
- training and knowledge. 
F or p 1 ann ing purposes we have to keep in mi nd that characteri st i cs of 
human beings can be subdivided into three groups 
- unchangeable: 
- changing: 
- changeable: 
sex 
anatomy 
genetic base 
race 
social background 
age 
mass of body 
health conditions 
physiological efficiency 
psychological stability 
abilitiy 
skillness 
experience 
knowhow. 
This situation leads to selections under different patterns of require-
ments for electricians, car-divers, pilots, power plant operator etc., 
followed by different training procedures for preparation for the real 
job - then under the load of responsibility. 
Training and preparation is one very important part of man-machine-in-
teraction not only in critical situations as explained below for the 
Harrisburg and Chernobyl accidents but also for keeping the required 
quality standard over the life period spent on the respective job - as a 
safety relevant object and part of the integral system. 
In power plant control rooms in the case of constant load events which 
need special attendance are rare. This situation is as bad for human ob-
servation as events constantly occuring over a longer time period. There 
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automatic systems with a discriminating capacity are much more reliable. 
Such systems on the other hand, need clearly determined signals with low 
noise. For a trained man the interpretation may still be possible if the 
level is low or parts are missing although a behaviour in steady expec-
tance may lead to make him seeing what he wants to. 
For information retrieval and processing a similar differentiation 
between human and machine capacibilities can be done, also for control. 
This evaluation allows a systemoriented method of development with 
clearly devided tasks according to abil ities and optimized for the 
process under consideration. One of the important criteria for this 
optimization is to get a situation with the highest degree of relia-
bility and safety of operation. 
As an example of ergonomically structured control room we may have a 
look on the MPR 30 design. An artist's view is given in Fig. 6 which 
shows together with the plan in Fig. 5 the arrangement of control boards 
and desks. From the reactor control desk the visibility of the important 
main circuits is guaranteed by being directly in front. Reactor pro-
tection and radiation protection are more oriented towards the 
communication desk. 
The use of analog instrumentation, indication lights or illuminated 
panel alarm indicators as well as video display need a carefully planned 
lighting system to give a clear impression of the different states of 
the indicators without any doubt to the responsible operators. 
3. Lessons Learned From Accidents 
It is a striking and astonishing situation that nearly all accidents in 
nuclear power plants which have occurred until tOday, have been caused 
or at least aggravated in their accident sequence by human error and 
actions of the personnel. With this regard automation of process equip-
ment, instrumentation and controls, the education of operators for normal 
operation and especially for accidents and under stress is an absolutelY 
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neccessary prerequisite for a save operation of nuclear power plants. 
Beside the theoretical analysis of man-machine-problems particularly in 
the field of nuclear energy production there is a possibility to learn 
special lessons about this topic analyzing the two accidents which are 
without any doubt the biggest accidents in nuclear history: The nuclear 
accident in Three Mile Island, Harrisburg, USA on March, 28, 1979 and the 
nuclear accident at Chernobyl, USSR, on April 26, 1986. Whereas the first 
of these accidents has been analysed to a very far extend leading to 
recommendations for other nuclear plants in the USA and with lessons 
learned for all nuclear operators in the world, the second is just in the 
phase of international discussion. In the TMI-plant a lot of technical faults 
and especially human errors led to an accident that came to a partial core 
melt down and to the fear that a big amount of radioactive fission products 
could be spread to the environment. This could be prohibited by the tight 
containment, which covers the whole nuclear installation and retained the 
nuclear material inside the plant without demaging the environment. There-
fore the radioactive burden outside the reactor was only extremely small. 
A commission which was chaired by John Kemeny analysed the accident and 
stated, that without human errors, the accident would have been by far 
less significant. The specific problem was, after the commission's report, 
the failure to recognize the actual conditions of the plant. But the 
commission related this fact to much broader problems of competence, back-
ground and training of both operators and management. The commission 
pointed out that although operator examinations where consistent with 
regulations, they did not ensure, that candidats for a operator license 
had an in-depth knowlegde of nuclear reactor theory, design and operation. 
The report explained that training for operators concentrated on systems, 
equipment and procedures rather than on basic scientific and technological 
concepts, such as thermodynamics, decay he at production, or system 
operation. So it was recommended that operator qualifications, training 
and licensing had to be improved. In this area consideration should be 
given more to educational background, to training methods, and to the 
content of the training programme. Attention should also be given to 
testing methods with specific concern for the ability of the testing method 
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to predict operator capability. Requalification, training and testing 
should be similarly examined to ensure that the operators take account of 
information that is developed by operation in the plant and to ensure that 
relevant information about other plants is made evalable to operators and 
is made part of the training and requalification programme. The use and 
limitations of simulators for operator training should receive carefull 
consideration. 
With respect to these findings it seems to be of high value and worth 
mentioning that in German power plants the operator is not forced to take 
any action within the first thirty minutes after an accident initiation. 
Up to a very high extend the recommendations of the Kemeny-Commission have 
already been realized in the Federal Republic of Germany as far as operator 
training, simulator-training and personnel education is concerned. Auto-
matie is given an even higher rank than it is given in the United States. 
Nevertheless in consequence of the TMI accident the German licensing 
authorities have recommended better instrumentation, better technical pro-
cedures for the operator and simplifications for processes which are 
executed by the operator, further development of programmes for simulator 
training, better information for the operator about the status of the 
systems and for the development of the automatie plant protection system. 
The Chernobyl accident was caused by an experiment evaluating the capability 
of the residual energy of the rotating turbine for the emergency power 
supply of the pumps. Partly according to the test programme and partly 
without regard to it a number of safety conditions where blocked, which were 
relevant for the reactor emergency shut down and the emergency core cooling 
system. A special feature of the reactor, a positive void coefficient of 
reactivety, led to a sudden extreme power excursion and in consequence to 
a total destruction of the reactor. Due to the fact that the reactor did 
not have a tight containment at all a massive release of radioactive fission 
products occurred to the environment. This did not only expose the neigh-
bours of the plant but also, to a much less extend, the inhabitants of 
eastern and central Europe. 
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The report of the USSR State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic 
Energy about the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant /5/, which 
was presented to the IAEA in August of this year, identified a number of 
man-machine- problems, which have led to the accident. First the twenty 
years old construction concept allowed interventions to the protection 
system even in the direction going to less safety. Second there was a lack 
of safety systems and automation which ensures the safety of the reactor 
even in the ca se of human error. Finally the test programme did not corres-
pond to the safety rules, and this test programme was not even followed. 
Appenrently the personnel was not suffiently informed about the peculiarities 
of the plant and about the pro ces ses which where to be expected in conse-
quence of the experiment. There is only one simulator for the RBMK-type 
reactors located at Smolensk, which is apparently not suffient for the 
operating personnel of more than thirteen reactors of this type in the USSR. 
The chief motive of the staff was to complete the experiment. The failure 
to adhere to instructions in preparing for and carrying out the experiment, 
the non-compliance with the testing programme itself and the carelessness 
in handling the reactor facility are evidence that the staff was insuffently 
familiar with the special features of the technological processes in the 
nuclear reactor and evidence also that the operators had lost any feeling 
for the hazards involved. 
The designers of the reactor facility did not provide for protective safety 
systems capable of preventing an accident in the combination of circum-
stances prevailing in the reactor. These were especially combined with the 
positive reactivity coefficients and the deliberate switching off of 
technical protection systems couppled with violations in the operating 
regualations. 
So, the working groups of the above mentioned IAEA conference recommended 
for a future international cooperation among other points international 
exchange of experience about the man-machine interface, an international 
conference about the balance of automation and human action in the operation 
of nuclear power plants and finally an international exchange of experience 
about the efficiency of training and education methods for reactor personneI. 
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It is to be expected that those experiences taken from the reactor 
accidents in Harrisburg and Chernobyl will play there role in improving 
ergonomics in nuclear safety and in human factors engineering. 
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ROLE OF STANDARDS AND CODES IN ENHANCING NUCLEAR SAFETY 
G. Philip, W. Schwarzer 
Kerntechnischer Ausschuß, Cologne, Federal Republic of Germany 
Introduction 
At the inception of nuclear energy, standards and codes spe-
cific to nuclear safety were virtually non-existent. Today, a 
licensing procedure without them is almost inconceivable. There 
is no doubt that safety standards and codes have become to play 
an increasingly important role in the licensing of nuclear fa-
cilities and that they contribute largely towards optimizing 
the overall safety. But what are standards and codes? It would 
perhaps be useful to dweIl on this'question for a while before 
passing on to some of the other interesting aspects. 
What are Standards and Codes? 
The NUSS program (Nuclear Safety Standards) of the Internati-
nal Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) talks of Codes of Practice and 
Safety Guides, the USNRC talks of Regulatory Guides and in the 
Federal Republic of Germany it is the Nuclear Safety Standards. 
But, irrespective of the names, they can all be broadly defined 
as requirements which must be fulfilled to ensure nuclear safe-
ty. Each set of standards, again, is made of various types of 
standards which are either reactor specific or are independent 
of reactor type, which speIl out either basic or general re-
quirements or detailed and perhaps component specific require-
ments. In all cases, however, there is a more or less clear 
demarcation between legal and technical aspects. At the same 
time, there is adefinite relationship between the legal regu-
lations, which define the protective aims and the standards, 
which set out the requirements for the technical means to 
achieve these protective aims. The situation in Federal Repub-
lic of Germany can be looked at, as an example, to consider the 
hierarchy of the regulations and standards (see Figure 1). 
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A comparison with the situation in the Uni ted States and France 
shows a similar set up (see Figure 2). 
So, at the national level, an Atomic Energy Act or Federal Re-
gulation and Ordinances define the protective aims to be ful-
filled, and this represents the peak of the pyramid. At the 
base, the safety standards specify the safety related require-
ments i.e. specific to nuclear facilities, for the technical 
means to achieve those aims; conventional standards specify the 
non-nuclear requirements, and industrial norms are applied to 
non safety related items. 
When the international scene is considered, there is no atomic 
energy act or similar legislation which is applicable to all 
countries. But there are recommendations and safety standards 
developed by international organisations like IAEA, ISO and 
IEEE. The NUSS standards of the IAEA are the first comprehen-
sive set of nuclear safety standards at the international 
level. The NUSS standards, however, have the dis advantage of 
being basic and general in nature, since they have to cater to 
the needs of all member states of the IAEA and have to be ap-
proved by all the member states before being published in their 
final version. But, they deal with the areas of governmental 
organisation and personnel training which, at the national 
level, are within the responsibility of the government (the 
Federal Republic of Germany is taken as an example here) and 
are thus not included in the safety standards. 
The Federal Republic of Germany can be taken as an example to 
see what is available in terms of safety standards relevant to 
the nuclear licensing procedure. If the pyramid is considered 
once agairi, directly below the level of the Atomic Energy Act 
/1/ and the ordinances are the Safety criteria /2/. This do-
cument, although 'technical in nature, has been issued by the 
government and is considered to have a higher rank in the hie-
rarchy than a standard. Drawing up the Safety Criteria was a 
first step towards rendering the legally worded safety require-
ments of the Atomic Energy Act and the associated ordinances 
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more concrete by technical provisions. The safety criteria 
have, in particular, been developed for nuclear power plants 
with light water reactors. But, a set of similar criteria for 
gas-cooled reactors is presently being developed. 
Below the level of the safety criteria are the safety stan-
dards. This category includes primarily the KTA safety stan-
dards and the regulatory guides issued by the Federal govern-
ment. The KTA (Kerntechnischer Ausschuß = Nuclear Safety Stan-
dards Commission) is a 50 member commission instituted by the 
Federal Government and consits of representatives of all groups 
involved in the nuclear licensing procedure, including in-
dustry. The set up and procedures of the KTA are discussed la-
ter in the paper. The KTA safety standards detail requirements 
for all phases of the construction and operation of nuclear 
power plants with respect to quality assurance, design, manu-
facture, operation and surveillance. A complete list of the 
program of the KTA safety standards can be seen from Table 1. 
Regulatory guides are in part specifications by the authorities 
regarding the licensing procedure and therefore not classified 
as safety standards. However, the government also issues re-
gulatory guides, which are technical in character. This is done 
in cases where KTA safety standards are not yet available. 
These technical guides are replaced, in time, by the corres-
ponding KTA safety standards, when these have been completed. 
A special role within the level of safety standards is played 
by the RSK-Guidelines /3/. The RSK (Reaktor-Sicherheitskommis-
sion = Reactor Safety Commission) is a commission which advises 
the Federal Government on issues related to nuclear safety. The 
guidelines are a condensed summary of the safety requirements 
which, according to the commission, should be met for the de-
sign, construction and operation of nuclear power plants. The 
purpose of the guidelines is primarily to simplify the deli-
beration process within the RSK and to give an indication, 
within a relatively short time and early in the licensing pro-
cedure, as to the requirements considered necessary by the com-
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mission. Such guidelines exist, as of the present time, for 
pressurized water' reactors and boiling water reactors. 
The RSK-Guidelines can be,considered as an interim measure be-
tween the safety criteria and the KTA safety standards. For 
areas where KTA standards are completed, the RSK-Guidelines 
replace the text of the guidelines by a reference to the re-
levant KTA safety standard, with supplementary comments or re-
quirements, should they be considered necessary. 
Below the safety standards on the pyramid are the industrial 
norms.One of the most important organisations working on in-
dustrial norms is the DIN (Deutsches Institut für Normung = 
German Standards Institute). The DIN establishes norms in all 
areas of technology. The KTA safety standards make reference to 
DIN norms where details are considered necessary. 
Why is it necessary to establish Standards and Codes? 
The obvious answer to this question would be: in order to 
achieve a uniform level of safety. Since the advent of Cher-
nobyl, one should say: in order to achieve a uniformly high 
level of safety on an international level. But, this answer 
should be analysed in the context of national practices. The 
Federal Republic of Germany can again be taken as an example. 
The nuclear licensing and supervisory procedure in the Federal 
Republic of Germany is strongly influenced by the federal 
structure of the country /4/. In accordance with the principle 
of as much centralism as necessary and as much federalism as 
possible, the responsibilities in the area of the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy have been defined such that nuclear legis-
lation is enacted at the federal level but the individual 
states are responsible for the implementation of these laws. 
The individual states are the licensing authorities and it is 
to them that an application for a license to build and operate 
a nuclear facility is made. There is, of course, a great deal 
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of interaction between the federal and state ministries, the 
experts and the various advisory groups before a license is 
issued (see Figure 3). But, each state is autonomous and is 
responsible for the licensing of a nuclear facility within its 
boundaries. It is therefore of the utmost importance that a 
nuclear facility in one state is as safe as one in any other 
state and that experiences gained with the construction and 
operation of one facility be passed on for the licensing of 
others. It was in this context that the Safety Criteria were 
drawn up, the RSK established and the KTA instituted. These 
have contributed a great deal towards optimizing plant safety 
and thus standardizing it at a high level. Especially with the 
KTA safety standards, the nuclear licensing and supervisory 
authorities now have an instrument with which they can assess 
all plants in the Federal Republic of Germany on an equal basis 
and thus provide a high level of safety in accordance with the 
current state of science and technology. 
In the United States of America, there is one central licensing 
or regulatory authority, the US Nuclear Regulatory Cornrnission, 
which has been empowered with the issue and revoking of licen-
ses. But, there is a multitude of architects/engineers, all 
with their own designs, and utilities with their own individual 
wishes as to how the plant they need should be designed. Then 
there is the additional problem of siting a plant in a vast 
country like the US with its high seismicity, especially on the 
west coast, and the various natural events like tornadoes and 
tsunamis. Considering all these factors, it was esential that 
some kind of standard requirements be made in order to achieve 
a uniform level of safety. Out of this necessity the NRC Re-
gulatory Guides were born. These Regulatory Guides were pro-
bably the first nuclear safety standards ever made. 
In France, there is a central body for regulation and for pro~ 
motion of nuclear facilities. with the large number of nuclear 
power plants being built, is was essential to standardize re-
quirements and thus achieve optimum safety. Standardization of 
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plants is also an important factor when the'question of export 
of nuclear power plants is considered. 
So far, the necessity of safety standards has only been con-
sidered from the point of view of safety. But, there is perhaps 
a legal aspect also to be considered. In the case of nuclear 
facilities, there are a great deal of discussions and words 
like risk, possible damages, responsibility, liability, liti-
gation, compensation, are often heard. Till the advent of Sel-
lafield, three Mile Island and especially Chernobyl, there were 
all quite theoretical discussions. But, the judiciary has al-
ways found it difficult to assess the safety of a technology 
and especially a complicated technology like the nuclear tech-
nology. So, safety standards have been welcomed by them in 
their efforts to come to an impartial judgement regarding the 
dangers arising from one plant or the other. The nuclear safety 
standards like the KTA safety standards reflect the precautions 
to be taken in accordance with the state of science and tech-
nology at a given point of time and in the case of a litiga-
tion, these can be taken by the judiciary as a yards tick of how 
much safety is possible and necessary. 
Differences in National Practices 
One of the first steps in the preparation of the NUSS standards 
of the IAEA was the so-called collation. This was essentially 
an analysis of the materials sent in by the member states and a 
comparison as to the differences and similarities. It was quite 
obvious from the beginning, that, especially in certain areas, 
the differences would be quite considerable. One of the pro-
blems in establishing NUSS standards was to come to a compro-
mise with regard to these differences and at the same time 
write in as much details as necessary into the codes of prac-
tice and the safety guides. 
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In this connection, reference should be made to a paper on an 
international comparison between norms and safety standards 
/5/. This paper essentially compares certain requirements in 
the NUSS program with those in USA, France and the Federal Re-
public of Germany. 
At this juncture, two features which are probably unique to the 
licensing procedure in Federal Republic of Germany should be 
mentioned. These have been incorporated into the KTA safety 
standards and have contributed largely to the safety of nuclear 
facilities. The first is the participation of authorized ex-
perts in the licensing procedure. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, these experts are generally employees of the GRS (Ge-
sellschaft für Reaktorsicherheit = Reactor Safety Company) or 
of the TüV (Technischer überwachungsverein = Technical Super-
visory Organisation) in each state. The experts of these or-
ganisations are called in by the authorities (authorized ex-
perts) to carry out assessments and tests to ensure the safety 
of the nuclear facilities. Both the initial tests and the in-
service inspections in the facilities are carried out by the 
utilities together with, or in agreement with, these authorized 
experts. The issue of licenses by the authorities based on the 
reports and expert assessments of these authorized experts. 
The second area is quality assurance. One can generally state 
that the testing for quality assurance in the Federal Republic 
of Germany is object oriented rather than system oriented as in 
USA. These tests, which .are carried out by the architect/en-
gineers and utilities together with the authorized experts, 
requires a very high effort in terms of man-power and costs. 
But, they contribute a great deal to safety. 
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Who establishes such Standards and Codes? 
In the ca se of the NUSS standards, no explanations are neces-
sary. In the United States, the Regulatory Guides are primarily 
written by the staff members of the US Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the KTA safety 
standards are established by the KTA. The details of the pro-
cedures used in establishing KTA standards, are discussed in 
the two papers /6/, /7/. 
In all the cases mentioned, one of the essential pre-requisites 
is the experience gained, especially in the licensing proce-
dure, and this is a major input into the establishment of the 
safety standards. The mandate of the KTA, e.g., according to 
the document instituting it, is to develop and promote the use 
of standards in the area of nuclear technology where, on the 
ba sis of experience, a consensus is expected from manufac-
turing, utility, regulatory authority and safety reviewing or-
ganization experts. 
The Atomic Energy Act was enacted in 1959. But, on1y in 1972 
was the KTA instituted and the work on KTA safety standards 
begun. The interim per iod and the period since has gone towards 
gathering this important component namely experience. 
The NUSS program of the IAEA was 1aunched in 1974. The first 
step for the preparation of each code of practice and safety 
guide, as mentioned earlier, was a c01lation of material ob-
tained from member states. This means that the experience 
gained by the member states in the licensing, construction and 
operation of nuclear faci1ities was the major input into the 
NUSS standards. 
Without this experience, which has been gathered over several 
years, it is virtually impossible to establish meaningful safe-
ty standards. There are practically no "short-cuts" to achie-
ving and optimizing safety. So, a country with a ielatively new 
nuclear program or a country embarking on a nuclear program 
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rnust be very careful in deciding on the safety requirernents to 
be applied to its nuclear program. The NUSS standards have been 
envisaged for this purpose, but they are only basic require-
ments and thus have to be supplemented by further detailed re-
quirements. It would, of course, be possible to think in terms 
of using the national practices of one or more countries with 
the necessary experience. This automatically leads to the topic 
of transferability of existing safety standards. 
Transferability of Safety Standards 
A country embarking on a nuclear program is irnmediately faced 
with the problem of the requirements to be applied to, and con-
sequently the standards to be used for, the program. It is pro-
bably neither useful nor possible for this country to establish 
its own complete set of standards. If a nuclear power plant is 
being bought from another country with an established nuclear 
program, it is probably far more advantageous to apply the stan-
dards of that country to the plant. But, the standards would 
have to be adapted to consider the characteristics specific to 
the country and the site, e.g., seismicity, geology, population 
distribution around the proposed site. This is the practice, 
e.g., in Switzerland. The NUSS standards are also used, but 
they have the disadvantage of not having enough details. The 
Swiss licensing authorities normally accept United States stan-
dards for a plant bought from the United States or German stan-
dards for a plant from the Federal Republic of Germany. These 
standards, however, are scrutinized carefully to ensure that 
they meet all the requirements considered necessary in Switzer-
land. This can be complicated though if, e.g., the nuclear 
steam supply system is from one country and the balance of 
plant from another. 
The NUSS standards have been established with the intention of 
helping countries embarking on a nuclear program. But, as men-
tioned earlier, these codes and guides contain only the basic 
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requirements. These could be supplemented by the detailed re-
quirements of a country with an established set of standards, 
e.g., USA or the Federal Republic of Germany, for those areas 
where details are considered necessary. However, extreme cau-
tion needs to be exercised if only certain elements of a na-
tional practice are adapted. Then, the safety of a program is 
ensured through its entirety and the program is made up of the 
individual requirements. Examples of the practice in the Fe-
deral Republic of Germany can be taken to illustrate this 
point: there are no requirements any further with respect to 
pipe whip restraints in the containment vessel. If one takes 
this as an isolated statement one could come to the conclusion 
that the safety is probably being reduced. But this is not 
true. Through aseries of 'quality measures, the pipe whip re-
straints have been made unnecessary. These measures are essen-
tially the "Basisssicherheit" or basic safety of systems of nu-
clear power plants in the Federal Republic of Germany. Some 
characteristics of this should be briefly outlined, since this 
is probably specific to the Federal Republic of Germany. Very 
stringent requirements are made with respect to the choice and 
manufacture of materials. This consists of 
review, prior to maufacture, of the manufacturing documents 
(specified valves) 
assessment of the manufacturer by the authorized expert 
tests and inspections during the manufacturing process 
(accompanying tests and inspections) independently by the 
authorized expert and by the manufacturer 
assessment by the authorized expert subsequent to manufac-
turing to verify whether the specified values correspond to 
the actual values 
documentation. 
The material used for the reactor coolant pressure boundary 
must meet requirements with respect to high fracture toughness, 
low tendency to brittle fracture and high tensile strength. 
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As a result of these measures, the double ended pipe break has 
been excluded as a design criterion except for the design of 
the containment vessel and the emergency core cooling. For the 
pipes, a 10% break criterion applies, i.e, 10% of a pipe cross-
section as the rupture area. This, however, is a conservative 
estimate of a hypothetical crack. The values are actually much 
smaller. But, the important fact is that the "leak before 
break" criterion applies and this is ensured through the mea-
sures outlined. 
Other examples of cases where caution is necessary in trans-
ferring elements of anational program could be the 'question of 
redundancies of equipment of the safety system and of the emer-
gency power supply. 
In principle, though, it is possible to take abasie program 
like the NUSS program and to supplement it with the detailed 
requirements of anational practice provided that those re-
quirements are adapted to the specific characteristics and 
needs of the country concerned and the overall safety through 
the program is ensured i.e., there is no reduction in safety 
through omitting key elements of the national practice con-
sidered. 
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Conclusion 
Nuclear safety standards and codes have more than proved their 
worth over the last decade and have firmly established them-
selves as an important element in the nuclear licensing pro-
cedure. In the Federal Republic of Germany, there is a direct 
relationship between the safety goals defined in the legal do-
cuments (Atomic Energy Act and Ordinances) and the experience 
gained as reflected in the requirements of the safety stan-
dards. This has been instrumental in achieving the high level 
of safety and maintaining it at that high level. But, the op-
timization of safety is a practically neverending process, 
especially in the area of nuclear technology. Standards and 
codes cannot afford to be stationary. It is essential that ad-
vances in science and technology and the invaluable experience 
gained from the construction, operation and decommissioning of 
nuclear facilities be an input into verifying whether existing 
standards need to be modified or updated. This was one of the 
important topics of dicussion at arecent IAEA symposium on 
NUSS standards. The KTA standards program has a built-in fea-
ture to review standards periodically in this context. 
In the aftermath of Chernobyl, it is hoped that an internatio-
nal exchange of information and experience can be realized to 
optimize safety at the global level. Existing safety standards 
and codes can contribute a great deal towards this effort. 
Energy 
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Program of KTA-Safety Standards (June 1986) 
Safety 
Standard 
KTA 1201 
KTA 1202 
KTA 1301.1 
KTA 1301.2 
KTA 1401 
KTA 1402 
KTA 1404.1 
KTA 1404.2 
KTA 1406 
KTA 1407 
KTA 1408.1 
KTA 1408.2 
KTA 1408.3 
KTA 1501 
KTA 1502.1 
KTA 1502.2 
KTA 1503.1 
KTA 1503.2 
KTA 1503.3 
KTA 1504 
KTA 1505 
KTA 1506 
KTA 1507 
KTA 1508 
1) VB 
REV 
RE 
R 
2) ip 
av 
Title 
Requirements for the Operator Manual 
Requirements for the Inspection Manual 
Consideration of the Radiation Protection of Personnel 
in the Design and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants1 
Part 1: Design 
"; Part 2: Operation 
General Requirernents for Quality Assurance 
Qua1ity Assurance in Electrical Engineering 
Method of Documentation During Construction and Opera-
tion of Nuclear Power Plants; Part 1: Construction of 
Nuclear Power Plants 
"; Part 2: Operation of Nuclear Power Plants 
Principles for Certification of Materials used in 
Nuclear Power Plants 
Methods for the Determination of Allowable Duration of 
Maintenance in Nuclear Power Plants 
Quality Assurance for WeId Materials and WeId Additives 
for Pressure and Activity Retaining Components in 
Nuclear Power Plants; Part 1: Suitability Testing 
11; Part 2: Manufacture 
11; Part 3: Processing 
Stationary System for Monitoring Local Dose Rates 
within Nuclear Power Plants 
Monitoring Radioactivity in the Inner Atmosphere of 
Nuclear Power Plantsi Part 1: Nuclear Power Plants 
with Light Ivater Reactors 
"; Part 2: Nuclear Power Plants with High-
Temperature Reactors 
Measuring and Monitoring the Discharge of Gaseous and 
Aerosolbound Radioactive Materials; Part 1: Measuring 
and Monitoring the Stack Discharge of Radioactive Ma-
terials during Specified Normal Operation 
11; Part 2: Heasuring and Monitoring the 
Stack Discharge of Radioactive Materials during Inci-
dents 
11; Part 3: Measuring and Monitoring of 
Radioactive Materials not Discharged through the Stack 
Measuring Liquid Radioactive Materials for Monitoring 
the Radioactive Discharge 
Suitability of Radiation Measurement Equipment 
Measuring Local Dose Rates in Exc1usion Areas of 
Nuc1ear Power Plants 
Monitoring the Discharges of Gaseous, Aerosolbound and 
Liquid Radioactive Materials from Research Reactors 
Meteorological Instrumentation in Nuclear Power Plants 
preliminary report in preparation or issued "Vorbericht 11 
status1 ) 
(Date of 
Issue) 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
VB 
REV 
REV 
REV 
REV 
R 
R 
R 
R 
R 
REV 
R 
REV 
VB 
R 
VB 
R 
R 
REV 
(12/85)3) 
( 6/84) 
(11/84) 
( 6/82) 
(2/80) 
(6/85) 
(6/85) 
( 6/85) 
(10/77) 
(6/86) 
(2/79) 
(6/78) 
( 6/86) 
(3/84) 
draft safety standard in preparation lIRegelentwurf in Vorbereitung" 
draft safety standard "Regelentwurf" 
safety standard lIRegel" 
translation in preparation 
English2) 
Transla-
tion 
ip 
ip 
ip 
av 
av 
av 
translation available from KTA-Secretariat c/o GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 
D-5000 Köln 1 
3) 
amended version: replaces version 3/81 
Table 
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Program of KTA-Safety Standards (June 1986) 
Safety 
Standard 
KTA 2101.1 
KTA 2101.2 
KTA 2101. 3 
KTA 2102 
KTA 2103 
KTA 2105 
KTA 2201.1 
KTA 2201.2 
KTA 2201. 3 
KTA 2201. 4 
KTA 2201. 5 
KTA 2201. 6 
KTA 2202.1 
KTA 2203 
KTA 2205 
KTA 2206 
KTA 2207 
KTA 2501 
KTA 2502 
KTA 3101.1 
KTA 3101. 2 
KTA 3102.1 
KTA 3102.2 
KTA 3102.3 
KTA 3102.4 
KTA 3102.5 
KTA 3103 
KTA 3104 
1) VB 
REV 
RE 
R 
2) ip 
av 
Table 
Tit1e 
Fire Frotection in Nuclear PO\'ler Plants; Part 1: Basic 
Principles 
"; Part 2: Structural Components 
11; Part 3: Mechanical and Electrical Cornpo-
nents 
Escape and Resaue Routes in Nuclear Power Plants 
Explosion Protection in Nuclear Power Plants with Light 
Water and High-Temperature Reactors 
Load Assumptions for Internally Generated Missiles 
Design of Nuclear Power Plants against Seismic Events; 
Part 1: Basic Principles 
11; Part 2: Soil Foundation 
"; Part 3: Design of Structural Components 
11; Part 4: Design of Mechanical and Elec-
trieal Cornponents 
u; Part 5: Seismic Instrumentation 
11; Part 6: Measures Subsequent to Earth-
quakes 
Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Aircraft 
Crash - Basic Principles and Load Assumptiohs 
Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Aircraft 
Crash and External Explosions; Design of Structural 
Components (for given Load Assumptions) 
Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against the Pene-
tration and Inf1uence of Explosive and Highly In-
flammable Materials 
status 1 ) 
(Date of 
Issue) 
R (12/85) 
REV 
REV 
REV 
RE ( 6/85) 
REV 
R (6/75) 
R ( 11/82) 
REV 
RE (11/83) 
R (6/77) 
REV 
REV 
REV 
VB 
Design of Nuclear Power Plants against Lightning Effects REV 
Protection of Nuclear Power Plants against Floods R (6/82) 
Sealing of Structures in Nuclear Power Plants 
Mechanical Design of Fuel Storage Pools 
Reactor Core Design for Pressurized and Boiling Water 
Reactorsi Part 1: Thermohydrau1ic Design 
"; Part 2: Nuclear Design 
Reactor Core Design for High-Temperature Gas-Cooled-
Reactorsi Part 1: Calculation of the Material Proper-
ties of Helium 
1/; Part 2: Heat Transport in Spherical 
Fuel Elements 
Reactor Co re Design for High-Temperature Gas-Cooled 
Reactors; Part 3: Loss of Pressure through Friction 
in Spherica1 Fuel Element Piles 
u; Part 4: Thermohydraulic Analytical Model 
for Stationary and Quasi-Stationary Conditions in 
Spherical Fuel Element Piles 
I'; Part 5: Systematie and Statistical Errors 
in the Thermohydraulic Core-Design of the Pebb1e-Bed 
Reaetor 
Shutdown Systems of Light Water Reactors' 
Determination of the Shutdown Reactivity 
preliminary report in preparation or issued "Vorbericht" 
RE (6/86) 
REV 
R ( 2/80) 
REV 
R (6/78) 
R (6/83) 
R ( 3/81) 
R (11/84) 
R ( 6/86) 
R (3/84) 
R (10/79) 
draft safety standard in preparation "Regelentwurf in Vorbereitung ll 
draft safety standard "Regelentwurf" 
safety standard "Regel ll 
translation in preparation 
translation available from KTA-Seeretariat e/o GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 
D-5000 Köln 1 
(contd. ) 
English2 ) 
Transla-
tion 
av 
ip 
av 
av 
av 
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Safety 
Standard 
KTA 3200 
KTA 3201. 0 
KTA 3201.1 
KTA 3201. 2 
KTA 3201. 3 
KTA 3201. 4 
KTA 3203 
KTA 3204 
KTA 3205.1 
KTA 3205.2 
KTA 3205.3 
KTA 3211.1 
KTA 3211. 2 
KTA 3211.3 
KTA 3211. 4 
KTA 3301 
KTA 3302 
KTA 3303 
KTA 3304 
KTA 3401.1 
KTA 3401. 2 
KTA 3401.3 
KTA 3401.4 
KTA 3402 
1) VB 
REV 
RE 
R 
2) ip 
av 
3) 
amended 
4) 
amended 
5) 
amended 
Table 
Title 
Safety Requirements for Nuclear Coo1ant Systems in 
Nuclear Power Plants with Light Water Reactors 
Cornponents of the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of 
Light Water Reactors; General Part 
11; Part: Materials 
11; Part: Design and Analysis 
11; Part: Manufacture 
"; Part: Inservice Inspections and Opera-
tional Monitoring 
Monitoring Radiation Embrittlement of Materials of the 
Reactor Pressure Vessel of Light Water Reactors 
Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals 
Component-Support Structures with Non-integral Connec-
tions; Part 1: Component-Support Structures with Non-
integral Connections for Cornponents of the Reactor-
Coolant Pressure Boundary 
"; Part 2: Component-Support Structures with 
Non-integral Connections for Pressure and Activity Re-
taining Components outside the Reactor Coolant Pressure 
Boundary 
"; Part 3: Standard Supports 
Pressure and Activity Retaining Cornponents of Systems 
outside the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary; Part: 
Materials 
"; Part: Design and Analysis 
11; Part: Manufacture 
"; Part: Recurrent Tests 
Residual-Heat Removal Systems for Light Water Reactors 
Requirements for Pressure Relief Valves of the Primary 
and Secondary Circuit 
Heat-Removal Systems for Water-Cooled Fuel Element 
Storage Pools in the Reactor Building of Nuclear Power 
Plants with Light Water Reactors 
Measures for Closure of Pipes of Systems in Case of 
System-Internal Incidents 
Steel Containment Vessels; Part: Materials 
11; Part: Analysis and Design 
"; Part: Manufacture 
11; Part: Recurrent Tests 
Air Locks through the Corytainment Vessel of Nuclear 
Power Plants - Personnel Lacks 
preliminary report in preparation or issued IIVorbericht" 
status 1 ) 
(Date of 
Issue) 
REV 
REV 
R (11/82) 3) 
R (3/84) 4) 
R ( 10/79) 
R (6/82) 
R ( 3/84) 
R (3/84) 
R (6/82) 
REV 
REV 
REV 
REV 
REV 
REV 
R (11/84) 
REV 
REV 
VB 
R (11/82) 
R (6/85) 5) 
R (10/79) 
R (3/81) 
R (11/76) 
draft safety standard in preparation "Regelentwurf in Vorbereitung" 
draft safety standard "Regelentwurf ll 
safety standard IIRegel ll 
translation in preparation 
English 2 ) 
Transla-
tion 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
av 
translation available from KTA-Secretariat c/o GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 
D-5000 Köln 1 
version: replaces version 2/79 
version: replaces version 10/80 
version: replaces version 6/80 
(contd. ) 
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Safety 
Standard 
KTA 3403 
KTA 3404 
KTA 3405 
KTA 3406.1 
KTA 3406.2 
KTA 3407 
KTA 3409 
KTA 3413 
KTA 3501 
KTA 3502 
KTA 3503 
KTA 3504 
KTA 3505 
KTA 3506 
KTA 3507 
KTA 3601 
KTA 3602 
KTA 3603 
KTA 3604 
KTA 3605.1 
KTA 3605.2 
KTA 3605.3 
KTA 3606 
1) VB 
REV 
RE 
R 
2) ip 
av 
3) 
amended 
4) 
amended 
5) 
amended 
6) 
amended 
Table 
Title Status l ) 
(Date of 
Issue) 
Cable Penetrations through the Reactor Containment 
Vessel 
Closure of Pipe Penetrations through the Containment 
in Ca se of aRelease of Radioactive Materials inside 
the Reactor Containment 
R 
RE 
Integral Leakage Rate Testing of the Containment Vessel R 
with the Absolute Pressure Method 
Measurement and Control of the Hydrogen Concentration REV 
in the Containment Vessel; Part 1: Measurernent 
11; Part 2: Contral REV 
Pipe Penetrations through the Reactor Containment Vessel RE 
Air Locks through the Containment Vessel for Nuclear R 
PO\'ler Plants - Material Locks 
Determination of the Loads for the Design of the Large RE 
Dry Containment against Plant-Internal Incidents 
Reactor Protection System and Monitoring Equipment of R 
the Safety System 
Incident Instrumentation R 
Type Testing of Electrical Modules for the Reactor Pro- R 
tection System 
(10/80) 3) 
(6/77) 
( 2/79) 
( 6/85) 
(6/79) 
(12/85) 
(6/85)4) 
( 11/82) 
(6/82) 
Electrical Drives of the Safety System in Nuclear Power RE (11/84) 
Plants 
Type Testing of Measuring Transmitters and Transducers 
of the Reactor Protection System 
Tests of Electrotechnical Control Systems of the Safety 
System of Nuclear Power Plants 
Factory Tests of Equipment for Instrumentation and 
Control 
Ventilation and Air Filtration Systems in Nuclear Power 
Plants 
Storage and Handling of Nuclear Fuel Elements, Control 
Rads, and Neutron Sources in Nuclear Power Plants with 
Light l1ater Reactors 
Facilities for Treating Radioactively Contaminated Water 
in Nuclear po\.,er Plants 
Storage, Handling and Plant-Internal Transportation of 
Radioactive Materials (other than Nuclear Fuel Ele-
ments) in Nuclear Power Plants 
Gas Exhaust Systems of Nuclear Power Plants; Part 1: 
Light l1ater Reactors 
11; Part 2: High-Temperature Gas-Cooled 
Reactors 
"; Part 3: Fast Breeder Reactors 
Concentrated Radioactive Wastes in Nuclear Power Plants 
pr'eliminary report in preparation er issued "Vorbericht" 
R (11/84) 
R (11/84) 
RE (11/82) 
RE (10/79) 
R (6/84)5) 
R (2/80) 
R (6/83) 6) 
REV 
VB 
VB 
REV 
draft safety standard in preparation lIRegelentwurf in Vorbereitung" 
draft safety standard "Regelentwurf" 
safety standard "Regel" 
trahslation in ·preparation 
English 2) 
Transla-
tion 
ip 
ip 
ip 
ip 
av 
ip 
translation available from KTA-Secretariat e/o GRS mbH, Schwertnergasse 1, 
D-5000 Köln 1 
version: replaces version 11/76 
version: replaces version 3/77 
version: replaces version 6/82 
version: replaces version 11/82 
(contd. ) 
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Safety 
Standard 
KTA 3607 
KTA 3701.1 
KTA 3701.2 
KTA 3702.1 
KTA 3702.2 
KTA 3703 
KTA 3704 
KTA 3705 
KTA 3706 
KTA 3901 
KTA 3902 
KTA 3903 
KTA 3904 
KTA 3905 
1) VB 
REV 
RE 
R 
2) ip 
Tit1e 
Quantitative In-Situ Testing of Aerosol Filters 
General Requirements for the Electrical Po\Yer Supply 
of the Safety System in Nuclear Power Plants; 
Part 1: Sing1e-Unit Plants 
"; Part 2: r.lulti-Unit Plants 
Emergency Power Facilities with Diesel Generators; 
Part 1: Design 
"; Part 2: Tests and Exarninations 
Status 1 ) 
(Date of 
Issue) 
REV 
R 
R 
R 
R 
(6/78) 
(6/82) 
(6/80) 
Ernergency Power Facilities with Batteries and Rectifiers R 
(11/82) 
(6/86) 
Emergency Power Facilities with DC/AC Converters R (6/84) 
8''Ii tching and Distributor Facili ties in Emergency Power REV 
Facilities 
Resistance cf Electrical Equiprnent for Incident Condi-
tions 
Communication Systems for Nuclear Power Plants 
Lifting Equipment in Nuc1ear Facilities 
Testing and Operation of Lifting Equipment in Nuclear 
Facilities 
Control Room and the Emergency and Local Control 
Facilities in Nuclear Power Plants 
Design, Testing and Inspection of Load Suspension Points 
in Nuelear Facilities 
preliminary report in preparation or issued "Vorberieht ll 
REV 
R 
R 
R 
RE 
REV 
(3/81)3) 
(l1/83) 4) 
(11/82) 
(6/85) 
draft safety standard in preparation "Regelentwurf in Vorbereitung 11 
draft safety standard "Regelent\'lurf" 
safety standard "Regel" 
translation in preparation 
(June 1986) 
English 2) 
Transla-
tion 
av 
ip 
ip 
ip 
av translation availab1e from KTA-Seeretariat e/o GRS mbH, Sehwertnergasse 1, 
0-5000 Köln 1 
3) 
replaces KTA 3901.1 version 3/77 
4) 
amended version: rep1aees version 6/78 
Table (contd.) 
Introduction 
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In-Service Inspection, Prerequisite for high 
NPP Availability and Safety 
G. F. Schultheiss 
GKSS-Forschungszentrum Geesthacht GmbH 
Institut für Anlagentechnik 
Max-Planck-Straße 
D-2054 Geesthacht, Fed. Rep. of Germany 
For nuclear power plant (NPP) availability and safety there exist a 
series of important contributors 
- a proven design 
- comprehensive quality ass uran ce during manufacturing and construction 
- qualified plant monitoring for early stage failure detection 
- in-service inspection OS!) during plant operation to demonstrate a 
continuously high level of component quality or to enable adequate 
repair measures and 
as an overall item the provision of adequately qualified personnel for 
all these tasks mentioned above. 
Although this paper concentrates on ISI and its effects on plant 
availability the interconnection to the other areas listed also has to be 
considered. In-service inspection includes 
- cost lowering and effective procedures during plant shut-down and 
radiation exposure of components and systems used 
- man power which may have to work under radiation exposure as low as 
reasonably achievable 
- requirements with respect to scheduling for preparative work, 
performance of inspections and useful evaluation and 
-303 
- a comprehensive documentation of a11 relevant data which have to be 
available over power plant life time. 
There ex ist different regulations or standards on ISI e. g. the Sa fety 
Guide on In-Service Inspection for Nuclear Power P lants (IAEA Sa fety 
Series No. 50-SG-02), German KTA Safety Standards or ASME XI. These 
guidelines are valid for different nuclear power plant concepts but this 
paper concentrates on examples taken from pressurized light-water 
reactors in the german power plant design concept by KWU. Similar 
procedures exist in other count ries as /1/ shows. 
ISI Effects on Design and Manufacturing 
As in-service inspection routines for PWRs concentrate on reactor 
pressure components to ensure the safe enclosure of radioactive fission 
products and activated matter like corrosion products and coolant within 
the primary circuit, the respecti ve components have undergone a risk 
reducing development /2/. 
To achieve the high technical level of the new concept of 
pressure-retaining components a systematic and continuous development in 
fields as materials, fabrication, design and calculation was necessary. 
Considerable progress has been made in the production of heavy forgings 
during recent years resulting in optimized construction of the 
components. The number of seam welds could be extensively reduced leading 
to the following essential advantages: 
The operational safety has gradua11y been increased s ince, w ith the 
reduction of the seam welds, the probability of remaining flaws is 
reduced. 
The manufacturing risk has been decreased since the defect frequency is 
greater in seam welds than in the base material. 
- The scope of non-destructive examination has been reduced during 
fabrication as weIl as during in-service inspections. 
- The fabrication times have been shortened. 
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Figures 1 to 5 /2/ show the improvements achieved for individual 
components. It ought to be mentioned that the change from the "old" to 
the "new " design status has been progressive and was not a sudden step. 
The figures showing the saving in seam weId numbers are valid for 
standardized pressurized water reactors with an output of 1300 MW(e): 
- The total length of seam welds of 122 m for the reactor pressure vessel 
has been reduced to one half, that is to 61 m (Fig. 1). 
- On the secondary shell of the steam generators, seam welds of 50 m 
length were saved, i. e. 200 m for the four steam generators of one 
plant (Fig. 2). 
The new main coolant pump housings are forged in one piece. Seam welds 
are completely avoided (Fig. 3). 
The entire seam weId length of the pressurizer has been reduced to 
approximately a third, from 91 m to 28 m (Fig. 4). 
- The nozzles of the main coolant pipes are manufactured as an integral 
element of the forged straight pipes. The pipe elbows, formerly welded 
together from two half shells, are formed to seamless elbows with 
forged tubes as initial material (Fig. 5). With these two measures the 
total number of seam welds is reduced from 250 to 60 circumferential 
joint welds. 
F igures 1 to 5 also show that by the exclusi ve use of forging the 
requirement of a mechanical design that is adequate to the loads to which 
the components will be subjected in service is fulfilled to a high 
degree. Local peak stresses are avoided by smooth shaping and seam welds 
are located in areas of low stresses. 
Additional efforts to minimize the number of welds in the primary 
pressure boundary are illustrated in the comparison given in F ig. 6. 
Considerable improvements have been achieved in the quality of the 
primary piping. The above mentioned forged-on nozzles are used for major 
attachment of the more important systems like volume control and 
emergency co re cooling as weIl as sections of piping bent in more than 
one plane. The savings in the amount of welding at site are considerable, 
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so are the benefits for in-service inspection. 
These design improvements in the primary pressure boundary have brought 
also some progress in the regulatory requirements. Rather than specifying 
engineered countermeasures to limit propagation and consequences of 
accidents (which meant extensive pipe whip restraints and poor access to 
the piping itself) greater emphasis is now placed on accident prevention 
(which means surveillance of the built-in quality over the years) and on 
reduction of radiation exposure. 
Not only the components to be inspected have been improved but also the 
whole NPP design was subject for introducing features for facilitating 
operational and inspection activities. As inspection starts in many cases 
with a visual examination, the accessibility e.g. inside the containment 
as shown in Fig. 7 is of importance. Together with an adequate 
positioning of auxiliary equipment, instrumentation etc. this leads once 
more to substantial man-dose reduction. Sufficient space for equipment 
storage and handling is of importance especially if work can be prepared 
without shutting down the plant and thereby increasing the overall 
availability. 
As operational experience of NPP shows, an important percentage of 
non-availability increasing defects originate from corrosion e.g. in the 
steam generators by stress or crevice corrosion on the secondary side. 
In Fig. 8 a simplified scheme of the essential components of the 
secondary system of a pressurized water reactor plant is shown. The main 
features of KWU's secondary-side concept are listed in the three boxes on 
the right-hand side. This concept minimizes the ingress of corrosion 
products and impurities into the steam generators, which can be 
considered as the most sensitive components of the PWR. 
The operating experience gained with KWU steam generators is extremely 
satisfactory. The most important reason is the selection of Incoloy 800 
as tube material which drastically minimizes the risk of stress 
corrosion. Furthermore , the possibility of tube denting is completely 
ruled out by the use of egg-crate type support grids made of stabilized 
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austenitic stainless steel. 
By v irtue of specia11y adapted manufacturing speci fications and design, 
crevice corrosion on tubes in the vicinity of the tubesheet and also the 
well-known problems of fretting damage encountered by other suppliers are 
ruled out. 
Corrosion product ingress via the blowdown line is reduced by means of 
annual lancing using a high-pressure spraying technique. This minimizes 
the risks of the bUild-up of a highly corrosive layer on top of the tube-
sheet. Consequently, a11 the other measures, shown in the boxes on the 
right-hand side, are also geared to the reduction of contaminant ingress 
into the secondary system: 
- Installation of a high integrity condenser with copper-free tube 
material resistant to corrosion/erosion e. g. titanium, tube to tube-
sheet welding and an improved condenser leakage monitoring system, and 
- Use of electromagnetic and mechanical filters in the feedwater line and 
de-aeration of feedwater, as weIl as 
- Chemistry control by virtue of the installation of sensitive sodium and 
chlorine monitors. 
All these measures allow optimum secondary-side water chemistry with high 
all volatile treatment and appropriate pH va lues greater than or equal to 
9.8. 
Measures such as the secondary side concept to increase the overall 
availability of NPPs are combinations of design oriented preventions and 
operational monÜoring procedures and considered here as 151 relevant. 
Therefore in the following the monitoring concept also has to be included 
as an in-operation ISI part. 
Monitoring System for NPPs 
As the total amount of 151 work not only depends on regularly planned in-
spections but also on failures which have been detected e.g. between two 
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refuelling periods or which caused immediate inspection and repair work, 
a sensitive monitoring system /3/ is an important prerequisite for 
effective ISI. 
Such systems represent an instrumentarium for the earliest possible 
detection of anomalies and malfunctions in machines, piping systems and 
tanks, as weIl as their internals. The mode of operation of mast of the 
individual systems presented here is based on the detection and analyis 
of mechanical-dynamic signals at frequencies between 0.1 Hz and 1 MHz, 
others work with thermal signals. 
Common design aspects of such monitoring systems are: 
- integral surveillance by a limited number of reliable sensors, mostly 
on the outside of the components 
- special indirect measuring methods with sophisticated signal analysis 
(e.g. of noise) 
- microprocessor systems with intelligent software for alarm annunciation 
and the capacity of complete data storage especially for the 
pre-failure history 
- adequate documentation. 
Fig. 9a gives on overview of the current monitoring systems developed and 
operated by KWU: 
Change in operating noises such as the impact of loose parts or 
detached parts banging on vessel walls (e. g. steam generators and 
reactor press ure vessels in nuclear power plants) 
(By means of the loose Earts ~onitoring ~ystem LPMS) 
- Changes in the oscillation behaviour of machines, vessels and piping 
systems 
(By means of the ~ibration ~onitoring ~ystem VMS) 
- Internal and external leaks 
(By means of the ~coustic leakage ~onitoring ~ystem ALMS) 
- 308 -
- The lhermal ~tratification ~onitoring ~ystem (TSMS) 
- Component fatigue as a result of thermal stresses 
(By means of the fatigue ~nitoring ~ystems FAMOS) 
- Origination and propagation of cracks 
(By means of the ~rack ~onitoring ~ystem CMS) 
- The ~eismic ~etection ~ystem (SDS). 
For example, the LPMS is an established monitoring system and installed 
in all KWU reactors. Ca ses of detected parts demonstrate the high 
sensitivity of the system (impacts of a 10 9 mass) and the capabilities 
to localize and to distinguish between loosened and detached parts. The 
modular, microprocessor-based system (see Fig. 9b) was completed and 
first installed in the nuclear power station Brokdorf in the north of 
Germany near Hamburg. 
The application of such systems are far from being restricted to nuclear 
power plant operation. They can be employed in all facilities and 
technical structures in which malfunctions or failures represent a safety 
hazard or economic risk - e.g. tanks and containers in the petrochemical 
industry, large machines or means of transport. 
ISI Technigues and Eguipment 
The development of ISl methods, techniques and equipment in Germany was 
based on the requirements (KTA Safety Standards) for Class 1 components. 
These safety standards require more details and more frequent coverage 
than specified for example in ASME XI. This has resulted in an almost 
100 ?6 mechanization of the examinations of the reactoI; coolant system 
components and piping of PWR plants which.was followed by a considerable 
reduction of the radiation exposure of examination personnel. Mechanized, 
remote controlled testing equipment has been developed which is set up on 
a permanently installed rail system shown schematicly in Fig. 10 and 
corresponding to the new seam weld concept and the extensive use of 
forged pipe elements mentioned above in the design relevant ISl 
consequences. 
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For the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) additional equipment is used for 
inspection at regular intervals, normally every 4 years. The transducers 
and search units required for inspection purposes, for example ultrasonic 
probes, are brought into position in the reactor press ure vessel with the 
aid of center mast manipulators (Fig. lla, Ilb). 
Center mast manipulators are large equipment units which, in canjunction 
with special tools, make it possible to subject pressure vessels, nozzles 
and internals to 
visual inspection via closed-circuit television 
- ultrasonic and eddy-current testing and 
- repair measures. 
As Fig. Ilb shows, significant reduction in inspection time (about 
- 30?6) and radiation exposure (about - 50?6) have been achieved in 
RPV-ISI using the new central mast manipulator CMM3 and specially 
developed tools for the different inspection tasks. 
The extension of service in the case of the steam generator tube 
inspection was linked with the problem that the water level in the 
reactor press ure vessel had to be lowered during the time the steam 
generator primary channel heads were open and no servicing work could 
thus be carried out due to the lack of shielding. To this end, loop seal 
units have been developed which plug the primary system pipes on the 
reactor press ure vessel and permit simultaneous work in the steam 
generator channel heads and in the reactor press ure vessel at an elevated 
water level (Fig. llc). 
Time scheduling for refueling and major inspection in Fig. 12 shows that 
the inspection of steam generators, besides the checks of fuel 
assemblies , dominate the shut down period. Control of steam generator 
tubes was manpower consuming in the past and resulted in significant 
radiation doses. 
Various measures have been provided in the past decade to reduce working 
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time and radiation exposure: 
- remote eontrolled deviees like finger walkers (see Fig. 13 and 14) have 
been developed and improved for automatie inspeetion proeedures 
- the change from the manual insertion of explosively welded tube plugs 
to reusable tube plugs and automatie insertion brought a drastie 
reduetion in radiation dose per plug insertion as Fig. 13 shows in the 
lower part. 
The applieation of finger walkers for remote eontrolled steam generator 
tube testing allows different proeedures /4/ during testing aetivities, 
e.g.: 
- analysis and/or visual examination by endoseopes and 
- eombined eddy-eurrent (ET) and ultra sonie (UT) testing (Fig. 15a) 
or tube repair, e.g.: 
- removal of exeess weId material and 
plugging defeetive tubes with reusable plugs as shown in Fig. 15b. 
The effeetive use of remote teehniques is elearly doeumented by the 
evaluation of work done between 1980 and 1984. In Fig. 16 a eompilation 
of inspeeted steam generator, tubes and exposure speeifie working time is 
given. The progress aehieved is obvious. 
Final Remarks 
Although standardization has been aehieved in many areas, important 
driving forees behind nuelear power plant development still exist. These 
are 8.g.: 
_ reduetion of investment and operating eosts, the latter mainly by 
inereasing plant availability (Fig. 17), 
- automation of operation, 
- reduetion of the personnel radiation exposure, 
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perfection of service activities by special handling tools and 
procedures, and 
- improvement in the fuel cycle area. 
Except the last item, all others are more or less interconnected to 
in-service inspection procedures. These are not only restricted to the 
reactor area. Therefore it has been the policy of many suppliefs to focus 
not only on the nuclear steam supply system but also on the entire power 
plant with its multi-faceted interplay of functions. KWU for example has 
therefore assumed full responsibility for all its german nuclear power 
plants in respect of planning, engineering, erection and commissioning. 
In this paper the relations between ISI activities, design, regulations 
and standards and plant operation have been shown. The ISI region has 
been widened to include monitoring and special operational procedures 
leading to higher plant availability and safer operation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
My talk is on probabilistic risk analysis or I as i t is fre-
quently called , risk assessment. The latter term indicates that 
a good deal of engineering judgement is required to perform 
such an investigation and that i t is by no me ans entirely a 
IIfirst principle exercise" , as will become clear in the course 
of my exposition. Risk is understood to be composed ~f two ele-
ments: the expected freguency of an undesired event and the 
magni tude of damages i t causes. In the analysis of a nuclear 
reactor it is the expected frequency of a major release of ra-
dioactive substances on one hand and the extent of this release 
and the consequent impact on humans and environment on the other. 
Risk analysis is applied if the calculation of risk from ob-
served failures is not possible I because events contributing 
substantially to risk are too seldom , as in the case of nu-
clear reactors. The process of analysis provides a number of 
benefits. Some of them are listed in Figure 1. 
After this by no means complete enumeration of possible bene-
fits to be derived from a risk analysis I should like to give 
an outline of risk studies for pressurized water reactors with 
some comments on the models used. The presentation is indebted 
to the detailed treatment of the subject given in the PRA Pro-
cedures Guide /1/. Thereafter I shall communicate some results 
of the German Risk Study, Phase B, which is under way. My talk 
concludes with some remarks on probabilistic considerations in 
licensing procedures. 
2. OUTLINE OF A RISK ANALYSIS 
2.1 Generalities 
The steps involved in a risk analysis are shown in Figure 2. 
They comprise analyses of 
the technical systems of the reactor 
the containment 
Figure 1: 
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Improved understanding of the fu" range 
of accident sequences and assessment of 
their relative importance 
Assessment of the efficiency of planned 
system improvements and mitigating 
measures 
Establishment of research priorities on 
the basis of the impact of gaps of 
knowledge on the final result 
Explicit indication of uncertainties in-
volved in the analysis 
Some of the benefits to be derived from a pro-
babilistic risk analysis 
the environmental transport of pollutants and the assess-
me nt of their health and other effects 
The investigations require the modeling of phenomena from the 
fields of reactor physics, thermal-hydraulics, structural me-
chanics, atmospheric dispersion, health physics. Accident pro-
gression has to be described by means of event trees and fault 
trees for the plant systems. Evidently the analysis is a multi-
disciplinary exercise. 
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Owing to the multiple barriers present in a nuclear reactor a 
major release of radioactive substances to the environment is 
only possible, if the reactor core melts and the pressure ves-
seI and the containment of the reactor fail. A situation lead-
ing to core degradation or co re melt may only arise as a con-
seguence of loss of coolant from the primary system piping or 
due to transients if in addition a number of highly reliable 
safety systems fail. Transients imply that there is either an 
increase of heat production in the core or a drop in heat re-
moval without coolant being lost. 
Step 
Initial 
information 
collection Significant 
~ Results 
Modeling of f--- Expectedfrequencies 
reactor systems of accident sequences 
~ 
Modeling of Time sequence of core 
in-vessel melt: release from 
behaviour pressure vessel 
~ 
Modeling of Mode, time and probability Release 
containment of containment failure, en- cate-
behaviour vironmental source term gories 
~ ~ 
,---
Modeling of environmental Adverse 
--"" Risk transport, countermeasures, 
effects 
and health effects 
'---
Figure 2: Probabilistic risk analysis - overview 
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2.2 Initiating Events 
The first event in the chain of events which may lead to co re 
degradation or core melt is called initiating event. Those ana-
lyzed in the German Risk study Phase A /2/ are shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: 
Loss of coolant 
Leaks in the primary piping system 
Leak in the pressurizer system 
Leak in the reactor pressure vessel 
Leak fram a connecting line to the 
primary piping system 
Transients 
Loss of power 
Loss of the maJn feedwater supply 
Turbine trip with loss of heat sink 
Anticipated transients without scram 
Initiating events from /2/ 
The initiating events presented in Figure 3 represent the prin-
cipal of the so called internal events. In order to be complete, 
external events would have to be added to the list, e.g.: 
earthquakes 
high winds and lightning 
floods 
low water 
aircraft crash 
pressure wave from an explosion 
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These may affect plant systems as weIl. 
The expected frequencies of occurrence of the initiating events 
are obtained from statistical records, from fault tree analyses, 
from structural mechanics calculations in the case of leaks or 
from estimates. Only if a number of safety systems fail an ini-
tiating event may lead to core degradation or core melt. 
The behaviour of these systems is analyzed in the task of sys-
tem modeling. 
2.3 System modeling 
system models describe the behaviour of plant systems in res-
ponse to ini tiating events. I f plant systems are capable of 
coping with an initiating event the accident sequence will be 
terminated successfully. If this is not the case co re degrada-
tion or core melt may result. Figure 4 gives an overview of this 
step of analysis. 
Modeling of Reactor Systems 
Methods Data requirements 
Event tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis 
Neutronic and ther-
mal hydraulic calcula-
tions to establish 
sucess criteria 
Expected frequencies of 
initiating events 
Reliability data for in-
dependent and dependent 
failures; probabilities 
of human error 
Nuciear and thermal-
hydraulic design para-
meters 
Output: Accident sequences leading to core melt due 
to loss-of-coolant and transients and ex-
pected frequencies of occurrence 
Figure 4: overview of reactor system modeling 
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The principal tools for modeling systems are event trees and 
fault trees. An event tree is the result of an inductive ana-
lysis which des6ribes the behaviour of all the systems required 
to cope wi th an ini tiating event. Normally i t is a binary 
model, i.e. a system whose functioning is required either ful-
fills its mission or does not do so. Figure 5 gives an example 
in which for ease of presentation several safety systems have 
been combined into one. Each of them only fails if several of 
its components fail. If the systems are weIl constructed and 
a sufficient number of them wi th the necessary functions are 
installed the reactor copes with the initiating event. The cor-
responding sequences represent the success paths of the event 
tree which are characterized by the fact that all systems which 
are required work as planned. If this is not the case in the 
example of Figure 5 a core melt will occur and, if containment 
integrity is not assured, arelease may result. since the ulti-
mate aim of the analysis is quantification the probability of 
whether a system works or not is found using fault tree analy-
sis. In this type of analysis the failure of a system to ful-
fill its mission is traced back deductively to the failure of 
its individual components. These components may either be tech-
nical components in the strict sense of the word or they may 
represent failures to carry out human interventions or - if 
external events analysis is included the consequences of 
their impact on the system. The fault trees take into account 
the possibili ty that components of the system under analysis 
may have been damaged due to the failure of other systems or 
as a consequence of the initiating event. 
The question of whether a system works or not or a component 
has to function or not for the system to fulfill i ts mission 
may only be represented by a binary yes/no variable if the 
dynamic behaviour of the system in response to the ini tia-
ting event is known. The necessary knowledge is usually ob-
tained by performing neutronic and thermal-hydraulic calcula-
tions. Their resul ts are the basis of the so called success 
criteria. For example, a thermal-hydraulic calculation may 
show that no high pressure inj ection system is required to 
cope wi th a 20 cm 2 leak in the primary piping. This system 
will then not be considered in the corresponding event tree. 
Figure 5: 
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simplified event tree for a loss-of-coolant-acci-
dent (from /2/) 
A short cut which is frequently used in this context, e.g. in 
the German Risk Study Phase A /2/ and the U. S . Safety Study 
/3/, is to base success criteria on the conservative reguire-
ments laid down in the licensing procedure. 
WeIl known co"mputer codes for addressing questions of core 
cooling in the case of transients are the ALMOD code /4/ and 
for loss-of-coolant-accidents DRUFAN /5/. Other codes used 
in this context are RELAP /5/, RETRAN /6/ and TRAC /7/. 
All the computer codes reguire input data. For evaluating 
faul t trees reliabili ty data describing the failure of tech-
nical components and probabili ties for human error are nee-
ded. Reliabili ty data are best obtained by observing fail-
ures of components in operation in power plants /9/, the 
evaluation of human error is performed by an analysis of 
the tasks, which are broken down into simpler tasks for which 
observed error probabili ties are available /10/. The neutro-
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nie calculations require amongst others information about core 
geometry and composi tion, neutron cross sections and reactor 
power, the thermal-hydraulic ones, the thermodynamic and hy-
draulic parameters of the system, material inventories, heat 
capacities and heat transfer correlations. 
By their very nature the models used in an analysis are an 
abstraction from reali ty. Therefore their representati veness 
must be a concern. For example, it is impossible to make the 
list of initiating events complete. Owing to the large number 
of analyses performed to date and the existing operating expe-
rience i t is believed, however, that omissions of accident 
sequences which would substantially alter or ne gate insights 
from probabilistic risk analyses are unlikely /11/. 
Thermal-hydraulic calculations will draw benefi ts from expe-
riments which are under way and from improvements in analyti-
cal models. 
Reliabili ty data for independent failures are now available 
in sufficient quali ty and number for pressurized water reac-
tors of German design /9/. However, information on common mode 
failures is still considered to be a problem. The same is true 
for the treatment of human error which naturally is more com-
plicated than the description of technical components. In this 
field principally the failure of carrying out properly main-
tenance and planned interventions during operation are treated 
analytically. Unforeseen acts and interventions apt to control 
complex situations are still difficult to model. 
In general the state of knowledge in the step of analysis just 
described is considered as good. Further improvements may be 
expected from the evaluations of operating experience which are 
carried out in many places. 
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3. SEVERE ACCIDENTS 
This step deals with event seguences which are described by 
the failure paths of the event trees just mentioned. These are 
characterized by the fact that the safety systems are not ca-
pable of coping with the initiating event. The resulting acci-
dents go beyond the design basis accidents. They are called 
severe accidents and lead to core damage or core me~t. Results 
of risk studies indicate that they are very unlikely. 
3.1 In-Vessel Behaviour 
After the expected freguencies for the different accident se-
quences have been established, the actual progression of core 
melt has to be treated analytically to predict the temperature 
history of the fuel. In addition the quanti ty and form of re-
lease from the fuel during heat-up have to be found. An over-
view of this step of the analysis is given in Figure 6. 
Normally in-vessel behaviour is not treated for all the acci-
dent sequences found in the previous step but only a few cases 
are selected. In what follows the phenomenology to be modeled 
is explained using the uncoped loss-of-coolant accident as an 
example. 
3.1.1 Core Melt 
wi th the drop of the water level in the core region the fuel 
heats up. The rate of heating is determined by the decay heat 
level, zirconium oxidation at high temperatures, convective 
heat transfer to steam and hydrogen and radiative he at trans-
fer to structures. 
As the fuel heats, cladding swelling and rupture occur. wi th 
a further rise in temperature zirconium, zirconium oxide and 
uranium dioxide will melt. The molten material is expected to 
slump and resolidify in the lower parts of the core causing 
some degree of flow blockage in the channels. Similarly con-
trol rods would mel t. A mol ten zone is expected to grow and 
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In - Vessel Behaviour 
Models/Phenomena 
Caleulation of heat transport be-
tween eoolant and fuel, fuel heat-
up and melt, heat produetion from 
metal/zireonium reaetion 
Caleulation of isotope generation 
and depletion due to fission, trans-
mutation and deeay 
Correlations for fission produet 
and struetural materials from fuel 
by cladding rupture, diffusion, 
leaeh and melt 
Correlations for transport inside 
eooling system deseribing pro-
cesses like reaetions of produets 
with eaeh other or with air or 
steam, hydrogen, sorption, sett-
ling, re-evaporation and re-
entrainment 
Charaeteristie results: 
Input information (partial) 
Number of fuel rods, initial power 
and water levels, geometrie and 
calorie eharaeteristics of eore, heat 
transfer eoefficients ete. 
Nuclear cross seetions, deeay 
rates, fission yield, fuel mass 
and burn-up 
Geometrie data of fuel elements, 
gap inventory, rod inventory, 
temperatures at release loeation, 
release rate eoefficients 
Physieal properties of radionue-
lides, geometrie eonfiguration of 
reaetor eoolant system, materials 
of surfaees, souree term from the 
eore, flow path through and ther-
malhydraulie eonditions in eooling 
system 
Time sequenee of eore melt, pre-
ssure vessel melt through, souree 
term to the containment 
Figure 6: Overview of modeling of in-vessel behaviour 
to progress downward following the receding water level. It 
eventually enters the lower plenum of the pressure vessel. 
When molten fuel in the lower plenum comes into contact with 
the water present there, an interaction will occur. The fuel 
is dispersed and steam is generated. Under some condi tions, 
a particularly energetic reaction, known as "steam explosion" 
may be produced. It will be discussed in detail later. After 
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the molten fuel has drained into the lower plenum, the remai-
ning water boils away in a short time. Reactions of core debris 
with zirconium or steel would then occur producing more hydro-
gen and heat. The bottom of the vessel will be heated up and 
eventually yield. The contents of the vessel is then discharged 
into the reactor cavity. According to results obtained in phase 
A of the German Risk study this would take place after 1.6 or 
2.2 h, respectively, depending on the boundary conditions used 
for the calculations /2/. 
The phenomena just described may be treated with the MARCH code 
/12/ which despi te improvements on a previous code remains a 
very simple model for the complex processes involved. 
3.1.2 Nuclear core inventory 
In parallel with the fuel heat-up release of radioactive ma-
terials from the fuel elements takes place. In order to cal-
culate i ts guanti ties, in the first place the inventory of 
radionuclides and structural materials of the reactor has to 
be obtained. This includes radionuclides, fuel, stable iso-
topes produced by the decay of radionuclides during reactor 
operation, and structural materials like fuel cladding, control 
rods, core support, and instrument tubes. The radionuclide and 
stable nuclide inventories are determined with an isotope ge-
neration and depletion code. These codes like ORIGEN /13/ and 
its improved version ORIGEN-2 /14/ account for fission, trans-
mutation, and decay. As input information they reguire nuclear 
cross sections, decay rates and fission yields, information on 
the initial nuclide inventory, uranium enrichment, and fuel ele-
ment burn-up, and details on the guantities of structural mate-
rials present in the core. 
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3.1.3 Radionuclide and structural materials source term from 
the core 
Releases of radionuclides from the fuel are expected to depend 
on the chemistry of the radionuclides within the fuel (kine-
tics and thermodynamics), the physical form of the fuel (e.g. 
cladding intact or failed, fuel solid or molten, fuel surface-
to volume ratio) and the environment to which the fuel is ex-
posed (e.g. temperature, fluid composition, and steam /water/ 
hydrogen ratio). Releases can occur in a variety of ways. The 
following phenomena have to be modeled: 
o cladding-rupture release (T < 1200 °C) 
o diffusion release 
o leach release 
o melt release 
o transport, deposition, and release in the reactor coolant 
system 
The aforementioned processes with the exception of the trans-
port inside the coolant system, are treated by models based on 
correlations describing experimental results. Substantial uncer-
tainties still present in this phase may be dealt with by assu-
ming conservatively that the entire inventory of the primary 
system is eventually released to the containment. This is done 
in the German risk study, Phase B. It should be noted, that the 
major contribution to the radioactive source term to the contain-
ment results from the failure of the pressure vessel. This source 
term consists chiefly of aerosols with a great variety of par-
ticle sizes and iodine and noble gases. 
Improved accuracy of the models required for this step may be 
expected from a number of experiments, as for example the 
SASCHA experiment conducted recently at the Karlsruhe research 
centre /15/. 
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3.2 CONTAINMENT FAlLURE AND IN-CONTAINMENT BEHAVIOUR OF 
FISSION PRODUCTS 
This step is concerned with the different modes of containment 
failure and the description of the behaviour of the molten fuel 
wi thin the containment. The object is to' calculate the release 
to the atmosphere, the environmental source term. An overview 
of the methods and phenomena involved is given in. Figure 7. 
Containment failure and ln-Containment 
behaviour of fission products 
Models/Phenomena 
Containment failure: 
• Pressure build-up calculation 
and structural mechanics calcu-
lations for determining time of 
failure 
Treatment of fission product re-
lease from the core and trans-
port and retention inside contain-
ment, determination of environ-
mental source term 
Input (partial) 
State of plant before accident, 
pressures, temperatures, volumes, 
heat contents etc., physical pro-
perties of materials and fluids, 
geometry and size of components 
and internals, mass and energy 
fluxes into containment after 
accident. Containment material 
properties, location of welds 
Containment source term, physi-
cal and chemical properties of 
released materials, containment 
and auxiliary building volumes 
and surfaces, filter efficiencies, 
reaction parameters, entrain-
mentment factors 
Characteristic results: Quantities, composition, time, duration, 
height and energy release for different re-
lease categories 
Figure 7: Methods and phenomena to be modeled for describing 
containment failure and in-containment behaviour 
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The containment may fail at an early stage of the accident, as 
would be the case if a hydrogen explosion occurred. The reason 
. for this would be apressure peak or generated missiles. Another 
'way of early failure would be the failure to isolate containment 
penetrations. Late failure of the containment would occur due to 
gradual pressure build-up as a consequence of evaporation from 
the water/core debris mixture which has dropped into the reactor 
cavity after penetrating the pressure vessel. 
In phase A of the German risk study /2/, for example, the follow-
ing failure modes of the containment were taken into account: 
failure due to steam explosion 
leakage from the containment, i.e. failures to isolate pene-
trations 
o small (diameter 25 mm) 
o medium (diameter 80 mm) 
o large (diameter 300 mm) 
failure due to pressure build-up. 
The failure of isolating the penetrations is immediate. The 
correspondi~g probability of occurrence results from fault 
tree analysis for the containment isolation systems. 
In the case of gradual pressure build up the time and space de-
pendent pressure and temperature profiles in the containment 
have to be calculated. This may be done using the codes CONDRU 
/16/ or RALOC /17/. Some of the conditions and phenomena to be 
addressed in this context are: 
gas comRos.i ti on (steam, oxygen, combustible and inert gases) 
coefficients of condensing heaR transfer to structures 
temperature profiles in structures 
the effects of cooling system~ 
hydrogen combustion 
heat source redistribution 
flow into the annulus. 
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To assess the containment response to pressure build-up struc-
tural mechanics calculations are required which may be perfor-
med in detail and with a high degree of accuracy using finite 
element codes such as ADINA /18/. These calculations determine 
the load required to make the containment fail. 
A possible mel t through of the concrete basemat of the con-
tainment is considered to occur later than any of. the other 
containment failure modes. For this reason ground release is 
normally not treated in risk studies. 
As has been mentioned before, there are interactions between 
the core debris which falls into the reactor cavi ty and the 
structural concrete. These lead to the formation of steam and 
hydrogen, carbon monoxide and dioxide and a gradual destruc-
tion of the concrete. In case of a loss-of-coolant accident, 
water is expected to be present in the sump. This water floods 
the mol ten fuel after the concrete of the cavern has yielded 
and is evaporated by the residual heat of the fuel. This eva-
poration has a significant influence on containment pressure 
build up. This phase of the accident may be treated with com-
puter codes like KAVERN /19/ and WECHSL /20/. Radioactive 
material - although in smaller quantities than on containment 
failure is released continuously from the mol ten fuel in 
the cavern. It enters the atmosphere of the containment chief-
ly in the form of aerosols and to a lesser degree as gas. 
During the transport in the containment multiple reaction, so-
lution, and settling processes reduce the reactivity concentra-
ti on in i ts atmosphere. On the other hand, reentrainment and 
resuspension is expected on containment failure due to over-
pressurization. Aerosol behaviour may be treated with the code 
NAUA /21/ and the distribution and reaction behaviour of iodine 
with the code IMPAIR /22/. 
There still exist considerable uncertainties in the treatment 
of in-containment transport which stern from a lack in under-
standing and experience in accident processes and fission pro-
duct behaviour associated wi th severe accidents. They refer 
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to release mechanisms and to the chemical form in which some 
of the fission products present themselves. 
4. RELEASE CATEGORIES 
After sketching the phenomena treated and the procedures 
applied for calculating the environmental source term for a 
severe accident, i t should be mentioned that the combination 
of the different accident sequences for different ini tiating 
events causing core melt with the different containment fail-
ure modes leads to a great number of sequences of events. In 
order to facili tate an expedient treatment these - about 100 
in the German Risk Study, Phase A /2/ - are grouped together 
to form the so called release categorieswhere the release is 
characterized by 
similar quantities 
similar time and duration 
similar height 
similar energy liberation 
of each of the categories - 8 in The 
the 
expected frequencies 
German Risk Study, Phase A /2/, are obtained summing 
all the event the expected frequencies of occurrence 
sequences belonging to them. The release 
sent the source term to the environment. 
of 
catagories 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPORT AND CONSEQUNCE ANALYSIS 
repre-
Based on the environmental source term the transport of ra-
dioactive substances in the environment is calculated with 
the object of finding the consequences. Depending on the scope 
of the study these may include early fatalities and injuries, 
latent cancer fatalities, genetic effects, land contamination, 
and economic impacts. The resul ts are usually presented in 
terms of complementary cumulative distribution functions, i.e. 
distributions which give the expected frequencies that the 
amount of damages exceeds a certain value. 
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Figure 8 gives an overview of this step of the analysis. 
Environmental transport and consequence analysis 
Models/Phenomena Input (partial) 
Atmospheric transport of radio-
activity (mostly Gaussian dis-
persion) 
Countermeasure modeling 
(shelter, evacuation, 
decontamination) 
Exposition modeling: airborne 
exposition (cloud shine, inhala-
tion), exposition from the 
ground (ground shine) and by 
ingestion with food stuffs dose 
effect relationships 
Parameters describing release 
categories, weather data~ e.g. 
wind speed and direction, rain 
frequency and intensity, stabili-
ty classes 
Living habits, quality of hous-
ing, number of people in reac-
tor vicinity 
Airborne radioactive concentra-
tions and contamination of 
ground and plants, transfer fac-
tors for uptake in plants, en-
richment factors in food chain, 
consumption habits, population 
distribution 
Characteristic results: Airborne and ground concentrations 
of radioactive isotopes as a func-
tion of time and distance, acute 
and late fatalities, genetic effects 
(individual and collective) 
Figure 8: overview of consequence modeling 
Most conseguence-modeling codes simulate the atmospheric dis-
persion of the released material by using a Gaussian disper-
sion model to calculate instantaneous and time integrated 
ground - level and airborne concentrations and deposi ted le-
vels of radioactivity. They take into account changes in atmo-
spheric stabili ty, wind speed, and precipi tation mostly for 
each successive hour of travel time. In addition, the follow-
ing effects are usually modeled: 
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buoyaney of the aetivity plume due to thermal energy 
dilution in the wake of buildings 
radioaetive deeay 
dry and wet deposition 
Among the possible eountermeasures whieh are usually taken 
into aeeount figure: 
seeking shelter in buildings 
evaeuation and reloeation 
deeontamination 
restrietions of the eonsumption of agrieul tural produets. 
The effeets on human beings are eaused via several exposition 
pathways. Airborne radioaetive material leads to radiation 
doses eaused by external radiation from the plume (eloud shine) 
and radiation from inhaled radionuelides. In ease of external 
radiation a model relates eoneentration in the air wi th doses 
delivered to various body organs (e.g. bone marrow, gastroin-
testinal traet). The radiation dose from inhaled radioaetive 
materials is proportional to the airborne eoneentration of ra-
dionuelides at about 2 m height above ground. A metabolie mo-
del deseribes the behaviour of radionuelides in the body and 
serves in eonj unetion wi th a dosimetrie model to deri ve the 
dose eonversion faetors whieh relate external eoneentration 
wi th potential heal th effeets. Radioaeti ve material deposi ted 
on the ground delivers radiation doses through three pathways: 
external radiation due to gamma rays emitted by deposited ma-
terial (ground shine), the inhalation of resuspended radioae-
tive material, and the ingestion of eontaminated food and water. 
The ingestion of radioaeti ve material may resul t from direet 
deposition on vegetation whieh is eonsumed by people or by ani-
mals serving as food or from the uptake of ground deposited ra-
dioaetive material through the roots of plants. 
After ealeulating the radiation-dose eommitments, it is neeessa-
ry to eonsider the health effeets whieh may result. Whilst the 
dose-effeet-relationship for high radiation levels whieh lead 
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to acute effects if radiation is above a certain threshold is 
relatively weIl known, the corresponding relationship for low 
doses which produce latent effects is still object to discus-
sion. Normally a linear extrapolation from high radiation levels 
is used to give probabilities for latent health effects. This 
procedure does not account for the existence of self healing 
effects which are believed to be present for low doses. 
The procedure just outlined serves to calculate population risk 
if the population distribution around the plant is taken into 
account. Early effects are expected to occur only in the vici-
nity of the plant. In the case of latent effects a very large 
area may be affected. 
The aforementioned calculations are usually performed using 
conseguence modeling codes like CRAC /23/, CRAC-2 /24/ or 
UFOMOD /25/. 
The capabili ties for performing offsi te conseguence analyses 
are considered to be fairly mature. Yet uncertainties remain. 
They concern the effectiveness of the emergency response, the 
dry deposition rate of particulate matter from the plume, the 
modeling of wet deposition caused by rainfall and, as mentioned 
before, the dose-effect relationship. 
6. UNCERTAINTIES 
Uncertainties have been mentioned throughout my talk. They most-
ly concerned modeling uncertainties whose impact on the final 
results is difficult to assess. They are the conseguence of in-
sufficient knowledge about certain phenomena. They are not a 
drawback of probabilistic risk analyses, but should rather be 
considered as one of i ts advantages, since the analysis puts 
their existence into evidence. Other uncertainties concern in-
put data. 
Both types of uncertainties are described by subjective proba-
bili ty distributions and may be propagated through the calcu-
lations - although possibly at considerable expense of compu-
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ting time. They are then reflected in the error band around 
the final result. 
Some of the variables involved in the analysis are of stochas-
tic nature, e.g. weather data. Their possible realizations are 
reflected by the cumulative complementary distribution function 
which describes the risk. 
After this outline of a probabilistic risk analysis which des-
pite its sketchy nature has become rather extensive given the 
considerable number of topics which have to be touched I should 
now like to turn to some resul ts obtained in the German Risk 
Study Phase B which is underway. 
7. SELECTED RESULTS FROM PHASE B OF THE GERMAN RISK STUDY 
7.1 Generalities 
Phase B of the German Risk Study was undertaken to increase 
the faith to be put into of results using improved models, me-
thods of analysis and data bases. In particular, the effect of 
realistic minimum requirements for success criteria and results 
from the available operating experience were to be exploited. 
Subsequently the following points will be touched 
system and event tree analysis 
low pressure and high pressure co re melt paths 
containment loads 
calculation of the environmental source term. 
It should be kept in mind that work on phase B has not yet been 
completed and that the results 1'11 quote represent.only a small 
portion of the analyses to be performed in this context. 
7.2 Systems and event tree analyses 
Changes with respect to phase A /2/ in this step of the analy-
sis principally result from: 
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changes in the reference plant Biblis B since phase A was 
performed 
the use of minimum requirements for success criteria obtai-
ned from calculations with realistic boundary conditions 
the application of reliabili ty data obtained from evalua-
ting operating experience in Biblis B. 
As a consequence of the results of the German Risk Study, Pha-
se A /2/ a number of system modifications have been introduced 
in the reference plant, among them: 
partially automatie cooling down with 100 K/h (human inter-
ventions still necessary led to important contributions 
to core melt frequency in Phase A) 
improvement of the live steam relief system 
coolant pressure limitation for activating pressurizer relief 
closing of pressurizer relief if 
o primary coolant pressure below a minimal value and relief 
valve open 
o departure from nucleate boiling smaller than a minimal value 
o containment isolation activated 
o N16 signal is activated 
re-connection with the power grid in case of failure of the 
emergency Diesel generators 
reserve connection to the power grid 
The calculations for loss-of-coolant accidents indicate that 
all leak sizes may be coped with by 1 high pressure and 1 low 
pressure system if cooling down of the secondary side of the 
reactor is started at latest 30 min after accident initiation. 
In Phase A /2/ success was only assumed if at least two high 
and two low pressure systems worked. In addition, the functio-
ning of two or, at times more, accumulator systems was required. 
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In the light of operating experience the expected freguency 
of occurrence of small leaks in the primary piping system is 
considered lower by a factor of two as compared with Phase A. 
Fracture mechanics calculations indicate that the expected fre-
quency of a guillotine break in the primary piping system in-
cluding connecting lines is several orders of magnitude lower 
_4 _1 
than the value of 2.7 x 10 a used in Phase A /2/. 
The effects of the aforementioned changes are shown in Figure 
9 where the reliabili ty data from Phase A are still used and 
changes may be expected with the use of Phase B data. 
Figure 9: 
Expected frequencies of core melt 
Initiating event in a-
1 
Phase A Phase B 
Small leak in 
primary system 5.7 '10-5 6'10-6 
piping 
Power failure 1.3 '10-5 1 '10-7 
Live steam line 
break not analyzed 2.10-6 
contributions to core melt freguency for some ini-
tiating events (from /26/) 
As can be seen there is a considerable reduction of expected 
core melt freguencies. 
7.3 Low pressure and high pressure core melt paths 
The phenomenology of core mel t progression 
after a loss-of-coolant accident has been 
at low pressure 
described pre-
viously. An additional accident sequence analyzed in Phase B 
is core mel tunder system pressure . It resul ts from an un-
controlled transient. The corresponding scenario implies that 
" 
secondary heat removal is impossible for a long period of time. 
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In such a case coolant evaporates slowly and is discharged via 
the relief valves of the pressurizer. The primary system re-
mains under high pressure and is heated up. When the water 
level inside the pressure vessel drops below the upper rim of 
the core, core melt begins. The pressure in the primary system 
is relieved only when after the melt of the fuel, about 3 hours 
after accident initiation, the pressure vessel yields. After 
pressure vessel failure high mass and energy fluxes. from the 
primary system are introduced into the containment during a 
short lapse of time. This causes apressure rise in the con-
tainment to values short of the design pressure . In the pos-
terior phase pressure time history of low and high pressure 
core melt accident are similar, as can be seen from Figure 10. 
Failure of the containment occurs in both cases after about 4 
days. This should be compared with a failure after approximate-
ly 1 day which was obtained in Phase A /2/ for the low pressure 
path using less sophisticated modeling. 
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Figure 10: Pressure time history for the reactor containment 
in case of core melt 
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7.4 Loads on the containment 
Some of the topics which have received special attention in 
Phase B of the German Risk Study are loads on the containment 
resulting from: 
a steam explosion in the reactor pressure vessel 
combustion from hydrogen in the containment 
The violent evaporation of water on contact with highly disper-
sed mol ten fuel is' called steam explosion. It ,.might occur to a 
significant extent if considerable portions of the molten core 
dropped into water present at the bottom of the pressure vessel. 
Such areaction might endanger the integri ty of the reactor 
pressure vessel and subsequently that of the containment. 
According to calculations performed with an extended version 
of the computer programme SEURBNUK /27/ masses up to 20 t of 
molten core material dropping into the lower plenum and reac-
ting simul taneously do not produce dangerous loads for the 
pressure vessel. Since the fuel element bottom plates do not 
yield simultaneously, calculations show that at most 10 t of 
co re material might be available for a simul taneous reaction 
with water. On these grounds a steam explosion with resulting 
containment failure is not considered to be an accident sequence 
of major importance /28/. 
It is more difficult to assess the impact of a possible hydro-
gen explosion. There are two principal processes for producing 
hydrogen: 
the zircalloy fuel clads react with steam during core melt 
progression at about 950 oe 
in the co re debris/concrete reaction steam is reduced to 
hydrogen by oxidizing substances from the core debris and 
concrete. 
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In case of the low pressure path it may be expected that un-
til the moment of core debris contact with water from the con-
tainment sump about 1.300 kg of hydrogen have been released to 
the containment. It may not always be expected that hydrogen 
burns continously. Hence there exists a possibili ty of the 
formation of explosible mixtures. Figure 11 shows the pressure-
time history for the low pressure core melt path. 
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Pressure build-up in the containment resulting 
from H2 -combustion for the low pressure core melt 
path 
The pressure peaks visible in the figure are due to a hydrogen 
combustion supposed to occur at different instances of time. 
If the mixture ignites on reaching the lower ignition limit, 
the peak is slightly above the design pressure . If ignition 
occurs at a very late stage when enrichment is greater, the 
peak may exceed the yield pressure of the containment. 
These results are intermediate and show that with the present 
state of knowledge a hydrogen explosion endangering containment 
integrity cannot be excluded. 
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8.5 Release of fission products 
As has been mentioned before, containment transport of fission 
products and their eventual release to the atmosphere is a very 
complex subject. After a core melt accident the containment 
contains a mixture of vapour, gases and aerosols in a concen-
. 3 . 
tratlon of about 20 g/m . Its total guantlty in case of a low 
pressure core melt at the beginning of the co re debris/concrete 
interaction amounts to about 3 t of which 95 % is not radio-
active. The initial aerosol density is reduced in the vapour 
atmosphere chiefly by sedimentation and sorption processes. 
In four days time, for example, the concentration of airborne 
aerosols drops by 5 to 6 orders of magnitude. Noble gases and 
the gaseous part of the released iodine are of course not re-
duced in this way. Calculations indicate that only 1 % of the 
iodine inventory is present as gaseous elementary iodine 
whilst the remainder reacts to form compounds, chiefly with 
cesium. 
ter is 
In addition silver iodide which is not soluble in wa-
formed with the silver of the control rods /28/. 
As has been said before, about 4 - 5 days will pass until 
overpressure failure of the containment is to be expected. 
This leaves a margin of time for possible countermeasures. 
A controlled pressure relief of the containment is among those 
analyzed at present. It implies opening a containment pene-
tration by remote control allowing arelief to the auxiliary 
building. This measure is apt to prevent an uncontrolled.pos-
sible containment failure. The containment is vented after 
pressure has risen above the design pressure, which in the 
case of the high pressure core melt path occurs after about 
three days. The sump water is expected to have evaporated two 
days later. After that containment pressure gradually drops 
to atmospheric. 
Till the moment of pressure relief release is only due to the 
design leakage of the containment and there is considerable 
retention of fission products in the annulus and the auxiliary 
building. Release after pressure relief has been calculated 
assuming conservatively that fission products 'are released 
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unfiltered and close to the ground from the auxiliary building. 
Apart from the noble gases the dominating release fraction 
corresponds to elementary iodine. This is because after pres-
sure relief there is a prolonged release of the elementary 
iodine from the containment atmosphere. At the same time I2 
present in the sump water enters the containment atmosphere 
in gaseous form. The important process of release of the 
cesium iodine dissolved in the surnp is the entra.inment of 
droplets by steam flow above the boiling water surface. The 
fractions of the core inventory released are shown in Figure 
12 (left hand side). 
In general the expected releases of iodine and cesium are 
about one order of magnitude lower according to the calcula-
tions of Phase B as compared wi th resul ts from Phase A /2/. 
Higher rates of release resul t from accident sequences wi th-
out containment isolation. The worst case is the failure of an 
air duct inside the annulus owing to the pressure wave caused 
by primary system failure. The results for this case are given 
in Figure 12 (right hand side) as weIl. 
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Figure 12: Fission product release in case of pressure relief 
from containment and air duct isolation failure 
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Results refer to the high pressure core melt path. 
7.6 General appreciation 
The work performed so far in phase B indicates that accident 
sequences leading to late releases are considerably more pro-
bable than those with early and therefore higher releases. In 
the case of a late release controlled relief of the contain-
ment is a possibili ty which would allow to contain the major 
part of radioactive material within the plant. 
8. PROBABILISTIC CONSIDERATIONS IN LICENSING PROCEDURES 
According to the German lieensing procedure a nuclear power 
plant has to be capable of coping wi th a number of design 
basis accidents. These lead aceording to engineering judge-
me nt to maximum loads for the system and hence supply the 
boundary condi tions for the design of safety systems. These 
systems have to fulfill in addition design principles like 
redundancy, diversity, geometrie separation and the single 
failure criterion. This is essentially a deterministic ap-
proach, al though, for example, the application of the single 
failure criterion or the decision on how redundant a system 
should be implies probabilistic considerations. However, no 
quantification is made. 
The probabilistic analysis, on the other hand, permits an 
estimation of the probability wi th which the individual sys-
tems fulfill their mission and hence the probability with whieh 
an accident is eoped with. This is an extension of the deter-
ministic concept which implies that all systems work as planned, 
i.e. with a probability of 1. In this way a number of imaginable 
accident sequences are added to the success path. These arise 
from the failure of one or several of the safety systems. If 
the reactor systems are weIl constructed an accident progres-
ses with a probability close to 1 along the success path whilst 
all other accident sequences are highly improbable. Probabi-
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listic considerations supplement the deterministic procedure 
but cannot replace it. They answer the question to what extent 
existing safety systems are capable of coping wi th accidents 
other than the design basis accidents. In this \'lay i t is pos-
sible to analyze whether the design basis accidents have been 
selected correctly, i. e. in the sense of optimizing safety. 
Hence a probabilistic procedure permi ts to develop a balanced 
safety concept. 
Whilst probabilistic investigations are used as supporting 
information for the licensing procedure in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, in the Uni ted states probabilistic safety goals 
stating requirements for individual risk are in use. The ex-
perience there seems to indicate that the safety goals should 
rather be interpreted as a general level of expected safety 
than as an acceptabili ty cri terion. This is due to the fact 
that a considerable margin of uncertainty is still associated 
with probabilistic risk analysis which \'lould make the question 
of whether a result obtained in such a study meets the safety 
goals or not a debatable issue. This circumstance does, however, 
not invalidate the usefulness of probabilistic risk analyses 
for making recommendations concerning design features and ope-
rational requirements /11/. 
In general probabilistic analyses may serve to throw light on 
the rationale behind deterministic licensing requirements and 
provide guidance for the future development of licensing proce-
dures. 
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MAJOR REACTOR ACCIDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
by 
Johannes Wolters 
Institute for Nuclear Safety Research at the Nuclear 
Research Center JÜlich, FRG 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As far as the peaceful use of nuclear energy is concerned, it was 
true to state for more than 30 years that no person in the en-
vironment of a reactor plant was recognizably injured by a reac-
tor accident. Since the Chernobyl catastrophe this statement 
can no longer be maintained. This does not mean that prior to 
Chernobyl no severe reactor accident happened. The contrary is 
true as we all are aware. But the quantity of radioactive sub-
stances released into the environment was always low enough 
to exclude health effects. 
Nevertheless we have to remember that the development of fission 
reactor technology has not been free from severe accidents. Arnong 
them were a nurnber which resulted in a partial or a total damage 
of the core and consequently in arelease of large quantities of 
radioactive substances at least from the fuel. Since this is the 
condition for a major release of radioactive material into the 
environment accidents with core damage have been considered as 
major reactor accidents in this report irrespective of the ac-
tual environmental consequences. Some of these accidents happen-
ed in sodium-cooled (fast) reactors but they have not been in-
cluded here since the report was confined to thermal reactors. 
In selecting major reactor accidents in thermal reactors no dif-
ference was made regarding the purpose of the respective re-
actor. In other words, military thermal reactors have also been 
taken into account. 
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2. REACTOR AND ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION 
Table 1 gives a survey of the accidents and the reactors dealt 
with in this report. The accidents are listed in accordance with 
the sequence of their occurrence. They are subsequently also dealt 
with in this sequence. 
2.1 NRX 
The NRX was a Canadian research reactor situated in the research 
establishment at Chalk River. It had a thermal power of 30 MW, 
was moderated by heavy water and cooled by light water. Fig. 1 
shows a vertical section through the reactor /1/. 
The core resembled that of a Candu reactor with the exception 
that the so-ca lied calandria stood upright. The calandria was 
a cylindrical aluminium tank with a flat bottom and top plate, 
which was vertically penetrated by equally distributed calandria 
tubes. The tank contained the liquid moderator and was surround-
ed by asolid reflector. 
The 192 fuel rods made from metallic natural uranium and sheathed 
by an aluminium cladding were housed within the calandria tubes 
in aluminium pressure tubes, which penetrated the upper and lower 
shields and which were connected via headers to the main cooling 
circuit. The pressure tubes formed the coolant boundary within 
the reactor. The annular gap between the pressure tube and the 
calandria tube was filled with air which could be blown through 
in order to remove the residual heat during refuelling /2/. 
The fuel elements wer~ cooled by water from the Ottawa River, 
which after an appropriate delay was returned to the river. The 
coolant passed through the core in the downward direction and 
was thus heated up from 10°C to 50°C. 
The accident happened on December 12, 1952 in connection with 
reactivity measurements /1/. For this purpose one fuel rod - it 
was a fresh one - was cooled by air and five were cooled by wa-
ter fed in at the bottom of the pressure tubes and spilled into 
a gutter at the top. Certain other rods were connected to the 
cooling circuit by jumpers so that the flow was considerably 
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less than normal. The reactor had not been up to power for several 
days /2/. 
The accident was initiated by an unexpected supercriticality when 
the first control rod bank, the so-called safeguard bank, was 
brought up. The reason for the supercriticality was that three 
other control rods brought up by human error in advance had failed 
to drop in due to mechanical defects. Under these circumstances 
the safeguard bank should not have been brought out. But the in-
terlock system which normaly would have prevented this was switch-
ed off. In addition, the reactor supervisor erroneously gave the 
order by a false characterization and the operator could not real-
ize from the signals in the control room that it was amistake /1/. 
Due to supercriticality the reactor power rose to 100 kW within 
20 s. At this time the operator tripped the reactor manually but 
only one of the four rods of the first bank dropped back into 
the reactor and that over aperiod of about 1.5 min. Thus the 
reactor power continued to rise. A tendency for the power to level 
off at about 20 MW was followed by a sudden increase of reacti-
vity carrying the power to about 80 MW within 10 to 15 s. The 
rise in reactivity was caused by the onset of boiling of the 
light water in the pressure tubes with temporary cooling, the 
steam formation and the ejection of water from the core. In 
other words, the light water in this reactor had a positive void 
coefficient of reactivity due to the fact that the light water 
in such an arrangement with a different moderator mainly acts as 
a neutron absorber and simultaneously improves the resonance ab-
sorption in the uranium. The reactor became subcritical by dump-
ing the moderator, by an inrush of light water at burst pressure 
tubes and by loss of uranium from the center of the reactor. For 
about 62 s the reactor power was beyond 1 MW. 
22 fuel rods together with their pressure tubes were severely 
damaged, all but a few situated in the center of the reactor. Among 
them were 9 fuel rods, all iradiated, with normal cooling. The 
fuel rods with the special cooling, which lay in the flux maxi-
mum, suffered particularly extensive damage. In all cases central 
portions of the uranium and sheaths were disrupted and, with the 
exception of the air-cooled rod, the calandria tubes were punctur-
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ed. That the latter only happened in the water-cooled positions 
is attributed to the fact that the chemical reaction between the 
molten metals, particularly uranium, and water played an important 
role. There were also strong indications that an oxyhydrogen ex-
plosion had occurred inside the moderator tank. 
An intensely active cloud was discharged during the burst via the 
air cooling system, which maintained the pressure in the shield 
slightly below atmospheric, and via the stack into the atmosphere. 
A large burst of activity was also carried out to the river. But 
monitors at the first two water intakes down-river (14 and 23 mi-
les) showed no increase of radioactivity above the natural level. 
The measured ground contamination downwind was nowhere very in-
tense either. The reactor building itself was completely and 
highly contaminated. One very serious problem was the maintenance 
of fuel cooling since the heavily contaminated coolant could not 
be discharged in to the river and threatened to flood the base-
ment of the reactor building. Ultimately 4500 m3 water contain-
ing about 3 .10 14 Bq of long-lived fission products was pumped 
into open trenches in a field 2 km from the site, which had been 
provided for the percolation of low-level radioactive waste wa-
ter /1/. 
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2.2 Windscale I 
The Windscale No. 1 reactor was one of two military reactors 
only used for the production of weapon plutonium. Both were com-
missioned in 1951. They were moderated by graphite and cooled 
by air. Fig. 2 shows a vertical section through the plant. 
The reactor core consisted of a graphite pile with equally dis-
tributed horizontal channels for the accornrnodation of the fuel 
rods. The pile was a lying octogon with a height and breadth of 
15 m and a depth of 7.6 m. It was housed in a concrete cavity. 
The fuel rod consisted of uranium-metal normally sheathed by 
aluminium. At the time of the accident the pile also contained 
fuel elements with a lithium-magnesium-alloy cladding. Loading 
and unloading of fuel elements was carried out from the charge 
hoist. Irradiated fuel rods were thus pushed through the channels 
to the dis charge face where they fell into a water duct, via which 
they were transported to the reprocessing plant. 
The coolant air was sucked through the pile by fans and was 
discharged into the atmosphere by a chimney of 130 m altitude 
and 13 m diameter /2/. The air entered the reactor at the charge 
face via latteral air ducts on both sides. Large air filters 
for the retention of radioactive aerosols were installed at the 
top of the chimney. The exit air analyzers downstream of the 
discharge face served to monitor the condition of the fuel clad-
ding and to localize elements with defective cladding. Localiza-
tion was carried out by a mobile scanning device. 
The accident was initiated on the morning of October 8, 1957 
and lasted about four days /3/. On October 7 the reactor was 
shut down to prepare the release of the so-called Wigner energy 
stored in the graphite due to the low operating temperatures. 
In the night of October 7-8 the core was heated up by nuclear 
power without air cooling to initiate the release of Wigner ener-
gy. A second nuclear heat-up followed several hours later when 
the reactor physicist had the impression that the temperatures 
of the graphite were falling again. He overlooked the fact that 
only a few values were falling whereas a number of values were 
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still rising. 15 minutes after the second nuclear heat-up the 
fuel temperature increased far more rapidly than was allowed. 
Therefore the reactor power was reduced instantaneously. Pre-
sumably one or more fuel claddings already became defective at 
this time. 
In spite of the outage of the reactor the graphite temperatures 
rose with an increasing gradient and, on the evening of the 
October 9, one measuring point reached a value at which coun-
termeasures had to be taken. By several periods of slight air 
cooling lasting 5 to 30 minutes the temperatures at all measur-
ing points could be reduced with the exception of the peak 
temperature, which was only stabilized at the high value. The 
high level of radioactive substances in the exhaust air detected 
for the first time on the early morning of October 10 was at 
first dismissed as normal but later the correct conclusion was 
drawn that one or more fuel elements must have been damaged. 
The localization of the damaged fuel elements failed (sticking 
of the scanner) as weIl as the attempt to unload the channels 
with the highest fuel temperatures. At this operation it was 
discovered that the fuel rods were red-hot. By unloading the ad-
jacent channels it was at least possible to prevent the fire 
from spreading. But it was not possible to reduce the tempera-
ture in the area concerned which covered about 150 channels 
on the evening of October 10. During the following night attemps 
were made to extinguish the fire by CO 2 without success. Only 
when water was used on the next morning could the fire be ex-
tinguished and the reactor be cooled-down. Melting of fuel ob-
viously did not take place. 
The committee charged with the analysis of the accident attrib-
uted the local overheating of the pile not to the sudden release 
of Wigner energy but to the oxidation of the fuel which was 
exposed to air by cladding defects. It is argued that the oxi-
dation generated enough heat to finally ignite the graphite 
and the cladding material itself, which on the other hand expos-
ed more metallic fuel to air. 
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During the accident large quantities of radioactive substances 
escaped into the atmosphere via the stack (Table 2) /4/. The 
dominant substance was iodine particularly iodine 131, which 
passed through the filters in the form of vapor. Other important 
nuclides like cesium 137, strontium- 89 and strontium <JO were re-
leased from the fuel to a lesser extent and were largely retained 
in the filters. 
2.3 SL-1 (Stationary Low Power) 
The SL-1 was a test power plant situated in the National Reactor 
Testing Station of the USAEC in Idaho about 60 km from the town 
of Idaho Falls /5/. It was designed as the prototype of a small 
electricity power and heat plant for remote military bases. The 
plant was commissioned in 1958 and had a single circuit boiling 
water reactor with natural circulation as the heat source. It 
had an electricity output of 300 kW whereas the reactor itself 
generated a thermal power of 3 MW. All equipment of the plant, 
except for the control room, was accommodated in a cylindrical 
steel shell which was mainly designed as a shelter. Fig. 3 shows 
a vertical section of the lower central part of shell where the 
reactor was housed. 
The cylindrical core (0.8 m diameter, 0.65 m height) of the 
SL-1 consisted of 40 fuel elements containing about 15 kg of 
highly enriched uranium in a UAL-meat, which was sheathed by 
a cladding of an aluminium alloy. The reactor was controlled 
by one central control absorber and 4 shim absorbers at the core 
edge. From the very beginning the shut-down reactivity was so 
small that the reactor core could reach criticality by the remo-
val of the central cross-shaped control rod. For the balance 
of the excess reactivity necessary to meet the requirements für 
a long lifetime of the core, boron was used as burnable poison. 
The boron was contained in thin strips of aluminium alloy spot-
welded to the fuel elements. Due to unexpected corrosion a re-
latively strong loss of boron was observed in autumn 1960 which 
was partly compensated by the insertion of cadmium strips into 
empty absorber positions in November 1960 /6/. 
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The core was housed in a slim pressure vessel of mild steel 
with an inner plating of stainless steel. Half of the pressure 
vessel was filled with water, which at the operatingpressure of 
20 bar adopted a saturation temperature of 216 oe. The core was 
irnrnersed completely in the water. The space above the water lev-
el served as a steam accumulator. 
The accident happened on January 3, 1961. At the time of the 
accident the reactor had been shut-down for 12 days for rou-
tine maintenance. The control room was unoccupied. Only the three 
members of the armed forces killed by the accident were present. 
They had received orders to reconnect the control rods to the 
drive mechanisms, which had been disconnected in order to open 
the reactor vessel. During this operation the central control rod 
was lifted far beyond the position at which the reactor became 
critical, as the later investigation revealed /7/. The cause 
could not be clarified but there were strong indications that 
the rod had become jammed. In this respect a lot of difficul-
ties had been encountered during previous reactor operations. 
The lifting of the central control rod resulted in a prompt su-
percriticality of the reactor accompanied by apower excursion 
to about 19,000 MW with a total energy generation of 130 MWs. 
The later analysis of the destruction revealed that the central 
part of the core had melted and partially vaporized. Additional 
energy of 24 MWs was produced by metal-water reaction. The sud-
den steam formation in the core produced an estimated pressure 
of 35 bar, which accelerated the water column beyond the core 
to a velocity of about 9 m/s. When the water impinged on the 
vessel lid it caused a 'water hammer' of about 700 bar. This 
force lifted the vessel by about 3 m, whereby the upper shield-
ing was penetrated. The central control rod was ejected from 
the vessel but did not penetrate the reactor building. It fell 
back on the vessel. 
In total 20 % of the core melted and released fission products, 
which could escape into the reactor building via the hole the 
ejected control rod had left. The radiation level inside the 
building reached a peak value of about 1000 R/h. Itdecreased 
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with a half-life of about 40 days. Small quantities of gaseous 
fission products, mainly iodine, were able to escape from th~ 
building into the environment. 
2.4 Lucens 
The test power station at Lucens, Switzerlandl. was an exclusively 
Swiss development. It was installed underground in three art i-
ficial rock cavities of which one contained the reactor /8/. The 
30 MW calandria type reactor was moderated by heavy water and 
cooled by carbon dioxide. Its design resembled that of the NRX. 
One special feature of the reactor was the fuel assembly which 
formed a unit with the pressure tube, as is shown in Fig. 4. 
Pressure tube and fuel assembly were changed together by a hand-
ling machine acting from the room below the reactor. An adapter 
attached to the top side connected the unit to the cold and hot 
gas leg of the main circuit. The fuel assembly consisted of three 
slim graphite blocks held together by three tie rods and con-
taining the fuel rods in one central and six peripheral channels. 
The fuel rods were made from uranium metal sheathed by a tube of 
magnesium alloy. The cladding was fitted with fins to improve 
the he at transfer to the gas. 
The graphite blocks served as a baffle. The gas flowed downward 
in the outer annular gap, was reversed at the bottom and passed 
the fuel channels in an upward direction, and was thereby heated 
up from 220 oe to 385 oe. It had apressure of 60 bar and was 
circulated by two blowers with water sealed glands. The heat was 
transferred to two steam generators. 
After commissioning in 1968 the plant was operated satisfactori-
ly for more than 2 months with full power followed by a planned 
shut-down per iod of nearly 3 months for modification and revision 
work. On January 21, 1969 the reactqr was restarted. When it 
reached a thermal power of 12 MW the accident occurred, result~ 
ing in a rapid depressurization of the primary circuit. Within 
10 minutes the balance pressure in the reactor cavity was reach-
ed. A high level of radioactivity was detected first in the 
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primary circuit and later in the cavity indicating that one 
or more fuel elements had been damaged. The loss of heavy water 
revealed that the moderator tank had also become defective. 
At the very beginning of the accident the reactor was tripped 
and the cavity closed. All the safety equipment worked weIl. 
The initial radiation level in the reactor cavity exceeded 
100 R/h. It was caused by short-lived nuclides (Rb 88, Kr 88). 
A small quantity of radioactivity entered into the machine 
cavity via leakages and in the exhaust air to the stack. 
The cause and progress of the accident could only be clarified by 
a detailed and thorokgh investigation which took nearly 10 years. 
The most likely initiating event was a water ingress into the 
primary circuit via a blower seal. The water got into some fuel 
assemblies where it remained for about five weeks leading to 
corrosion of the magnesium fins and claddings. The corrosion pro-
ducts mostly settled down at the lower end of the cooling chan-
nels and greatly reduced the flow area. 
At the reactor start the cooling of one assembly was impaired 
so much that with increasing reactor power single segments were 
overheated. Shortly be fore the reactor power stabilized at 
12 MW melting of the central fuel rod must have happened. Melt-
ing propagated to one or two peripheral channels where the mol-
ten metals started to burn in CO 2 . The enormous heat produced 
by the burning resulted in a distortion of the graphite column 
which then must have touched the pressure tube heating this up 
to bursting temperature. The tube burst and destroyed the sur-
rounding calandria tube leading to a blow-down of the coolant 
into the moderator tank. Shortly before, the reactor had been 
tripped by the high level of radioactivity released into the 
primary circuit by the burning fuel. 
The rapid pressure build-up in the moderator tank opened one of 
the five rupture discs and resulted in a considerable deforma-
tion of the interior. A few seconds later a second and higher 
pressure peak must have occurred caused by an explosive chemi-
cal reaction between heavy water and hot liquid metals. The 
liquid metals had collected in the bot tom part of the fuel 
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assembly and had melted two holes through the pressure and ca-
landria tube via which it was injected into the water. The sec-
ond pressure peak resulted in a collapse of some calandria tubes 
and thereby in a jamming of some shut-down rods in the fully-in 
position. 
2.5 Three Mile Island Block 2 (TMI2) 
TMI 2 is a nuclear power station with a pressurized water reactor 
(PWR) of 2800 MW as the he at source /9/. The power station was 
commissioned in 1978, i.e. one year before the accident happen-
ed. The primary system consists of two loops each containing a 
steam generator via which the reactor power is transferred to 
the secondary water-steam circuit. One of the loops is shown in 
Fig. 5 together with the other systems which played a significant 
role in the accident. 
One important component was the pressurizer, avessei half fill-
ed with water which has a temperature that produces a steam 
pressure of 152 bar above the water level. At the bottom end, 
the vessel is connected to the hot leg of one loop by a syphon. 
To cope with rapid pressure transients the pressurizer is fit-
ted with a pilot-operated relief valve. In the case of a fail-
ure of the relief valve the line can be closed by an upstream 
block valve. Three safety valves protect the pressurizer from 
too high pressure. All valves blow down in a drain tank where the 
steam is condensed in a water pool. A safety valve and rupture 
discs protect the tank from too high pressure and discharge, 
if occasion arises, into the containment. 
The straight-tube steam generator has the advantage of producing 
superheated steam. On the other hand, the water content on the 
secondary side is very low. Conseguently a malfunction of the 
feed water system encroaches very guickly on the primary sys-
tem. Another significant aspect of the feed water system is 
the fact that it is needed for after-heat removal with an in-
tact primary circuit since temperature and pressure of the pr~­
mary water must be reduced via the steam generators before the 
separate after-heat removal system of the primary circuit can 
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be started. TMI 2 has thus besides the main feed water system 
an auxiliary system as is shown in Fig. 5. 
To cope with leaks in the primary circuit the plant has two 
high-pressure and two low-pressure injection systems. Both 
are switched on automatically, the high-pressure system when for 
instance the pressure in the primary circuit drops to 110 bar. 
The high pressure system is combined with the make-up system 
which means that the pumps were designed for a head of 200 bar. 
This circumstance turned out to be disastrous in the accident. 
As in many PWR's the water inventory is controlled by the water 
level of the pressurizer. In this connection one has to bear 
in mind that due to the syphon the level indicator acts like a 
manometer. It balances the pressure between the pressurizer and 
the primary circuit but gives no indication whether the circuit 
is filled with steam or water. This fact was also very important 
for the occurrence of the accident. 
The accident in TMI 2 was initiated at 04.00 on March 28, 1979 
by a malfunction in the main feed water system, leading to a 
simultaneous shut-down of both main feed water pumps ;10;. The 
reactor protection system responded correctly by shutting-down 
the turbine, opening the turbine by-pass and switching on the 
auxiliary feed water system. The pumps started but flow could 
not be established because the valves in the feed line were 
falsely closed. Eight minutes elapsed be fore the error was 
detected and corrected. 
The missing feed water supply inlpaired the heat removal from 
the primary circuit. Consequently the temperatures rose and the 
thermal expansion of the water resulted in apressure increase 
of the pressurizer. After 3 sec the relief valve opened and after 
9 sec the reactor was tripped. During the subsequent pressure 
drop the relief valve failed to close, which the operator did 
not realize since the valve position was not indicated. After 
2 minutes the high-pressure injection pumps started automatically 
and injected cold water into the primary system. From the fact 
that the pressurizer was completely filled with water after 4 
minutes the staff falsely concluded the primary system was fill-
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ed with water and switched off the high-pressure pumps. They 
feared that a continuing operation of the pumps could open the 
safety valves. 
The failure of the relief valve resulted in a continuous loss 
of water from the primary circuit by vaporization. The steam 
was discharged into the closed containment via the pressurizer 
and the drain tank, the rupture disc of which had burst due 
to the excess amount of steam. The loss of water was accelerated 
by the circumstance that the steam pressure on the secondary 
side of the steam generator was not reduced. Consequently the 
primary pressure could not drop below 70 bar. After 1 hour and 
40 minutes the last two circulation pumps were switched off due 
to cavitation. Up to this time the co re was still sufficiently 
cooled by a water-steam mixture. But then the water level start-
ed to drop below the top end of the core. The uncovered parts 
of the fuel rods were gradually overheated whereby additional 
heat and hydrogen were produced by chemical reaction between 
steam and the zircaloy cladding. Severe core damage occurred which 
could not be prevented by closing the relief line after 2.3 hours. 
As is concluded from the condition of the core found later by 
the inspection of the pressure vessel interior, a zone of molten 
material must have been formed in the core centre before the 
co re was reflooded by switching on one circulation pump, which 
happened after 3 hours for about 15 minutes /11/. The molten zone 
solidified by reflooding and the vibration caused crumbled the 
embrittled fuel rods of the upper part of the core, which then 
formed a debris bed on the solidified material, as is shown in 
Fig. 6. Later the solidified material melted again and the hot 
molten material dropped into the bot tom part of the pressure 
vessel, where it solidified mostly to fist-sized lumps in the 
residual water. At 3 hours and 30 minutes the high-pressure sys-
tem was switched on and core cooling was restored, preventing 
the core from melting completely. 
In the course of the accident, 9.10 16 Bq to 5'10 17 Bq of the 
radioactive noble gases xenon and krypton were released into 
the environment, but only about 6 • 10 11 Bq (17 Ci) of radioac-
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tive iodine was released /12/. The fact that in spite of the 
closure of the containment radioactive substances escaped into the 
environment is attributed to the circumstance that highly con-
taminated sump water was pumped to the waste treatment system 
in the auxiliary building within the first 5 hours of the accident. 
Insufficient hold-up tanks on line resulted in an overflow to 
the building floor. Outgassing from this water and discharge 
through the ventilation system and filters caused the offsite 
release. 
2.6 Chernobyl 4 
Chernobyl 4 belongs to a special Russian reactor line, the 
RBMK 1000, which is only used in 'the Soviet Union /13/. The RBMK 1000 
is a graphite-moderated pressure tube boiling water reactor with 
a thermal power of 3200 MW. In 1984 twelve units were in operation, 
four of them in Chernobyl, 100 km north of Kiev. The Chernobyl 
unit No. 4 was commissioned in 1983. 
The reactor consists of a large cylindrical graphite pile (14 m 
diameter, 8.5 m height), which rests on a bottom shielding pla-
te as shown in Fig. 7. At the top the pile is covered by a shield-
ing slab supported by a lateral cylindrical shielding wall. A 
compensator-like iron shroud welded to both plates envelops the 
pile. The gas-tight room thus formed is filled with inert gas of 
low overpressure compared with atmospheric pressure. 
The graphite pile is vertically penetrated by about 1700 pres-
sure tubes, made from zirconium alloy in the pile and staiDless 
steel out of it. Each pressure tvbe contains one fuel element 
consisting of two bundles with 18 rods each. The rod cladding 
is made from the same zirconium alloy as the pressure tubes. 
Thus a lot of zirconium is contained in the core. The fuel is 
U0 2 with an initial enrichment of 1.8 %. 
The reactor is controlled by 211 vertical absorber rods housed 
in additional pressure tubes. The absorber rods are subdivided 
into five groups according to their function. One group is 
used as an automatic scram system, but the rods need 20 s to drop 
~ully into the core. The lack of a real fast shut-down system 
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is one deficiency that contributed to the accident. The other 
deficiency important for the accident is the positive void 
coefficient of reactivity of the H2ü, the coolant for the fuel 
elements. The reason for the positive void coefficient is the 
same as in the NRX. The void coefficient increases with increas-
ing burn-up and with the removal of absorber rods from the core. 
Also the temperature coefficient of reactivity of the graphite 
moderator is positive. All this together with the size of the 
core results in a very unstable reactor, which requires a compli-
cated control system for stabilization. 
The reactor is housed in a pit of concrete walls. The room as 
weil as the other rooms in which aggregates and pipes of the in-
ternal cooling loops are housed are gas-tight and partially de-
signed to withstand an internal pressure of 4 to 5 bar. In the 
basement of the reactor building there is apressure suppression 
system consisting of water ponds in which the steam-air mixt ure 
is fed in the case of a pipe fracture. A containment in the 
ordinary sense does not exist because it was considered un-
necessary. 
The accident was initiated by a rundown test of the turbine gene-
rator /14/. The aim of this test was to see how long a main feed 
water pump could be powered from the rotation energy of the tur-
bine generator rotor in the event of a loss of offsite power. 
The pumps are part of a quick acting emergency feed water system 
(see Fig. 8), which is needed as a back-up system after a large 
pipe fracture in a loop, but only for a short interval of 45 to 
50 s. Then the long-term emergency cooling system will be in 
operation. Earlier tests in 1982 and 1984 had failed. Now the 
operators were so determined to complete the test that they 
violated many operating rules and procedures. 
At the time of the test the reactor was in a very unstable and 
dangerous condition. Instead of thirty absorber rods as the 
regulations required only eight were in the core. The others 
were withdrawn to compensate for the high xenon poisoning and 
other effects which consumed excess reactivity. In addition, the 
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absorber rods of the global automatie regulation system, which 
at the time controlled the reactor power, were in a lower reactor 
position. The reactor was operated only at 200 MWt since a higher 
power was prevented by the small excess reactivity available. 
In both loops all four circulation pumps were operating to pro-
vide for safe core cooling after the test since two pumps of 
each loop were connected to the busbar of the turbine generator 
and would run down with the turbine. Owing to the low power and 
the inadmissably high flow rate the steam content in the core was 
very low. Several trip signals associated with parameters in the 
cooling loops were disconnected in order to avoid a reactor trip 
be fore the test could be performed. The fact that the emergency 
cooling system pumps were disconnected was in accordance with the 
experimental programme. 
At 1:23:04 the test began when the staff closed the emergency 
regulating valves on the running turbine. The reactor continued 
to operate at apower of 200 MWt since the trip signal from the 
closing of the valves had been blocked so the test could be re-
peated in case it failed the first time. When the pumps began 
to run down, flow was reduced, the coolant boiled and the reactor 
power began to rise slowly. 
The steam formation resulted in a further reduction of flow 
which again together with the rising power enhanced the steam 
production and so on. The automatie control system was not able 
to compensate the reactivity increase caused by the growing 
steam content in the channels. At 1:23:40 the reactor was scram-
ed manually, but in vain: because of the position and the slow 
movement the absorber rods proved to be inefficient. The reactor 
became prompt cirtical. Its power shot up to 100 times the nominal 
reactor power within a few seconds. The energy density in the 
fuel reached a value where the fuel disintegrated - in effect, 
exploded. The interaction of the hot fuel particles with the 
water led to an abrupt increase of pressure in the fuel channels, 
destruction of the channels, and finally .an explosion which 
destroyed the reactor and part of the building and ejected fuel 
and graphite blocks into the environment. A few seconds later 
a second explosion occurred but it is still unclear whether it 
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was a second power excursion or an explosion of hydrogen formed 
by metal-steam reaction. 
The fire which broke out irnrnediately at over 30 places in and 
outside the reactor building was extinguished by about 05.00. 
But the smothering of the graphite fire in the pile took several 
days. It was achieved by covering the damaged reactor with com-
pounds of boron, dolomite, sand, clay and lead dropped from hel-
icopters. About 5000 t in all was dropped between April 27 and 
May 10, mostly between April 28 and May 2. The layer acts as 
a filter having reduced the release of radioactive substances 
from the pile to a few hundred Ci per day by May 6. The problem 
of reducing the fuel temperature was solved at the same time by 
pumping nitrogen from the compressor station into the space be-
neath the reactor vault. 
First estimates by the Soviets revealed that 3.5 % to 4 % of 
the fuel was released from the reactor, with 0.3 % to 0.4 % dis-
persed on site and 1.5 % in a 20 km zone around the site. The fuel 
is believed to have remained in the bottom of the reactor weIl 
and adjacent piping with a limited quantity in the steam drums. 
Visual examination confirmed that about 10 % of the graphite 
had been ejected from the reactor building. About 25 % of the 
total graphite was estimated to have been consumed in the gra-
phite fire. 
Table 3 shows the quantities of radioactive substances released 
into the environment in the first stage of the accident and in 
the period from April 27 to May 6. The values were estimated by 
the Soviets on the basis of their own measurements, with a 50 % 
error margin. They correspond quite weIl with the values which 
were calculated by German scientists on the basis of the fallout 
over western and northern Europe. In total about 2.10 18 Bq ex-
cluding noble gases were released be fore May 6, the day the 
release of radioactive materials virtually ceased. 
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3. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS 
Apart from the Chernobyl catastrophe, only the accident in 
Windscale had major radiological consequences for the environment. 
In the other cases the radioactive materials released from the 
damaged core were almost completely retained in the reactor build-
ing. In this respect the containment of TMI 2 proved good. With-
out the containment this accident would also have been a cata-
strophe. So the maximum individual whole body dose did not ex-
ceed half the value of the annual dose by natural radiation. 
From the collective dose the US Health Authority calculated one 
additional cancer death in aperiod of 30 years. 
In the Windscale accident the radioactive materials were released 
into the atmosphere via the 130 m stack and were subsequently 
dispersed and deposited over England, Wales and over parts of 
northern Europe. Already in the early stage of the accident iodine 131 
was identified as the most important nuclide as far as health 
consequences to the population were concerned. Restrictions were 
imposed on the distribution of milk to reduce intakes by the 10-
cal population of radioiodine via the pasture-cow-milk pathway. 
These restrictions were introduced 1 to 3 days after the first 
release and the final area restricted was 520 km2 . In the most 
contaminated area, close to Windscale, milk distribution was 
not resumed until 44 days later. Owing to the milk ban the average 
radiation doses to the thyroids of the local population were 
typically 5 to 20 mSv for adults and 10 to 60 mSv for children. 
The highest child thyroid doses inferred from measured thyroid 
activity were 160 mSv, which is attributed to the fact that the 
milk ban was not completely effective. A comprehensive assess-
ment most recently published /4/ showed that the collective effec-
tive doses were in the order of 10 3 manSv, to which the ingestion 
of contaminated milk contributed the most. The total number of 
additional thyroid cancers caused by the accident in the United 
Kingdom population is expected to be 260 (13 of which will be 
fatal). This figure must be compared with the 660 thyroid cancer 
incidents per yearin England and Wales. 
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The high quantities of radioactive materials released in the 
first stage of the Chernobyl accident required immediate measures 
to protect the population around the plant /14/. After potassium 
iodide pills had been distributed to the 45,000 inhabitants of 
Pripyat, the nearest town to the plant, evacuation beg an by 
11 a.m. April 27 and was finished 2 1/2 hours later. Another 90,000 
people were evacuated in the next 10 days from the surrounding 
areas including the town of Chernobyl, 15 km away, so that altogether 
about 135,000 people were evacuated from a 30 km radius area. The 
Russian criteria require action when the predicted whole-body 
doses exceed 0.75 Sv. It is estimated that groups of the later 
evacuees received external doses of 0.3 to 0.5 Sv and 10 times 
that to the thyroid from inhalation. These doses would be twice 
as high as those to the Pripyat inhabitants. 
The main zones of ground contamination after the accident were to 
the west, north-west and north-east of the plant, as is shown 
in Fig. 9. Radiation levels near the plant exceeded 100 mR/h. 
On the western track the maximum radiation levels 15 days after 
the accident were 5 mR/h at a distance of 50 to 60 km, and the 
same to the north at a distance of 35 to 40 km. In Kiev the ra-
diation levels at the beginning of May reached 0.5 to 0.8 mR/h. 
The collective doses over the next 50 years will be determined 
by internal exposure. Soviet experts calculated a value of about 
2~106 manSv, whereas the collective doses from external exposure 
are expected to be a tenth of that value. But there are indica-
tions that the figure for the internal exposure may be too high 
by a factor of at least 10. This, in turn would lower the Soviet 
estimate of cancer fatalities in the Soviet Union from Chernobyl 
by an order of magnitude, from some 25,000 to several thousand. 
4. LESSONS TO BE LEARNT FROM THE ACCIDENTS 
The description of the accidents already reveals that the com-
bination of design deficiencies and human errors played an 
important role in the occurrence of the accidents. This under-
lines the significance of adequate qualifications and training 
for the staff. Apart from the accident in Lucens, doubt exists 
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as to whether the staff of the plants concerned were trained 
in the right manner. It seems to be clear that in almost all 
cases the staff were not familiar with the special physical 
properties of the individual system. 
For the design and layout of a fission reactor the following 
conclusions must be drawn: 
- the core should not allow for an autocatalytic nuclear 
reaction, which means that it should be self-stabilizing 
at least under normal operating conditions, 
- the safety equipment must be adequately designed to meet 
the safety requirements of the special system, 
- there should always be enough shut-down reactivity so that 
the removal of a single absorber rod cannot lead to criti-
cality, 
- all important safety parameters must be directly measured 
and the condition of the plant should be presented by 
clear and easily understandable information, 
- the combination of safety and operational systems must be 
avoided, at least if this impairs the safety, and 
- an adequate automatie inter lock system must exist as a 
provision against human error. 
The last measure, of course, is no universal remedy against hu-
man errors. In some countries much effort is thus spent on the 
development of a so-called forgiving nuclear reactor. The small 
HTR developed in the Federal Republic of Germany is an example 
of such a system. 
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Reaetor NRX Wlnd- SL-1 Lueens TMI-2 Chernobyl 
seale-I 
Country Canada UK USA Swltzerl. USA USSR 
Purpose Research Pu-Pro- Test Po- Test Po- Power Power 
Reaetor duetlon wer Sta. wer Sta. Station Station 
Applleatlon elvillan military military elvlllan elvlllan elvillan 
Commlsslonlng 1951 1958 1968 1978 1983 
Reaetor Oata 
Therm. Power [MWJ 30 ? 3 30 2800 3200 
Moderator O2° Graphite H20 O2° H2 0 Graphite 
Coolant Rlver Water Air H2 0 CO2 H2 0 H2 0 
Coolant - Boundary Tubes Channels Tank Tubes Tank Tubes 
U - 235 - Content 0,7% ? 91% 0,96% 3% 2% 
Fuel Matrix U-Metal U-Metal UAI-Metal U-Metal U02 U02 
Caddlng Material AI LI-MO-Alloy AI-NI-Alloy Mg-Alloy Zirconium Zirconium 
Fuel Geometry Rods Plns Plates Plns Plns Pins 
Aeeldent 
Oate Dec.12/52 Oct.8/57 Jan.3/61 Jan.21/69 Mar. 29/79 Apr.26/86 
Cause Stuck-Rods Wigner Absorber Channel Feed-Wa- Insufflei-
Absorber Energy Removal Bloekage ter Loss ent Cool-
Removal ing 
Power Exeursion nuelear ehem. nuelear no no nuelear 
Peak Power [MW J 80 ? 19,000 - - 320,000 
Energy [MWs) 2000 ? 130:!: 20% - - ? 
Steam Explosion no - yes no no yes 
Peak Pressure [bar J 3-4 - ~ 700 16-25 - ? 
Metal- Water Reaetlon yes - yes yes yes yes 
Chemlcal Explosion In Pile - no In Pile out 01 Pile ln/out of 
Pile 
Peak Fuel Temp. [KJ 1400 red-hot > 2000 ? >2000 ~ 3000 
Post Aeeldent Core 22 FE* 150 FE* 20% molt. 1 FE* > 20% molt. completely 
Condltlon damaged damaged destroyed /debrls damaoed 
bed 
Radiologieal Consequences 
Maximum Individual Thyrold, In 10 DaY5 
Doses** [mSvJ ? 160 0.1 0.05 0.5 300-500 
Colleetlve Ooses ** ? 1.2' 10 5 ? negllglble 102 2' 10 6 
[man SV) 
Expeeted Late ? 13 ? 0 1 25,000 
Fatalltles 
*FE: Fuel Element ** Whole Body , If not Speclfled 
Major Reactor Accidents and Reactors Concerned 
Table 1 
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Estimates of Radionuclides Released 
in the Windscale Accident 
Nuclide Ratios to 131 I 
85 Kr 9.8' 10- 2 
89 Sr 4.1 . 10- 3 
90 Sr 1.0 . 10- 4 
95 Zr 1.3 . 10- 2 
99 Mo 6.0' 10- 2 
103 Ru 6.7 .10- 2 
106 Ru 4. 1 . 10- 3 
* 131 I 1.0 
132 Te 5.9 .10- 1 
133 Xe 2.1 . 10 1 
134 Cs 2.0 . 10- 3 
137 Cs 3.0 . 10- 2 
140 Ba 1.1 .10- 2 
141 Ce 1.2 .10- 2 
144 Ce 4.1 .10- 3 
* 13110dine : 6· 10 14 Bq os 1.6· 10 4 Ci 
Table 2 
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Release ot Radioactive Materials into 
the Environment tram the Damaged 
Chernabyl No. 4 Plant 
Released Radioactivity [Mega Ci 1 
Radio- Fraction [%1 of 
Isotope on April 26 from April 27 Go re Inventory 
to May 6 
133Xe 5 45 up to 100 
85mKr 0,15 -
" 
100 
85Kr 
- 0,9 
'" 
100 
1311 4,5 7,3 20 
132Te 4 1,3 15 
134CS 0,15 0,5 10 
137CS 0,3 1,0 13 
99Mo 0,45 3,0 2,3 
95Zr 0,45 3,8 3,2 
103Ru 0,6 3,2 2,9 
106Ru 0,2 1,6 2,9 
140Sa 0,5 4,3 5,6 
141Ce 0,4 2,8 2,3 
144Ce 0,45 2,4 2,8 
89Sr 0,25 2,2 4,0 
90Sr 0,015 0,22 4,0 
238pU o 1 . 10-3 , 0,8 . 10-3 3,0 
239pU 01 '10-3 , 0,7 '10-3 3,0 
240pU 02 .10-3 , 1 . 10-3 3,0 
241pU 0,02 0,14 3,0 
242pU 03 . 10-6 , 2 . 10-6 3,0 
242Cm 0,3 . 10-2 2 1 . 10-2 , 3,0 
239Np 2,7 1,2 3,2 
* Uncertalnty ± 50 % . Only Sovlet Measurements taken into account . 
G) Outlet Air Duct 
o Inlet Air Duct 
CD Thermal Column 
8 Tubes with Fuel Rads 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 
Emergency protection measures are the necessary administra-
tive supplement to the technical measures of engineered 
reactor safety to reduce the effects of nuclear accidents. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany by law we have to do 
emergency planning and to prepare emergency protection mea-
sures for all potentially dangerous installations both con-
ventional and nuclear independent of the probability of an 
accident. 
The fact that there are definitions of such terms as "inci-
dent," "accident," "catastrophe," does not mean that these 
events are bound to occur in nuclear facilities. On the other 
hand, there can be no absolute safety in any technical sec-
tor. Nuclear installations are designed, constructed and 
opera ted in such a way that the probability for an incident 
or accident is very low and the probability for a severe 
accident wi th catastrophic consequences is extremely small. 
These accidents represent the residual risk of the nuclear 
installation, and this residual risk can be decreased on one 
hand by a better design, construction and operation and on 
the bther hand by planning and taking emergency measures in-
side the facility and in the environment of the facility. 
By way of introduction and definition it may be indicated to 
define some terms pertaining to the subject in order to make 
for more uniform understanding. For there is often a lack of 
clarity with respect to the meanings of the terms "incident," 
"accident," "catastrophe" not only in different countries but 
also in the minds of different people. 
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• Incident 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the Radiation Protection 
Ordinance (BUND 76) offers adefinition of an incident in the 
nuclear field. 
An incident is a sequence of events the occurrence of 
which does not allow operation of the plant or the acti-
vi ty to be continued for safety reasons, and for which 
the plant has been designed, or for which precautionary 
measures have been taken in the performance of the acti-
vity. 
• Accident 
Defini tions of the term "accident" can be found in the Basic 
Safety Standards of the Commission of the European Communi-
ties (CEC 80) or, again, in the Radiation Protection Ordinance 
of the Federal Republic of Germany: 
EC: 
An unforeseen event that causes damage to an installa-
tion or disrupts the normal operation of an installa-
tion, and is likely to result for one or more persons in 
a dose exceeding the maximum permissible doses. 
Federal Republic of Germany: 
Sequence of events which can cause one or more persons to 
undergo a radiation exposure or incorporate radioactive 
substances in excess of the prescribed limits, unless 
classified as an incident. 
Both definitions differ from the customary definition of an 
accident because, for an accident in the nuclear field, it is 
already sufficient if there is a possibility of a limit being 
exceeded. 
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This clarification of the terminology by legal definition 
also affected the safety criteria, with respect to the tech-
nical design of nuclear power plants for incident situations 
to be brought under control, not using the term "maximum 
credible accident" but "design basis incident." 
G Catastrophe 
Wi th respect to the term "catastrophe" I am not able to 
present any official definition. Oxford English Dictionary 
defines: 
"final event, conclusion generally unhappy (disastrous 
end, finish up, ruin, calamitous fate)" 
and Grand Larousse 
"grand malheur qui vient subi tement bouleverser la vie 
d'une personne ou d'une societe, specialement: evenement 
inattendu causant la mort de plusieurs personnes." 
A more comprehensive definition could be this: 
"A catastrophe is an event caused by extensive occur-
rences which can be traced back to natural elements or 
adverse conditions in traffic or in industry and which 
damages or jeopardizes the lives and health of numerous 
people, valuable property or the supply of the public." 
I feel that in the public debate about nuclear technology in 
some countries certain mass media and environmentalists will 
already use the term "nuclear catastrophe" if, in the sense 
of the above definition, merely an incident has occurred. 
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EI Limits 
The above definitions of incidents and accidents resul t in 
the following dose levels, according to the dose limits per-
taining in the Basic Safety Standards of the Commission of 
the European Communi ties or the Radiation Protection Ordi-
nance of the Federal Republic of Germany, exceeding which 
will constitute an accident. 
FRG EC 
annual dose 
limits 
mSv/a 
dose commitment 
limits 
Whole body, bone marrow, gonads 
effective dose 5 
Skin, bones 50 
Extremities 50 
Thyroid 50 
Other organs 50 
Table 1: Annual dose (European Communities) and 
ment (Federal Republic of Germany) 
members of the pu,blic for the design 
dent of nuclear facilities. 
2. ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES 
mSv 
50 
300 
600 
150 
1 50 
dose commit-
limits for 
basis inci-
In case of an accidental release from a nuclear power plant 
the radioactive nuclides will be transported to the environ-
ment. The amount of activity release, the time dependence and 
the release pathes from the core to the environment may 
differ in a broad range depending on the actual accident 
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sequence. Details are given in risk analysis studies (e.g. 
NRC 75, DRS 79). Confining oneself to the atmospheric release 
which is most relevant, essentially five principal pathways 
can cause an exposure of people outside the plant: 
• external exposure due to the airborne beta oder gamma 
activity of the cloud, 
external exposure due to the gamma activity deposited on 
the ground, 
internal exposure following inhalation of radionuclides 
from the plume, 
internal exposure following inhalation of resuspended 
radionuclides, 
internal exposure due to ingestion of contaminated food-
stuffs. 
External exposure due to the cloud activity will be acute 
only during the time the cloud is passing. This will occur in 
the early phase of an accident. Due to the short range in air 
and the limi ted penetration the beta activi ty will cause a 
skin dose only and is usually negligible in comparison to 
other pathways. 
External exposure due to activity deposited on the ground (on 
roads, buildings, roofs) is limited to gamma activity for the 
same reason as discussed above.' The resul ting dose will be 
reduced by radioactive decay and by natural removal processes 
as e.g. migration into soil. 
Internal exposure following inhalation of radionuclides from 
the plume is a pathway arising from the passing time of the 
plume. This will resul t in an exposure over a longer time 
period depending mainly on the physical and biological half-
life of the nuclide. 
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following inhalation of radionuclides Internal exposure 
resuspended from initially deposited radioactive -material 
depends on the nature of the ground (smooth or rough, humid 
or dry), the deposit (particle size) and the atmosphere 
(turbulence class, wind velocity). This pathway can have 
importance if at all only in a late phase of an accident. 
Internal exposures due to ingestion of foodstuffs contamina-
ted by deposi ted acti vi ty can be important due to direct 
contamination and due to indirect contamination via transfer 
from soil to the foodstuff, This pathway may lead to an 
exposure of people living far away from the plant and from 
the contaminated area. 
The relative importance of these different modes of exposure 
in the case of an accident depends on many boundary condi-
tions: 
• type of the accident, 
• nuclide spectrum, 
8 chemical form of the nuclides, 
• weather conditions during the accident, 
• effectiveness of the countermeasures. 
The consequences of the exposure may be somatic or heredi-
tary, this means effects in the irradiated individual himself 
or in his descendants. The somatic effects may be ei ther 
stochastic or nonstochastic. Nonstochastic effects can occur 
shortly after exposure to high levels of radiation and are 
those for which the severity of the effects varies with dose 
and for which a threshold may occur. Stochastic effects 
generally appear long after irradiation and are those for 
w~ich the probability of the effect occuring, rather than its 
severity, is taken to be a function of dose without thresh-
old. 
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A very important pathway in the case of an accident may be 
the acute exposure of the bone marrow in the early phase. In 
this case the value for the meadian lethai dose wi thin 60 
days (LDSO / 60 ) is assumed to be in the range between 2.S and 
S Gy with a lower threshold for this effect of about 1.S Gy. 
Health risks due to stochastic effects are described by risk 
factors. Due to ICRP the total risk factor for the incidence 
of fatal cancer is 1 .2Sxl0- 2 Sv- 1 . 
Starting with this knowledge of effects it is possible to fix 
a set of dose limits for purposes of handling an emergency. 
These so-called emergency reference levels define something 
like the boundary to exclude nonstochastic effects and to 
keep the probability of stochastic effects at a reasonable 
low level. 
3. PROTECTIVE MEASURES 
The main purpose of emergency planning and enforcement is the 
reduction of radiological consequences to the public in the 
case of an accident. 
Emergency protection measures are the necessary administra-
tive supplement to the technical measures of engineered safe-
guards. The following overv iew will be made as general as 
possible. In those cases where special examples are gi ven 
these examples have been taken I if not mentioned otherwise I 
from the emergency preparedness practice of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. Due to the general state of this paper 
it is not possible to describe the on-site emergency planning 
though this is a very important aspect for the effectiveness 
of emergency planning. 
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To get more detailed information about on-site and off-site 
emergency planning a lot of literature is available. To get 
the more general philosophy together wi th a lot of special 
aspects and information the following papers can be recom-
mended (e.g. IAEA 81, IAEA 82a, IAEA 82b, BMI 77a, ICRP 84, 
EC 82). 
Regarding this goal the responsible authorities have to 
handle a set of countermeasures: 
Sheltering and respiratory protection 
The public may be asked to stay in houses, close doors 
and windows and, if possible, move into shielded rooms, 
such as cellars. This will shield against external gamma 
radiation (depending on the wall thickness of the room) 
and reduce the inhalation of radioacti ve aerosols (de-
pending on the freguency of air changes in the rooms). 
Iodide tablets (if release of radioiodine is taken into 
account) 
The internal radiation exposure mainly of the thyroid by 
radioiodine can be reduced by the consumption of iodide 
tablets due to a blocking effect. The efficiency of this 
radioprotective prophylaxis depends mainly on the time 
interval between iodide tablets intake and incorporation 
of radioiodine. 
Evacuation 
Evacuation can be an effective countermeasure if it can 
be carried out in time. But it should be mentioned that 
this protective measure has i ts own risks and will be 
very difficul t if a large number of people has to be 
evacuated. 
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These countermeasures can be most effective in the early 
phase of an accident and most appropriate to reduce the 
number of early fatalities. 
In accordance with these possibilities, and staggered by 
radiation dos es in the open air, the measures indicated in 
Table 2 have been proposed by the German Advisory Commi ttee 
on Radiation Protection (Strahlenschutzkommission). 
These protective measures are partly prophylactic or they are 
at least able to reduce the conseguence to a lower level. In 
each case the choice of the adeguate countermeasure depends 
on some relevant boundary conditions of the specific accident 
seguence. 
Introducing the acute emergency measures guoted in Table 2 
involves a tremendous responsibility. This applies above all 
to evacuation. This step might create a panic among the 
public which is in no way justified by the true radiation 
hazard, and if condi tions are adverse, these measures might 
even cause accidents. Neither conseguence should be the 
resul t of precautionary measures, and i t should be put up 
only if there is a really acute hazard to health or life. In 
the first instance, in order to provide the necessary techni-
cal information even for the unlikely case of a major release 
of radioactivity, the expert committee regarded it as its 
duty to pronounce general recommendations for the initiation 
of acute emergency measures. Naturally, such recommendations 
can be made only wi th the proviso that each specific case 
wi th all i ts ramifications should be considered. For this 
reason, no strict limits have been given for the initiation 
of specific measures; instead, i t has been explained which 
acute emergency measures should be recommended in accordance 
with the guide levels indicated here. In specific cases 
different decisions will be justifiable or even necessary 
under special local conditions. 
Done jn open 
(Sv) 
< 0.25 
, . ;u r 
0.7.5 - 1 
> 1 
- 411 -
Stay jtl hOlwe! 
llHCrlll 
ncccsnary 
nCCC!1S<lry IIni 11. 
cVilclIatloll 
Hccommendcd mOilsur-üS 
F.vilcuation 
no 
useful 
nC{:O!1sary 
Jrr<}(]jiltiOtl of lhc whole hody hy oxl.crtwl radial 1011 illlel Inhalcd radionuclidcH. 
Dose in open air· 
(1lv) 
< 0.7.5 
0.25 - 5 
> 5 
stay in houne"' 
lIserul 
neceS:Hlry uuli I 
cvacuilt.ion 
rodidc tnhlcls" 
not neccssnr-y 
uscfu l. 
neCetHHlry 
when > 1 Sv 
necC!HJnry cvan 
when eVilcuaLed 
Irradiation oE ll10 lhyroi(1 glnnd by itlllnlcd ril(li()jodinc. 
Comments 
r~VilClliltioll 
not necessary 
usnful. 
necessary 
when > 10 Sv 
I} ']'he done 1cvelR indicalcd n~(er 1:0 short:-term oxposnt"cs (in hours or days) in the open air, 
independent oF aga or sex. 
') 1'he do"e redu<!tion ur external radialion Ir pertlOn" ntay in HlOjr honsen and senk sheHer 
dcpendn on the shielding provJdc.d hy walls nur) ccdlings. II faclot" of ill least 5 may be 
expcc Led for: hOlIDes cun loma ry j n FHG. 
') The dO[Jc rcduc t i on i r penJonn s lay in 1 he i r hOHnes aud c J O~Je lha i r w I ndowR ilnd dOOCR depends 
above <11J on the dlilllUCB or nir in Ihe c('npecLive r·ooms and on Ihe mel:cocologjcnl distri-
bution facl:ocs. !I. dose reduclion by n facLor of 2 may be expccted for halwes cuslomary in 
f'HG. 
"} 'J'ho dose reducl:ion hy the admininLralion of iodide l:il~)lets 18 npproximntely 00% for adults 
cxposed lo rndloiodillC, j( Lilose lal,lols ure Laken will)in 2 Iloues fo110w1ng 1nllalot10n: the 
reduclion 19 50% if lhe labtels aro nrlminisler-cd wJLhin 6 hours. 
Table 2: Emergency reference levels and recommended measures 
in case of emergency at a nuclear facility. 
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4. CLASSIFICATIONS 
To prepare an effecti ve emergency plan i t is necessary to 
introduce some classifications to obtain an instrument one 
can handle in a practicable way. This especially will be 
important for the following aspects of the plan: 
• emergency classification, 
• alarm levels, 
• alarm measures, 
• emergency planning zones. 
Emergency classification 
There are different approaches to classify the emergency 
si tuations. IAEA for example recommends a system compatible 
with that used by many public authorities (IAEA 82b). 
• Emergency Standby 
Appropriate plant personnel are placed on standby, i.e. 
they are alerted, in order to be in readiness for an 
emergency situation; appropriate off-site organizations 
mayaiso be put on standby. 
Plant Emergency 
The consequences of the emergency situation are confined 
to a section of the plant. On-si te personnel are acti-
vated and appropriate off-site organizations notified. 
Site Emergency 
The consequences of the emergency situation are confined 
to the site. The personnel on-site are activated and 
off-site organizations are notified. Some of the latter 
may be activated. 
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Off-site Emergency 
The consequences of the emergency situation extend 
beyond the site boundary. The overall emergency plan is 
put into effect. 
Alarm levels 
Omitting in this paper the problems of on-site emergencies in 
the Federal Republic of Germany we have for the field of 
off-site emergencies introduced three alarm levels: 
• Emergency alert 
Emergency alert is initiated in case of an accident in a 
nuclear facility which has not yet given rise to any or 
to major impacts on the environment below the cri teria 
fixed for emergency alarm, but where the possibility of 
such impacts cannot be excluded with absolute certainty. 
Water alarm 
Water alarm is ini tiated after a hazardous release of 
radioactive substances only into bodies of water. 
Emergency alarm 
Emergency alarm is raised if an accident in the nuclear 
facility has given rise to a hazardous release of radio-
active substances into the air or is likely to do so 
very soon. 
Criteria for the operator to determine alarm levels 
As a rule, alarm levels are ini tiated by the emergency pro-
tection staff following a recommendation by the operator. Due 
to a draft version of a recommendation of the Commi ttee on 
Emergency Protection Measures the operator shall inform the 
- 414 -
emergency protection staff at the latest when at least one of 
the criteria set forth below is met: 
Criteria for emergency alert 
- General Criterion 
Sequences of events likely to be associated with 
releases of radioacti ve substances into the environ-
ment of the plant, which could gi ve rise to a whole 
body dose of more than 0.05 Sv or a thyroid dose of 
more than 0.15 Sv in the environment of the plant. 
- Plant Criterion 
Sequences of events in the reactor, the occurrence of 
which prevents any further operation of the plant for 
safety reasons and in which the minimum number of 
safety systems required in the design to control such 
events are not fully effective. 
This cri terion is presumect to be met, e. g., in the 
following plant states: 
- The core is cooled to an insufficient degree, i.e., 
the minimum conditions for observation of the emer-
gency cooling criteria are not met. 
- The release of radioactive substances at levels 
above those indicated in column 3 of Table 3 is only 
prevented by one design basis barrier fully func-
tioning. 
- Emission Criterion 
Release of airborne radioacti ve substances into the 
environment in such a way that 1/10 of the release 
levels indicated in Table 3 was found to have been ex-
ceeded. 
Criteria for emergency alarm 
- General Criterion 
Sequences of events in which releases of radioactive 
substances into the environment of a plant either were 
ascertained or are likely to occur, which can give 
rise to a whole body dose and an effective dose, 
respectively, in the environment of the plant in 
excess of 0.05 Sv or a thyroid dose in excess of 
0.15 Sv. 
- Plant Criterion 
Sequences of events in the reactor, the occurrence of 
which prevents any further operation of the plant for 
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safety reasons and in which the minimum number of 
safety systems required in the design tocontrol such 
events are not fully effective and the effectiveness 
of the retention systems provided (barriers) is either 
considerably impaired or in direct danger of being 
lost. 
This criterion is presumed to be met, e.g., in the 
following plant states: 
- The co re has been damaged because of insufficient 
cooling. Sufficient cooling of the core continues to 
be impossible. 
- Arelease of radioactive substances at levels above 
those indicated in column 3 of Table 3 is only pre-
vented by one design basis barrier which, however, 
is in direct danger of being lost. 
- Emission Criterion 
Release of airborne radioactive substances into the 
environment in such a way that the release levels 
listed in Table 3 either were found to have been 
exceeded or are presumed to be exceeded in the near 
future. 
Nuclide Organ Release levels (Bq) Emission heights group exposed 50 - 80 m 81 - 130 m 131 - 150 m 
Noble gases 5x10 16 1x10 17 2x 10 1 7 
Cesium Whole 1 x 10 15 1x10 15 2x10 15 body 
4x10 15 1 x1 0 16 1 x1 0 16 Other 
nuclides 
Iodine Thyroid 7x10 12 2x10 13 6x10 13 
Table 3: Activity release corresponding to a whole body dose 
of 0.05 Sv and a thyroid dose of 0.15 Sv. 
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Table 3 contains release levels resulting in a potential 
radiation exposure of 0.05 Sv as a whole body dose and 0.15 
Sv as a thyroid dose at the most adverse point of impact. The 
release levels are indicated for various effective stack 
heights and for four groups of nuclides. The selection of 
nuclide groups is based on the stack instrumentation custom-
ary in nuclear power plants. A summation formula must be 
applied if several nuclide groups are released. 
The wind speed has been assumed to be m/s at 10 m above the 
average disturbance level. For wind speeds > 2 m/s, the 
release levels indicated in the table may be mul tiplied by 
the amount of the wind speed. For release times in excess of 
8 h, the release data according to the table may be mul ti-
plied by a factor of 2. 
The release levels in the table are based on the following 
assumptions: 
Radiation exposures have been calculated in accordance 
with the basic principles of accident calculation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany wi th an integration period 
of 50 a for the whole body and for the thyroid. 
For the ground radiation, ingestion and inhalation ex-
posure pathways, the values have been determined on the 
basis of statistical evaluations of real weather records 
collected at a selected site. 
Cloud radiation is determined by the envelope of the 
curves of all diffusion categories A to F. 
For the ingestion exposure pathway, an intake of con-
taminated food has been assumed up until 24 h after the 
onset of the release. 
The per iod for which the population is exposed unshield-
ed to radiation from the radionuclides deposited on the 
ground has been assumed to be seven days. 
Alarm measures 
Starting wi th the alarm levels one can define three classes 
of alarm measures with partly different details applying them 
to the three alarm levels: 
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Stage alarm measures include the alarms to be initia-
ted upon receipt of an alarm signal by the. emergency 
protection staff and the necessary preparations for 
further measures which must be taken right away and 
without special instructions at each alarm level. 
Stage 2 alarm measures serve for the protection against 
acute dangers . They can be taken only by special deci-
sion made in the light of more detailed knowledge of the 
nuclear accident and the first results of examinations. 
Stage 3 alarm measures shall follow and serve for the 
elimination of dangers that do still exist. They shall 
be subject to the special conditions of the emergency. 
These measures shall also be planned in advance to 
enable a rapid and efficient execution. 
Following one can find details of these alarm measures pro-
vided for the three alarm levels taken from german regula-
tions (BMI 77a). 
Al1ocation of Alarm Heasureg to Alarm Levels 
Heasures In the eaBe of emergency alert 
• c!ass 1 emergency measuresl 
- Alarming of the authorities in charge. 
- Gathering of the emergency protection statr in minimum strength. including the llcensee's 
expert. 
- stand-by readlness of the other members cf the emergency protection slalf and lhe rnea-
suring servIces. 
- Preparat!on of the measurihg equipmenl. 
- Notlflcation of neighbouring administrative authorities If these may gel involved. 
• elaes 2 end 3 emergency measures, which will affect the population, are hot required In an 
emergency alert. 
MeBnureS in the eBse of watet alarm 
• Class 1 emergency measures! 
- Alarming of the authorities and offices in charge, 
- Gathering of the emergency protectioh staff. 
- Action of measuring services for measurements of radioactivity 1n water and sludge, if 
required. 
- Notification of neighbouring administrative authorities if these may get involved. 
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elaas 2 emergency measures: 
- As required - warning to downrlver watet supply points. 
- As required - warning to the downtiver popUlation not to Use the watet and refrain from 
watet sports and fishing. 
- As requlred - notificatlon cr restrietion of shlpplng. 
elaas 3 emergency measures: 
- C!oslng of contamlnated watet Bupply points and cf heavlly contamlnated areas. 
- becontaminatlon 6f personnei, incorporation measurements and decorporatton. 
- Medteal cate end, if necessary, treatment of personnei. 
- Deconlamination of animale and/ar removal of heavily contamlnated antmale. 
- Assurance of watet supplles and, If required, decontamination cf the watet supply system. 
Heasuten in t~e esse of emergency alarm 
elass 1 emergency measures: 
- Alarming of the authorities and emergency services in charge. 
- Gathering of the emergency protection staff. 
- Definition of the endangered area on the basis of zones and sectors. 
- Action of measuring services: measurements t0 be taken according to a special plan. 
- Notification of neighbouring administrative authorities if these may get involved. 
elass 2 emergency measures: 
- Information of the population aecordlng to a prepared text by means of publie address 
eare, Ineluding, if necessary, the announcement that iodine tablets will be distributed. 
If a large area has to be informed the faei1ities of the emergency services (sirens) 
ahal1 be used and supplemented by special broadeast and television announcements. 
- Traffic restrietions aecording to a prepared plan. 
- AB required - distribution of iodlne tablets. 
- AB requJred evacuatlon according to a prepared plan. 
- Aa required - transportation and housing of persona who have been overexposed to radia-
tion. 
- As requ1red - warning to downriver water supply points and to the downriver population 
not to use the water and refrain from water sports and fishing. 
elass 3 emergency measures: 
- elosing of contaminated water supply points and of heavily eontaminated areaa. 
- Oecontamination of personnei, Incorporation meaaurements aod deeorporation. 
- Hedieal care and, if necessary, treatment of peraonnel concerned. 
- Supply of uncontaminated food to the population and of uncontaminated fodder to animals. 
- eonfiscation of eontaminated food and fodder, if possible, subsequent decontamination. 
- Decontamination of animals and/or removal of heavlly contaminated animals: evaeuation in 
special cases. 
- Assurance of water aupplies and, if required, decontamination of the water supply system. 
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Emergency planning zones 
For a better handling of emergency planning and implementa-
tion of emergency measures it is useful to classify the 
environment of the nuclear facility to get so-called emer-
gency planning zones. The details of these classifications 
are very different in different countries . Therefore as an 
example the practice in the Federal Republic of Germany shall 
be described here. 
The environment of a nuclear facility is broken down into the 
following zones for the purpose of defining preparatory 
measures: 
Central zone 
The central zone directly surrounds the nuclear facil-
i ty. Its boundaries are a function of local condi tions 
(size of plant, si te structure). Only in exceptional 
cases will its radius exceed 2 km. 
Median zone 
The median zone surrounds the 
limi ts are fixed by a circle 
approximately 10 km. 
Outer zone 
central zone. 
wi th a radius 
Its outer 
of up to 
The outer zone surrounds the median zone. Its outer 
limi ts are fixed by a circle wi th a radius of up to 
approximately 25 km. 
The median zone and the outer zone are subdivided into sec-
tors of 30° or 22.5°, which sectors are numbered consecutive-
ly in a clockwise direction, starting in the north. 
For the central zone and the median zone the necessary alarm 
measures must have been prepared. In the outer zone i t is 
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only necessary to determine the measuring and sampling sta-
tions and prepare for alerting. Outside the outer zone there 
is generally no need for preparatory measures. 
5. ORGANIZATION 
It is obvious that the emergency planning and in 
the implementation of emergency measures will 
particular 
only work 
having a weIl defined and trained organization. An essential 
precondition will be that there are no ambiguities regarding 
the responsibilities of the different organizations involved. 
In addition it is necessary that the emergency plans of the 
involved organizations are coordinated efficiently and, if 
possible, exercised. 
In practice the approaches in the different countries differ 
to a large extent due to legal requirements, organizational 
structures and available technical possibili ti es . Therefore 
the principal aspects will be discussed again giving an 
example from the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany, the federal states are 
responsible for the organization and implementation of emer-
gency control. However, 
emergency plans to be 
in an attempt to harmonize the local 
established by the licensee and the 
authorities the regulatory authorities of the federal states 
and the Federal Ministry of the Interior have issued recom-
mendations for the planning of emergency control measures by 
the authority (BMI 77a) and by the licensee (BMI 77b). 
The responsibili ties must be distinguished into on-si te and 
off-site aspects: 
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on-site responsibility: licensee 
As the operator has all the information to judge the 
si tuation of the facili ty the shift on duty is in the 
position to make the initial assessment of the accident 
and the possible consequences for the environment. 
Therefore the main tasks of the operator will be: 
- Assessing the actual accident situation and predicting 
the resul ting condi tions relevant for off-si te con-
sequences. 
These questions can be answered only by the operator 
because they demand information about the present 
status of the plant, the efficiency of the safety 
features, the consequences of malfunctions, possible 
activity release and release pathways etc. 
- Measuring the atmospheric dispersion conditions rele-
vant for the off-site consequences. 
- Predicting the potential radiation exposure in the 
vicini ty of the plant to give the first informations 
to the emergency protection staff of the authorities. 
- Assisting the responsible authori ti es by sending an 
expert to work together with authorities in the emer-
gency operating control center. 
off-site responsibility: authorities 
The main purpose of the responsible authori ti es in the 
case of an accident is: 
- independent assessments of the possible 
radiological consequences, 
off-site 
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- selection of the most adequate emergency measure for 
the different regions and time phases, 
- initiating and implementation of all protective action 
off-site: 
alarming, 
assigning of measuring teams, 
measurements, 
information of the pUblic, 
traffic control, 
distribution of iodide tablets, 
evacuation. 
6. MEASUREMENTS 
During an accident the emergency protection staff needs a lot 
of information to be in a position for choosing the adequate 
countermeasures in each phase. These informations have to 
come from the nuclear installation and from the off-si te 
environment. 
The plant operator should provide especially the following 
information: 
amount of radioactivity released, 
nuclide vector of radioactivity released 
(at least amounts of the relevant groups), 
time characteristic of release 
(probable beginning and duration), 
point of release, 
wind direction, wind speed, diffusion category, preci-
pitation rate, 
operational status of engineered safety features. 
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These informations should resul t, if possible, from direct 
measurements or from estimations on the basis of indirect 
measurements. To assure that' the main informations can be 
provided during an accident the corresponding equipment 
should be designed so that it can work and be read even under 
severe accident condi tions regarding the local environment 
(temperature, pressure, humidity, radiation) and the range of 
the measured values. 
Measurements to be taken off-si te and required in order to 
allow the consequences of a nuclear accident to be judged are 
of the following types: 
(a) dose rate measurement (gamma radiation), 
(b) determination of the concentration and type of airborne 
radioactive substances, 
(c) determination of the content of radioactive substances 
in vegetation, 
(d) determination of the content of radioactive substances 
by direct measurement of contamination, 
(e) determination of the radioactivity concentration in 
fresh milk of cows grazing in the area concerned, 
(f) determination of the radioactivity concentration in 
surface water. 
Measurements under (a) and (d) above should generally be 
carried out wi th portable equipment in the field. The other 
measurements require sampling at representative points fol-
lowed by measurements in a special laboratory. 
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In general, measurements under (a) and (b) will enjoy priori-
ty. Measurements under (c) and (d) are also required within 
the first few hours after a nuclear accident in order to 
allow the situation to be assessed. Radiation detection 
squads of the police, the fire brigade or of general emer-
gency protection services should be charged only wi th mea-
surements under (a) and samplings under (b) and (c). All 
other measurements and samplings should be carried out by 
expert measuring organizations. 
All measurements discussed be fore will be useful in the case 
that release of radionuclides due to an accident has already 
happened. But as one could see looking for the different 
types of countermeasures the protective actions necessary in 
the early phase of an accident will be most successful when 
there is time enough to initiate and perform these actions. 
For this reason the most important information should co me 
f~om measurements inside the plant which can give useful 
hints for the future development of an accident especially 
regarding the release of radioactive material. This has to be 
done by interpreting the measurement of e. g. pressure , tem-
perature and activity of primary coolant or containment 
atmosphere. Important in this frame will not only be the 
momentary state but the anticipated development wi th time. 
Most relevant for a prognosis of radioactive releases will be 
the state of the different barriers, especially of the con-
tainment. Based on these information and having additional 
measurements as discussed be fore i t should be possible to 
give a prognose of radiological consequenGes off-site and to 
initiate the proper countermeasures in time. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear facili ties, such as nuclear power plants, research 
reactors, fuel element fabrication plants, radioactive waste 
reposi tori es or reprocessing plants, dis charge residues of 
radioactive substances into their respective environments. 
The radiation emi tted by those radioactive substances may 
cause man to be exposed to external or internal radiation. 
The radioactive emissions of nuclear facili ti es consti tute 
part of the manmade radiation exposure of the public which, 
however, resul ts mainly from the application of X-rays and 
sources of ionizing radiation for diagnostic and therapeutic 
purposes in medicine and from the fallout of nuclear weapon 
tests carried out above ground. The sum total of all contri-
butions to manmade radiation exposure is approximately 0.6 
mSv/a in terms of genetically significant dose for the aver-
age of the population in the Federal Republic of Germany. The 
contribution from nuclear facili ti es to the overall manmade 
radiation exposure is less than 1 ~Sv/a. 
2. OBJECTIVES OF ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 
Env ironmental moni toring of nuclear facil ti es , i. e., moni-
toring for potential repercussions on its immediate vicinity 
of the operation of a nuclear facili ty, is part of general 
monitoring for environmental radioactivity all over the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The interest in 
environmental monitoring is limited to watching for the 
occurrence of manmade radioactive substances and the external 
and internal radiation exposure these may cause to the public 
living in the immediate vicinity of a specific nuclear facil-
ity. Radioecological studies and large area environmental 
monitoring for manmade radioactivity, especially with regard 
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to pollution superimposing in areas with several nuclear 
facilities, must be left to governmental or scientific insti-
tutions as a more demanding job. Problems of this type are 
solved in particular by the eight "Leitstellen" (control 
centers) for monitoring environmental radioactivity. 
Environmental monitoring supplements the control of emissions 
of radioactive substances from nuclear facili ti es . The basis 
of emission control is found in Section 46 of the Radiation 
Protection Ordinance (1). The type and scope of emission 
control in light water cooled reactors is described in the 
pertinent rules drafted by the Kerntechnischer Ausschuß (Nu-
clear Technology Committee) (2, 3). The radioactive substances 
discharged wi th liquid and gaseous effluents gi ve rise to 
certain pollution levels in the immediate environment. It is 
one of the main duties of environment al monitoring, therefore, 
to detect manmade radioactivity in various media constituting 
relevant exposure pathways and to measure directly the ex-
ternal radiation exposure of the public in the environment. In 
this way, on the basis of known emission da ta and meteoro-
logical and hydrological diffusion parameters, the radiation 
exposure in the environment is calculated by means of radio-
ecological models. As a result of the variances in parameters 
and statistical quantities mentioned above, all radioecologi-
cal computer models contain a number of so-called conservative 
assumptions, i. e., unfavorable assumptions or safety factors 
with respect to computed annual radiation doses. 
As a consequence, practical environmental mon i toring has i ts 
significance not only in demonstrating that prescribed dose 
limits are observed, but also in indicating, by measurements, 
the gap between conservative estimates and environmental 
exposures which, in all experience, are much lower. 
For practical environmental monitoring of nuclear facilities, 
three sets of problems can be formulated: 
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( 1) Assessment, by so-called background measurements, of 
the environmental radioactivity existing before commis-
sioning of the respective nuclear facility. 
(2) Routine monitoring of the environment of a nuclear 
facili ty, while that plant is opera ted according to 
permit. 
(3) Environmental monitoring for accidental releases of 
radioactive substances. 
Background measurements are to assess diffusion patterns of 
radioactivity in the environment which may be due to a speci-
fic si te. Such "stocktaking" of environmental radioactivi ty 
is to allow, during subsequent operation of a nuclear facil-
i ty, to distinguish pollutions due to plant operation from 
background activity and background dose rates, respectively. 
Routine monitoring serves for continuous control OI the 
observation of set limits, i ts purpose is the complete and 
quantitative assessment of all pollution as far as possible. 
In-house monitoring by the operator of a nuclear facility may 
be restricted to the area of the plant site and its immediate 
environment. 
Practical environmental monitoring is particularly important 
in cases of undiscovered escapes of radioactive substances or 
accidental radioactivity relreases. In such instances, it 
serves to determine the type, intensi ty and extension of 
potential environmental contamination by direct measurements 
in situ and by analyses of representative samples. In this 
connection, it is important that measured data are made 
available to the action teams as quickly as possible as a 
basis for decision making. The emergency measures ini tiated 
by the operator tie in wi th an accident moni toring program 
organized by government agencies. 
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3. IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 
3.1 Condi tions 
A number of indispensable precondi tions must exist for en-
vironmental monitoring to be performed effectively. The type 
and number of constant and potential emitters must be known. 
The resul ts measured in emission moni toring must always be 
made available in the shortest possible period of time. 
Besides radioactivity concentration data this also includes 
information about gaseous and liquid effluent volumes and 
records of different operating conditions of the nuclear 
facility in question. 
Another important precondi tion is the exact knowledge of a 
number of general factors about the environment. Such factors 
of interest include the topography of the terrain, plant 
growth and building structures, settlement patterns, typi-
cal agricul tural products, volumes of crops, locations and 
sizes of agricultural areas. 
A factor of particular importance in this connection is the 
microclimate in the immediate vicinity of a nuclear facility. 
Statistically backed meteorological data on the si te and a 
minimum of information continuously available about present 
weather conditions are necessary for assessment of the atmo-
spheric diffusion of the radioactive substances emitted with 
gaseous effluents. 
3.2 Aspects in Drawing Up Monitoring Programs 
General principles 
lated by the ICRP 
of environmental monitoring were formu-
(International 
Protection) as early as in 1965 
Committee 
(4) • Basic 
on Radiological 
principles of 
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env ironmental mon i toring were adopted by the Commission of 
the European Communities (5). 
Schematic diagrams of potential transmission pathways of 
radioactive substances emitted by nuclear facilities into air 
and water as the transport media are shown in Figures 1 and 
2. Experience and numerous studies have shown that specific 
nuclides and specific exposure pathways are of greater im-
portance than others in causing radiation exposure of the 
public. Such nuclides and exposure pathways are called "crit-
ical." The group of the population in the environment of a 
nuclear facility, which must be regarded as being potentially 
exposed to radiation, is called the "cri tical" group of the 
population. Taking into account such "critical" quantities is 
recommended both in establishing routine programs and in 
selecting monitoring measures for accident situations. 
In setting up a monitoring program, also those provisions and 
rules must be observed in addition to the moni toring goals 
and preconditions mentioned above, which are contained in the 
Radiation Protection Ordinance or in special condi tions im-
posed by the responsible supervisory authorities. 
3.3 Regulations and Dose Limits in Environmental Monitoring 
Under the German Radiation Protection Ordinance 
The basic requirements of organiza tion and practical imple-
mentation of environmental mon i toring in nuclear facili ties 
can be derived from the sections in the Radiation Protection 
Ordinance (1) dealing with the "protection of the public and 
the environment from the hazards of ionizing radiation" and 
wi th the definition of "radiation protection areas." The 
provisions formulated in those sections indicate a system of 
various physical moni toring areas, for which different dose 
limits were defined. 
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Fig. 1: Schematic diagram of the transmission pathways from 
radioactive substances discharged into the atmo-
sphere to man. 
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The "areas, which are not radiation protection areas" prac-
tically mean the national terri tory at large. Secti·on 45 of 
the Radiation Protection Ordinance requires that the techni-
cal design and operation of a nuclear facility be planned in 
such a way as to minimize the radiation exposure of persons 
due to radioactive substances discharged from the plant 
together with the gaseous or liquid effluents. Such radiation 
exposure must not exceed specific limits for various areas of 
the human body (see Table 1). In calculating radiation ex-
posures , the "most adverse points of impact, taking into 
account all relevant exposure pathways, including the food 
chains," shall be used as a basis. It is also important to 
know that the dose li mi ts should not be regarded as limits 
per plant, but refer to the Federal Republic of Germany. This 
is to say that they must also be observed by overlapping 
pollution levels coming from more than one plant or site. 
Body area 
1. Whole body, bone marrow, gonads, uterus 
2. Hands, forearms, feet, lower legs, ankles, 
including the skin of those parts 
3. Skin, if only the skin is exposed to 
radiation, except for the skin of the 
hands, fore arms , feet, lower legs and 
ankles 
4. Bone 
5. Thyroid and other organs 
Dose limits 
mSv/a 
o . 3 
3.6 
1 .8 
1 .8 
0.9 
Table 1: Maximum permissible radiation exposures in the 
environment of nuclear facili ti es caused by dis-
charges of radioactive substances with the gaseous 
or liquid effluents. 
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4. GUIDELINE FOR IMMISSION MONITORING OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES 
IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
In 1974, the German Bundesgesundheitsamt (Federal Health 
Office) jointly wi th a number of other institutions drafted 
"Guidelines for Measures of Monitoring the Environment of 
Nuclear Power Plants Incorporating Light Water Cooled Re-
actors" for the Federal Republic of Germany. Those guidelines 
helped to standardize environmental monitoring programs and 
make their results capable of comparison. A revised guideline 
was published in November 1979 by the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, entitled "Emission and Immission Monitoring of 
Nuclear Facilities" (6). 
4.1 Principles 
Moni toring of impacts in the environment of nuclear facili-
ties is a supplement of emission monitoring. The results are 
necessary for preservation of testimony, for control of 
radiation exposure calculated from the resul ts of emission 
moni toring and for taking precautions wi th respect to pos-
sible incidents. 
In case of releases due to an incident appropriate sampling 
and measurements in the environment are to provide a quick 
survey of a situation, so as to furnish arguments for deci-
sions at an early stage. In this context, measurements shall 
be made in the possible areas of impact. 
Two monitoring programs in principle must be established for 
environmental monitoring of nuclear facilities: 
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a program to be implemented by the operator of a facil-
ity, and 
a supplementary and controlling program to be imple-
mented by the measuring service charged by the author-
ity. 
To be able to record any future impacts of nuclear power 
station operation and possible preliminary burden and for 
training implementation of major parts of this program must 
start at least two years prior to plant commissioning. 
4" 2 Moni toring Programs for Licensees and Independent Mea-
suring organizations 
The licensee' s sampling and measuring points shall cover in 
particular the immediate vicinity of the nuclear power plant 
and the moni toring of the transport media water and air as 
far as the deposition on the ground, vegetation and sediment 
in such vicini ty. Therefore, measurements shall be carried 
out and sampIes taken predominantly in the area of the most 
unfavorable point of impact for water and air considering the 
prevailing diffusion conditions. 
The sampling and measuring points of the 
suring organization exceed the licensee's 
independent 
sampling and 
mea-
mea-
suring network insofar as food chains on land and in water 
are included for mon i toring purposes . The program of the 
measuring organization should be oriented more to the utili-
zation of the environment of the nuclear power plant by the 
population. It shall ensure a verification of the data mea-
sured by the licensee and, at the same time, supplement his 
measuring program. 
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4.2 Exposure Pathways 
The following exposure pathways must be taken into account 
when setting up the environmental monitoring programs: 
external radiation exposure: 
• beta submersion 
• gamma submersion 
• soil radiation 
internal radiation exposure: 
• inhalation of radionuclides 
• ingestion of radionuclides by the uptake of 
00 drinking water 
00 plant products 
grain) 
(for instance green vegetable, 
00 animal products (for instance meat, fish, milk). 
4.4 Media and Radionuclides to be Monitored 
Measuring of the air (monitoring of direct radiation and air-
borne activities) shall include, in each case, monitoring of 
the exposure pathways of gamma submersion, ground radiation 
and inhalation. In general, beta submersion need not be moni-
tored, however, the respective necessi ty shall be examined 
upon the meri ts of each case considering the relevance of 
this pathway. 
The monitoring of water shall include the monitoring of the 
activity concentration in the water and in the sediment. In 
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general, the exposure pathways of gamma submersion and beta 
submersion need not be monitored, however, the respeQtive ne-
cessity shall be examined upon the merits of each case consi-
dering the relevance of these pathways. 
The following criteria shall be used in the monitoring of the 
exposure pathway of ingestion: 
- The monitored medium should be as close as possible to the 
end of the food chain, i. e., i t should preferably be a 
foodstuff. 
- The mon i tored foodstuff should be typical of the nuclear 
facility site environment. 
- The monitored foodstuff should suggest a significant con-
tribution to the entire ingestion dose. 
The plant products to be monitored should be chosen so as to 
possibly cover diverse products which become ready for har-
vesting at different times of the year, in this context, pre-
ference should be given to plants whose overground parts are 
destined for human consumption. 
Since the relative contribution of radionuclides occurring to 
the total activity emitted may differ for the individual 
facili ties, the selection of the radionuclides to be moni-
tored shall be adapted to the expected and actual radionu-
clide mixture, respectively, occurring in the nuclear facil-
ity. 
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4.5 Sampling and Measuring Methods, Locations and Frequen-
cies 
Sui table sampling and measuring methods are described inter 
alia in "Meßanlei tungen für die Überwachung der Radioaktivi-
tät in der Umgebung von Kernkraftwerken und sonstigen kern-
technischen Anlagen" (Measuring Instructions for Moni toring 
the Radioacti v i ty in the Vicini ty of Nuclear Power Stations 
and other Nuclear Facilities), elaborated by the central 
offices for monitoring of the environmental radioactivity, as 
well as in the loose-leaf edition issued by the Working Group 
"Umweltüberwachung" (Environmental Monitoring) of "Fachver-
band für Strahlenschutz". 
Sampling and measuring locations must be specified in the en-
vironment of the nuclear power station. They shall be located 
in an area where a measurable impact by the facili ty is 
possible. 
The sampling and measuring locations shall be located pre-
ferable in the area of the point of impact least favorable 
with respect to the individual exposure pathways. 
The network of the sampling and measuring locations shall in-
clude points which are largely unaffected by nuclear facil-
ities (reference areas). 
Wi thin the framework of precautions against accidents mea-
suring and sampling locations shall be provided above all 
near the communities situated in the immediate vicinity. 
The number of sampling and measuring locations is specific of 
the site. It shall be seen in the context of the sampling and 
measuring frequencies and shall be fixed as a function of the 
media to be monitored. For the purpose of optimization of the 
evidence of measurements priority shall be given to a mean-
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ingful selection of the sampling and measuring locations in-
stead of too a high number of such locations. 
To be able to perform quick and specific samplings and mea-
surements during accidents, the number of sampling and mea-
suring locations shall be fixed taking into account the 
structure of settlement and the existing disaster control 
plans. 
The sampling and measuring frequencies and, in case of con-
tinuous sampling, the duration of the period of collection, 
respectively, shall be adapted to the physical half-life and 
to the time of radionuclide transfer to man. 
If an exposure pathway is interrupted during specified pe-
riods of the year (for instance changeover from green fodder 
to dried fodder) sampling can be abandoned during this pe-
riod. 
4.6 Detection Limits 
To guarantee by environment al moni toring an additional con-
trol of observance of the dose limits as stipulated in § 44 
and 45 of the Radiation Protection Ordinance, one third in 
total of the respective dose limit shall be detectable, i.e. 
for instance 0.1 mSv/a of the whole body dose via exhaust air 
and liquid effluents and 0.3 mSv /a of the thyroid dose via 
ingestion. 
In the measurement of single-nuclide activity in air, drink-
ing water and foodstuffs the major radionuclides in terms of 
radia tion exposure shall be recorded wi th a detection limi t 
corresponding to 1/30 of the dose limits, i.e. for instance 
10 ~Sv/a in case of the whole body dose and 30 ~Sv/a in case 
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of the thyroid dose by ingestion. Since experience has shown 
that only few nuclides make significant contributions to 
radiation exposure on every exposure pathway, i t can be 
guaranteed that 1/3 in total of the respective dose limit can 
be detected. 
When comparing the detection limits achievable with the 
requirements stated above the following aspects shall be 
taken into account: 
By measurement of the local dose at the fence of the 
nuclear facility a whole body dose of 0.5 mSv per year 
caused by external gamma radiation should be detectable. 
By measurement of the local dose in the environment a 
whole body dose of 0.1 mSv per year caused by exhaust 
air and liquid effluents should be detectable. 
If in the acti vi ty measurement of single nuclides de-
tection limits are attained which correspond to a dose 
much lower than 1/30 of the respective dose limit, 
reduction of the expendi ture of measurement might be 
considered. 
If in the absence of additional expenditure in terms of 
measurement detection limits can be achieved which 
correspond to a dose much lower than 1/30 of the re-
spective dose limit this particular method shall be 
preferred. 
Detection limits for single nuclides corresponding to a 
dose of more than 1/30 of the respective dose limit are 
acceptable in the individual case, provided that 1/3 of 
the respected dose limit can be detected for the total 
exposure. Otherwise, either more sensitive methods shall 
be employed or other media moni tored for which more 
sensitive methods are available. 
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4.7 Measurements during Incidents 
The licensee and the independent measuring organization shall 
have available and test measuring and evaluation methods to 
be applied during incidents and enabling rapid statements. 
The necessary measurements shall be practiced by way of the 
monthly measuring trips of the licensee and the semi-annual 
measuring trips of the independent measuring organization to 
the sampling and measuring points which have been laid down. 
The stationary facili ties for continuous sampling and mea-
suring shall be equipped in such a way that the measured data 
can also be used for assessment purposes during incidents. 
In the event of incident-related releases of radioactive sub-
stances, the licensee and the independent measuring organiza-
tion shall first perform random sampIe measurements in the 
potential hazard areas on the basis of the incident program. 
Addi tional moni toring measures during incidents will depend 
on the merits of each case. 
5. ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM FOR A NUCLEAR POWER 
PLANT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
The measures to be taken in the Federal Republic of Germany 
by the licensee of the nuclear power plant and the indepen-
dent measuring organization are compiled in Tables 2 and 3. 
The map following Table 3 shows the actual si te map of the 
measurement and sampling locations for environmental moni-
toring of the Karlsruhe Nuclear Research Center. Figure 3 
shows a ficti tious si te of a nuclear power plant and the 
sampling and measuring stations of the monitoring program. 
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I-Ionitored medium Required Sampling and Type and fre-Program and monitored type Measured detection measuring quency of Remarks 
ftem of radiation, variables limit loeat!ans, samplings and 
respectively respectively measurements 
1. AIR 
1.1 v-radiation Lacal v-dose 40 mSv/h 1 measurlng Contlnuous 
rate 10eation each in direct measure-
the area of the ment 
least favorable 
point cf impact 
and in the dif-
fusion direc-
I:lon, secend in 
frequency 
1.2 v-radiation Local v-dose 0.5 rnSv/a 10 solid-state J\nnual eva-
dosimeters at 1 uatlan 
the fenee of the 
plant 
1.) Aeroso1s a) Long-lived 1.8 maq/m l 1 sampl1ng a) Continuous a) Evaluation 
ß-gross related to loeat10n each in 0011eot1011 in the ear-
activity Sr-90 t:he area cf the within a Her S days 
least favorable period of after com-
point of impact 14 days and pleUon of 
and in the dif- evaluation sampling 
fusion direc- every fort~ 
tion, second in night 
frequency 
b) Speciflc 0,37 mBg/rn' 1 sampling b) Quarterly b) The mixed 
aeUvity related to loeation each in evaluation sampie is 
of single Co-60 the area of the of a mixed to be eom-
nuelides least favorable sample pOSE!d from 
determined point of impact filters 
by y-spec- and in the dif- changed 
trometry fus ion direc- every fort-
tion, seeond in night 
freguency 
c) Sr-90 1,8 mBg/rn l 1 sampl1ng c) Quarterly c) The mixed 
activity loeation each in evaluation sampie is 
eoncentration the area of the of a mixed to be com-
least favorable sample posed from 
point of impact filters 
and in the dif- changed 
fusIon direc- every fort-
tion, second in night 
frequency 
d) a-gross 3.7 mBq!m' 1 sampling d) Quarterly d) The mixed 
activity related to loeation each in evaluation sampie is 
Pu-239 the area of the of a mixed to be com-
least favorable sampie posed from 
point of impact filters 
and in the dif- changed 
fusion direc- every fort-
Uon, saoond 1n night 
frequency 
1.' GaseOUB iodine SpeeHie 3.7 mnq/m 1 1 aampling Continuoua Evaluation aB 
1-1 )1 loeation eaeh in eollection far aB pOBsibll:!! 
activity the area of the within a perlod ahort-term 
least favorable of I' days and after completion point of impact evaluation of salopl ing 
and in the dlf- every fortnight 
fusion direc-
tion, second in 
frequency 
Table 2: Environmental monitoring of a NPP by the operator. 
Program for normal operation. 
I·jonitored medium 
rrogrilm ilnd moni tored type 
Itcm of radlation, 
respectively 
2, SOU, l\ND PLT'lNTS 
2.1 Soil 
2.1 Grass 
3. Nl\TER 
3.1 Surface water 
3.2 Süd iment 
3.3 Ground water 
Heasured 
var lablea 
a) Specifie 
Sr-gO ac-
tivity 
b) SpecH ic 
activity 
of single 
nuclides 
by )-
spectro-
metry 
SpecHte acti-
vity of single 
nucl1dea by y-
spectrometry 
al Tritium 
acHvity 
bl Residual ß-
acUvity 
cl SpecH ic 
activity 
of single 
nuclides 
by y-
spectro-
metry 
Specific aeti-
vity of single 
nuclides by y-
spectrometry 
Speclfic actl-
vlty of single 
nuclides de-
termined by y-
spectrometry 
or residual ß-
aetivity 
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Required 
detectlon 
limit 
74 mBq/kg 
related to 
dry matter 
0.37 Bq/kg 
related to 
Co-60 and 
dry matter 
0.74 aq/kg 
related to 
Co-60 .nd 
dry matter 
0.11 Bq/l 
related to 
K-40 
74 mBg/l 
related to 
co-60 
18.5 Bq/kg 
related to 
Co-60 and 
dry matter 
74 mBq/l 
related to 
Co-60 
0.11 aqll 
related to 
K-40 
Sampl ing and 
measuring 
locations, 
reapectively 
.1 1 sampling 
looation in 
the area of 
the least 
favorable 
point of im-
pact and at 
a referenee 
bl 1 sampling 
loeation in 
the area of 
the least 
favorable 
point of im-
pact and at 
a reference 
1 sampling 10-
eation in the 
area of the 
least favorable 
point of impact 
and at a refe-
renee area 
.1 1 sampling 
IDeation 
each In the 
inlet and 
the Qutlet 
building 
bl 1 sampling 
IDeation 
each In the 
iniet and 
the autiet 
building 
cl 1 sampling 
location 
each in the 
inlet and 
the outlet 
building 
1 sampling 10-
cation each In 
the inlet .nd 
the outIet 
buUding and in 
the area of the 
point of impact 
least favorable 
under considera-
Uon of the spe-
cial site speei -
fic hydrological 
condi tions 
Type and fre-
quency of 
sampl inga and 
rneasurements 
al 2 random 
aamples per 
year 
bl 2 random 
sampies per 
year 
2 random sampies 
per year pr 10r 
to the first Bnd 
second hay 
harvest 
.1 Continuous 
sampllng and 
quarterly 
evaluation 
bl Continuous 
sampling and 
quarterly 
evaluation 
cl Continuous 
sampling and 
quarterly 
evaluation 
Quarterly evalu-
ation of tandom 
sampies 
Quarterly sampl-
ing of random 
sampies and eva-
luation 
Rel11arks 
öl So11 .nd 
grass sampl-
ing at the 
same plaee 
alld time 
bl Soil "nd 
grass sampl-
Ing .t the 
same place 
amI time 
Soll and grass 
snmpling at 
the same place 
and time 
bl If rcsidua 1 
ß-acUvity 
> 0.37 Elq/l 
then mca-
surcrncnt 
accordinq 
to J. 1 ,c 
In the a rea of 
dnms, tidal 
waters <lud 
fiel~s of beilns, 
the sampllng 
10eaUon" have 
to be sCI'ilriltcly 
stipulntc'd 
If only residual 
ß-activltr is 
measured y-~pc('­
trometry ls re-
quired if actl-
vlty > 0,]7 nq/l 
Table 2: 
cont. 
Environmental monitoring of a NPP by the operator. 
Program for normal operation. 
Honitored medium 
progralll and mon! tored type 
item of radiation, 
respectively 
4. "IR AND SOlL 
4.1 y - rad ia Uon 
4.2 y-radiation 
4.3 Aerosols 
4.4 Gaseous iodine 
4.5 Soil surface 
Measured 
variables 
Local y-dose 
Local y-dose 
rate 
ß-gross 
activity 
Speclflc 1-131 
activity 
ß-gross 
activity 
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Required 
detection 
limit 
0.5 rnSv/a 
0.1 jJSv/h 
3.7 Bq/rn' 
related to 
Sr-90 
3.7 Bq/rn' 
related to 
1-131 
Sampling and 
measuring 
locations, 
respectively 
40 sol1d-state 
dosimeters di-
stributed aecor-
ding to the site 
speeifie condi-
Hans in the 
vicinity of the 
plant 
Honthly changing 
measuring loca-
tions at the se-
leeted lecations 
in the zones and 
sec tors of the 
environment of 
the plant 
Monthly changing 
measuring loca-
tions at the se-
lected locations 
in the zones and 
sec tors of the 
environment of 
the plant 
Menthly changing 
measuring loca-
tions at the se-
lected loeations 
in the :lenes and 
sec tors of the 
environment of 
the plant 
Monthly changing 
measuring loca-
tions at the se-
lected locations 
in tha zones and 
sec tors of the 
environment of 
the plant 
Type and fre-
quency of 
samplings and 
measuremen ts 
l\nnual evalua-
tion 
r-Ionthly short-
term measure-
ments 
Monthly random 
sampies and 
evaluation in 
the measuring 
Monthly random 
samples and 
evaluation in 
the measur Ing 
Monthly short-
term measure-
ments 
Rem,lrks 
Background y-
dose of Ililtural 
ori']i n approx. 
0.8 mSv/a 
Heasurcs aL lhc 
periOllical mua-
suring Lravu! 
Heasures at thc 
periodical mea-
suring travel 
Heasurcs at thc 
periodical mea-
suring travc:!l 
Heasures at tila 
periodical mea-
suring tnwcl 
Table 2: 
cont. 
Environmental monit~ring of a NPP by the operator. 
Program for accidents. 
Honitored medium 
Pto9rnm and monitorcd type 
item of radiation, 
respectively 
1. AIR 
1.1 Aerosols 
1.2 y-radiation 
2. FOOD CHAINS IN 
TIIE COUNTRY 
2.1 Cow' s milk 
2.2 Grass 
2.3 So11 
2.4 Faodstuff 
Heasured 
variables 
Specifie acti-
vi ty of single 
nuclides de-
termined by y-
spectrornetry 
Loeal y-dose 
a) Sr-90 
activity 
b) specHie 
activity 
of single 
nuclides 
determined 
by y-spec-
trometry 
c) specific 
1-131 
acUvity 
Specific acti-
vity of single 
nuclldes de-
termined by y-
spectrornetry 
Specific aeti-
vlty of single 
nuclides de-
termined by y-
spectrometry 
a) Sr-90 
activity 
b) Specific 
activity 
of single 
nuclides 
determined 
by y-spec-
trometry 
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Required 
detection 
limit 
0.37 mBq/m l 
relaled to 
Co-60 
0.5 mSv/a 
18.5 mBq/l 
185 mßg/1 
18.5 mBq/l 
740 mBg/kg 
related to 
Co-60 aod 
dry matter 
370 mBq/kg 
related to 
Co-60 and 
dry matter 
)7 mDg/kg 
related to 
fresh mat-
ter 
370 rnBq/kg 
related to 
Co-GO and 
fresh mat-
ter 
Sampllng and 
measuring 
loeations, 
respectively 
Type and fre-
quency of 
samplings and 
measur-ements 
From the indivi- Quarterly 
dual sampies of evaluation of 
the operator the mixed sampIes 
Heasuring Service 
charged by the 
authority makes 
mixed sampies 
quarterly 
10 solid-state lI.nnual 
dosimeters evalu<1tion 
distributed at 
the fenee of the 
plant 
a) Sarnpling at a 
farm wi th 
milch cows in 
the area of 
the least 
favorable 
point of im-
pact and at a 
dairy 
b) Sarnpling at a 
farm with 
milch eows in 
the area of 
the least 
favorable 
point of im-
pact and at a 
dairy 
c) Sampling at a 
farm with 
milch cows in 
the area of 
the least 
favorable 
point of im-
pact and at a 
dairy 
1 sampling loea-
tion in the area 
of the least 
favorable point 
of impact and at 
a reference 
point 
a) Twice il year 
during tlle 
per iod of 
green fonder 
bl Twiee a year 
during the 
per iod of 
green fodder 
cl Honthly 
during the 
per iod oE 
green fodder 
Respectively two 
random samples 
per year of the 
first and seeond 
hay harvest 
1 sampling 10ca- 2 random sampies 
tion in the area per year 
of the least 
favorable point 
of impact and at 
a reference 
point 
Hany sampl1ng 
locations, pre-
ferably of the 
area of impact 
least favorable 
and oE a refe-
renee area 
Hany sarnpllng 
locations, pre-
ferably of the 
area of impact 
ll;!äst fävvrabl~ 
and of a refe-
renee area 
Samples of har-
vest-rlpe pro-
ucts 
Samples of har-
vest-ripe pro-
ducts 
Helll<!1 ks 
Hilk, gC,HlS and 
soi I sampies 
are ta ue tuken 
as fal~ "'!1 pos-
sjble iJt lhc 
same li tUt' allel 
at. thc 
plilce 
~lilk, grass and 
soil s,lmplcs 
are to ue taken 
as Ear as pos-
sible at lhe 
same time und 
at the 
pI ace 
Random sälOples 
preferahlc oE 
free-Iand and 
leaf vegctables, 
frult and corn, 
as Ear as pos-
sible c1inperscd 
over tllC whnle 
year 
Random samplcs 
prcfcrilulc of 
free-land and 
leaf vegetables, 
(ruit dmi ellrn, 
as filr iW pOfl-
sible (n'spL'cscd 
over thc wholü 
year 
Table 3: Environmental monitoring of a NPP by the authority. 
Program for normal operation. 
Monitored medium 
Program and monitored type ~Ieasured 
Hern of radiation, variables 
respectively 
) • HATEH AND FOOD 
CIIAINS IN WATER 
3.1 Sur face water 
J.2 Fish meat 
J.J Sediment 
3.4 Drinking water 
a) Tritium 
activity 
b) Residual 
ß-activity 
cl Specific 
activity 
of single 
nuclldes 
determined 
by y-spec-
trometry 
SpecH1e acti-
vi ty of single 
nucUdes de-
termined by y-
spectrometry 
Speclfic acti-
vlty of single 
nuclides de-
termined by y-
spectrometry 
a) SpecHie 
activity 
of single 
nuclides 
determined 
by y-spec-
trometry 
b) Sr-90 
activity 
cl specHie 
activity 
of sIngle 
nuclides 
determined 
by y-spec-
trometry 
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Required 
detection 
limit 
185 Bq/i 
110 mBq!l 
re la ted to 
K-40 
74 mBg!l 
related to 
Co-60 
370 mBq/kg 
related to 
fresh matter 
and Co-60 
18.5 Bq/kg 
related to 
dry matter 
and Co-60 
74 mBq!l 
related to 
Co-60 
74 mBg/l 
74 mBq/l 
related to 
Co-60 
Sampling and 
measuring 
lecations, 
respectively 
a) 1 sampllng 
leeation 
each in the 
inlet and 
outlet 
bullding 
b) 1 sampling 
leeation 
each In the 
inlet and 
cutlet 
building 
cl 1 sampling 
leeation 
each in the 
inlet and 
outlet 
buUdlng 
1 sampling 10-
eation each in 
the area oE the 
buildlog oE out-
let aod down-
stream the 
power plant 
1 sampling 10-
eation each in 
the area oE the 
buildlng oE out-
let as well as 
up- and down-
stream the power 
plant 
Type and fre-
quency of 
sampllngs and 
measuremen ts 
al Contlnuous 
sampllng 
during a 
per iod oE 
one month 
and quarter-
ly evaluation 
b) If residual 
ß-activity 
> 370 mBg/l 
then measure-
ment accord-
ing to ).l.c 
cl continuous 
sampling 
during a 
period oE 
one month 
and quarter-
ly evaluation 
Semi-annual ran-
dom sampies and 
semi-annual 
luation 
Semi-annual tak-
Ing of random 
sampies with 
evaluation 
a) Samplings out a) 
oE a nearby 
fountain 
Quarterly 
taklng oE 
random 
samplea w 1. th 
evaluation 
which 1s used 
for the supp-
ly of drink-
Ing water 
b) Waterwork 
downstream 
the power 
plant 
cl Waterwork 
downstream 
the power 
plant 
b) Semi-annual 
evaLuation oE 
the sampie , 
obtalned 
withln a pe-
riod of c01-
lecting of 
half a year 
c) Semi-annual 
evaluation of 
the sampie , 
obtained 
within a pe-
riod of c01-
lecting of 
half a year 
Hemar);s 
special ecologi-
ca I cond j ti ans 
speciEic to 
location have to 
be cons idered 
for moni tor Ing 
Special ecologi-
eal eonditions 
speeiEic to 
loeation have to 
be considüred 
for monitoring 
a) Honltoring 
only, If a 
founta in In 
thc cnv lron-
ment of the 
nuclear power 
pLant i5 used 
b) Only water-
works prepar-
Ing surEace 
water or fil-
trate of 
ri vor banks 
(sampJ 1n9 
proEerably 
carricd out 
with eVilpora-
tion coUoc-
tor) 
c) Only walet'-
works propar-
ing stlrfilce 
water or fil-
trnto of 
r i ver bnnks 
(snmpllng 
preferably 
carried out 
with evapora-
tion coLLec-
tor) 
Table 3: 
cont. 
Environmental monitoring of a NPP by the authority. 
Program for normal 6peration. 
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Mon! tored medium Required sampling and Type and fre-Program and monitored type Measured detectlon measuring queney of l1emLlJ ks 
ilem of radiation, variables limit locations, sampl1ngs and 
respectively respectively measurements 
4. AIR AND SOlL 
4.1 v-radiation Local v-dose 0.5 msv/a 20 solid-state Annual 
dosimeters evaluation 
4.2 v-radiation Looal v-dose 0.1 ~,sv/a Semi-annually Semi -annually I-leasuros at lhü 
rate changing measur- short-term periodicul l1lea-
ing locations at measurements su1'1119 trLlvcl 
the selected 
places in the 
zones and sec-
tors in the en-
vironment of 
the nueleal' 
power plant 
4.) Aerosols ß-gross ).7 Bq/rn l Sem! -annually Sem i -annua Ily HeasurcR at the 
activity changing meaSl1r- random sampies periodlcal tnCCl-
ing loeations at and evaluation suri n~J travcl 
the se lee ted in the measur-
places in the ing car 
zones and see-
tors in the en-
vironment of 
the nuclear 
power plant 
4.4 Gaseous iodine SpecHie ).7 Bq/m J Semi-annually Sem i -annuall y Neasunw at the 
1-131 changing measur- random sampl es periodical mCil-
activity ing locations at and evaluation suring travol 
the selected in the measur-
places in the ing car 
zones and sec-
tors in the en-
vironment of 
the nucl!Ö!ar 
power plant 
4.5 Soil surface ß-gross 3.7 k8q/m 1 Semi-annually Semi -annually Measuros at the 
activity related to changing rneaSur- short-term periocl1cdl nleu-
K-40 ing locations at measurements suring t ravel 
the selected 
places in the 
zones and sec-
tors in the en-
vironment of 
the nuclear 
power plant 
Table 3: 
cont. 
Environmental monitoring of a NPP by the authority. 
Program for accidents. 

Legend M_ KXJO-=-='I%~i33! ~lfIIJIOO'" iJ Status October 1984 
• COUNTING TUBE FIELD STATION C DRINKING WATER (WATERWORKSI 
• SOLID STATE DOSIMETERS • GROUND WATER (OBSERVATION WELLSI 
Ausschnitt aus der topographischen Karte L 6916. 
$~ Karlsruhe-Nord; mit Genehmigung des LandesYef-
b=====b====d"======,======" mesaungsamtes Baden-Württemberg 
PLANKTON AND 
• CONTINUOUS SAMPLING 
OF SURFACE WATER 
Cl SLUDGE 
____ LIQUID EFFLUENT FEED PIPE TO 
THE MAIN CANAL (AL TRHEINI 
_ COURSE OF SURFACE WATERS 
DCJSO'L 
____ AGRICULTURAL 
____ PRODUCTS 
D AEROSOLS • SURFACE WATER 
• • • • FlSH AND WATER PLANTS SERVING AS MAIN CANALS ""'MAINWIND 
--.I DIRECTION SECTORS 
Site Map of the Measurement and Sampling Loeations for Environmental Monitoring 
of the Karlsruhe Nuelear Research Center 
~ 
V1 
N 
ALPHA CITY 
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING 
PROGRAM BY PLANT OPERA TOR 
11 Gamma dose rate, aerosols, 
radioiodine 
• Gamma local dose 
... Soil 
• 
Grass 
.." 
Surface water 
~ Sediment 
At. G round water 
- 453 -
N 
o 
1 km 
'==='==J 
~ Nuclear power plant 
~ Plant area with fence 
~ 
o 
.., 
c () 
.- '" 
"''''' E c 
~ .~ 
.- Ql 
LL 0. 
'" 'i5 
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM BY THE 
MEASURING SERVICE CHARGED BY AUTHORITY 
0 Aerosols 
6 Cow milk 
0 Gamma local dose 
<:> Soil 
0 Grass 
<> Foodstuff 
\l Surface water 
..,p Fish 
~ Sediment 
'17 Drinking water 
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6. RESULTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING OF NUCJ~EAR POWER 
PLANTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Since 1958, data on environmental radioactivity from measure-
ments by authorized laboratories have been published in the 
Federal Republic of Germany in quarterly reports and since 
1968 in annual reports. In addition to the results from 
environmental monitoring, 
population exposure due to 
these reports include 
natural and artificial 
Information is given on radiation exposure from 
- natural radiation sourees, 
- medical application, 
- nuclear installations, 
data on 
sourees. 
- handling of radioactive substances and ionizing radiation, 
- occupational exposure, 
- nuclear weapons tests, 
- radioactive waste, 
- radiation accidents and particular incidents. 
The 1983 report on "Environmental Radioactivity and Radiation 
Exposure" published by the Federal Ministry of the Interior 
in 1985 has 388 pages. This report contains a weal th of 
tables of activity concentrations in different media and 
details of the release of radionuclides from nuclear instal-
lations (Tables 4-6). 
Releases of radioactive substances from nuclear installa-
tions produce only an insignificant increase in the radiation 
exposure of the population (Tables 7 and 8). The upper values 
of the radiation exposure of individuals from these emis-
sions, calculated according to the basic calculation prin-
ciples valid in the Federal Republic of Germany, are clearly 
below the dose limits specified in the Radiation Protection 
Ordinance and are considerably lower than the width of vari-
ation of natural radiation exposure in the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
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Obrlgheim Stode BlbUs A Blblh B Neckanlestheim Unterwe8er Grafenrheinfeld 
er Sl 3,1 E7 1,2 E7 
Hn5l< lj,l r:7 1,2 E7 9,0 E6 1,1 E6 6,7 E.5 
Fe 59 
CQ 57 
CQ 56 4,0 E8 7,0 E7 2,7 E7 6,1 E7 6,2 E6 3,8 E7 3,6 E7 
CQ 60 1,4 E9 4,7 ES 9,3 .ES 6,4 E8 5,4 [7 6,7 E7 2,6 E7 
Zn 65 6,5 ES 
Sr 89 3,9 E6 2,7 E6 1,3 E6 8,8 ElI 
Sr 90 2,3 [6 8,8 E5 4,6 E6 1,3 E6 1,7 I6 
Zr 9S 2,1 E6 
Nb 95 5,2 E6 1,7 E6 5,6 E..5 1,9 E6 
Ru 103 7,0 ES 
Ru 106 2,2 E6 2,0 E6 
J.f; llOm 8,1 [7 9,04 E7 3,0 ES 8,0 E6 
le 123m 4,1 E7 5,6 E7 2,0 [7 6,5 E6 1,9 E7 
Sb 122 
Sb 124 7,0 E6 6,0 E7 2,2 ES 8,6 E7 6,4 [6 3,3 ES 1,3 E7 
Sb 125 B,9 E6 1,3 [6 
I 1.31 2,0 E6 3,3 E7 3,3 E7 1,7 [6 1,8 [6 
Xe 1.33 3,3 ES 
C, l.34 5,1 E7 4,1 E7 2,9 ES 1,8 E7 4,9 E6 3,9 E7 
Cs 1.37 4,1 t8 3,4 ES 5,7 E8 1,3 ES J,S E6 1,7 EB 
Ba 140 1,1 E7 
l..a 140 2,1 E6 2,8 E6 1,2 E6 
Ce 141 
Ce 144 6,0 ES 6,7 E6 
Sum 2,9 E9 1,1 E9 2,3 E9 9,9 E8 1,2 E6 6,5 E8 9,6 [7 
Table 4: Activation and fission products in liquid effluents 
from german nuclear power plants with PWR, 1983. 
Nuclear Activation and H-3 power fission products plant GBq TBq 
Obrigheim 2.9 3.2 
Stade 1 . 1 8 
Würgassen 6.2 0.4 
Biblis A 2.3 21 
Biblis B 1 .0 15 
Neckarwestheim 0,1 11.8 
Brunsbüttel 0.9 1.1 
Isar 0.5 3.1 
Unterweser 0.7 19.2 
Philippsburg 3.3 1 .7 
Grafenrheinfeld 0.01 1 9 
Krümmel 1 .3 0.04 
Table 5: Activity in liquid effluents, 1983. 
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Nuclear power plant Noble gases Aerosols 1-131 C-14 H-3 
Bq Bq Bq Bq Bq 
Obrigheim 1.7 E13 1.2 EOB 5.6 E07 4.0 E10 loB E11 
Stade 1.B E12 2.7 EOB 5.4 E06 1 .3 E11 1.5 E12 
Würgassen 2.3 E13 2.1 E09 7.6 EOB 1 .5 E10 5.2 E10 
Biblis A 3.5 E12 1 .0 E09 1.2 EOB 4.1 E10 1 .7 E12 
Biblis B 1.5 E13 7.4 E06 2.7 EO 7 2.2 E10 6.4 E11 
Neckan/es theim 5.0 E12 1.5 EOB 7.9 E06 2.6 E10 B.O E11 
Brunsbüttel 1 .9 E12 5.9 E07 6.4 E06 B.B EOB 1 .4 E10 
lsar 2.2 E13 4.3 EOB 3.1 E06 3.4 E11 5.7 E11 
Unterweser 6.0 E12 1 .4 E07 5.0 E06 2.2 E10 1 .6 E12 
Philippsburg 2.B E13 3.7 EO 7 2.1 E09 2.0 E11 2.0 E11 
Grafenrheinfeld 7.4 E12 3.5 E05 4.6 E04 3.1 E11 2.3 E11 
Krümmel B.1 E09 1.3 E05 2.7 E04 
-
7.5 E09 
Table 6: Activity in airborne effluents, 1983. 
Maximum whole Maximum thy- Average gonad dose 
Nuclear power body exposure roid exposure of the population 
plant [adult) [infant) 0-3 km 0-20 km 
/lSV /lSV /lSV /lSV 
Kahl 1 1 0.04 <0.01 
Obrigheim 2 10 0.2 0.01 
Stade 0.2 0.2 0.03 <0.01 
Würgassen 2 8 0.2 0.02 
Biblis 0.4 2 0.06 <0.01 
Neckarwestheim 0.1 <0.1 0.01 <0.01 
Brunsbütlel 0.1 0.1 <0.01 < 0.01 
Isar 0.3 0.3 0.05 <0.01 
Unterweser 0.1 <0.1 <0.01 <0.01 
Philippsburg 0.8 70 0.04 <0.01 
Grafenrheinfeld 0.1 0.1 0.01 <0.01 
Krümmel <0.1 <0.1 <0.01 <0.01 
Table 7: Radiation exposure due to airborne effluents, 1983. 
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Maximum whole Average whole 
Nuelear power body exposure body exposure 
plant (adult) (publie) 
,uSv ,uSv 
Kahl 0.3 <0.1 
Obrigheim 0.2 <0.1 
Stade 0.1 <0.1 
Würgassen 1 <0.1 
Biblis 0.1 <0.1 
Neekarwestheim 0.4 <0.1 
Brunsbüttel 0.1 <0.1 
Isar 0.1 <0.1 
Unterweser 0.2 <0.1 
Philippsburg 0.4 <0.1 
Grafenrheinfeld 0.4 <0.1 
Krümmel 0.2 < 0.1 
Table 8: Radiation exposure due to liquid effluents, 1983. 
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CLOSING REMARKS 
by Iyos Subki, DDG-BATAN 
Distinguished delegates from FRG, seminar's participants, Ladies and 
Gentlemen : 
It is indeed a great honour for me to be given an opportunity 
to say a few words of closing remarks. 
This joint Indonesian-German Seminar on Public Acceptance, Waste 
Management and Nuclear Safety is not only timely but also of great 
importance in securing the strong foundation for nuclear technology 
in Indonesia. 
A weIl 
always gives 
mankind and 
founded technology, 
full and in-depth 
environment. This 
nuclear technology!. Otherwise, 
be it nuclear 
considerations 
is exactly the 
a technology 
or conventional, 
on the safety of 
characteristics of 
will be called 
inadequate and therefore considered unacceptable to uso 
In various occasions, BATAN as governmental body in its 
function to develop safe nuclear technology, has expressed its 
political determination and will to improve the safety of nuclear 
energy systems in Indonesia. This seminar, in fact, manifests our 
commitment and our irrevocable responsibility to secure nuclear 
safety, human health and environmental protection. 
Before going further, may I say a few words about the present 
seminar. 
This joint seminar has been made a reality thanks to the 
support of German Ministry for Research and Technology (BMFT) who 
has succeeded to mobilize and send a mission of German nuclear 
experts to Jakarta. In this venture, I must say that the role of 
Bapak Nentwich of KFA is really outstanding. 
Meeting on progress eval. 
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In this opportunity, allow me also to express my sincere 
congratulations and appreciations to the German experts for their 
inspiring, weIl planned and weIl presented papers. We are of the 
opinion that your ideas and thoughts are of great importance to our 
programme in improving and strengthening nuclear safety and 
radiological protection in Indonesia. And let me assure a11 of you 
that we are not being complacent in these strategic endeavours. 
Ladies and Gentlemen : 
What are the major critical issues in nuclear energy at the present 
time ? The answer is : 
Nuclear safety, 
radiological.hazards and 
radioactive waste management. 
In this seminar the experts and the participants have discussed 
comprehensively the above three problems in an open and honest 
manner. And, ofcourse, we are convinced that the problems are not 
insurmountable. The technology is available to solve the problems, 
what is needed now is a strong political determination to reach our 
safety goal. 
The unfortunate accident at Chernobyl has indeed had a negative 
effect on public opinion and increased the number of people 
scepticle about or frightened by nuclear power. 
We, as scientists and engineers, urge everybody not to be too 
emotional and jump up to negative conclusions. 
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A week-long meeting was convened by IAEA in Vienna last August 
and attended by more than 500 nuclear experts from all over the 
world to discuss and review in detail the report by Soviet experts 
on the Chernobyl accident. 
We have learned from that meeting, and as discussed also in 
this seminar, the following facts about the consequences of the 
accident : the number of casualty up to now is 31 and according to 
calculations by authoritative experts the possible number of 
additional cancer cases due to radiation exposure in the next 70 
years is between 5000 and 20000. This means 0.1% of the possible 
number of cancer cases (due to all causes) in the same population 
during the same period. 
We know also that the accident at Chernobyl is specific to this 
type of reactor, that is RBMK or Light Water Graphite Moderated 
Reactor (LWGR), which has a core configuration enabling a fast 
reactivity transient due the positive void coefficient. Ofcourse, 
this is not the only weakness. 
Nevertheless, we, as good students, can learn many lessons and 
answer many questions from the accident. It is also encouraging that 
the Soviet authorities have taken several measures in the right 
direction with the aim of preventing any recurrence. 
So, ladies and gentlemen, if we exercise some reflections on 
the performance of nuclear power plants, there should be no question 
with regard to the acceptability of nuclear power as an economic 
source of energy, especially electricity. 
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Just remember: that before Chernobyl, nuclear electricity 
generation had logged 4000 reactor years of experience without a 
single death due to accident or radiation. Ofcourse, this record 
will be very much improved in the comming years especially outside 
the Soviet. 
Remember also that today, 15% of the electricity is generated 
by NPP (this is equivalent to 7 million BOE per day) and by 1990 it 
will be 20%. 
We may repeat again that nuclear power is a safe and viable 
energy source. That nuclear power is not a luxury, like lisptick for 
a lady of which she can do without. 
This idea is also supported by the leaders of seven 
industrialized countries in their last meeting in Tokyo (just after 
Chernobyl accident) who declared that 'properly managed" nuclear 
power will continue to produce an increasing share of the world's 
electricity. 
Coming back to the discussion in this seminar, and in 
congruence with our commitment to the highest standard of safety, I 
believe that the future direction in nuclear safety will be a more 
concentrated effort on design features that tolerate human error 
(forgiving design), technical devices designed to prevent the 
off-site consequences, computerized operational aids and a much 
better education of operators. 
- 463 -
Ladies and Gentlemen 
I would like now to touch upon Indonesia's 
responsibility in nuclear safety, I can inform 
government has signed two International Conventions 
subject only to ratification by our parliament. 
international 
you that our 
in Vienna, 
The conventions are Conventions on Early Notification of a 
Nuclear Accident and Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident 
or Radiological Emergency. 
These are essentially conventions on actions by nations in case 
of accidents with potential transboundary effects. 
We discussed also about nuclear standards in this seminar, the 
existing IAEA nuclear safety standards (NUSS) is highly respected 
and often incorporated in national legislation. What we are heuding 
at right now in the international dimension is a "binding interna-
tional safety standards" which will be adopted by every nation 
including the Soviets. This, ofcourse, will take sometime. But it is 
exhilarating to note that Mr. Gorbachev has called for an 
"international safety regime". 
At this juncture, ladies und gentlemen, I would like to express 
my satisfaction for the conduct of the seminar, for the issues 
discussed by the experts and for the active participation of the 
audience. Il is my hope that this seminar will be continued with a 
more intensive cooperation between our two countries. 
In conclusion, may I wish the distinguished German delegates 
an enjoyable visit in Indonesia and a safe journey to Germany. 
I thank you 
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